

THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

NEWMAN

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THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

BY

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VOLUME IV

ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONS
BOOKS VI–VIII—TEXT AND NOTES

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THE CONSTITUTIONS DEALT WITH BY ARISTOTLE IN THE POLITICS.

WE must not expect to find in the last three Books of the Politics a systematic description of the various forms of constitution dealt with in them and a complete estimate of their strength and weakness, their merits and defects. The object of these Books is rather a practical object, to teach statesmen how to frame, amend, and administer each constitution so that it may last. Aristotle is naturally led in the course of his inquiries on this subject to mark off the various forms and sub-forms of constitution from each other, and incidentally to throw much light on their nature and tendencies, but his paramount object is a practical object, to give guidance to statesmen, not to set before us a detailed picture of each constitution and its working. We gather from what he tells us that statesmen were not aware how many sub-forms of each constitution existed, and that consequently they committed errors both in introducing and in amending constitutions. They probably confounded the sub-forms, and gave one of them institutions appropriate to another. We gather also that they often introduced constitutions and sub-forms of constitution where they were out of place; that they often sought rather to make the constitutions they framed pronounced examples of their type than to make them durable; and that they commonly did not attempt to create by education and habituation an *êthos* favourable to the main-

tenance of the constitution. Aristotle seeks to enable statesmen to avoid all these errors. His object is to make the study of constitutions more thorough and detailed and more practically useful than it had been.

It has been said (vol. i. p. 485) that the Politics is in part a Statesman's Manual. The last three Books constitute such a Manual in an especial degree. Yet they are not a complete Statesman's Manual. They afford guidance both to the framers of constitutions and to administrators, but the guidance which they afford to administrators is mainly limited to one problem—how to administer the State so as to make the constitution last. Aristotle does not tell administrators in them how to make government efficient; he studies rather how to satisfy all classes of citizens or most of them, for his object is to make the constitution last. His treatment, indeed, even of the question to which he does address himself is incomplete. For instance, he says but little as to the way in which difficulties arising from differences of race among the citizens should be dealt with. He writes with a special view to the particular perils to which the Greek City-State was most exposed—those arising from the jealousies and discords of classes. He writes for States in which the relations between the rich and the poor were bad, and asks how constitutions are to be made durable where that is the case.

The absolute kingship and the best kind of aristocracy.

At the head of Aristotle's list of constitutions stand the two forms—the absolute kingship and the best kind of aristocracy—in which supreme power rests with men of fully equipped virtue, and the aim of the constitution is the realization of the most desirable life, the life which is lived in accordance with virtue—virtue not of one kind only, but of all—and with a full equipment of external and bodily goods. No constitution could fully satisfy Aristotle which stopped short of this aim. Holding as he did that the *polis* existed to guide men to the life of full virtue and happiness, he could not fail to hold that the constitution and laws of the *polis* must place supreme

power in the hands of men able and purposed to rule and be ruled in such a way as to enable the *polis* to discharge this function.

The absolute kingship exists where a man or a family of surpassing virtue and political ability (3. 13. 1284 a 3 sqq.: 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq.) rules over men capable of being ruled with a view to the most desirable life, who gladly accept his or their rule.

Of the best kind of aristocracy there are, it would seem, two varieties:—

1. There is the variety in which the same men always rule, the ruled being always ruled and never succeeding to rule. Here the rulers must be capable of ruling with a view to the most desirable life, and the ruled must be capable of being ruled as freemen should be ruled with a view to the same end. This is the form described in 3. 17–18. We do not learn whether the rulers in this form are hereditary or elected by the ruled, nor whether they are controlled by law.

2. There is the variety in which the ruled succeed to rule on their attainment of a certain age and after a long period of military service, preceded by a careful education. This is the form described in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books. Here, as in the first-named variety, the rulers are capable of ruling, and the ruled of being ruled, with a view to the most desirable life. Both rulers and ruled are good men as well as good citizens, though the ruled are not good citizens and good men in the fullest sense till they reach the age at which they acquire moral prudence and become rulers. In this variety, as in the other, the rulers are apparently conceived by Aristotle as not numerous—not a multitude (πλῆθος). When a multitude rules for the common good, a polity exists, not an aristocracy (3. 7. 1279 a 37 sqq.), and though the ruling class rules for the common good, it does not apparently rule with a view to the most desirable life.

Next to these ideal constitutions, but next after a great

interval, come constitutions in which rule is in the hands not indeed of men possessed of transcendent virtue and a full equipment of external and bodily goods and ruling with a view to the most desirable life, but of men of virtue whose rule is based on desert and is exercised for the common advantage of the citizens. Under this head fall (1) the forms of kingship other than the absolute form, and (2) the so-called aristocracies, with the exception of that form of the so-called aristocracy in which the elements mingled are merely wealth and free birth, and virtue is not one of them.

Kingship other than the absolute kingship.

Kingship other than the absolute kingship is described by Aristotle in the Politics as a form in which one man rules with high and important powers (*μειζόνων κυρία*, 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 5 sq.) and rules for the common good and over willing subjects. It may be either hereditary (*κατὰ γένος*) or not (this is implied by the mention of *αἱ κατὰ γένος βασιλεῖαι* in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 sq.). It need not be for life. An elective sole ruler elected for only a few months is regarded by Aristotle as a king if his powers are large and his rule is willingly accepted by his subjects. In the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (c. 10. 1295 a 7 sqq.) Aristotle denies the name of kingship to monarchies in which the monarch, though he rules in accordance with law and over willing subjects, rules despotically and as he pleases (*κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην*), and classes such monarchies as tyrannies, and even in the Third he does not seem quite certain that they should be called kingships, though he there classes them as such. Yet he classes the absolute kingship as a kingship, though the absolute king rules as he pleases (*κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν*, 3. 16. 1287 a 1). Kingship, we are told in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book, but not, I think, elsewhere in the Politics, is based on desert (*κατ' ἀξίαν*). The king, or in hereditary kingships the founder of the kingship, has won his throne by desert. He has been made king by the people because of his virtue or the virtue of his family, or else in return for benefits conferred, or in return for benefits conferred and the power to confer them. In the Third Book,

however (3. 14. 1285 b 4 sqq.), not all kingships are traced to this origin, but only the kingship of the heroic times. Aristotle was no doubt led to trace kingship, and especially the kingship of the heroic times, to this illustrious origin by the authority of Homer and of Greek historical tradition (see notes on 1285 b 6, 7). The halo with which he invests kingship, however, often did not belong to it. He himself tells us that in hereditary kingships the kings were frequently contemptible men (7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 sqq.). Elsewhere (2. 11. 1272 b 40 sqq.) he implies that not a few of the Lacedaemonian kings were insignificant men. Stories incidentally told by him of the Persian and Macedonian courts place them in an unfavourable light. Are contemptible or insignificant or vicious kings rulers by virtue of desert, and do they rule for the common good? If not, are they kings? Aristotle does not consider this question.

Aristotle's account of kingship leaves us in the dark about many things. He nowhere even distinguishes between kingship in a City-State and kingship in a nation. Of the kingships of the nations bordering on Greece he tells us little. We do not hear much from him about the Macedonian or Molossian kingships, and he makes no mention of those of Thrace and Illyria. We should have been glad to learn how the Macedonian and Molossian kingships were administered. A kingship which governs through sub-kings, or hereditary chiefs of any kind, is very different from a kingship which governs through non-hereditary officials appointed by itself. We are told (3. 16. 1287 b 30 sq.) that kings made their friends partners in rule, and this statement is probably based both on Homer and on historical fact (see note on 1287 b 30). Were these 'friends' ever hereditary sub-kings? It is not even clear under which of Aristotle's kinds of kingship the Macedonian and Molossian kingships fall.

One reason why Aristotle's account of the actually existing forms of kingship is rather cursory is that he studies them in the Third Book on his way to the study

of absolute kingship, and in the Seventh (old Fifth) on his way to the study of tyranny.

Perhaps the best of his sayings about kingship is that 'the king is ideally a guard set to see that the rich suffer no wrong and the demos no insolence or outrage' (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.).

The so-called aristocracy.

If it is doubtful whether kingship, or at any rate hereditary kingship, was always based on desert and whether it always ruled for the common good, the same doubt arises as to the so-called aristocracies. These so-called aristocracies stand on different levels.

1. In some of them not only was account taken of virtue as well as of free birth in the distribution of political power, but the promotion of virtue was made a matter of public concern (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sqq.). This was the case in the Lacedaemonian aristocracy, though we are told that it cared for only one kind of virtue, military virtue, and that it valued military virtue not for its own sake, but because it was thought to be productive of external goods and of empire (2. 9. 1271 a 41 sqq.: 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40 sqq.).

2. There were so-called aristocracies in which the promotion of virtue was not made a matter of public concern, but account was taken of virtue in appointments to office, and the constitution had regard to virtue as well as to wealth and free birth. The Carthaginian aristocracy seems to have belonged to this class, though it is said to have honoured virtue less than wealth (2. 11. 1273 a 41 sq.).

3. There were so-called aristocracies in which account was not taken of virtue in the distribution of political power, but only of wealth and free birth (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 20 sq.: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.). So-called aristocracies of this type differed from polities only in inclining more to oligarchy than polities did.

Even in those so-called aristocracies which belonged to the first of these three classes, much more in those comprised in the second, the kind of virtue for which the State cared was only virtue relative to the constitution, not absolute virtue (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 6 sq.); and we note that the

deviation-forms of constitution are advised by Aristotle to take account of virtue relative to the constitution in elections to office (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.). Are the so-called aristocracies, then, merely on the same level as the deviation-forms in this matter? No: virtue relative to the constitution is no doubt of a higher type in them than in the deviation-forms. One defect, however, seems to attach to all forms of the so-called aristocracy. The notables were indulged in them, and were allowed to encroach on the rights of other classes (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34 sqq.)[1].

Notwithstanding this, Aristotle evidently regards all forms of the so-called aristocracy as normal constitutions, and therefore as existing for the common good of all the citizens. He probably thought that those in which account was taken of virtue in the distribution of political power, and still more those which made the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern, took the best security for government with a view to the common good; while those which took account only of wealth and free birth could at any rate plead that they associated more classes than one in power, and that in them the constitution was not dominated, as it was in the deviation-forms, by a single class ruling in its own interest. The same thing, however, might be said of the polity; and so-called aristocracies of this last type could claim no superiority over the polity. They were, indeed, more insecure than the polity, for they gave a superior share of power to the rich, a class at once weaker than the many and therefore less able to hold its own, and less inclined to rest content with the share awarded to it (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 12 sqq.).

If we ask how the so-called aristocracy is organized, we shall find that the same eclectic methods are to be followed in organizing it as in organizing a polity (6 (4). 9. 1294 b

[1] Aristotle nowhere says that the bitter feuds which often arose within the ruling class in oligarchies, and did so much to weaken it, arose also in the so-called aristocracy; but he does not explain why they were absent in it, if absent they were.

10 sqq.). It is oligarchical to appoint to magistracies by election, and democratic not to require a property-qualification; hence it is suitable to an aristocracy to combine the two systems, and to appoint by election without requiring a property-qualification (ibid.)[1]. In democracy, again, all appoint to the magistracies out of all, in oligarchy some out of some; hence in an aristocracy all will appoint out of some, or some out of all (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 4 sq.: cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 2 sqq.)[2]. So again, an aristocracy will award office to men of virtue (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq.: 2. 11. 1273 a 25 sqq.: 3. 5. 1278 a 18 sqq.), or at any rate to the notables (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq.), but it will divide deliberative and judicial authority between all and some (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 5 sqq.: 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq.)[3]. Aristotle does not explain why it is characteristic of aristocracy not to appoint to office by lot or to pay office-holders (2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq.), but the reason probably is that to appoint to office by lot runs counter to the principle of appointing to office for virtue, while the payment of office-holders savours of democracy (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35 sqq.).

Aristocracy shows the same leaning to a midway course in its choice of a site for the city. While oligarchy favours a single lofty acropolis, and democracy a level site, aristocracy avoids both these extremes and favours a site comprising more strong places than one (4 (7). 11. 1330 b 17 sqq.). It is less easy to say why it is more suitable to an aristocracy to give certain magistracies the power

[1] Thus, when in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 6 sqq. and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. constitutions based on a property-qualification are referred to, polities and oligarchies are mentioned, but nothing is said of aristocracies. Yet that property-qualifications for office existed in some aristocracies appears from the reference to the aristocracy of Thurii in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 27 sqq.

[2] But though it is suitable to aristocracy that some should appoint the magistrates out of all, it appears from 2. 11. 1273 a 13 sqq. that to make powerful magistracies like the Pentarchies at Carthage self-elective is suitable to oligarchy, not to aristocracy.

[3] It appears, however, from 2. 11. 1273 a 4 sqq. that an aristocracy goes too far in a democratic direction when it gives the assembly not merely the right to have decisions of the magistrates communicated to it, but the right to decide questions, and allows any one who pleases to speak in opposition to the proposals of the magistrates.

to try all lawsuits, as was done at Carthage, than to allow some suits to be tried by one magistracy and others by another, as at Sparta (2. 11. 1273 a 19 sq.).

The polity is described by Aristotle as a mixture of oligarchy and democracy (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 33 sq.), of wealth and free birth, and of the rich and the poor (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 16 sq., 22 sq.). We naturally ask how it is that the mixture of two deviation-forms, oligarchy and democracy, results in a normal constitution. Would a mixture of all the three deviation-forms, oligarchy democracy and tyranny, result in a normal constitution? Apparently not. The badness of tyranny is said (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8 sqq.) to be due to the fact that it is a mixture of the worst points of extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy. The reason why the mixture of oligarchy and democracy in polity results in a normal form is that it mixes them in a special way. It fuses them in such a manner as to avoid the excesses and the one-sidedness of both, and to hit the mean between them (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.): if it borrows an institution from oligarchy, it borrows another from democracy to counterbalance it; if it gives an advantage to the rich with one hand, it gives an advantage to the poor with the other. It makes the moderately well-to-do class the arbitrator between the rich and the poor, and gives this class supremacy. Aristotle regards it as well fitted for rule, seeing that it is more ready to be guided by reason than the very rich and the very poor, and is free from the insolence of the former class and the petty misdoing of the latter; it is capable, unlike them, of both ruling and being ruled as freemen should be ruled. The polity.

We have seen that Aristotle describes the polity as a mixture of the rich and the poor. Is it really so? Is it not rather a mixture of two constitutions, oligarchy and democracy, than the association of rich and poor in rule? Does it give any power to the poor? If we press the account of polity which we find in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sq., where we are told that the polity should admit only the

possessors of heavy arms to a share of political power, we shall doubt how far it gave power to any poorer class than the possessors of heavy arms; but then it would seem from 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 36 sqq., that in a polity the poor would share at any rate in judicial functions. It is evident also from 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 38, *προστιθέμενον γὰρ (τὸ μέσον) ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν καὶ κωλύει γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολάς*, that the poor are conceived by Aristotle to possess considerable power in a polity and to play an active part, the moderately well-to-do class giving its support to them or to the rich as it thinks fit. The extent of the power of the poor in a polity would evidently depend on the amount of the property-qualification on which the possession of political rights was made to depend; and as this would vary (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 2 sqq.), the polity would also vary in character, in some cases being more and in others less democratic. In 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 10 we read of 'aristocratical polities'. A polity in which the ruling class consisted almost entirely of the moderately well-to-do would evidently differ much from one in which it included many poor. One in which the moderately well-to-do class was more numerous than rich and poor put together would also differ from one in which it was only more numerous than one or other of these classes[1]. A numerous moderately well-to-do class was a guarantee for the durability of a polity. A polity would be all the better if the many were not only agricultural or pastoral by pursuit, but also lived at a distance from the central city, so that meetings of the assembly would not be frequent (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32 sqq.).

Aristotle evidently takes it for granted that the moderately well-to-do class in a polity would hold together and act as a body, but is it not likely that it would be torn asunder, one section of it siding with the rich and the other with the poor? If this happened, it would obviously be

[1] The moderately well-to-do citizens may well have been more numerous than the poorer citizens, or even than the rich and the poor put together, in more Greek States than we might expect, for in ancient Greece a large part of the working class consisted of slaves and metoeci, who formed no part of the citizen-body.

unable to exercise the controlling influence which Aristotle counts on its exercising. Is it certain that, if it held together, it would rule for the common good? Would not the moderately well-to-do class, no less than the rich and the poor, have sectional interests of its own and rule more or less with a view to them? Aristotle himself implies in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sqq. that the possession of a moderate amount of property is no security for well-controlled desires in the absence of a good system of education. We hear nothing of this in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book, though in the Seventh (old Fifth) we meet with somewhat similar teaching again (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.).

The institutions of a polity have been studied in vol. i. p. 508 sqq. One point should be noticed in connexion with them which has escaped mention there. In a polity the few (Aristotle probably means the magistrates) had a final voice in rejecting measures proposed to them, but not in voting affirmative resolutions. Such resolutions became valid only when they had received the assent of the many, or, in other words, of the assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 38 sqq.).

Mixed constitutions.

The so-called aristocracies and the polity are mixed constitutions[1]. Aristotle means by a mixed constitution a mixture of two or more constitutions, i. e. of the principles characteristic of each (virtue, wealth, free birth), or of institutions characteristic of each, and therefore a constitution which associates two or more classes in supreme power.

His best constitution in its two forms, the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy, is not a mixed constitution, but his second-best constitutions are so. He appears to hold that if rulers of transcendent virtue are not obtainable, the next best thing is to place supreme power in the hands of the good, the rich, and the free-born

[1] Aristotle nowhere uses the exact phrase 'mixed constitutions', but as he speaks of 'mixing the constitution' and of 'well-mixed aristocracies' and 'well-mixed polities', we shall not be wrong if we use it in giving an account of his views.

(6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq.: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19 sqq.), and the next best thing to that is to place it in the hands of the rich and the free-born, guided by the midway class. If supreme power is given to the rich and the free-born thus guided, it should be divided fairly between them, so that the advantages of the constitution may not be monopolized by one of the two classes (6 (4). 13. 1297 a 38 sqq.). The constitution will then be a broad and equal constitution (*κοινὴ καὶ ἴση πολιτεία*, 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sq.), and the fairer it is, the more durable it will be (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 6 sq.).

It is not quite clear whether the *συνδυασμοί* described in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 39 sqq. are regarded by Aristotle as mixed constitutions. They are constitutions in which the three departments of the State, the deliberative, magisterial, and judicial, are not organized harmoniously, one of them, for instance, being aristocratically organized and the other two oligarchically or *vice versa*, or some similar disharmony existing between the three departments. Perhaps they are to be considered mixed constitutions, for they combine institutions characteristic of more forms of constitution than one.

The milder forms of oligarchy are described by Aristotle as 'well-mixed' (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21: 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 35), because they were less narrow than the extreme form, and he would presumably apply the same epithet to the milder forms of democracy, but it is not likely that he regarded these forms of oligarchy and democracy as mixed constitutions.

Aristotle is content with any mixed constitution which gives a fair share of power to the three classes, the good, the rich, and the poor, or to the rich, poor, and *μέσοι*. More than this he does not ask. The inquirers mentioned by him in 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. had held that the best constitution was a mixture of all constitutions, and Polybius praises (6. 3. 7) a mixture of all normal constitutions, or in other words of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. Aristotle does not accept either view. He does not insist that his mixed constitution should contain a monarchical

element (see vol. i. p. 264 sq.). Polybius (6. 10), followed by Cicero (De Rep. 1. 45. 69), had held that a constitution composed of his three normal constitutions is free from the tendency to degenerate which besets the three normal constitutions when unmixed. In such a constitution, according to him, the king is checked by the demos and the demos by the few, and the whole fabric escapes degeneracy. Aristotle knows nothing of this. He holds that a well-framed mixed constitution is durable[1] not for the reason assigned by Polybius and Cicero, but because its internal equilibrium is perfect; it contents all classes by giving them a share of power, so that no one of them wishes for another constitution in its place (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 34 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 40 sqq. and 2. 9. 1270 b 21 sqq.).

The deviation-forms.

We now pass on to the deviation-forms. Aristotle seeks to make them moderate and durable, or where they cannot be moderate, as little extreme as possible. A constitution might be tolerable even though it gave supremacy to a single class ruling for its own advantage, or to a single individual ruling in the same way. It might be dominated by the rich or the poor, but not so dominated as to deprive the less favoured class of all power and all advantage.

Aristotle evidently regards the deviation-forms as at their best when rule is least monopolized by the ruling class or individual and least exercised for the exclusive advantage of that class or individual. Oligarchy and democracy are according to him at their worst when they most nearly approach monarchy and cast off the rule of law, and this happens in a democracy when the ruling class is so poor as to be supported by State-pay and in an

[1] When he implies in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 3 sqq. that aristocracies are unsafe constitutions, he probably refers to that variety of the so-called aristocracy which differs from the polity only in inclining towards oligarchy. Tacitus denied that the mixed constitution is durable (Ann. 4. 33, cunctas nationes et urbes populus aut primores aut singuli regunt: delecta ex iis et consociata rei publicae forma laudari facilius quam evenire, vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest), but the mixed constitution he has in view is evidently that of Polybius, not that of Aristotle.

oligarchy when the ruling class is especially small and rich. Under such circumstances the ruling class has abundance of leisure, in a democracy because it has no property to distract its attention from politics, and in an oligarchy because the property of its members is so large that they can afford to neglect it. The richer and fewer the oligarchs become in an oligarchy, and the poorer and more numerous and less pure in extraction the demos becomes in a democracy, the more the ruling class claims to have everything its own way and to throw off the control of law.

Thus the more the ruling class in oligarchy and democracy approaches the mean in the amount of its property, the better and the less exacting it is, and the more ready to allow the less favoured class some share of power and advantage. Aristotle has, in fact, in the polity, in which the moderately well-to-do class rules, a standard for estimating the merits of the varieties of oligarchy and democracy (6 (4). 11. 1296 b 4 sqq.). Those varieties are the best which most nearly approach the polity. He has no faith in the rule of the very rich or the very poor; he prefers those oligarchies and democracies in which the ruling class most nearly resembles the moderately well-to-do class. It is evident that Aristotle's confidence in this class influences his estimate of the comparative merits of the varieties of oligarchy and democracy.

The question, however, may be raised, whether the badness of oligarchy and democracy is as closely connected as Aristotle thinks with the pecuniary circumstances of the ruling class. He himself mentions the case of an oligarchy at Erythrae, that of the Basilidae, in which a few, presumably very rich, men ruled well (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18 sqq.). The rule of a party-club, or of a handful of adventurers, revolutionists (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18 sq.), condottieri (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 24 sq.), or returned exiles, would surely be worse than the rule of a few very rich men. And so again, bad as the rule of a pauper demos may be, the rule of a demos infuriated by oppression and elated by victory is probably worse. Aristotle no doubt would not

claim for his scale of oligarchies and democracies more than a broad and general truth.

OLIGARCHY.

Oligarchy according to the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.) is always the rule of a minority; in 3. 8. 1280 a 1 sq., however, it is said to exist whether the ruling class is a majority or a minority, if only this class rules because of its wealth.

The kinds of oligarchy.

Aristotle was not the first to recognize more kinds than one of oligarchy. The Theban orator in Thuc. 3. 62. 4 had already distinguished between an ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος and a δυναστεία, and Plato (Polit. 301 A) had already marked off oligarchy controlled by law, which he calls aristocracy, from oligarchy uncontrolled by law. Aristotle goes farther in the same direction. He describes the kinds of oligarchy in the fifth and sixth chapters of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book and elsewhere as follows:—

1. The first kind.

In this kind the property-qualification for office is not high, though high enough to exclude the poor, who are in a majority, from office. A distinction is made between the 'merely necessary' (ἀναγκαῖαι) offices and the 'more supreme' ones (κυριώτεραι), and the property-qualification for the former is fixed at a lower amount than for the latter (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq.)—such an amount as will admit to political rights a sufficient number of persons belonging to the demos to make the privileged class stronger than those outside it. The acquisition of this property-qualification entitles to admission to the privileged class, no other condition being imposed, such as abstinence for a certain period from trading or industrial occupations or election by the privileged class. It would seem from 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq. that the deliberative in this kind of oligarchy would be an elective body, accessible to all possessing a comparatively moderate property-qualification and no further condition being imposed. But might it not also be a gathering of the whole privileged class, not an

elective body? No information is given us as to the nature of the judicial authority in this kind of oligarchy, but probably all members of the privileged class would have the right to serve on dicasteries. It would seem that in some oligarchies both rich and poor were eligible as members of dicasteries, though the rich were often forced by fines to attend and the poor were not, but stratagems of this nature would hardly be employed in a well-organized oligarchy of the first type.

The merits of this kind of oligarchy are (1) that a large proportion of the privileged class, like the ruling class in a polity, is neither very rich nor very poor, and therefore is free from the defects attaching to the very rich and very poor; (2) that admission to the privileged class is made comparatively easy; (3) that the privileged class is stronger, though less numerous, than those outside it; (4) that it is too numerous and too much occupied with the care of its property to throw off the control of law; (5) that, though the chief offices fall to the richer members of the privileged class, none of its members are without a share of political rights, all of them having access to the less important offices and the right of electing to the principal ones, while membership of the deliberative, and probably of the dicasteries, is open to all. Its main weakness is that the poor, though more numerous than the privileged class, are excluded not only from all offices (which is dangerous: see 3. 11. 1281 b 28 sqq.), but also from deliberative and judicial authority. Aristotle would probably recommend that they should be allowed a share of deliberative authority in one or other of the ways described by him in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq. Another of its weaknesses is that it is exposed to the risks to which all oligarchies based on a property-qualification were exposed (see note on 1306 b 6). For other weaknesses attaching to it see notes on 1305 b 30 and 1320 b 19.

The question may be raised, is the first kind of oligarchy oligarchy at all, if oligarchy is the rule of the few and the rich? It is rather the rule of a large well-to-do minority—a

fairly numerous *bourgeoisie*—than the rule of the few and the rich.

2. The second kind.

In this the privileged class is composed of richer men and is less numerous, a high property-qualification being apparently required for all offices, and admission to its ranks being made more difficult in other ways also, election by the privileged class being exacted in addition to the possession of the property-qualification. The privileged class, again, may elect the new members either from all possessing the property-qualification or from a specified section of them. The former plan has something aristocratic about it, the latter is more fully oligarchical.

In this kind of oligarchy supreme power rests with a small and very rich class which does not comprise all the very rich, inasmuch as the mere possession of the high property-qualification does not give admission to it, but election by the privileged class is also required. Its exclusion of a certain number of very rich men cannot fail to make it insecure. The privileged class in it also has the faults of a very rich class and cannot easily be made stronger than those outside it; the difficulty of obtaining access to it is a further defect; yet it is not small and rich enough to rule without law.

Aristotle does not include in his list of oligarchies a kind intermediate between the first and the second, one in which the property-qualification for office is high, but membership of the privileged class is open to any one who acquires it, no further condition being imposed.

3. The third kind.

In this the privileged class is still smaller and richer and more inaccessible, no one being admitted to it from outside, but sons succeeding fathers in their offices when they die. Yet even in this kind the law rules.

4. The fourth kind.

The fourth and last kind of oligarchy has all the characteristics of the third, and this in addition that the law no longer rules.

It should be added that the account given in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq. of the modifications of the deliberative in the various kinds of oligarchy is not quite in harmony with the list of oligarchies given in 6 (4). 5–6.

Other kinds of oligarchy.

The four kinds of oligarchy enumerated by Aristotle are rather grades of intensity than kinds. They represent the steps by which in Aristotle's view oligarchy becomes more and more extreme. Incidental notices in the Politics enable us to construct a quite different list of the various forms assumed by Greek oligarchy [1].

1. First we have the form of oligarchy in which rule rested with a single gens—usually the royal gens. To this type belong the oligarchies of the Bacchiadae at Corinth and the Basilidae at Erythrae. When kingship fell or was reduced to sacred functions, the change often only meant that an annual magistrate took the place of the king, this magistrate being selected by the royal gens from its own members. Supremacy in the State passed, in fact, from the king to the royal gens.

2. There were oligarchies in which rule rested not with one gens only, but with a plurality of gentes, e.g. that of the Eupatridae at Athens. Compare the rule of the patricians at Rome. Aristotle does not appear to notice this kind of oligarchy.

3. There were oligarchies in which rule rested with the heads of the tribes. The oligarchy at Epidamnus mentioned in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 21 sqq. seems to have been of this type.

4. There were oligarchies of knights (ἱππεῖς) or rearers of horses (ἱπποτρόφοι), i.e. of the richest families. In these rule perhaps rested not with all the families belonging to certain gentes or tribes, but with the richest of them. Oligarchies of γεωμόροι, or large landowners, may have been somewhat akin to these.

5. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to

[1] Mr. L. Whibley, in his excellent essay on 'Greek Oligarchies, their character and organization', has anticipated me in distinguishing most of these varieties.

the original settlers and their descendants. In some colonies founded at a specially early date we find a royal gens in possession of supreme power (e.g. at Erythrae the Basilidae), but in colonies founded later (e.g. in Thera and at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf) office was accessible to all the original settlers and their descendants, not exclusively to the members of a royal gens. The descendants of the original settlers possessed a certain religious prestige, because it was from their ranks that the priests of the oldest worships were taken (Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1423 a 36 sqq.: see note on 1290 b 12). They had done much for the colony in its early and more struggling days, and it is not wonderful that they claimed a monopoly of office, though perhaps they were hardly wise in doing so. Their claim was analogous to that made on behalf of citizens who could count three generations of ancestors, but it went beyond that.

6. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to the descendants of particular individuals, not however to the descendants of the original settlers, but to those of persons who on their return from exile had fought against and conquered the demos (e.g. the oligarchy at Megara referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq.). Oligarchies of this kind rested on a far more invidious basis than those in which the descendants of the original settlers formed the ruling class.

7. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to a fixed number of persons (e.g. 600 or 1000). The fixing of the number of the privileged class prevented these oligarchies from changing into polities or democracies on the one hand, and into narrow oligarchies on the other. Their nature would vary according to the conditions under which access was obtained to the privileged class. If, as will often have happened, the right of co-opting new members rested with the privileged class, it might be allowed to co-opt any one it pleased; or its choice might be confined to certain tribes gentes or families, or to those possessed of a given property-qualification, or might be

subject to some other restriction. Oligarchies of this kind had the advantage that an assembly of the privileged class would probably exist in them, in addition to the smaller body which managed the current business of the State. The powers of this assembly would vary; at Massalia the assembly of the 600 timuchi apparently received envoys (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 200), and may have had the right of concluding treaties of peace and alliance and of deciding questions of war and peace; but, whatever its powers were, an assembly of this kind must have served to some extent as a check on the governing council and the magistrates.

8. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to persons possessing a certain property-qualification, high or low, though never so low that the privileged class would be more numerous than the non-privileged (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.). In these oligarchies the possession of the property-qualification might or might not be the sole condition of access to office. Where it was not the sole condition, access to office might be made dependent in part on membership of certain tribes, gentes, or families, or on inclusion in a list framed by the privileged class. Where it was the sole condition, and the property-qualification was not high, or there were two property-qualifications—a high one for the major and a lower one for the minor offices—the first or most moderate kind of oligarchy would exist, nearly approaching polity. This kind of oligarchy has already been described. The fact that oligarchy in Greece sometimes assumed a form so moderate—we should not find many oligarchies of this type in mediaeval or modern Europe—shows that it was not unaffected by influences akin to those which moulded Greek democracy.

9. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to the members of certain clubs. A club was often grouped round a single individual; hence the power of individuals was great in this form of oligarchy. The decadarchies of Lysander were apparently of this type. The right of electing to the magistracies in these oligarchies would probably in

most cases rest with the class which was eligible to them, the members of the clubs (see note on 1305 b 30).

10. There were oligarchies in which eligibility to the magistracies was confined to a small class, to persons possessing a high property-qualification, or to the members of certain clubs, but the demos or the hoplites had the right to elect to them (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). Akin to these were oligarchies in which the dicasteries were recruited from a wider class than that which had access to office (1305 b 34 sqq.). As to the special perils to which oligarchies of these two types were exposed, see 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 sqq.

11. There were *δυναστεῖαι*, hereditary oligarchies in which the ruling class was very small and ruled uncontrolled by law. It might be composed of very rich men (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.), or of captains of mercenary troops (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 24 sq.), or of the leaders in a successful revolution (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18 sq.), or of the holders of great offices for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 18 sqq.).

12. There were oligarchies in which an attempt was made to conceal the oligarchical character of the constitution (3. 5. 1278 a 38 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 14 sqq.: 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq., cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq.).

We do not hear of any oligarchies in Greece in which office was confined to families members of which had held office in the past, oligarchies like that which long existed at Rome. Nor does Aristotle notice the existence of oligarchies based on race, oligarchies in which men of one race ruled over men of another. Oligarchies based on religion did not of course exist in Greece in his day.

We must bear in mind, in reading what Aristotle tells us about Greek oligarchy, that he studied it in its declining days. He fully recognizes that in the early ages of Greece it was more in place than it came to be later on (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 25 sqq.). The reason which he gives for this is that the midway class was then small, and the hoplites were weaker and less well-trained than they afterwards became,

the cavalry being still the most important military force. But many other reasons can be given. The rule of the nobles did much for Greece in its early days. States grew greater and stronger and wealthier under it; commerce discovered new paths, and colonies were founded; temples were built, and music, choric singing, and lyrical poetry found a home in them[1]. The nobles of those days had many claims to rule. They had leisure to practise military exercises, and even where the cavalry which they furnished to the State was not its most effective force, they were probably its best and most fully trained soldiers; they lived together in the cities, while the demos lived mostly scattered in country villages; they were supreme in the tribes phratries and gentes, and the priests of the chief public and private worships; they traced their descent from gods and heroes, or at any rate from families long settled in the State; if they called themselves 'the good' and 'the notables', their claims were not unsupported by public opinion, for they were commonly held to be raised by their wealth above many temptations to wrong-doing to which poorer men were exposed (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq.). They were at any rate usually more trustworthy as parties to a contract than the poor (3. 13. 1283 a 32 sq.). Many members of the demos owed them money and stood in a dependent relation to them, for in the early days of Greece there were few rich metoeci resident in the State from whom money could be borrowed.

Thus their ascendency was based on some moral and many material advantages. But even from the outset it was no doubt often abused. The rise of tyrannies in many States as early as the seventh century B.C. was probably to some extent due to misgovernment on the part of the nobles. Aristotle always regards the rich as ready to encroach whenever the constitution gives them a chance of

[1] Plut. De Musica, c. 27, *μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἤδη θεάτρου παρὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐκείνοις κατεσκευασμένου, ἀλλ' ἔτι τῆς μουσικῆς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀναστρεφομένης, ἐν οἷς τιμήν τε τοῦ θείου διὰ ταύτης ἐποιοῦντο καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπαίνους.*

doing so (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 19 sq., 34 sqq.), and the very rich as unruly and content with nothing short of despotic authority (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13 sqq.). The less secure oligarchies became, the more timorous and cruel and oppressive they grew. The Peloponnesian War redoubled their fears and their oppressiveness. Oligarchs and democrats came now to regard each other not only as rivals for power, but also as allies of a hated foreign foe. Each side could count on the support of a leading State, and the ruling class both in oligarchies and in democracies must have felt that, however badly it governed, it had protectors who would not allow it to be driven from power. Oligarchy was probably worst where it was most insecure and distrustful. After the close of the Peloponnesian War it was least secure in those regions in which democracy had prevailed under the Athenian empire—on the eastern and northern coasts of the Aegean and in the Aegean islands—and here from the time of the Athenian defeats at Syracuse and Aegospotami to the victory of Alexander on the Granicus in B.C. 334 its history was a history of vicissitudes. Its fortunes were equally varied in Greece Proper after the defeat of the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra in B.C. 371. For about forty years before the Politics was written, such oligarchies as existed in Greece Proper must have lived as threatened a life as the more eastern oligarchies had done from a still earlier date. Oligarchies were now often set up after a conflict with the demos and by returned exiles, and such oligarchies were sure to be oppressive.

Aristotle studied Greek oligarchy in its worst days, and its weaknesses, as it existed in his time, were many. Oligarchies were often too narrow; they often did not include even all the rich in the privileged class; they were often so framed that the moderately well-to-do class was not conciliated (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 13 sqq.), much less the demos, and no means were taken to secure that those who wished the constitution well should be stronger than those who did not. Admission to the ranks of the privileged class was often made difficult; sometimes admission was

obtainable only by those who, in addition to possessing a high property-qualification, were elected by the ruling class; sometimes not all those who possessed this high property-qualification were eligible, but only a favoured section of them; and sometimes the privileged class was an hereditary class, sons succeeding their fathers in office, and no one else being admissible to it. Nor was the smallness of the privileged class its only source of weakness. It was commonly unprepared by training for its position, and was often at once luxurious and grasping. It was also often divided against itself by feuds. These sometimes arose from inequalities of privilege, some families having access to the most important offices and others not, so that an oligarchy existed within the oligarchy, or from the fact that offices were tenable for life or for long terms, and that a cumulation or repeated tenure of them was allowed, so that they were practically monopolized by a few. Sometimes these feuds arose from quarrels about marriages, inheritances, or lawsuits, or from a factious persecution of some oligarchs by others, or from a rivalry in courting the hoplites or demos, where the hoplites or demos had the right of electing the holders of great offices. Another source of weakness in oligarchies was that the leading oligarchs often sought to make the oligarchy narrower. Oligarchies, again, no less than democracies, often failed to place the chief offices in the hands of their best and most trustworthy men; they were content if the holders of such offices were friendly to the constitution and skilful in the discharge of their official functions, and did not secure that they should be proof against temptation by requiring them to possess the kind of virtue suited to the constitution.

To these sources of weakness in oligarchies others were occasionally added. The tendency of oligarchies was to rule in a high-handed despotic way (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27 sq.: 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3 sqq.). They often also oppressed the demos, and failed to enforce purity of administration on the officials, though nothing angered the demos so much as to see the holders of offices from which it was

excluded plundering public property and taking bribes. The privileged class commonly sought to monopolize, not only office, but also honour and profit. Instead of resting content with claiming the most important offices for its members, and abandoning minor but lucrative offices to the demos, and giving an honorary precedence to the class less favoured by the constitution, it claimed for itself a monopoly of office, honour, and profit. That oligarchs were occasionally guilty of outrages on the poor, is clear from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 22, and such outrages must often have been fatal to oligarchies[1]. Narrow oligarchies, in fact, must have been almost as much exposed to overthrow as tyrannies, and yet they do not seem to have taken the elaborate precautions against overthrow which tyrannies did. We are told, indeed, that oligarchies often disarmed the many and expelled them from the central city, but we do not hear of the leading oligarchs being protected by a bodyguard, though they must often have needed one.

Unlike tyranny, oligarchy seldom brought glory or greatness to the States which adopted it, at any rate in the times of which we know most. It did not exist in any of the leading States of Greece. Corinth and Massalia were the greatest of the oligarchical States, and they were only second-rate States. Oligarchies can seldom have been strong from a military point of view, for their choice lay between arming the demos, a course which commonly involved the concession to it of a share of power, or employing mercenary troops and running the risk of their commander making himself tyrant. They were also often weak in light-armed troops. Nor can they have been strong financially, for they could hardly with safety impose heavy taxation on the demos.

And yet, notwithstanding all these weaknesses, there were States in which oligarchy long held its ground. Corinth, Epidaurus, Troezen, Phlius, the Arcadian Orcho-

[1] Students of the Venetian oligarchy will notice how many of the rocks pointed out by Aristotle it succeeded in avoiding (see notes on 1308 a 10, 15, b 20, 28, 1309 a 21, 22, 23, 27).

menus, and Pellene in Achaia remained true to the Lacedaemonians, and probably to oligarchy, after Leuctra (Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 78: vol. 10. 299). The fidelity of some of these States to oligarchy is no doubt attributable to their fear of the democracy of Argos, but we cannot thus account for its survival in those Achaean cities which were too distant from Argos to fear it. Oligarchy, however, was so little unpopular in Achaia that Epaminondas in B.C. 367, though the representative of a democratic State, abstained from overthrowing the Achaean oligarchies (Grote, 10. 365 sq.), and when Thebes later on reversed his policy and overthrew them, they were speedily restored (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 42 sq.). These oligarchies probably held their ground because they did not oppress or interfere with the demos (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 17 sqq.). The oligarchy of Massalia also was long-lived, and if we knew more than we do of the history of this State, we should know more than we do of the circumstances under which oligarchy tended to survive in Greece.

As to one important difference between Greek oligarchies we learn less from Aristotle than we could wish. We gather from what he tells us that there were oligarchies in which the magistracies were everything and the general body of the privileged class nothing, and also oligarchies in which the magistracies acted more or less under the control of the privileged class. In the former no assembly existed, the magistrates possessing not only administrative, but also deliberative and judicial authority (3. 1. 1275 b 7—17), while in the latter an assembly existed composed of the members of the privileged class (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.), which must probably have possessed some deliberative authority, and have operated to a certain extent as a check on the magistracies. In some cases we find, in place of an assembly, an elective body chosen by and from the privileged class (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq.); and here again some check on the magistracies would exist. A similar distinction is traceable in respect of the judicial authority of the State. There seem to have been oligarchies in which

the magistracies constituted the judicial authority, and others in which dicasteries existed independent of the magistracies. In some cases these dicasteries were probably composed of members taken from the privileged class, while in others they were, nominally at any rate, composed of both rich and poor, though, as the rich were commonly fined for non-attendance, and the poor were not, the poor would seldom be present at their meetings (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq. : 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq.). It is evident that oligarchies in which the magistracies constituted the judicial authority must have differed much from those in which they did not.

Both in oligarchies in which the magistracies combined deliberative and judicial with administrative authority, and in those in which they did not, the gerusia would usually be the most important of the magistracies, but we learn little from Aristotle as to its powers. It may probably have exercised some control over the other magistracies, a control which would be especially needed where no deliberative or judicial authority existed independent of the magistracies.

There is another point in connexion with oligarchy on which Aristotle perhaps hardly lays enough stress. He does not fully bring out how much support Greek oligarchies derived from the ascendency of the leading families in the tribes phratries and gentes. Cleisthenes found that he could not uproot oligarchical tendencies at Athens except by substituting wholly new tribes for the old ones. The fact that oligarchy could not be completely uprooted without a sweeping change of this kind must often have delayed or prevented its overthrow.

Aristotle fails to see how deeply rooted oligarchy is in human nature. He sees that men render willing allegiance to pre-eminent virtue (see note on 1284 b 32), but he does not see that they also willingly obey men of pre-eminent wealth and birth. Oligarchy, after all, had its strong points; it did not engender, as democracy often did, a tendency to indiscipline and anarchy, or a jealousy of superiority of all

kinds, or a belief in the equality of unequals, or a love of innovation for its own sake, or a repudiation of parental authority. The State was not ruled in oligarchies by popular assemblies and by demagogues more skilled in oratory than in war, as it was in many democracies, and the men at the head of oligarchical governments were usually men of pure local descent, untainted by alien or servile blood.

Aristotle's analysis of the principle of oligarchy.

Aristotle's theory of oligarchy lags somewhat in the rear of the facts as to oligarchy which he incidentally reveals to us in the Politics. In oligarchy, according to him, the rich rule because of their wealth (3. 8. 1280 a 1 sq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 14 sq.), and with a view to their own advantage. The rich may rule in other constitutions also, but not because of their wealth. Not only, however, do the rich rule in oligarchy with a view to their own advantage; they also rule with a view to their own enrichment, which is not quite the same thing. Oligarchy prizes wealth, not virtue (3. 15. 1286 b 15 sq.); it makes wealth its end (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 9 sq.) and its standard in awarding office (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 11). Yet oligarchies, in common with other constitutions, are advised in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. to require virtue relative to the constitution, as well as friendliness to the constitution and administrative capacity, in the holders of important offices. Thus even oligarchy, it would seem, cannot safely make wealth alone its standard in awarding office. Then again, does it make wealth its end? Aristotle inherits this view from Plato (Rep. 550 D sqq., 562 B), but he sometimes speaks as if the quest of gain were characteristic of democracy rather than oligarchy (e. g. in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sqq.: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sq., where the many are said to love gain more than honour).

We gather also that oligarchy regards those who are unequal in wealth as absolutely unequal (7 (5). 1. 1301 a 31 sqq.: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 22 sqq.), and holds that it is not just that those who possess nothing should have an equal share of political power with those who possess much (7 (5). 12.

1316 b 1 sqq.), or that one who has contributed a mina to a common capital of a hundred talents should receive as much of the capital and profits as one who has contributed all the rest (3. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq.). So again in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 18 sqq. the partisans of oligarchy are represented as claiming that whatever commends itself to those who own a larger amount of property is just, a contention which, as Aristotle points out in 1318 a 21 sqq., exposed them to the retort that it gave any rich man who possessed more than all the rest of the rich put together a right to make himself tyrant. Elsewhere (3. 13. 1283 b 33 sqq.) Aristotle adds a further objection, that the many may be richer than the few rich, if the amount of property held by each of them is added together.

So far Aristotle regards the claims of oligarchy as based entirely on wealth. But he occasionally connects culture as well as wealth with oligarchy (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 36 sqq.), and in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sq.—if that passage is from his pen—he says that 'oligarchy is defined by birth and wealth and culture', so that a value for birth and culture, as well as wealth, is recognized as one of its distinguishing characteristics. And, in fact, we have seen that many forms of Greek oligarchy gave supreme power to birth—to the members of a single gens or of several gentes or tribes, or to the descendants of the earliest settlers, or to the sons of the oligarchs in a *δυναστεία*—so that in them wealth alone conferred no title to a share of power. Even in oligarchies based on a property-qualification the possession of the property-qualification was often not the only condition of admission to the privileged class. In oligarchies based on membership of clubs no one, however rich, could be a member of the privileged class without belonging to one of the favoured clubs.

It would seem, indeed, that if the account which Aristotle, following Plato, usually gives of the principle of oligarchy were correct, and oligarchy really looked to wealth alone in awarding political power, it ought not to place all the rich on a level and give them an equal share of power, but

should proportion political power to wealth, giving the richer more and the less rich less. Yet Aristotle praises oligarchies which place the privileged class as much as possible on a level in respect of political power (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 11 sqq.).

DEMOCRACY.

The kinds of democracy.

That two kinds of democracy were commonly recognized we see from 2. 12. 1273 b 38, where the mention of ἡ πάτριος δημοκρατία implies the existence of another kind of democracy, not πάτριος. Plato (Polit. 302 D sq.) distinguishes two kinds of democracy, one in which law is observed and another in which it is not. Isocrates also (Areop. § 60: Panath. § 131 sqq.) recognizes two kinds.

Aristotle distinguishes in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 20 sq. between ἔννομοι δημοκρατίαι and κύριοι δημοκρατίαι, and in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sq. between ἡ πατρία δημοκρατία and ἡ νεωτάτη, but in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book he goes farther and recognizes not two, but four, or even five, kinds of democracy—five in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30—1292 a 37, but four only in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 22—1293 a 10 and in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6, where the first two of the five are perhaps treated as virtually one.

Thus Aristotle distinguishes more kinds of democracy than Plato. But this is not the only difference between them. Plato had not explained *why* law is observed in one of his two kinds of democracy and not in the other. Aristotle, on the contrary, explains the origin of the differences which exist between his five kinds of democracy. The first four, he tells us, differ from the fifth because law is supreme in them over the resolutions of the assembly, and because the magistracies still retain considerable power, and they differ from each other because the demos which possesses access to office in each of them differs[1]. In the first two kinds of democracy the class admissible to office

[1] In 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 22 sqq. he adds another source of difference. In some kinds of democracy more of the institutions characteristic of democracy are adopted and in others fewer.

and supreme over the constitution is the agricultural and pastoral class and those who possess a moderate amount of property, in the third those whose extraction is unimpeachable, and in the fourth all those who possess citizenship. It is not quite clear whether in each of these four forms only those are admissible to the assembly and dicasteries who are admissible to office, but, at any rate, in each of them the class which is admissible to office is supreme.

The first two kinds.

We obtain a glimpse of the organization of the first two forms in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq., where we are told that in the first, or most moderate, kind of democracy all the citizens have the right to act as dicasts, to elect to elective offices, and to review the conduct of office-holders, though the most important offices are filled by election, not by lot, and eligibility to them is confined to those who possess the requisite property-qualification, which increases with the importance of the office, or (without any requirement of a property-qualification) to those who are capable of filling them[1]. It would appear from this that even in the first kind of democracy the less important offices would be filled by lot. The assembly does not meet often—it meets only when it must (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 28 sq.)—and the same thing probably holds of the meetings of the dicasteries. Still the powers of the assembly and dicasteries even in this kind of democracy are sufficient to ensure just and pure administration on the part of the richer citizens who hold the most important offices.

The main reason why the first kind of democracy (if we group the first two together) is the best is that the ruling class in it is most like that which rules in the polity and least disposed to make itself sole sovereign. It has property enough to distract its attention from politics. It is too busy with its own affairs, and the rural section of it lives

[1] This does not altogether agree with the account of the first two kinds of democracy given in 6 (4). 4-6, for it would seem from it that in one of these forms no property-qualification for office exists and in the other only a small one.

too far from the central city, to attend frequent meetings of the assembly, and it cares more for its business pursuits than for a life of politics and office-holding; thus it rules in subordination to the law and leaves a share of power to the magistrates, the chief citizens, and the rich, and does not sacrifice them to demagogues. It does so not only because it has not leisure enough to do otherwise, but because it would not wish to do otherwise if it could.

It may be asked whether a constitution which makes only a part of the demos admissible to office is really a democracy. Aristotle so regards it because the majority is supreme in it (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 37 sq.), and because it admits to office all who acquire a certain property-qualification (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 30 sqq.). But if those who possess a moderate amount of property are supreme in it (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sq.), and democracy is a constitution in which the poor are supreme (3. 8. 1280 a 2 sq.), how can it be a democracy?

The third and fourth kinds.

In the third and fourth kinds of democracy a wider and wider class comes to be admissible to office, the care for purity of extraction which still prevails in the third disappearing in the fourth, but Aristotle does not describe how their organization differs from that of the first and second. Evidently, however, the class admissible to office in them includes a larger urban element, and a larger element of traders, artisans, and day-labourers, and this element would desire, and be better able to attend, frequent meetings of the assembly (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 28 sqq.). Yet it would not have time either to hold office or to attend frequent meetings of the assembly in the absence of State-pay, and not much State-pay is forthcoming in these two kinds of democracy. Thus the law is still supreme in them, and the magistrates, the chief citizens, and the rich still enjoy a share of power, though probably a smaller share than in the first two kinds, and a more precarious share also, for they would be deprived of it if the State was large enough and rich enough to supply the ruling class with abundant State-pay.

Already in the fourth kind of democracy we trace the indifference to purity of extraction which was one of the most prominent characteristics of extreme democracy in Greece. Not only did it tend to place the poor man on a level with the rich, but it also often tended to place the semi-slave and the semi-alien on a level with the freeman and the citizen of pure descent.

The ultimate kind.

In the ultimate kind of democracy every citizen was enabled by State-pay to take an active part in deliberative, administrative, and judicial work, and the full programme of Greek democracy was realized. The aim of democracy in Greece was not simply the supremacy of the poor, for the poor might be supreme, and yet their participation in political activity might be very limited. Its aim was rather the full participation of all in all forms of political activity. It was only in the ultimate democracy that this ideal was realized (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3 sqq.). In it not only was office open to all citizens, whatever their extraction and however small their means, but pay was freely forthcoming, owing to a great increase in the populousness of the State and in its revenues (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), and pay was given to the holders of offices and to the members of the assembly and dicasteries. The result was that the assembly and dicasteries met frequently, and an assembly which met frequently was apt to draw all decisions into its own hands (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38 sqq.: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.). The demos shook off the control of law; it came to be like a monarch and to wish to play a monarch's part. A monarch, however, needs flatterers, and so demagogues arose, whose interest it was to make the decrees of the assembly supreme over the laws. The authority of the magistracies was overthrown also; persons brought complaints against them, and appealed to the assembly for its decision. Thus under this form of democracy the State was ruled not by the universal principles embodied in the laws, but by successive expressions of the will of the majority of the assembly. The ultimate democracy was, in fact, hardly a democracy, for it was

hardly a constitution; a constitution exists only where laws rule.

Nor were these the only evils connected with it. Not only did decrees of the assembly override the authority of the laws and the magistrates, and demagogues take the place of the leading citizens, but the rich ceased to attend the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 6 sqq.). The care of their property made it impossible for them to attend frequent meetings of either (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq.), and thus the work of both the assembly and the dicasteries was less well done than it would otherwise have been (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq.: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq.). The poor, on the other hand, were pauperized by the system of State-pay, and their attention diverted from the trades which gave them the best chance of enriching themselves (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 7 sqq.). Nor was this all. Democracies of this type encouraged every one to live as he pleased (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq.), so that the control of the law was not only thrown off in them by the assembly, but also by the citizens individually.

We see that Aristotle regards extreme democracy in Greece as the source of some evils which do not result from it in modern States. In our own days, no doubt, under an extreme form of democracy the rich tend to withdraw to some extent from active political life, the magistrates to adopt an attitude of subservience to the popular will, and demagogues to take the place of the natural leaders of the State, but the poor are not pauperized, nor is the control of law thrown off either by the deliberative or by the citizens individually. Aristotle, on the contrary, depicts the ultimate democracy as a mixture of tyranny and anarchy.

How far does Aristotle obtain his classification of democracies from a study of the history of

It is an interesting question how far Aristotle obtains his classification of democracies from a study of the history of the Athenian democracy. The first of his kinds of democracy seems to answer in many respects to the Solonian democracy, though it does not appear that in the latter the less important offices were filled by lot—i. e. by selection by

lot out of all—as we gather from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30 that they are in the former. On the other hand, the rise of the ultimate form of democracy is connected by Aristotle with the provision of pay for the assembly (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1–10: 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38—1300 a 4: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30–35), but this step does not seem to have been taken at Athens till 'soon after the archonship of Eucleides', who was archon in B.C. 403 (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 290: 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 41). It seems likely, however, from 2. 12. 1274 a 5–15 and 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20–24 (cp. 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 27. ll. 7–11) that Aristotle held that an ultimate democracy existed at Athens in the latter part of the fifth century B.C., or even earlier. If so, his account of the ultimate democracy does not in this particular closely reproduce the facts of the constitutional development of Athens. His language, again, suggests (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq.: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.) that in the ultimate democracy half-aliens were not excluded from citizenship; this may have been the case at Athens at certain times (cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 173 and Isocr. De Pace, § 88), but at any rate after the restoration of the democracy, citizenship was confined there to the sons of two citizen-parents (vol. i. p. 227). No close relation seems, therefore, to be traceable between the course of constitutional change at Athens and Aristotle's series of democracies.

the Athenian democracy?

These four or five kinds, or perhaps rather grades, of democracy are far from exhausting its possible varieties, or even the varieties the existence of which is implied in the Politics.

Other kinds of democracy.

Thus a form of democracy which is recognized in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 26 sqq. does not seem to be included among them. This is the form in which the ruling demos consists of cultivators and artisans, the day-labourers being excluded. This form approaches near to the first of Aristotle's kinds, but does not fall within it, for artisans do not appear to find a place in the demos which bears rule in that form (8 (6). 4.

1319 a 24 sqq.). Again, a kind of democracy existed in which the ruling demos was composed of owners of land, whether cultivators and herdsmen or not. Phormisius, we know, proposed in B.C. 403 that the restored democracy at Athens should be of this type. Then again, there was the kind of democracy devised by Telecles of Miletus, in which deliberative authority mainly fell not to a numerous assembly, which might be guided by demagogues and might exalt itself above the magistracies and the law, but to successive sections of the citizen-body, each section being comparatively small (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 11 sqq.). In some other democracies (1298 a 13 sqq.) the assembly had little or nothing to do, and the real deliberative consisted of the council of magistrates (*συναρχίαι*), to which all citizens had access in succession. There was also the kind of democracy which at one time existed at Mantineia. In this the assembly possessed deliberative authority, but the right of appointing the magistrates was reserved for persons 'elected by alternation out of all' (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.). We see, again, from 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq., that in some forms of democracy the poor and the moderately well-to-do outnumbered the rich, but not the poor taken by themselves, while in others the poor greatly outnumbered the rich, without the addition to their side of the moderately well-to-do. Democracies of the latter kind were far more short-lived than democracies of the former. There were democracies, again, in which the demos was largely composed of trireme-oarsmen, and others in which it was largely composed of the crews of merchant-ships or fishermen. The one sort must have differed considerably from the other (see note on 1291 b 18).

Democracies would of course differ also according to the circumstances under which democracy was introduced. It might be introduced suddenly in an extreme form—possibly after some victory, like those of Cnidus, Naxos, or Leuctra, or after some civil conflict—or it might develope gradually. At Athens democracy only gradually became extreme, and time was allowed for the growth of laws and customs

favourable to its maintenance. In the absence of such laws and customs extreme democracy did not commonly last long (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 3 sq.). The position and surroundings of the State, again, would exercise an influence on the character of its democracy. In a State like Argos, constantly in danger of subjugation by powerful neighbours who were champions of oligarchy, democracy would be very different from what it was in States less constantly in peril. Fear of treason on the part of the rich would make it suspicious and sanguinary. Democracies, again, in which a single demagogue stood at the head of affairs would be very different from those in which rival demagogues struggled for supremacy. The best days of the Athenian democracy were those in which it was guided, first by the Council of the Areopagus, and then by Pericles.

The circumstances under which democracy came into existence in Greece.

Aristotle connects the first appearance of democracy in Greece in one passage (3. 15. 1286 b 17 sqq.) with a reaction against the excessive concentration of power in the tyrannies, but in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 sqq. he connects it rather with an increase in the populousness of States and in the power of the hoplite force. It is likely enough that many early democracies originated in this way, for we learn from Aristotle (1297 b 24 sq.) that early democracies resembled what were afterwards called polities, and in polities the hoplites were supreme (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sqq.).

The demos which set up the earliest democracies was commonly an agricultural or pastoral demos resident in the country (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq.); hence the rise of these democracies indicates a tendency on the part of the rural citizens to assert their claims at the expense of the nobles, who dwelt for the most part in the central city. We may gather the aims of those who founded early democracies from the organization they gave them. When Solon, for instance, set up a democracy at Athens, he left the magistracies in the hands of the richer class, but he took pains to secure that this class should govern well by giving the

whole body of citizens the right of electing the magistrates and reviewing their conduct in office and by opening the dicasteries to all, thus placing an efficient check on the magistrates (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27—1319 a 4). It is likely, therefore, that, when the rural hoplites set up one of these early democracies which resembled polities, they did so with the view of controlling and improving the administration of the nobles. They probably, however, had another aim also. They sought to obtain for themselves the right of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance. They formed the most effective part of the army of the State, and their farms were exposed to the ravages of the enemy in case of war. It was natural, therefore, that they should claim this right, and none of the boons conferred by the early democracy can have been more highly valued by the peasant demos of those days than the right which it conferred on the assembly of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance.

It is interesting to note that the Lacedaemonian constitution, though it was not a democracy, went further than these early democracies. It opened the ephorate to the whole body of citizens. The poorest citizen might become a member of a powerful magistracy which checked and controlled the other magistracies of the State. The reason why the Lacedaemonian demos succeeded in acquiring this great privilege was probably two-fold. In the first place it was composed of citizens resident in Sparta, and not, like the demos of most States of early Greece, of citizens scattered over the territory, and next it was composed of citizens who were owners of land tilled for them by Helots, and who were not withdrawn by other occupations from political activity.

Not all early democracies, however, were as limited and moderate as the Solonian democracy or the democracies resembling polities to which reference has been made. Democracies introduced after a sudden revolution, especially if that revolution was provoked by oppression or originated in contempt, were probably more extreme. When the

demos at Ambracia, for instance, apparently about B.C. 580, joined in expelling the hateful tyrant Periander, and set up a democracy (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 31 sqq.), the democracy set up will hardly have been as moderate as the Solonian. The same thing may probably be said of the democracy instituted at Erythrae 'in ancient times' (*ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις*), when the demos changed the constitution in its indignation at the narrowness of the ruling class (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18 sqq.). It is not certain that the Heracleia referred to in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 31 is Heracleia on the Euxine, but, if this is so, as this colony was founded about B.C. 550, the democracy which was introduced there on its foundation was an early one, and yet of a pronounced type. The same thing may be said of the democracy which existed at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon. This appears to have been unruly and disorderly (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 31 sq.), and cannot have been moderate.

The development of democracy in Greece.

Aristotle is disappointingly silent as to the organization of the forms of democracy intermediate between the most moderate forms and the extreme form. We should know more than we do about the way in which Greek democracies developed if we knew more than we do of the way in which the powers of the Boulê developed. We know hardly anything on this subject as to other States than Athens, and even as to Athens we know but little.

From the first the Boulê stands in a close relation to the popular assembly. As soon as a popular assembly acquires the right of arriving at political decisions of moment [1], we find it placed in charge of a Boulê, much as a blind man is placed in charge of a dog. We might ask why a separate body was needed for this purpose—why committees of the assembly chosen by it from time to time should not have sufficed. The answer is that a body not intermittently, but permanently in existence was needed, capable of introducing measures into the assembly and of carrying its decisions

[1] It is remarkable that Solon instituted a Boulê at Athens, though the powers which he gave the assembly were very limited (see note on 1281 b 32).

into effect (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 13 sqq.). This duty might no doubt have been assigned to one of the ordinary magistracies, but it was evidently thought better to assign it to a body as little differentiated from the assembly and as accessible to all the citizens as possible. The Boulê must be a numerous body like the assembly and must be annually appointed by lot, and just as the assembly consisted of all the tribes, so all the tribes must have an equal voice in the Boulê. We do not know how soon the rule was introduced at Athens that no one could be more than twice a member of the Boulê ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 62 *sub fin.*); one effect of this rule, however, was that all the citizens came once or twice in their lives to be members of the Boulê, and that it consequently nearly resembled the small deliberative body planned by Telecles the Milesian (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 12 sqq.), of which all the citizens were to be members in succession. Another result of the rule was that none of the members of the Boulê could have more than two years' experience, so that there was no fear of its being a skilled gathering capable of rivalling the assembly and dictating to it. More care was taken at Athens to make the Boulê an institution congenial to democratic feeling, and to prevent its encroaching on the prerogatives of the assembly, than to secure its efficiency. Its powers were probably largely increased when those of the Council of the Areopagus were curtailed; how great they were at one time is shown by the fact that it could sentence Athenian citizens to imprisonment and death ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 45); yet it continued to be appointed by lot, not by election. No doubt, indeed, it was because the Boulê was appointed by lot and was the reverse of a skilled magistracy that so little hesitation was felt in adding to its powers.

Whether there were any democracies in which the Boulê was appointed by election, we do not learn. In that of Rhodes, however, the Boulê so far differed from the Athenian Boulê that it was headed, and perhaps to a great extent guided, by great magistrates, the six prytaneis (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 178). In that of Thebes (B. C.

366) the Boulê seems to have been joined with the magistrates for purposes of deliberation, and to have had the right to try murderers and to put them to death, or at any rate those whose guilt was evident (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 5 sqq.).

The rise of the ultimate democracy.

The Boulê played a great part in the democracies intermediate between the first and the last. But in course of time, at any rate in large and populous States, the revenues became sufficient to provide ample pay for the assembly, dicasteries, and magistracies, and when pay could be provided for the assembly and it came to meet frequently, the power of the Boulê began to decline (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38 sqq.: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.). The assembly now reserved all decisions for itself, and democracy assumed its ultimate form. Aristotle dates the decline of the power of the Boulê from the provision of pay for the assembly, and, as has already been pointed out, pay does not appear to have been provided for the assembly at Athens till after B. C. 403.

The increase in the revenue of the State to which reference has been made is regarded by Aristotle rather as the indispensable condition of the rise of the ultimate democracy than as its cause. He frequently traces in the Politics the way in which a moderate democracy passes into an ultimate democracy (2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq.: 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20 sqq.: 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq.: 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sqq.: 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 18 sqq.), and we gather that, at Athens at any rate, the change was due in part to the elation of the demos after their naval victory at Salamis, which had led to the foundation of the Athenian empire, and in part to the action of demagogues, who kept constantly adding to the power of the demos in the hope of winning its favour, till at last they made the assembly supreme over the law. In 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq., where the experience of Athens may or may not be present to Aristotle's mind, the change is traced to the rivalry of competitors for office when the offices are filled by election without the safeguard of a property-qualification, and the demos elects. But perhaps we may infer from 6 (4). 12,

1296 b 29 sq. that the ultimate democracy would hardly come into being unless there was a great excess of artisans and hired labourers in the citizen-body, and that its rise was due in part to a change in the composition of the demos. It is implied in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. that the admissibility to office of citizens of not unimpeachable extraction was one of the concomitants of its rise. In *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 27 a somewhat different account is given of the circumstances under which democracy became extreme at Athens, though here too 'the elation of the many' is mentioned as one of the causes of the change. The decision of the demos 'to administer the constitution itself', which probably marks the introduction of the ultimate democracy, is there connected not with the provision of pay for the assembly, but with the concentration of the citizens in Athens during the Peloponnesian War and with their receipt of State-pay for service in war[1]. This account of the origin of the ultimate democracy at Athens does not quite agree with the account given in the Politics, which connects it with the provision of pay for the assembly.

That a change sometimes occurred in the opposite direction—that the ultimate democracy sometimes passed into the moderate forms—we see from 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 21 and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 15 sq., but Aristotle nowhere gives us any account of the way in which this change commonly came about.

The special characteristic of the ultimate democracy was, according to Aristotle, that under it the decrees of the assembly became supreme over the law and that the authority of the magistracies was overthrown (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sq.: 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq.). This would have been a great evil even if the meetings of the assembly had been attended by all the citizens, but, as a matter of fact, more classes than one were unable

[1] *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 27, *ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους ἐνέστη πόλεμος, ἐν ᾧ κατακληθεὶς ὁ δῆμος ἐν τῷ ἄστει καὶ συνεθισθεὶς ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις μισθοφορεῖν τὰ μὲν ἑκὼν τὰ δὲ ἄκων προῃρεῖτο τὴν πολιτείαν διοικεῖν αὐτός.*

to attend them. The rich were often prevented by the claims of their property from attending the meetings either of the assembly or of the dicasteries (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 7 sqq.); they could attend occasional meetings, but not very frequent ones (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq.); and the rural citizens, some of whom must have lived, in Attica at all events, twenty or thirty miles from the place where the assembly met, were also often unable to be present. The result was that in the ultimate democracy supremacy over the law and the administration was exercised not by the whole citizen-body, but by the poorest class of urban citizens, those whose means were so small that the State-pay was a sufficient inducement to them to attend the assembly. Democracy in Greece, in fact, when fully developed, narrowed the class with which actual supremacy rested; we might have expected it to do the opposite. It culminated in a form in which the State paid the poorest and most ignorant class of urban citizens to attend the meetings of the assembly and did not enforce the attendance of other classes. Probably, however, other urban classes than the poorest did habitually attend the meetings of the assembly even in this form of democracy, for we read in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 14 sqq. that in democracies the moderately well-to-do class shared in office to a greater extent than in oligarchies, and this suggests that those of them who lived in or near the central city were not absent from the meetings of the assembly in ultimate democracies.

Aristotle makes various suggestions for the mitigation of the evils connected with the ultimate democracy. It was because the assembly met frequently in a democracy of this kind that it came to claim all power for itself (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 3 sq.). Partly perhaps to check this abuse, as well as to lighten the pecuniary burden on the rich and to make it easier for them to attend, Aristotle recommends that the meetings of the assembly and the dicasteries should be made less frequent (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 22 sqq.). He recommends also that meetings of the assembly should not be held in the absence of the country citizens (8 (6). 4. 1319 a

36 sqq.), and that its pauper members should be provided by States possessing surplus revenues with the means of engaging in agriculture or trade (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq.). This would make them less eager for frequent meetings of the assembly. Elsewhere (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.) Aristotle recommends that the rich should be obliged by fines (he says nothing about the country citizens) to attend the meetings of the assembly. He adds other suggestions in 1298 b 21 sqq. He may have been doubtful whether fines, however severe they might be, would suffice to enforce the attendance of the rich in an assembly in which they were greatly out-numbered, or he may have thought that the deliberative body would deliberate better if the numbers of the poor in it were less disproportionate than they usually were to those of the rich. At any rate he adds (1298 b 21)—'it is advantageous, again, that those who are charged with deliberative functions should be elected or taken by lot in equal numbers from the parts of the State' (i. e. the notables and the demos), 'and it is also advantageous, if the members of the demos are greatly superior in number to the men of political capacity' (i. e. the notables), 'either not to give pay to all, but only to a number proportionate to the numerical strength of the notables, or to exclude by lot those who are in excess of the proper number'. Aristotle does not make it clear by whom the deliberative body the appointment of which he here suggests is to be elected, if it is elected and not appointed by lot, but his meaning seems to be that half of it is to be elected by the notables and half by the demos. If this is so, his recommendation amounts to a recommendation of a representative deliberative body in which the number of the representatives of the notables and demos should be equal. He omits to arrange for the payment of the representatives of the demos, though this would evidently be necessary. He would not apparently be content with a paid representative body elected in each deme by the members of the deme or appointed in each deme by lot, though the substitution of a representative body of this kind for the popular assembly

would seem to a modern to be the true remedy for the defects of the popular assembly. Such a representative body would have been less likely than the popular assembly to encroach on the province of the law and the magistracies, and it would have been more acceptable to the demos than the kind of representative body which Aristotle suggests, one in which the representatives of the notables are equal in number to those of the demos.

It is evident from Aristotle's language in such passages as 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq. that ultimate democracies were often introduced in Greece. They must have existed in many States besides Athens, though we are not able to point with certainty to any existing elsewhere. Perhaps the democracies at Cos, Rhodes, Heracleia, and Megara mentioned in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 25 sqq. and the democracy at Cyrene mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 22 sq. were ultimate democracies. Democracy was strong at Byzantium and Tenedos (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23 sqq.), but whether ultimate democracies existed there we do not know.

Some ultimate democracies were no doubt more tolerable than others. The burden on the rich was less where the State-pay was provided wholly or in part by special revenues derived from dependent allies, or an emporium, or mines, or some exceptional product like silphium, and not exclusively by taxes levied on the rich. An ultimate democracy introduced gradually was less oppressive than one which was suddenly introduced after a victory over the rich won by leaders embittered by exile at the head of a demos infuriated by oppression. An ultimate democracy in which the poor greatly outnumbered the rich without any addition to their numbers from the moderately well-to-do was worse than one in which their numbers were less.

It is evident that the ultimate democracy at Athens in the days before the rich were decimated by defeats on land (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 8 sqq.) and the whole State impoverished by the disastrous latter years of the Peloponnesian War, differed greatly from what it became in the fourth century before Christ. Isocrates tells us (De Antid.

§ 159 sq.: cp. § 142) that when he was a boy—he was born in B.C. 436—everybody was eager to be reputed rich, but that at the time at which he was writing (B.C. 353) it was more perilous to be thought rich than to be an open criminal, for criminals were let off with light punishments, whereas absolute ruin befel persons held to be wealthy.

Aristotle's contribution to our knowledge of Greek democracy.

Aristotle nowhere gives us in the Politics a full description in detail of the organization and working of democracy. What he tells us on the subject he tells us incidentally. His aim in the last three Books of the Politics, as has already been said, is a practical aim, to guide Greek statesmen and lawgivers in the construction and administration of the various constitutions, and it is from the remarks he makes in the course of pursuing this aim that we obtain his views on the subject of the organization and working of Greek democracy. Perhaps we learn from him more about its structure and institutions than about its life and working.

If we seek pictures of its life and working, we shall find more of them in the pages of Thucydides than in those of the Politics. Herodotus had already dwelt on the passionate vehemence of democracy in action (3. 81) and had pointed out how much it did at Athens, at any rate in its earlier days, to stimulate patriotic effort (5. 78). Thucydides tells us far more. His task compelled him to study the behaviour of the Athenian assembly in the many crises with which it had to deal in the course of the Peloponnesian War. We watch its behaviour to Pericles under the stress of cruel suffering. We see its hastiness and impulsiveness, its rapid alternations of severity and clemency, its susceptibility to excitement not only in an angry or vindictive direction, but also in the direction of mercy and sympathy[1], its occasional recklessness and levity in dealing with important affairs, and other weaknesses which affected it.

[1] Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 377, where Xen. Hell. 1. 5. 19 is referred to, and the behaviour of the Syracusan assembly under similar circumstances (Diod. 11. 92) compared.

We see that in the fifth century before Christ, when the Athenian democracy was at its best, it was a government of action as well as of open discussion, though the famous lines of Ion of Chios in praise of its rival, the Lacedaemonian State (Fragm. 63 Nauck), suggest that he regarded it as even then too much a government of words. The orations of Demosthenes complete the picture by setting before us the weaknesses of the Athenian democracy at a time when it had lost much of its original vigour.

Among the characteristics of democracy which had been already pointed out before Aristotle dealt with the subject the following may be mentioned:—

1. its exercise of rule in the interest of a section of the citizens (Plato, Laws 715 A sq., 832 B sq.) and frequent oppression of the rich:
2. its passion for liberty and equality (Plato, Rep. 557 B, 558 C, 562 B sq.) and its jealousy of men of superior merit (see note on 1284 b 28):
3. its demand for equality of access to magistracies, and hence for
   - A. appointment to magistracies by lot, i. e. appointment by lot out of all, not out of selected persons (*πρόκριτοι*). This had been dwelt on by many from Herodotus' time onwards:
   - B. a rotation of office (Eurip. Suppl. 392 sqq. Bothe, 406 sqq. Dindorf):
   - C. the multiplication of offices and the diminution of their powers, resulting in feebleness of action (Plato, Polit. 303 A). Herodotus (3. 80) treats the accountability of magistrates as one of the institutions characteristic of democracy.
4. its practice of referring questions to the whole citizen-body (Hdt. 3. 80 *sub fin.*) and of consulting the opinion of all (Eurip. Suppl. 424 sqq. Bothe, 438 sqq. Dindorf):
5. its aggrandizement of flatterers and demagogues (Aristoph. Eq.) and especially of some one individual (Plato, Rep. 565 C):

6. Plato had hinted (Rep. 565 A) that the many were not eager to attend the meetings of the assembly unless they derived some profit from so doing, but he does not point out, as Aristotle does, the effect of State-pay in making democracies extreme:
7. the favour shown in democracies to low birth, poverty, and want of education (Aristoph. Eq., [Xen.] Rep. Ath.: see note on 1317 b 38–41):
8. the humouring in democracies of women, children, and slaves, and the license allowed to all to live as they please (Plato, Rep. 557 B sqq., 562 E sqq.).

The following, on the other hand, are some of the chief characteristics of democracy to which Aristotle, so far as we know, was the first to call attention :—

1. His classification of the kinds of democracy is more careful and more complete than the received one, which distinguished only between the *πατρία δημοκρατία* and the *νεωτάτη δημοκρατία*. That democracies vary in kind as the demos which bears rule in each varies we had not been told by any one before, nor does it seem that any one had dwelt on the merits of an agricultural and pastoral demos. The effect of abundant State-pay in making the extreme democracy possible is pointed out by him more clearly than by any one before.
2. In his picture of the institutions of an extreme democracy he dwells, as no one before him appears to have done, on its tendency to exalt the power of the assembly at the expense both of the law and of the magistracies, even the Boulê. His view that the extreme democracy resembles tyranny may possibly have been suggested by some lines of Aristophanes (see note on 1292 a 11), but had any one before him asserted the fact with equal clearness?
3. Aristotle was apparently the first to point out the tendency of the extreme democracy to make the citizen-body as large as possible, so that the demos might greatly outnumber the rich, and hence to extend citizenship even to illegitimate sons and the sons of

an alien or slave father or mother (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.).

4. He was also the first, so far as we know, to dwell on the tendency of democracy to mingle the citizens together and to modify or do away with earlier sectional distinctions and worships.
5. The view that it is the tendency of democracy to assimilate the rearing, education, dress, and mode of life of rich and poor was apparently a common one (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq.), but he seems to have been among the first to mention this view.
6. Had any one before him pointed out the tendency of democracy to restrict the term for which magistracies were tenable and to discourage a repeated tenure of magistracies, or drawn attention to the variations in the organization of the deliberative in democracies and in the extent of its powers?
7. Had any one before him pointed out that democracies were more secure and durable than oligarchies, or traced the various causes to which they owed this advantage?
8. We hear from no one else of the existence of democracies not of law, but of custom and training, or of democracies of law, but not of custom and training.

Aristotle's analysis of the principle of democracy.

The first account given us in the Politics of the principle on which democracy rests is contained in 3. 9. 1280 a 7–25. We are there told that the champions of the democratic view of what is just claimed an equal share—we do not distinctly learn in what, but probably in political power—for those who were equal in free birth (*ἐλευθερία*). But who are equal in free birth? According to 3. 8. 1280 a 5 'all share in free birth', but yet we read in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 sq. of 'the class which is not free-born by descent from two citizen-parents' (*τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*), an expression which seems to imply that the sons of only one citizen-parent are not fully free-born, and in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17 sqq. it is implied that free birth is not possessed by

all, for it is there distinguished from 'numerical superiority' as falling under the head of 'quality' (τὸ ποιόν), whereas the latter falls under the head of 'quantity' (τὸ ποσόν). So in 3. 15. 1286 a 36 a demos consisting of the free-born is tacitly contrasted with a demos including other elements than the free-born. It seems clear, then, that democracy according to one conception of it claimed an equal share of political power only for those who were equal in free birth, not for any one and every one who might be made a citizen.

But this restriction appears to pass out of sight in other accounts of the principle of democracy, for instance in that contained in 8 (6). 2, where it is implied that democracy claims equality for all, not merely for all who are equal in free birth. Democracy is said to aim at 'freedom and equality' (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq.: 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 9 sq.), or at 'freedom' in its two kinds, freedom based on equality, which implies an interchange among the citizens of ruling and being ruled and the supremacy of the will of the majority, and freedom in the sense of living as one likes, which implies not being ruled at all, or, if that is impossible, an interchange of ruling and being ruled (8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40—b 17). Elsewhere (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq.) democracy is said to be characterized by two things, the supremacy of the majority and freedom in the sense of living as one likes. Here freedom is distinguished from the supremacy of the majority, though this is regarded as a kind of freedom in 8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40 sqq.

In these accounts of democracy it is implied that freedom and equality are conferred on all, both rich and poor. True, the rich will be in a minority, and as the majority is supreme, the poor will be supreme. But the rich will have a share of authority. It is on this principle that the first form of democracy is organized, that which is especially based on equality (ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq.). In that form all share in the constitution alike.

But democracy is also the rule of the poor, whether in a majority or not (3. 8. 1280 a 1 sqq.). Then it is not

necessarily the rule of the majority, nor is it based on equality for all. Here we have an account of democracy which conflicts with those previously given. What right on democratic principles have the poor to rule, if they are in a minority? A democracy which gives supremacy to a minority of poor would seem to sin against the principle of arithmetical equality, which is the basis of democracy according to 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.

It will be seen that Aristotle's account of democracy is not free from inconsistencies. Nor are we yet at an end of them. Democracy tends to favour not only the poor, but also bastards, half-aliens, and half-slaves, and to admit them to citizenship (3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.: 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 sq.). Thus democracy is something more than the rule of the poor; it is the rule of a demos possibly comprising half-alien and half-servile elements. Now at last we have sounded the depths of the democratic principle. Low birth and *βαναυσία* are as dear to it as poverty (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.).

Another characteristic of democracy is the assimilation of the dress and mode of life of rich and poor, and of the rearing of their children (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq.). This is in harmony with the conception of democracy according to which it is based on equality for all.

The inconsistencies which have been noticed in Aristotle's account of democracy perhaps reflect real inconsistencies in democracy itself. It is perhaps true that democracy claims equality for all and the supremacy of the majority and an interchange of rule, but also claims supremacy for the poor and low-born. Its claims are thus not wholly self-consistent, but its paramount claim is supremacy for the poor and the full participation of the poor in all forms of political activity.

Its organization will evidently vary according as one or other of these conceptions of it predominates. Aristotle's first form of democracy is based on the conception according to which democracy implies equality for all; the ultimate democracy on the conception according to which

democracy is the supremacy of the poor and the full participation of the poor in all forms of political activity. But even in the ultimate democracy the principle of the equality of rich and poor was not abandoned; the rich were legally possessed of all the political rights enjoyed by the poor, though they were commonly in too great a minority to exercise them with effect. There was a nominal equality, but a real inequality, in the position of rich and poor.

One characteristic of democracy meets with less notice from Aristotle than we might have expected. If it is the rule of the many and the poor, the many, we are told in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sq., seek gain rather than honour, and gain, we might expect, rather than a barren liberty and equality, or even a barren rule of the poor, must be the aim of democracy. And, in fact, Aristotle implies in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sqq. that one of the characteristics of democracy is that those who rule in it seek gain rather than honour. But nothing is said of this characteristic of democracy elsewhere. The aim of democracy is usually represented by Aristotle to be liberty, or liberty and equality, or the rule of the majority or of the poor, or the interchange of rule, not the gain of the ruling class. Yet perhaps his remark in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sqq. is not without an element of truth. The dominant class in a democracy usually seeks not only to rule but to derive material profit from its rule.

Some contrasts of Greek and modern democracy.

Some light will be thrown on the characteristics of Greek democracy if we briefly note a few important points in which it differed from modern democracy.

The demos in a Greek State was only a section of the working class, for a large part of the working class consisted of metoeci and slaves. Hence the dominant class in a Greek democracy was less numerous and outnumbered the rich and the moderately well-to-do less, than in a modern democracy. Thus in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 23 sq. it is implied that the demos *might* not greatly exceed the notables in number. Nor was this all. The poorer class of citizens in a Greek democracy was itself a privileged

class and had classes beneath it on which it looked down, metoeci and slaves. Not so the poor in a modern democracy.

The demos in a Greek State was not too large to be brought together in an open-air meeting for purposes of deliberation and discussion. A meeting composed of all the citizens of a modern city would often be unmanageably large, and a meeting composed of all the citizens of a modern State would be manifestly impossible. Hence a modern democracy cannot be ruled by the demos in person; it must be ruled by representatives, and an assembly of representatives is less likely to be able to make its momentary will supreme over the law and to overthrow the authority of the magistracies than an assembly composed of the citizens themselves. In a Greek democracy, on the other hand, it was comparatively easy for the whole citizen-body gathered in an assembly and headed by its demagogues to administer as well as to rule and to free itself from the restraints of law.

In a Greek democracy, again, the State was ruled from one centre, in modern democracies it is ruled from many centres, which check and balance each other. Its policy is shaped by representative bodies representing a number of widely scattered constituencies, no one of which is dominant over the rest. It is the result of discussion carried on by persons gathered from a very large area, whereas in the assembly of a Greek democracy the disputants would usually be citizens of a single not very large city. A modern democracy consequently stands far more in need of organizers and wire-pullers than a Greek democracy did, and these men play a far greater part in it. They are needed, indeed, not only to keep the various centres working together, but also to guide the many elections of officials and representatives which must necessarily take place. These are far more numerous in a modern than in a Greek democracy, because the lot is not now used in making appointments to offices.

We have seen that the deliberative in a Greek demo-

cracy, consisting as it did of the citizens themselves, not of representatives of them, stood in a different relation to the magistracies from that in which a representative deliberative body stands to the executive in a modern democracy. It was also less checked by the judicial authority than the deliberative in a modern democracy. The judges in a Greek democracy were not trained lawyers marked off by special knowledge from the common herd, but ordinary citizens grouped in large dicasteries, who shared the passions and the prejudices which prevailed in the deliberative assembly. In the ultimate democracy these dicasteries were paid, and consisted to a large extent of poor men, who were often only too ready to become the tools of the demagogues in their schemes of confiscation (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq.).

Another difference may be noted between the deliberative assembly in a Greek democracy and the legislature in a modern democracy. It was not a legislative body only, but both a legislative and a deliberative body, having power to decide some important administrative questions, such as those of peace, war, and alliance. Indeed, it had also power to decide some important judicial questions, for it had power to inflict on citizens the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation of property. Its powers, therefore, resembled those of the magistrates more than those of a modern legislative body do, and it was more easy for it to become a jealous rival of the magistrates, and ultimately to weaken their authority.

The poorer citizens in a Greek democracy, again, were more aspiring than the corresponding class in a modern democracy. They sought not merely for substantial gains or for a control of legislation and taxation in their own interest, but also for the gratification of their vanity; they wished to hold office and to act as judges and members of the assembly. They enjoyed having great men before them competing for their votes. In modern democracy this aim is still present, but as the sovereign people does not rule in person and cannot be gathered into one

all-powerful assembly, it is gratified in a less direct way. Modern democracy, though it demands a rotation of office (see note on 1317 b 17), seeks rather to regulate legislation and taxation in the interest of the labouring class than to give a turn of office to every poor man. Even in the ultimate form of Greek democracy, indeed, the poor did not claim to hold offices which demanded special experience and skill.

In ancient Greece, again, democracy, or at any rate extreme democracy, meant the supremacy of classes which were often in part of semi-alien or semi-servile origin. In many Greek cities the urban section of the demos contained a large admixture of elements of this kind. Democracy in most modern States brings no such consequences with it, though it is true that in the United States classes which are semi-alien, or even more than semi-alien, play a considerable part in politics.

TYRANNY.

The definition of tyranny.

Aristotle does not always define tyranny in the same way. His earliest definition of it in the Politics makes it a form of monarchy in which rule is exercised for the advantage of the monarch (3. 7. 1279 b 6 sq.), but in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book he treats as forms of tyranny a despotic kind of kingship found in some barbarian nations and the aesymneteship of early Greece (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 7 sqq.), though he does not appear to hold that either the barbarian king or the aesymnete ruled for his own advantage. His reason for classing these two forms of monarchy as tyrannies apparently is that both possessed large powers of arbitrary rule (1295 a 16 sq.). Viewed in this light, the name of tyranny may be given to any office exercising despotic authority; thus the ephorship was regarded by some as a tyranny (2. 6. 1265 b 40: cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 13 sq.). Thucydides seems to approach this view when he tacitly contrasts tyrannies with 'hereditary kingships with fixed rights' (*ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι*, 1. 13).

Others found the distinctive mark of tyranny not so much in the despotic character of its rule as in its not ruling in accordance with law. Thus Plato says in Polit. 301 B, *ὅταν μήτε κατὰ νόμους μήτε κατὰ ἔθη πράττῃ τις εἷς ἄρχων . . . μῶν οὐ τότε τὸν τοιοῦτον ἕκαστον τύραννον κλητέον;* Cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37, *μοναρχία δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τοὔνομα ἐν ᾗ εἷς ἁπάντων κύριός ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δ' ἀόριστος τυραννίς*, and Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, *τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἑκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο* (sc. Σωκράτης), *τὴν δὲ ἀκόντων τε καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁ ἄρχων βούλοιτο, τυραννίδα.* In the passage last quoted we find a further characteristic added that the rule of the tyrant is exercised over unwilling subjects (cp. Thuc. 3. 37. 2).

Tyranny is also described as a kind of rule based on deceit or force (Diog. Laert. 3. 83, *τυραννὶς δέ ἐστιν ἐν ᾗ παρακρουσθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες ὑπό τινος ἄρχονται*: cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 10 and Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 9 sq., where see note).

Aristotle's prevailing tendency is to define tyranny, or at any rate that kind of tyranny which is thought to be especially tyranny (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 17 sqq.), as a form of monarchy in which the monarch rules irresponsibly over men as good as, or better than, himself for his own advantage, and consequently rules over unwilling subjects (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 19 sqq.)[1]. Tyranny is the perversion not merely of kingship (3. 7. 1279 b 4 sqq.), but of absolute kingship (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sqq.), and just as the absolute king is greatly superior to those over whom he rules and rules for the common advantage, so his antithesis the tyrant is the inferior, or at any rate only the equal, of those over whom he rules and rules for his own advantage. It follows that if a man is to possess absolute power and not to be a tyrant, he must not only rule for the common advantage, but also be greatly superior to those over whom he rules

[1] In this kind of tyranny the tyrant possesses unlimited powers, but is there not a kind of tyranny in which the tyrant possesses only limited powers and uses them for his own advantage?

(4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq.). When the ruler possesses this transcendent superiority, men willingly accept his rule (3. 13. 1284 b 32 sqq.), and he is not a tyrant. Rule comes to the king by reason of his virtue, to the tyrant by reason of the power which enables him to make himself tyrant, whether that power is possessed by him as a king or as a great official or as a demagogue and general (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 14–31).

The rise of tyranny.

The first introduction of tyranny in the Greek world seems to have been due not to demagogues, but to kings or great officials who converted the positions legally held by them into tyrannies, and thus were the first to make the breach through which later on so many soldier-demagogues successfully passed. Tyranny was a legacy from the early incautious days in which kingships existed and great magistracies were held by single individuals. Even the soldier-demagogue, when he arose, commonly held some great military office before he made himself tyrant (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.).

In later days most tyrants, but not all, won their tyrannies as demagogues. Not all, for some won their tyrannies simply because they possessed an overpowering influence in the State (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.), others because they were the holders of important offices for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 20 sqq.), others because they belonged to leading families in close oligarchies (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22 sq.), others because they were captains of mercenaries (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 22 sq.) or 'neutral magistrates' (ἄρχοντες μεσίδιοι, 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 26 sqq.). Another class of tyrants consisted of nominees of Persia or in later days of Macedon.

The rise of tyranny in ancient Greece was not, as it was in mediaeval Italy, a symptom of exhaustion and weariness of faction. It was often due rather to the difficulty which the demos experienced in overthrowing oligarchies which oppressed it. It could not easily overthrow these oligarchies unless it was headed by a man possessing both military and demagogic skill. In early oligarchies the demos was for the most part a rural demos, while the

oligarchs dwelt in the city. A demagogue at the head of a demos of this kind found himself in a difficult position. He had to defend in the city the rights of supporters scattered over the country, too distant and busy to give him effective support. He had to prosecute in oligarchical lawcourts rich men who had wronged poor men. We can readily imagine that he was almost driven by stress of circumstances to make himself tyrant (Plato, Rep. 565 D sqq.). He would obviously stand in great need of a bodyguard. That Cypselus, though the founder of a tyranny at Corinth, never had a bodyguard is mentioned as a remarkable fact (7 (5). 12. 1315 b 27 sq.). This bodyguard he had to ask of the State, and Aristotle thinks (3. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq.) that the citizens would have been wise if they had done what was usually done when an aesymnete was elected, and had limited the numbers of the bodyguard, not allowing it to be stronger than the many, but this precaution was commonly neglected, no doubt because, when the bodyguard was granted, the demos felt unbounded confidence in its champion. The bodyguard of a tyrant was usually composed of aliens, notwithstanding that he had the support of the demos, and this was a sinister sign. It meant that he intended to be independent of the demos.

An alien bodyguard would be most easily hired in regions in which mercenary soldiers were easily obtainable. Thus Corinth Sicyon and Megara, the earliest homes of tyranny in Greece Proper, were close to Arcadia, where mercenary soldiers were always to be had. States bordering on regions peopled with warlike barbarians (for instance, States in Caria, Sicily, or Thrace), or near bodies of warlike slaves like the Penestae, were similarly circumstanced. It would be especially easy, again, to obtain mercenaries at the close of great wars, when large numbers of men had lost all taste and aptitude for peaceful pursuits. Thus the tyranny of Dionysius the Elder at Syracuse and probably that of Pherae arose at the end of the Peloponnesian War. It was no doubt a fortunate thing for Greece that these tyrannies enlisted so many turbulent

spirits in their service and drew them away to Syracuse and Pherae.

It was not always under oligarchy that the hostility between rich and poor arose from which tyranny usually sprang. It sometimes arose under a democracy. Herodotus (3. 82) describes tyranny as arising under both oligarchy and democracy. Plato, indeed, in the Republic (562 B sqq.) conceives tyranny as always arising under democracy, but that was evidently not the case. In his picture of the tyrant he clearly has Dionysius the Elder especially in view, and the tyranny of Dionysius the Elder arose under a democracy (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. 176 D).

The rise of tyranny seems to have been often connected with other than purely internal difficulties, though neither Plato nor Aristotle draws attention to the fact. Dionysius the Elder acquired his tyranny when Syracuse was fighting for its existence against a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily which had already proved fatal to several of its Greek cities. It is likely enough that the establishment of a tyranny at Corinth by Cypselus in B. C. 657 was connected with the revolt of Corcyra from Corinth and the sea-fight fought by their fleets in B. C. 664. So again the origin of the tyranny at Pherae was probably connected with the struggle of Larissa and Pherae for supremacy, which, beginning at the end of the fifth century B. C., ultimately resulted in the subjection of Thessaly to Philip of Macedon. At times of crisis, when the existence of the State was threatened by external foes, the concentration of civil and military authority in the hands of one able man had its advantages[1]. This was especially felt in Sicily, which never forgot that a formidable Carthaginian invasion had been repulsed in B. C. 480 by the tyrant Gelon. If the invasion of Greece Proper by Xerxes had been repulsed under the leadership of tyrants, it is probable that tyranny would have won the prestige there which it enjoyed in

[1] That the value of a single able ruler was recognized we see from Thuc. 6. 72. 3, Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 18, Isocr. Nicocl. § 24 sq., and Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 184 sq.

Sicily. No doubt tyrannies were often successfully set up at times when the State was not menaced by any external perils, and when the only thing that troubled its peace was internal faction. This was the case with the tyranny of Peisistratus among others.

The rule of tyrants.

The mere fact that tyrants needed a bodyguard made a considerable revenue a necessity of their position. Thus it was in wealthy States that tyranny was most at home. This large revenue was raised by taxation which was often oppressive. We gather from 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 14 that 'eisphorae and liturgies' were commonly exacted by tyrants from their subjects. We also hear of their receiving a certain proportion of the produce of the soil, often a tenth. The heavy taxes levied by tyrants were a characteristic feature of their rule, and were no doubt partly responsible for its commonly short duration. Free States appear to have intentionally abstained from following their example in this matter. Usually, however, tyrants were not satisfied with possessing a large revenue; they also sought to amass a treasure (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 10). The possession of a treasure enabled them to act more promptly in special emergencies than they could otherwise have done. They needed it, or thought that they needed it, to face the perils of their position, but it also added to these perils, for those whom the tyrant left in charge of his treasure, when he was absent from the city, often conspired against him (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 10 sqq.). It was easy for tyrants to amass a treasure, for, as their rise to supreme power was commonly opposed by most of the rich, they had abundant opportunities of enriching themselves by confiscation. The more the expenditure of the tyrant increased, the greater would be the temptation to plunder the rich, and his expenditure constantly tended to increase. Partly to keep his mercenaries employed, partly to win glory and popularity, partly to make himself indispensable to the State, the tyrant often made war. He would easily find excuses for war, for the great resources, political military and financial, which were at his disposal and the concentration of authority in his hands must have made all

neighbouring States distrustful of him and anxious, if not actually hostile. His own subjects were not sorry when he made war, for they knew that he would be obliged to arm them, and they hoped, when he had done so, to find some opportunity of dethroning him (Diod. 14. 45. 5, 14. 64. 4: Isocr. Hel. § 32).

The extent to which tyrants altered the laws and constitution of the State which they ruled seems to have varied. Mr. Freeman is probably right in saying (Sicily, 2. 53): 'It does not appear that the tyrant, as a rule, swept away the laws and constitution of the city. The forms of law might go on; it was enough if magistrates and assemblies practically did their master's bidding. Whenever either silent influence or express command failed to secure obedience, the spearmen were ready to step in'. Still Herodotus (3. 80) says of the tyrant, 'he changes traditional customs' (*νόμαια κινεῖ πάτρια*), and it is clear from Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 17 sq. that the tyrants of Salamis in Cyprus at any rate, besides issuing their edicts (Isocr. *loc. cit.*: cp. Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20), also revised the laws and tried and decided lawsuits in person.

Aristotle recommends the tyrant to win, if possible, the support both of the rich and of the poor, or, if not, the support of whichever of these classes was the stronger (7 (5). 11. 1315 a 31 sqq.). He implies that it was always open to him to win the support of the rich, but this it must have commonly been difficult for him to do. His taxation fell with especial severity on the rich. He dreaded those of them who ranked as notables, for conspiracies against him were for the most part their work, and he especially dreaded those who overtopped the rest (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 40). It cannot have been easy for him to employ the notables in the work of government, and yet, if they had no share in it, they were discontented. The tyrants seem to have brought into the administration of the State the methods by which the generals in command of besieged cities controlled them (see note on 1313 a 41), and these methods would be especially odious to the leisured class, the class

which set most store by freedom in social intercourse. Greek cities were commonly pervaded by a hum of discussion and talk, but a silence fell on them under a tyranny of the worse kind; the tyrant's spies made social intercourse dangerous; the citizens came not only to distrust each other, but to be unacquainted with each other. The poor suffered less under a government of this kind than the rich. The tax on the produce of the soil no doubt fell in part upon them, and the impoverishment of the rich must have cost them dear. Tyrants were also sometimes led by their fear of plots to discourage the residence of the poor in the central city and to keep them hard at work. Still they occasionally helped the poor with gifts or loans of money, and were often great builders, and therefore great employers of labour. The tyrants of Corinth and probably of Miletus [1] founded colonies which must have given many poor men a chance of enriching themselves, and so did Dionysius the Elder. The luxurious court of the tyrant was partly supplied by alien handicraftsmen, but it was also a source of profit to the native poor, and many new arts were introduced and old ones developed under his rule.

Plato's sketch of the tyrant's career (Rep. 568 E), however, implies that a time often came in the course of it when he found that he had run through the property of the rich. He had now only poor men to tax, and his heavy expenditure had to be maintained at the cost of his early friends, the demos. He thus lost their good will, and it sometimes became necessary for him to disarm them and to win fresh supporters by emancipating slaves.

Even a short period of tyranny must have been injurious to a State. Many of its natural leaders would be put to death or exiled or stripped of their property, and however short a time a tyranny might last, it would be difficult, when it fell, to replace them in their position. A long continuance of tyranny, however, must have been far more ruinous. In the early days of a tyrant's rule the citizens would at any rate know what freedom meant, for they would

[1] See as to the latter E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterthums, 2. 447.

have lived at one time under more or less free institutions; but as time went on and a generation grew up which had never known any government but tyranny, a visible deterioration of character must have set in. The best elements of the citizen-body would long have been weeded out and their place taken by the tyrant's mercenaries, some of them probably not even of Hellenic extraction, and only those would have been left from whom the tyrant had nothing to fear. A general mediocrity would prevail. The citizens would not be as well acquainted with each other as they were in a free State, and would often lack confidence in themselves and in each other. A State thus morally enfeebled was fit for nothing but tyranny, and tyranny would find a more or less permanent home in it. This, at any rate, was the fate of Syracuse. Yet it was not the fate of all States long ruled by tyrants. At Heracleia on the Euxine, on the extinction of a tyranny which lasted for nearly eighty years, a democracy was set up which would seem to have been sufficiently well-ordered to last for more than two centuries, and which came to an end only when the city received its death-blow.

In the later years of Greek tyranny the tyrant was often not even a native of the State he ruled. He was frequently merely a captain of mercenaries unconnected with the State.

As in mediaeval Italy, so in ancient Greece tyrants do not all stand on the same level. Not only were some far better rulers than others, but some could point to public services which made amends to a certain extent for their usurpation of power. Gelon and Dionysius the Elder humbled Carthage and added to the greatness of Syracuse, while others could claim to have overthrown oppressive oligarchies.

Some points of contrast between tyranny in ancient Greece and

Tyranny was less widespread in ancient Greece than in mediaeval Italy, and held its ground with more difficulty. In mediaeval Italy its rise often meant that the citizens were weary of the struggles of the factions which had torn the State asunder and had made material prosperity

tyranny in mediaeval Italy.

impossible, or that they saw that the days of citizen armies were over and that the mercenary troops which had taken their place needed a strong hand to rule them. Its rise was often a symptom of exhaustion and decline. This was less the case in ancient Greece. The rise of tyranny there did not commonly betoken a diminution of political ardour in the minds of the citizens or a disinclination for military service. Citizen armies did not fall into the background in ancient Greece as much as they did in mediaeval Italy. Tyranny was less dictated by circumstances and was more reluctantly endured. One indication of this may be found in the short duration of most dynasties of tyrants in ancient Greece, and the long continuance of many such dynasties in mediaeval Italy. The establishment of a tyranny in ancient Greece often meant no more than this, that some clever and unscrupulous soldier-demagogue had succeeded in using for his own aggrandizement a moment of disunion or of internal or external crisis.

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ζ′ (Δ′).

'Εν ἁπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς 1288 b 10
μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, ἀλλὰ περὶ γένος ἕν τι τελείαις
οὔσαις, μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἁρμόττον,
οἷον ἄσκησις σώματι ποία τε ποίῳ συμφέρει καὶ τίς ἀρίστη
(τῷ γὰρ κάλλιστα πεφυκότι καὶ κεχορηγημένῳ τὴν ἀρίστην
ἀναγκαῖον ἁρμόττειν), καὶ τίς τοῖς πλείστοις μία πᾶσιν (καὶ 15
2 γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν)· ἔτι δ' ἐάν τις μὴ τῆς
ἱκνουμένης ἐπιθυμῇ μήθ' ἕξεως μήτ' ἐπιστήμης τῶν περὶ τὴν
ἀγωνίαν, †μηδὲν ἧττον τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ
παρασκευάσαι τε καὶ ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν†. ὁμοίως δὲ
τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ περὶ ναυπηγίαν καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ 20
3 περὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην τέχνην ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι
καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι
τίς ἐστι, καὶ ποία τις ἂν οὖσα μάλιστ' εἴη κατ' εὐχήν, μηδε-
νὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός, καὶ τίς τίσιν ἁρμόττουσα· πολ-
λοῖς γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τυχεῖν ἴσως ἀδύνατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατί- 25
στην τε ἁπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ
λεληθέναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν·
4 ἔτι δὲ τρίτην τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν δύ-
νασθαι θεωρεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γενομένη
τίνα τρόπον ἂν σώζοιτο πλεῖστον χρόνον· λέγω δὲ οἷον εἴ τινι 30
πόλει συμβέβηκε μήτε τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν
ἀχορήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, μήτε τὴν ἐνδε-
5 χομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀλλά τινα φαυλοτέραν. παρὰ
πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τὴν μάλιστα πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁρμότ-

τουσαν δεῖ γνωρίζειν, ὡς οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀποφαινομένων περὶ πολιτείας, καὶ εἰ τἆλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, τῶν γε χρησίμων διαμαρτάνουσιν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν ἀρίστην δεῖ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ 6
καὶ τὴν δυνατήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ῥᾴω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἁπάσαις· νῦν δ' οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ δεομένην πολλῆς χορηγίας ζητοῦσι μόνον, οἱ δὲ μᾶλλον κοινήν τινα λέγοντες τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιροῦντες πολιτείας τὴν Λακωνικὴν
1289 a ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἐπαινοῦσιν· χρὴ δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγεῖσθαι τάξιν 7
ἣν ῥᾳδίως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμανθάνειν τοῦ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. διὸ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τὸν πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον 8
ἀγνοοῦντα πόσα πολιτείας ἐστὶν εἴδη. νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἴονταί τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές. ὥστε δεῖ τὰς διαφορὰς μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν, πόσαι, καὶ συντίθενται ποσαχῶς. μετὰ δὲ τῆς 9
αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης καὶ νόμους τοὺς ἀρίστους ἰδεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἑκάστῃ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἁρμόττοντας· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς νόμους. πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς 10
πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστοις τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν· νόμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τὴν πολιτείαν, καθ' οὓς δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἄρχειν καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας αὐτούς. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγ- 11
καῖον καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοὺς αὐτοὺς νόμους συμφέρειν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πάσαις, εἴπερ δὴ πλείους καὶ μὴ μία δημοκρατία μηδὲ ὀλιγαρχία μόνον ἐστίν.

2 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν διει-

λόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, βασιλείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατίαν δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἴρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρῆσαι ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων· βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην), ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία, καὶ πότε δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν περὶ πολιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῷ κοινῷ προσαγορευομένης ὀνόματι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημο-
2 κρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος. φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκβάσεων τίς χειρίστη καὶ δευτέρα τίς. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης παρέκβασιν εἶναι χειρίστην· τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ οὖσαν, ἢ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος· ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας), μετριωτάτην δὲ
3 τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ βλέψας ἡμῖν. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἔκρινε πασῶν μὲν οὐσῶν ἐπιεικῶν, οἷον ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, φαύλων δὲ ἀρίστην· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἐξημαρτημένας εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ βελτίω μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς ἔχει
4 λέγειν, ἧττον δὲ φαύλην. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης κρίσεως ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν· ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔπειτα τίς κοινοτάτη καὶ τίς αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλη τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεστῶσα καλῶς, ἀλλὰ ταῖς
5 πλείσταις ἁρμόττουσα πόλεσι, τίς ἐστιν· ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαία δημο-

κρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δ' αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐκείνης)· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τὸν βουλόμενον ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγαρχίας· τέλος δέ, πάντων τούτων 6 ὅταν ποιησώμεθα συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

3 Τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας αἴτιον ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκιῶν συγκειμένας πάσας ὁρῶμεν τὰς πόλεις, ἔπειτα πάλιν τούτου τοῦ πλήθους τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς δ' ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν ὁπλιτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄνοπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὁρῶ- 2 μεν ὄντα, τὸν δ' ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάναυσον. καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων εἰσὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας, οἷον ἱπποτροφίας (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσαις πόλε- 3 σιν ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχίαι παρὰ τούτοις ἦσαν· ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους ἵπποις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας, οἷον Ἐρετριεῖς καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ Μάγνητες οἱ ἐπὶ Μαιάνδρῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν)· ἔτι πρὸς 4 ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ
1290 a κατ' ἀρετήν, κἂν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ διείλομεν ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ πᾶσα πόλις. τούτων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὁτὲ μὲν πάντα μετέχει τῆς πολιτείας, ὁτὲ δ' 5 ἐλάττω, ὁτὲ δὲ πλείω. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγκαῖον 5 εἶναι πολιτείας, εἴδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἴδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστί, ταύτην δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἢ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἢ κατά τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητα κοινήν (λέγω δ' οἷον τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων), ἡ κοινήν

6 τιν' ἀμφοῖν. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσαύτας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχάς εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων. μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο,
7 δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. τὴν γὰρ ἀριστοκρατίαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος τιθέασιν ὡς οὖσαν ὀλιγαρχίαν τινά, καὶ τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι τὸν μὲν ζέφυρον τοῦ βορέου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὖρον. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας, ὡς φασί τινες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τίθενται εἴδη δύο, τὴν δωριστὶ καὶ φρυγιστί, τὰ δ' ἄλλα
8 συντάγματα τὰ μὲν Δώρια τὰ δὲ Φρύγια καλοῦσιν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν εἰώθασιν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν· ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, δυοῖν ἢ μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας, τὰς δὲ τῆς ἁρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δ' ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικάς.

4 Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι δημοκρατίαν, καθάπερ εἰώθασί τινες νῦν, ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὅπου κύριον τὸ πλῆθος (καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πλέον μέρος κύριον), οὐδ' ὀλι-
2 γαρχίαν, ὅπου κύριοι ὀλίγοι τῆς πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ εἶησαν οἱ πάντες χίλιοι καὶ τριακόσιοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ χίλιοι πλούσιοι, καὶ μὴ μεταδιδοῖεν ἀρχῆς τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν ἐλευθέροις οὖσι καὶ τἄλλα ὁμοίοις, οὐδεὶς ἂν φαίη δημοκρα-
3 τεῖσθαι τούτους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ πένητες μὲν ὀλίγοι εἶεν, κρείττους δὲ τῶν εὐπόρων πλειόνων ὄντων, οὐδεὶς ἂν ὀλιγαρχίαν προσαγορεύσειεν οὐδὲ τὴν τοιαύτην, εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὖσι πλουσίοις μὴ μετείη τῶν τιμῶν. μᾶλλον τοίνυν λεκτέον ὅτι
4 δῆμος μέν ἐστιν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κύριοι ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι· ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς δ' ὀλίγους· ἐλεύθεροι μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλούσιοι δ' ὀλίγοι.

καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμοντο τὰς ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ φασί τινες, ἡ κατὰ κάλλος, ὀλιγαρχία ἦν· ὀλίγον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν μεγάλων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τούτοις μόνον ἱκανῶς ἔχει διωρίσθαι τὰς πολιτείας ταύτας· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρια καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἰσίν, ἔτι διαληπτέον ὡς οὔτ' ἂν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες πλειόνων καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἄρχωσι, δῆμος, οἷον ἐν Ἀπολλωνίᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ἰονίῳ καὶ ἐν Θήρᾳ (ἐν τούτων γὰρ ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν πόλεων ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἦσαν οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας, ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν), οὔτε ἂν οἱ πλούσιοι διὰ τὸ κατὰ πλῆθος ὑπερέχειν, ὀλιγαρχία, οἷον ἐν Κολοφῶνι τὸ παλαιόν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο μακρὰν οὐσίαν οἱ πλείους πρὶν γενέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδούς), ἀλλ' ἔστι δημοκρατία μὲν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι πλείους ὄντες κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες. 6

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἓν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν. 7

ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῴου προηρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἴδη, πρῶτον μὲν ἂν ἀποδιωρίζομεν ὅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν ζῷον, οἷον ἔνιά τε τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικὸν καὶ δεκτικόν, οἷον στόμα καὶ κοιλίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἷς κινεῖται μορίοις ἕκαστον αὐτῶν· εἰ δὴ τοσαῦτα [εἴδη] μόνον, τούτων δ' εἶεν διαφοραί, λέγω δ' οἷον στόματός τινα πλείω γένη καὶ κοιλίας καὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κινητικῶν μορίων, ὁ τῆς συζεύξεως τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιήσει πλείω γένη ζῴων (οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ταὐτὸν ζῷον ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ὅτων), ὥσθ' ὅταν ληφθῶσι τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσουσιν εἴδη ζῴου, καὶ τοσαῦτ' εἴδη τοῦ ζῴου ὅσαιπερ αἱ συζεύξεις 8

9 τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων εἰσίν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται μερῶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις. ἓν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλῆθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναυσον (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι· τούτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς 10 τρυφὴν ἢ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν), τρίτον δ' ἀγοραῖον (λέγω δ' ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὠνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρῖβον), τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμῆσον, ὃ τούτων οὐδὲν ἧττόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον 11 ὑπάρχειν, εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ δουλεύσειν τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν. μὴ γὰρ ἓν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ᾗ πόλιν ἄξιον εἶναι καλεῖν τὴν φύσει δούλην· αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὔταρκες. διόπερ 12 ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κομψῶς τοῦτο, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἴρηται. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τεττάρων τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων πόλιν συγκεῖσθαι, λέγει δὲ τούτους ὑφάντην καὶ γεωργὸν καὶ σκυτοτόμον καὶ οἰκοδόμον· πάλιν δὲ προστίθησιν, ὡς οὐχ αὐτάρκων τούτων, χαλκέα καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις βοσκήμασιν, ἔτι δ' ἔμπορόν τε καὶ κάπηλον· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίνεται πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε χάριν πᾶσαν πόλιν συνεστηκυῖαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον, 13 ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν οὐ πρότερον ἀποδίδωσι μέρος πρὶν ἢ τῆς χώρας αὐξομένης καὶ τῆς τῶν πλησίον ἁπτομένης εἰς πόλεμον καταστῶσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι καὶ τοῖς ὁποσοισοῦν κοινωνοῖς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα τὸν ἀποδώσοντα καὶ κρινοῦντα 14 τὸ δίκαιον. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ψυχὴν ἄν τις θείη ζῴου μόριον μᾶλλον ἢ σῶμα, καὶ πόλεων τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον θετέον τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν συντεινόντων, τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ μετέχον δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ 15 βουλευόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. καὶ ταῦτ' εἴτε κεχωρισμένως ὑπάρχει τισὶν εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲν δια-

φέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ ὁπλιτεύειν καὶ γεωργεῖν συμβαίνει τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολλάκις· ὥστε εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα θετέα μόρια τῆς πόλεως, φανερὸν ὅτι τό γε ὁπλιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μόριον τῆς πόλεως. ἕβδομον δὲ τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὃ καλοῦμεν εὐπόρους. ὄγδοον δὲ τὸ δημιουργικὸν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν, εἴπερ ἄνευ ἀρχόντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν εἶναί τινας τοὺς δυναμένους ἄρχειν καὶ λειτουργοῦντας ἢ συνεχῶς ἢ κατὰ μέρος τῇ πόλει ταύτην τὴν λειτουργίαν. λοιπὰ δὲ περὶ ὧν τυγχάνομεν διωρικότες ἀρτίως, τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. εἴπερ οὖν ταῦτα δεῖ γενέσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ καλῶς γενέσθαι καὶ δικαίως, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναί τινας ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας δυνάμεις τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ πολλοῖς, οἷον τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς προπολεμοῦντας καὶ γεωργοῦντας καὶ τεχνίτας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς βουλευομένους τε καὶ κρίνοντας· ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες, καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς ἄρχειν οἴονται δύνασθαι· ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὔποροι καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς, ταῦτα ἐναντία μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστᾶσι, καὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον· ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ καὶ δημοκρατίας εἴδη πλείω καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, λέγωμεν. φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. εἴδη γὰρ πλείω τοῦ τε δήμου καὶ τῶν λεγομένων γνωρίμων ἐστίν, οἷον δήμου μὲν εἴδη ἓν μὲν οἱ γεωργοί, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ ὠνὴν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατρῖβον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πολεμικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικόν, τὸ δὲ πορ-

θμευτικόν, τὸ δ' ἁλιευτικόν (πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἕκαστα τούτων πολύοχλα, οἷον ἁλιεῖς μὲν ἐν Τάραντι καὶ Βυζαντίῳ, τριηρικὸν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν, ἐμπορικὸν δὲ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ καὶ Χίῳ, πορθμευτικὸν ἐν Τενέδῳ), πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ χερνητικὸν καὶ τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον οὐσίαν ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον
22 ἕτερον πλήθους εἶδος· τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, ἀρετή, παιδεία, καὶ τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν. δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι ὁποτερουσοῦν, ἀλλ'
23 ὁμοίους ἀμφοτέρους. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστ' ἐστὶν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, καθάπερ ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, κοινωνούντων ἁπάντων μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δῆμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν
24 τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος δημοκρατίας τοῦτο, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων ὄντων, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν, καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ μετέχειν· ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας 1292 a
25 ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τἆλλα μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ
26 μὴ ὁ νόμος. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δ' οἱ νόμοι μή εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάν-
27 τες. Ὅμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην,

πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος,
ἄδηλον. ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὤν, ζητεῖ μο-
ναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος
ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἦθος τὸ 28
αὐτό, καὶ ἄμφω δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιόνων, καὶ τὰ ψη-
φίσματα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς
καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. καὶ μάλιστα δ' ἑκά-
τεροι (παρ') ἑκατέροις ἰσχύουσιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοῖς
τυράννοις, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. αἴτιοι 29
δέ εἰσι τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς νόμους
οὗτοι, πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δῆμον· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς
γίνεσθαι μεγάλοις διὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν δῆμον πάντων εἶναι κύ-
ριον, τῆς δὲ τοῦ δήμου δόξης τούτους· πείθεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος
τούτοις. ἔτι δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι 30
δεῖν κρίνειν, ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν· ὥστε κα-
ταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί. εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτι-
μᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν·
ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν 31
μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχὰς
καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία
τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερὸν ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ᾗ ψη-
φίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία κυρίως· οὐδὲν
γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δη-
μοκρατίας εἴδη διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·

5 Ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ εἴδη, ἓν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι
τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων ὥστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν πλείους
ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας· ἄλλο
1292 b δέ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱρῶν-
ται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας (ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων
τοῦτο ποιῶσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ
ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρχικόν)· ἕτερον εἶδος ὀλιγαρ- 2
χίας, ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίῃ· τέταρτον δ', ὅταν

ὑπάρχῃ τό τε νῦν λεχθὲν καὶ ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἄρχοντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἴπομεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν.

3 Ὀλιγαρχίας μὲν οὖν εἴδη τοσαῦτα καὶ δημοκρατίας· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ' ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ' ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρ-
4 χεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα μετὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαπῶσι τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν νόμοι διαμένουσιν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες, κρατοῦσι δ' οἱ μεταβάλλοντες τὴν πολιτείαν.

6 Ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ τοσαῦτα εἴδη δημοκρατίας καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ἐστιν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα μέρη τοῦ δήμου κοινωνεῖν τῆς πολιτείας,
2 ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ γεωργικὸν καὶ τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν κύριον ᾖ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατὰ νόμους· ἔχουσι γὰρ ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν, ὥστε τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες ἐκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν, ὅταν
3 κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐξεῖναι (πᾶσι δημοκρατικόν)· διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν· σχολάζειν (δ') ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδων οὐσῶν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἐν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν, ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι
4 τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, μετέχειν μέντοι δυναμένους σχολάζειν. διόπερ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δημοκρατίᾳ οἱ νόμοι ἄρχουσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον· τρίτον δ' εἶδος τὸ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι,

ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι, μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, μὴ μέντοι
μετέχειν διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ
ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρχειν τὸν νόμον· τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας 5
ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. διὰ
γὰρ τὸ μείζους γεγονέναι πολὺ τὰς πόλεις τῶν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς·
καὶ προσόδων ὑπάρχειν εὐπορίας, μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς
πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους, κοινωνοῦσι δὲ καὶ
πολιτεύονται διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους
λαμβάνοντας μισθόν. καὶ μάλιστα δὲ σχολάζει τὸ τοιοῦτον 6
πλῆθος· οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδίζει αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέ-
λεια, τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει, ὥστε πολλάκις οὐ κοινωνοῦσι
τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὔτε τοῦ δικάζειν. διὸ γίνεται τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων
πλῆθος κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ νόμοι. τὰ μὲν οὖν 7
τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταύτας τὰς
ἀνάγκας ἐστίν· τὰ δὲ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ὅταν μὲν πλείους
ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ μὴ πολλὴν λίαν, τὸ τῆς
πρώτης ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδός ἐστιν· ποιοῦσι γὰρ ἐξουσίαν μετέχειν
τῷ κτωμένῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ 8
πολιτεύματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον
εἶναι κύριον· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλεῖον ἀπέχωσι τῆς μοναρχίας,
καὶ μήτε τοσαύτην ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν ὥστε σχολάζειν ἀμελοῦν-
τες, μήθ' οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως,
ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτούς.
ἐὰν δὲ δὴ ἐλάττους ὦσιν οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες ἢ οἱ τὸ πρό- 9
τερον, πλείω δέ, τὸ τῆς δευτέρας ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεται εἶδος,
μᾶλλον γὰρ ἰσχύοντες πλεονεκτεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν· διὸ αὐτοὶ μὲν
αἱροῦνται ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας,
διὰ δὲ τὸ μήπω οὕτως ἰσχυροὶ εἶναι ὥστ' ἄνευ νόμου ἄρχειν,
τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον. ἐὰν δ' ἐπιτείνωσι τῷ ἐλάττονες 10
ὄντες μείζονας οὐσίας ἔχειν, ἡ τρίτη ἐπίδοσις γίνεται τῆς
ὀλιγαρχίας, τὸ δι' αὐτῶν μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν, κατὰ νό-
μον δὲ τὸν κελεύοντα τῶν τελευτώντων διαδέχεσθαι τοὺς
υἱεῖς. ὅταν δὲ ἤδη πολὺ ὑπερτείνωσι ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς 11

πολυφιλίαις, ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ νόμος· καὶ τὸ τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀντίστροφον τῷ τελευταίῳ τῆς δημοκρατίας.

7 Ἔτι δ' εἰσὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι παρὰ δημοκρατίαν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν λέγουσί τε πάντες καὶ εἴρηται τῶν τεττάρων πολιτειῶν εἶδος ἕν· λέγουσι δὲ τέτταρας μοναρχίαν, ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατίαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην ἀριστοκρατίαν· πέμπτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοὺς πειρωμένους ἀριθμεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς τέτταρσι μόνον, 2 ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις. ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις (τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγα- 3 θοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτῶν)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰσί τινες αἳ πρός τε τὰς ὀλιγαρχουμένας ἔχουσι διαφοράς, καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι, καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν, ὅπου γε μὴ μόνον πλουτίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδην αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχάς. αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀρι- 4 στοκρατικὴ καλεῖται· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς. ὅπου οὖν ἡ πολιτεία βλέπει εἴς τε πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον, οἷον ἐν Καρχηδόνι, αὕτη ἀριστοκρατική ἐστιν, καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, εἰς ἀρετήν τε καὶ δῆμον, καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο 5 τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο εἴδη· καὶ τρίτον ὅσαι τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας ῥέπουσι πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον·

8 Λοιπὸν δ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν περί τε τῆς ὀνομαζομένης πολιτείας εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τυραννίδος· ἐτάξαμεν δ' οὕτως οὐκ οὖσαν οὔτε ταύτην παρέκβασιν οὔτε τὰς ἄρτι ῥηθείσας ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς πᾶσαι διημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας, ἔπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων, εἰσί τ' αὐτῶν αὗται παρεκβάσεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὴν εἴπομεν. τε- 2
λευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὔλογόν ἐστι ποιήσασθαι μνείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἥκιστα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τέτακται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, εἴρηται· νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς διωρισμένων τῶν περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὡς 3
ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, εἰώθασι δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν ἀποκλινούσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς εὐπορωτέροις. ἔτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν οἱ εὔποροι ὧν ἕνεκεν οἱ 4
ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοῦσιν· ὅθεν καὶ καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καὶ γνωρίμους τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶναί φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν μᾶλλον. δο- 5
1294 a κεῖ δ' εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατουμένην πόλιν ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομουμένην. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εὐνομία τὸ εὖ κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους, μὴ πείθεσθαι δέ. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν 6
ὑπολητέον εἶναι τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις, ἑτέραν δὲ τὸ καλῶς κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους οἷς ἐμμένουσιν (ἔστι γὰρ πείθεσθαι καὶ κακῶς κειμένοις). τοῦτο δὲ ἐνδέχεται διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐνδεχομένων αὐτοῖς, ἢ τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἀρίστοις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς 7
τιμὰς νενεμῆσθαι κατ' ἀρετήν· ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅρος ἀρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δ' ἐλευθερία· τὸ δ' ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀλι-

γαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν δήμοις, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλείονι μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κύριον.

8 ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται (μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας· σχεδὸν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὔποροι τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν

9 χώραν)· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὃ καλοῦσιν εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσίν· ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή), φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν

10 ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἕτερα πολιτείας εἴδη παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, εἴρηται, καὶ ποῖα ταῦτα, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων αἵ τ' ἀριστοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πόρρω αὗται ἀλλήλων, φανερόν·

Τίνα δὲ τρόπον γίνεται παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλι- 9
γαρχίαν ἡ καλουμένη πολιτεία, καὶ πῶς αὐτὴν δεῖ καθιστάναι, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται καὶ οἷς ὁρίζονται τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ληπτέον γὰρ τὴν τούτων διαίρεσιν, εἶτα ἐκ τούτων ἀφ' ἑκατέρας

2 ὥσπερ σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας συνθετέον. εἰσὶ δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως. ἡ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ληπτέον ἃ ἑκάτεραι νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοῖς εὐπόροις ζημίαν τάττουσιν, ἂν μὴ δικάζωσι, τοῖς δ' ἀπόροις οὐδένα μισθόν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις μισθόν, τοῖς δ' εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν ζη-

3 μίαν· κοινὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον τούτων ἀμφότερα ταῦτα· διὸ καὶ πολιτικόν, μέμικται γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. εἷς μὲν οὖν οὗτος τοῦ 1294 b
συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος, ἕτερος δὲ τὸ μέσον λαμβάνειν ὧν ἑκάτεροι τάττουσιν, οἷον ἐκκλησιάζειν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τιμήματος οὐδενὸς ἢ μικροῦ πάμπαν, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ μακροῦ τιμήματος· κοι-

νὸν δέ γε οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέσον ἑκατέρου τιμήματος τού-
των. τρίτον δ' ἐκ δυοῖν ταγμάτοιν, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὀλιγαρ- 4
χικοῦ νόμου, τὰ δ' ἐκ τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ. λέγω δ' οἷον δοκεῖ
δημοκρατικὸν μὲν εἶναι κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, τὸ
δ' αἱρετὰς ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ
τιμήματος, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τιμήματος· ἀριστοκρα- 5
τικὸν τοίνυν καὶ πολιτικὸν τὸ ἐξ ἑκατέρας ἑκάτερον λαβεῖν,
ἐκ μὲν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ αἱρετὰς ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐκ δὲ
τῆς δημοκρατίας τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος. ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς 6
μίξεως οὗτος, τοῦ δ' εὖ μεμῖχθαι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν
ὅρος, ὅταν ἐνδέχηται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρα-
τίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο πάσχουσιν οἱ λέ-
γοντες διὰ τὸ μεμῖχθαι καλῶς. πέπονθε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ
μέσον· ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἑκάτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄκρων. ὅπερ 7
συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. πολλοὶ γὰρ
ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὡς δημοκρατίας οὔσης διὰ τὸ δημοκρατικὰ
πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν, οἷον πρῶτον τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τῶν
παίδων· ὁμοίως γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσίων τρέφονται τοῖς τῶν
πενήτων, καὶ παιδεύονται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν ἂν δύναιντο
καὶ τῶν πενήτων οἱ παῖδες· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐχομέ- 8
νης ἡλικίας, καὶ ὅταν ἄνδρες γένωνται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον·
οὐδὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλούσιος καὶ ὁ πένης· οὕτω τὰ περὶ τὴν
τροφὴν ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις, καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα οἱ
πλούσιοι τοιαύτην οἵαν ἄν τις παρασκευάσαι δύναιτο καὶ
τῶν πενήτων ὁστισοῦν. ἔτι τῷ δύο τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς τὴν 9
μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν δῆμον, τῆς δὲ μετέχειν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ
γέροντας αἱροῦνται, τῆς δ' ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν. οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρ-
χίαν διὰ τὸ πολλὰ ἔχειν ὀλιγαρχικά, οἷον τὸ πάσας αἱρε-
τὰς εἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν κληρωτήν, καὶ ὀλίγους εἶναι κυρίους
θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά. δεῖ δ' ἐν 10
τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ μεμιγμένῃ καλῶς ἀμφότερα δοκεῖν εἶναι
καὶ μηδέτερον, καὶ σώζεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν, καὶ
δι' αὐτῆς μὴ τῷ πλείους [ἔξωθεν] εἶναι τοὺς βουλομένους (εἴη

γὰρ ἂν καὶ πονηρᾷ πολιτείᾳ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχον) ἀλλὰ τῷ μηδ' ἂν βούλεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν μηδὲν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων ὅλως. τίνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι πολιτείαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζομένας ἀριστοκρατίας, νῦν εἴρηται·

Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὡς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτήν, ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιούμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, πότερον ἀσύμφορος ἢ συμφέρει ταῖς πό-
2 λεσιν, καὶ τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ πῶς· τυραννίδος δ' εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (ἔν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τισὶν αἱροῦνται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν ἐγίγνοντό τινες μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον,
3 οὓς ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δέ τινας πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὗται διαφοράς, ἦσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἑκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, ἥπερ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμ-
4 βασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν ὑπομένει τῶν ἐλευθέρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν. τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας·

Τίς δ' ἀρίστη πολιτεία καὶ τίς ἄριστος βίος ταῖς πλεί-
σταις πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἣ φύσεως δεῖται καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς, μήτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατ' εὐχὴν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ βίον τε τὸν τοῖς

1295 a. 10 11

πλείστοις κοινωνῆσαι δυνατὸν καὶ πολιτείαν ἧς τὰς πλείστας πόλεις ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἃς καλοῦσιν ἀριστο- 2
κρατίας, περὶ ὧν νῦν εἴπομεν, τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρω πίπτουσι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων, τὰ δὲ γειτνιῶσι τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ· διὸ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾶς λεκτέον. ἡ δὲ δὴ κρίσις περὶ
ἁπάντων τούτων ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ καλῶς 3
ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς ἑκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος· τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους ὅρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
καὶ πόλεως ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ πολιτείας· ἡ γὰρ πολι-
1295 b τεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως. ἐν ἁπάσαις δὴ ταῖς πόλεσίν ἐστι 4
τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως, οἱ μὲν εὔποροι σφόδρα, οἱ δὲ ἄποροι σφόδρα, οἱ δὲ τρίτοι οἱ μέσοι τούτων. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτριον ἄριστον καὶ τὸ μέσον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τῶν
εὐτυχημάτων ἡ κτῆσις ἡ μέση βελτίστη πάντων· ῥᾴστη γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν· ὑπέρκαλον δὲ ἢ ὑπερίσχυρον ἢ ὑπερ- 5
ευγενῆ ἢ ὑπερπλούσιον, ἢ τἀναντία τούτοις, ὑπέρπτωχον ἢ ὑπερασθενῆ καὶ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, χαλεπὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθεῖν. γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι
μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν· τῶν δ' ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δι' ὕβριν, τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν. ἔτι δ' ἥκισθ' οὗτοι φυλαρχοῦσι καὶ βουλαρχοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα βλαβερὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ μὲν ἐν 6
ὑπεροχαῖς εὐτυχημάτων ὄντες, ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ φίλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρχεσθαι οὔτε βούλονται οὔτε ἐπίστανται (καὶ τοῦτ' εὐθὺς οἴκοθεν ὑπάρχει παισὶν οὖσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὴν τρυφὴν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς διδασκαλείοις ἄρχεσθαι σύνηθες αὐτοῖς), οἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἐνδείᾳ τούτων ταπει-
νοὶ λίαν. ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχειν οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἀλλ' ἄρχεσθαι 7
δουλικὴν ἀρχήν, οἱ δ' ἄρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, ἄρχειν δὲ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν. γίνεται οὖν [καὶ] δούλων καὶ δεσποτῶν πόλις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐλευθέρων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φθονούντων τῶν δὲ

καταφρονούντων. ἃ πλεῖστον ἀπέχει φιλίας καὶ κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς· ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλικόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁδοῦ βούλονται
8 κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα, τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστα τοῖς μέσοις· ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ἄριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν φαμὲν φύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. καὶ
9 σώζονται δ' ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὗτοι μάλιστα τῶν πολιτῶν. οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὔτε τῆς τούτων ἕτεροι, καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· καὶ διὰ τὸ μήτ' ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι μήτ' ἐπιβουλεύειν ἀκινδύνως διάγουσιν. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ηὔξατο Φωκυλίδης
10 "πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα· μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι." δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρίστη ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων, καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνδέχεται εὖ πολιτεύεσθαι πόλεις, ἐν αἷς δὴ πολὺ τὸ μέσον καὶ κρεῖττον μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, θατέρου μέρους· προστιθέμενον γὰρ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν καὶ
11 κωλύει γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολάς. διόπερ εὐτυχία μεγίστη τοὺς πολιτευομένους οὐσίαν ἔχειν μέσην καὶ ἱκανήν, ὡς ὅπου οἱ μὲν πολλὰ σφόδρα κέκτηνται οἱ δὲ μηδέν, ἢ δῆ- 1296 a
μος ἔσχατος γίγνεται ἢ ὀλιγαρχία ἄκρατος ἢ τυραννὶς δι' ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπερβολάς· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τῆς νεανικωτάτης καὶ ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας γίγνεται τυραννίς, ἐκ δὲ
12 τῶν μέσων καὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς πολὺ ἧττον. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν ὕστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὅτι δ' ἡ μέση βελτίστη, φανερόν· μόνη γὰρ ἀστασίαστος· ὅπου γὰρ πολὺ τὸ διὰ μέσου, ἥκιστα στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις
13 γίγνονται τῶν πολιτῶν. καὶ αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἀστασιαστότεραι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ μέσον· ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ῥᾴδιόν τε διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας, ὥστε μηδὲν καταλιπεῖν μέσον, καὶ πάντες σχεδὸν ἄποροι ἢ εὔποροί
14 εἰσιν. καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστεραι τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πολυχρονιώτεραι διὰ τοὺς μέσους (πλείους τε γάρ εἰσι καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχουσι τῶν τιμῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις

κνῖαν τοῦ μέσου πλεῖον, ἂν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνῃ τις. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις οὔσης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἱρετωτέρας ἐνίοις οὐδὲν κωλύει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

Τίς δὲ πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποία συμφέρει ποίοις, ἐχό- 12
μενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν. ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον περὶ πασῶν καθόλου ταὐτόν· δεῖ γὰρ κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ βουλόμενον μέρος τῆς πόλεως τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα πόλις ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. λέγω δὲ ποιὸν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσὸν
2 δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν, οἷον πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν γενναίων τοὺς ἀγεννεῖς ἢ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀπόρους, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχειν τῷ ποσῷ ὅσον λεί-
3 πεσθαι τῷ ποιῷ. διὸ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκριτέον. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου, οἷον ἐὰν μὲν τὸ τῶν γεωργῶν ὑπερτείνῃ πλῆθος, τὴν πρώτην δημοκρατίαν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθαρνούντων, τὴν τελευταίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς μεταξὺ τούτων· ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων μᾶλλον ὑπερτείνει τῷ ποιῷ ἢ λείπεται τῷ ποσῷ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον
4 εἶδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους. δεῖ δ' ἀεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προσλαμβάνειν τοὺς μέσους· ἄν τε γὰρ ὀλιγαρχικοὺς τοὺς νόμους τιθῇ, στοχάζεσθαι χρὴ τῶν μέσων, ἐάν τε δημοκρατικούς, προσάγεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις τούτους. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων ὑπερτείνει πλῆθος ἢ συναμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἢ καὶ θατέρου μόνον, ἐνταῦθ' ἐν-
5 δέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον. οὐδὲν γὰρ φοβερὸν μή ποτε συμφωνήσωσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τοῖς πένησιν ἐπὶ τούτους· 1297 a

κυΐαν τοῦ μέσου πλεῖον, ἂν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνῃ τις. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις οὔσης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἱρετωτέρας ἐνίοις οὐδὲν κωλύει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

12 Τίς δὲ πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποία συμφέρει ποίοις, ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν. ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον περὶ πασῶν καθόλου ταὐτόν· δεῖ γὰρ κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ βουλόμενον μέρος τῆς πόλεως τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα πόλις ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. λέγω δὲ ποιὸν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσὸν
2 δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν, οἷον πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν γενναίων τοὺς ἀγεννεῖς ἢ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀπόρους, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχειν τῷ ποσῷ ὅσον λεί-
3 πεσθαι τῷ ποιῷ. διὸ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκριτέον. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου, οἷον ἐὰν μὲν τὸ τῶν γεωργῶν ὑπερτείνῃ πλῆθος, τὴν πρώτην δημοκρατίαν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθαρνούντων, τὴν τελευταίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς μεταξὺ τούτων· ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων μᾶλλον ὑπερτείνει τῷ ποιῷ ἢ λείπεται τῷ ποσῷ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον
4 εἶδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους. δεῖ δ' ἀεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προσλαμβάνειν τοὺς μέσους· ἄν τε γὰρ ὀλιγαρχικοὺς τοὺς νόμους τιθῇ, στοχάζεσθαι χρὴ τῶν μέσων, ἐάν τε δημοκρατικούς, προσάγεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις τούτους. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων ὑπερτείνει πλῆθος ἢ συναμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἢ καὶ θατέρου μόνον, ἐνταῦθ' ἐν-
5 δέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον. οὐδὲν γὰρ φοβερὸν μή ποτε συμφωνήσωσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τοῖς πένησιν ἐπὶ τούτους· 1297 a

οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄτεροι βουλήσονται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἑτέροις, κοινοτέραν δ' ἂν ζητῶσιν, οὐδεμίαν εὑρήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης· ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειαν διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητὴς δ' ὁ μέσος. ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον ἡ πολιτεία μι- 6
χθῇ, τοσούτῳ μονιμωτέρα. διαμαρτάνουσι δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας, οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πλεῖον νέμειν τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ παρακρούεσθαι τὸν δῆμον. ἀνάγκη γὰρ χρόνῳ ποτὲ ἐκ τῶν ψευδῶς ἀγαθῶν ἀληθὲς συμβῆναι κακόν· αἱ γὰρ πλεονεξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τοῦ δήμου.

13 Ἔστι δ' ὅσα προφάσεως χάριν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις σο- φίζονται πρὸς τὸν δῆμον πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, περὶ ἐκκλησίαν, περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, περὶ δικαστήρια, περὶ ὅπλισιν, περὶ γυμνασίαν· περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν τὸ ἐξεῖναι ἐκκλησιάζειν πᾶσι, ζημίαν δὲ ἐπικεῖσθαι τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἐὰν μὴ ἐκκλησιάζωσιν, ἢ μόνοις ἢ μείζω πολλῷ, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς 2
τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι τίμημα μὴ ἐξεῖναι ἐξόμνυσθαι, τοῖς δ' ἀπόροις ἐξεῖναι, καὶ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια τοῖς μὲν εὐπόροις εἶναι ζημίαν, ἂν μὴ δικάζωσι, τοῖς δ' ἀπόροις ἄδειαν, ἢ τοῖς μὲν μεγάλην τοῖς δὲ μικράν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Χαρώνδου νόμοις· ἐνιαχοῦ δ' ἔξεστι μὲν πᾶσιν ἀπογραψαμένοις 3
ἐκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπογραψάμενοι μήτ' ἐκκλησιάζωσι μήτε δικάζωσιν, ἐπίκεινται μεγάλαι ζημίαι τούτοις, ἵνα διὰ μὲν τὴν ζημίαν φεύγωσι τὸ ἀπογράφεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀπογράφεσθαι μὴ δικάζωσι μηδ' ἐκκλησιάζωσιν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὅπλα κεκτῆσθαι 4
καὶ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι νομοθετοῦσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις ἔξεστι μὴ κεκτῆσθαι, τοῖς δ' εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιον μὴ κεκτημένοις· κἂν μὴ γυμνάζωνται, τοῖς μὲν οὐδεμία ζημία, τοῖς δ' εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιον, ὅπως οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν ζημίαν μετέχωσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ μετέχωσιν. ταῦτα 5

μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχικὰ τὰ σοφίσματα τῆς νομοθεσίας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀντισοφίζονται· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις μισθὸν πορίζουσιν ἐκκλησιάζουσι καὶ δικάζουσιν, τοῖς
6 δ' εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν τάττουσι ζημίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι εἴ τις βούλεται μιγνύναι δικαίως, δεῖ τὰ παρ' ἑκατέροις συνάγειν καὶ τοῖς μὲν μισθὸν πορίζειν τοῖς δὲ ζημίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν κοινωνοῖεν ἅπαντες, ἐκείνως δ' ἡ πολιτεία γίγνεται
7 τῶν ἑτέρων μόνον. δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἐχόντων μόνον· τοῦ δὲ τιμήματος τὸ πλῆθος ἁπλῶς μὲν ὁρισαμένους οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τοσοῦτον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ σκεψαμένους τὸ ποῖον ἐπιβάλλει μακρότατον ὥστε τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι πλείους τῶν μὴ μετε-
8 χόντων, τοῦτο τάττειν. ἐθέλουσι γὰρ οἱ πένητες καὶ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν, ἐὰν μήτε ὑβρίζῃ τις αὐτοὺς μήτε ἀφαιρῆται μηδὲν τῆς οὐσίας. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐ ῥᾴδιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμβαίνει χαρίεντας εἶναι τοὺς μετέχον-
9 τας τοῦ πολιτεύματος. καὶ εἰώθασι δέ, ὅταν πόλεμος ᾖ, ὀκνεῖν, ἂν μὴ λαμβάνωσι τροφήν, ἄποροι δὲ ὦσιν· ἐὰν δὲ πορίζῃ τις τροφήν, βούλονται πολεμεῖν. ἔστι δ' ἡ πολιτεία παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὁπλιτευόντων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡπλιτευκότων· ἐν Μαλιεῦσι δὲ ἡ μὲν πολιτεία ἦν ἐκ τούτων, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ᾑροῦντο ἐκ τῶν στρατευο-
10 μένων. καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο μετὰ τὰς βασιλείας ἐκ τῶν πολεμούντων, ἡ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ τῶν ἱππέων (τὴν γὰρ ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ὁ πόλεμος εἶχεν· ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ συντάξεως ἄχρηστον τὸ ὁπλιτικόν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐμπειρίαι καὶ τάξεις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις οὐχ ὑπῆρχον, ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εἶναι τὴν ἰσχύν), αὐξανομένων δὲ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἰσχυσάντων μᾶλλον πλείους μετεῖχον τῆς πο-
11 λιτείας. διόπερ ἃς νῦν καλοῦμεν πολιτείας, οἱ πρότερον ἐκάλουν δημοκρατίας. ἦσαν δὲ αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι εὐλόγως ὀλιγαρχικαὶ καὶ βασιλικαί· δι' ὀλιγανθρωπίαν γὰρ οὐκ

εἶχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον, ὥστ' ὀλίγοι τε ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι. διὰ 12
τίνα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἰτίαν αἱ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τί
παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἕτεραι (δημοκρατία τε γὰρ οὐ μία
τὸν ἀριθμόν ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως), ἔτι δὲ τίνες αἱ
διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
τίς ἀρίστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν, καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ποία ποίοις ἁρμόττει τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴρηται·

14 Πάλιν δὲ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς περὶ ἑκάστης λέγωμεν
περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς, λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν.
ἔστι δὴ τρία μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν, περὶ ὧν δεῖ θεω-
ρεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον νομοθέτην ἑκάστῃ τὸ συμφέρον· ὧν ἐχόν-
των καλῶς ἀνάγκη τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχειν καλῶς, καὶ τὰς
πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἕκαστον τού-
των. ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἓν μὲν τί τὸ βουλευόμενον 2
1298 a περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (τοῦτο δ'
ἐστὶν ἃς δεῖ καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίγνε-
σθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν), τρίτον δὲ τί τὸ δικάζον. κύριον δ' ἐστὶ 3
τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ συμμαχίας καὶ
διαλύσεως, καὶ περὶ νόμων, καὶ περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς καὶ
δημεύσεως, καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεως καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀναγ-
καῖον δ' ἤτοι πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις ἀποδεδόσθαι πάσας ταύτας
τὰς κρίσεις ἢ τισὶ πάσας (οἷον ἀρχῇ τινὶ μιᾷ ἢ πλείοσιν, ἢ
ἑτέραις ἑτέρας) ἢ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πᾶσι τινὰς δὲ τισίν. τὸ 4
μὲν οὖν πάντας καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων δημοτικόν· τὴν τοιαύτην
γὰρ ἰσότητα ζητεῖ ὁ δῆμος· εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ τρόποι τοῦ πάντας
πλείους, εἷς μὲν τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντας ἀθρόους,
ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Τηλεκλέους ἐστὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου (καὶ
ἐν ἄλλαις δὲ πολιτείαις βουλεύονται αἱ συναρχίαι συνιοῦ-
σαι, εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζουσι πάντες κατὰ μέρος ἐκ
τῶν φυλῶν καὶ τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐλαχίστων παντελῶς, ἕως
ἂν διέλθῃ διὰ πάντων), συνιέναι δὲ μόνον περί τε νόμων
θέσεως καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰ παραγγελλό-

μενα ἀκουσομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ πάντας ἀθρόους, συνιέναι δὲ μόνον πρός τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας [αἱρησομένους] καὶ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας καὶ περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ πρὸς εὐθύνας, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς βουλεύεσθαι τὰς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις τεταγμένας, αἱρετὰς οὔσας ἐξ ἁπάντων ἢ κληρωτάς· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ἁπαντᾶν τοὺς πολίτας, καὶ περὶ πολέμου βουλευσομένους καὶ συμμαχίας, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖν αἱρετὰς οὔσας, ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τοιαῦται δ' εἰσὶν ὅσας ἄρχειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς ἐπισταμένους· τέταρτος δὲ τρόπος τὸ πάντας περὶ πάντων βουλεύεσθαι συνιόντας, τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς περὶ μηδενὸς κρίνειν ἀλλὰ μόνον προανακρίνειν, ὅνπερ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διοικεῖται τρόπον, ἣν ἀνάλογόν φαμεν εἶναι ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τε δυναστευτικῇ καὶ μοναρχίᾳ τυραννικῇ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ τρόποι δημοκρατικοὶ πάντες, τὸ δὲ τινὰς περὶ πάντων ὀλιγαρχικόν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διαφορὰς πλείους. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μετριωτέρων αἱρετοί τε ὦσι καὶ πλείους διὰ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ τιμήματος, καὶ περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινῶσιν ἀλλ' ἀκολουθῶσι, καὶ ἐξῇ κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν, ὀλιγαρχία μὲν πολιτικὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη διὰ τὸ μετριάζειν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι μετέχωσιν ἀλλ' αἱρετοί, κατὰ νόμον δ' ἄρχωσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλιγαρχικόν· ὅταν δὲ καὶ αἱρῶνται αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ κύριοι τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίῃ καὶ κύριοι τῶν νόμων ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχικὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ταύτην. ὅταν δὲ τινῶν τινές, οἷον πολέμου μὲν καὶ ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὗτοι αἱρετοὶ [ἢ κληρωτοί], ἀριστοκρατία ἡ πολιτεία· ἐὰν δ' ἐνίων μὲν αἱρετοὶ ἐνίων δὲ κληρωτοί, καὶ κληρωτοὶ ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκ προκρίτων, ἢ κοινῇ αἱρετοὶ καὶ κληρωτοί, τὰ μὲν πολιτείας ἀριστοκρατικῆς ἐστὶ τούτων, τὰ δὲ πολιτείας αὐτῆς. διῄρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον

πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖται ἑκάστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν· συμφέρει δὲ δη- 12
μοκρατίᾳ τε τῇ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ νῦν (λέγω
δὲ τοιαύτην ἐν ᾗ κύριος ὁ δῆμος καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐστίν) πρὸς
τὸ βουλεύεσθαι βέλτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δικα-
στηρίων ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις (τάττουσι γὰρ ζημίαν τούτοις
οὓς βούλονται δικάζειν, ἵνα δικάζωσιν, οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ μι-
σθὸν τοῖς ἀπόροις), τοῦτο δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖν·
βουλεύσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινῇ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν
δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους· συμ- 13
φέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ αἱρετοὺς εἶναι τοὺς βουλευομένους ἢ κληρωτοὺς
ἴσως ἐκ τῶν μορίων· συμφέρει δὲ κἂν ὑπερβάλλωσι πολὺ
κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἢ μὴ πᾶσι
διδόναι μισθόν, ἀλλ' ὅσοι σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τῶν γνωρί-
μων πλῆθος, ἢ ἀποκληροῦν τοὺς πλείους· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρ- 14
χίαις ἢ προσαιρεῖσθαί τινας ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ἢ κατασκευά-
σαντας ἀρχεῖον οἷον ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις ἐστὶν οὓς καλοῦσι
προβούλους καὶ νομοφύλακας, [καὶ] περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν
περὶ ὧν ἂν οὗτοι προβουλεύσωσιν (οὕτω γὰρ μεθέξει ὁ δῆμος
τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ λύειν οὐδὲν δυνήσεται τῶν περὶ τὴν πο-
λιτείαν)· ἔτι ἢ ταὐτὰ ψηφίζεσθαι τὸν δῆμον ἢ μηδὲν ἐν- 15
αντίον τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις, ἢ τῆς συμβουλῆς μὲν μεταδιδό-
ναι πᾶσι, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. καὶ τὸ ἀντικεί-
μενον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις γιγνομένου δεῖ ποιεῖν· ἀπο-
ψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον [εἶναι] δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, κατα-
ψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ' ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ
τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνεστραμμένως 16
ποιοῦσιν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριοι, κα-
ταψηφισάμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς
1299 a πλείους αἰεί. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ βουλευομένου καὶ τοῦ κυρίου
δὴ τῆς πολιτείας τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον·

15 Ἐχομένη δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρεσις· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλὰς δια-

φοράς, πόσαι τε ἀρχαί, καὶ κύριαι τίνων, καὶ περὶ χρόνου, πόσος ἑκάστης ἀρχῆς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἑξαμήνους, οἱ δὲ δι' ἐλάττονος, οἱ δ' ἐνιαυσίας, οἱ δὲ πολυχρονιωτέρας ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς), καὶ πότερον εἶναι δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀιδίους ἢ πολυχρονίους ἢ μηδέτερον ἀλλὰ πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτούς, ἢ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν δὶς ἀλλ' ἅπαξ μόνον· ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων
2 καὶ πῶς. περὶ πάντων γὰρ τούτων δεῖ δύνασθαι διελεῖν κατὰ πόσους ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τρόπους, κἄπειτα προσαρμόσαι, ποίαις ποῖαι πολιτείαις συμφέρουσιν. ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο διορίσαι ῥᾴδιον, ποίας δεῖ καλεῖν ἀρχάς· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται, διόπερ πάντας οὔτε τοὺς αἱρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρωτοὺς ἄρχοντας θετέον, οἷον τοὺς ἱερεῖς πρῶτον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς
3 θετέον. ἔτι δὲ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες· αἱροῦνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν, ἢ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν πρός τινα πρᾶξιν, οἷον στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων, ἢ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ὁ γυναικονόμος ἢ παιδονόμος· αἱ δ' οἰκονομικαί (πολλάκις γὰρ αἱροῦνται σιτομέτρας)· αἱ δ' ὑπηρετικαὶ καὶ πρὸς ἃς, ἂν εὐπορῶσι, τάττουσι δούλους.
4 μάλιστα δ' ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας, ὅσαις ἀποδέδοται βουλεύσασθαί τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρῖναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν (οὐ γάρ πω κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητούντων περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος), ἔχει δέ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν.
5 ποῖαι δ' ἀρχαὶ καὶ πόσαι ἀναγκαῖαι εἰ ἔσται πόλις, καὶ ποῖαι ἀναγκαῖαι μὲν οὔ χρήσιμοι δὲ πρὸς σπουδαίαν πολιτείαν, μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε πρὸς ἅπασάν τε δὴ πο-
6 λιτείαν καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς μικρὰς πόλεις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ ταῖς μεγάλαις ἐνδέχεταί τε καὶ δεῖ μίαν τετάχθαι πρὸς ἓν ἔργον (πολλούς τε γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἀρχεῖα ἐνδέχεται βαδίζειν διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας, ὥστε τὰς μὲν δια-

λείπειν πολὺν χρόνον τὰς δ' ἅπαξ ἄρχειν, καὶ βέλτιον
ἕκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης
1299 b ἢ πολυπραγματούσης)· ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ἀνάγκη συνάγειν 7
εἰς ὀλίγους πολλὰς ἀρχάς· διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὐ
ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι· τίνες γὰρ οἱ
τούτους ἔσονται διαδεξόμενοι πάλιν; δέονται δ' ἐνίοτε τῶν
5 αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ νόμων αἱ μικραὶ ταῖς μεγάλαις· πλὴν
αἱ μὲν δέονται πολλάκις τῶν αὐτῶν, ταῖς δ' ἐν πολλῷ
χρόνῳ τοῦτο συμβαίνει. διόπερ οὐδὲν κωλύει πολλὰς ἐπι- 8
μελείας ἅμα προστάττειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδιοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις),
καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ ἀρχεῖα οἷον
10 ὀβελισκολύχνια ποιεῖν. ἐὰν οὖν ἔχωμεν λέγειν πόσας
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν πάσῃ πόλει, καὶ πόσας οὐκ ἀναγ-
καῖον μὲν δεῖ δ' ὑπάρχειν, ῥᾷον ἂν τις εἰδὼς ταῦτα συνά-
γοι ποίας ἁρμόττει συνάγειν ἀρχὰς εἰς μίαν ἀρχήν.
ἁρμόττει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λεληθέναι, ποίων δεῖ κατὰ τόπον 9
15 ἀρχεῖα πολλὰ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ποίων πανταχοῦ μίαν
ἀρχὴν εἶναι κυρίαν, οἷον εὐκοσμίας πότερον ἐν ἀγορᾷ μὲν
ἀγορανόμον, ἄλλον δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τόπον, ἢ πανταχοῦ τὸν
αὐτόν· καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν ἢ κατὰ
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δ' οἷον ἕνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας, ἢ παίδων
20 ἄλλον καὶ γυναικῶν· καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας δέ, πότερον 10
διαφέρει καθ' ἑκάστην καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος ἢ οὐδέν, οἷον
ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ μο-
ναρχίᾳ πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ μέν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ κύριαι, οὐκ ἐξ
ἴσων δ' οὐδ' ἐξ ὁμοίων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρων ἐν ἑτέραις, οἷον ἐν μὲν
25 ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρ-
χίαις ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ τῶν
ἐλευθέρων, ἢ τυγχάνουσι μέν τινες οὖσαι καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς
διαφοραὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔστι δ' ὅπου συμφέρουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ
καὶ ὅπου διαφέρουσιν (ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ ἁρμόττει μεγάλας,
30 ἔνθα δ' εἶναι μικρὰς τὰς αὐτάς). οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἴδιαί 11
τινές εἰσιν, οἷον ἡ τῶν προβούλων· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ δημοκρα-

τική, βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικόν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναί τι τοιοῦτον ᾧ ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται τοῦ δήμου προβουλεύειν, ὅπως ἀσχολῶν ἔσται· τοῦτο δ', ἐὰν ὀλίγοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχικόν· τοὺς δὲ προβούλους ὀλίγους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος, ὥστ' ὀλι- 35
12 γαρχικόν. ἀλλ' ὅπου ἄμφω αὗται αἱ ἀρχαί, οἱ πρόβουλοι καθεστᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς βουλευταῖς· ὁ μὲν γὰρ βουλευτὴς δημοτικόν, ὁ δὲ πρόβουλος ὀλιγαρχικόν. καταλύεται δὲ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς ἡ δύναμις ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἐν
13 αἷς αὐτὸς συνιὼν ὁ δῆμος χρηματίζει περὶ πάντων. τοῦτο 1300 a
δὲ συμβαίνειν εἴωθεν, ὅταν εὐπορία τις ᾖ μισθοῦ τοῖς ἐκκλησιάζουσιν· σχολάζοντες γὰρ συλλέγονταί τε πολλάκις καὶ ἅπαντα αὐτοὶ κρίνουσιν. παιδονόμος δὲ καὶ γυναικονόμος, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἄρχων κύριός ἐστι τοιαύτης ἐπιμε- 5
λείας, ἀριστοκρατικόν, δημοκρατικὸν δ' οὔ (πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε κωλύειν ἐξιέναι τὰς τῶν ἀπόρων;) οὐδ' ὀλιγαρχικόν (τρυ-
14 φῶσι γὰρ αἱ τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων). ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω νῦν, περὶ δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν καταστάσεις πειρατέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς διελθεῖν. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ 10
ἐν τρισὶν ὅροις, ὧν συντιθεμένων ἀναγκαῖον πάντας εἰλῆφθαι τοὺς τρόπους. ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἓν μὲν τίνες οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς ἀρχάς, δεύτερον δ' ἐκ τίνων, λοιπὸν δὲ
15 τίνα τρόπον. ἑκάστου δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων διαφοραὶ τρεῖς εἰσίν· ἢ γὰρ πάντες οἱ πολῖται καθιστᾶσιν ἢ τινές, καὶ ἢ 15
ἐκ πάντων ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, οἷον ἢ τιμήματι ἢ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ ἄλλῳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Μεγάροις ἐκ τῶν συγκατελθόντων καὶ συμμαχεσαμένων πρὸς τὸν δῆ-
16 μον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ· πάλιν ταῦτα συν- 20
δυαζόμενα, λέγω δὲ τὰς μὲν τινὲς τὰς δὲ πάντες, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. τούτων δ' ἑκάστης ἔσονται τῆς διαφορᾶς
17 τρόποι τέτταρες. †ἢ γὰρ[1] πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει, ἢ πάν-

[1] In the following attempt to frame a text of 1300 a 23–b 5 the similar attempts of C. Thurot, Spengel, and Susemihl (see the critical

τες ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ (καὶ ἢ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἢ ὡς ἀνὰ μέ-
ρος, οἷον κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ δήμους καὶ φρατρίας, ἕως ἂν
διέλθῃ διὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, ἢ ἀεὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων), καὶ
ἢ τὰ μὲν οὕτω τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως· πάλιν εἰ τινὲς οἱ καθιστάντες, 18
ἢ ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἢ ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἢ ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέ-
σει ἢ ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, ἢ τὰ μὲν οὕτω τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, λέγω
δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ. ὥστε δώδεκα
οἱ τρόποι γίνονται χωρὶς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν. τούτων δ' 19
αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικαί, τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων
αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς
δ' αἱρέσει τῶν ἀρχῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας ἅμα μὲν καθι-
στάναι, ἐξ ἁπάντων δ' ἢ ἐκ τινῶν, ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ
ἀμφοῖν, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν
(τὸ δὲ ἀμφοῖν λέγω τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει), πο-

notes on this passage) have been kept in view. Added words are printed in thicker type, and omitted words are placed within square brackets :—

ἢ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἢ πάντες ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ (καὶ [ἢ] ἐξ ἁπάντων ἢ ὡς ἀνὰ μέρος, οἷον κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ δήμους καὶ φρατρίας, ἕως ἂν διέλθῃ διὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, ἢ ἀεὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων), [καὶ] ἢ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ἢ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ ἢ τὰ μὲν οὕτω τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως· πάλιν εἰ τινὲς οἱ καθιστάντες, ἢ ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἢ ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἢ ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ἢ ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, ἢ τὰ μὲν οὕτω τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, λέγω δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ. ὥστε δώδεκα οἱ τρόποι γίνονται χωρὶς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν. τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικαί, τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ [γίνεσθαι] ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει τῶν ἀρχῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας ἅμα μὲν καθιστάναι, ἐξ ἁπάντων δ' [ἢ ἐκ τινῶν], ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ ἀμφοῖν, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ ἀμφοῖν (τὸ δὲ ἀμφοῖν λέγω τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει), πολιτικόν· καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ [ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει, ὀλιγαρχικόν], ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δέ, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ· τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, [μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως,] καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἁπάντων τό τε ἐκ τινῶν πάντας αἱρέσει ἀριστοκρατικόν,

20 λιτικόν. καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει, ὀλιγαρχικόν· ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀρι-
21 στοκρατικῶς, ἢ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἁπάντων, τό τε ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει πάντας
22 ἀριστοκρατικόν†. οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοσοῦτοι τὸν ἀριθμόν εἰσι, καὶ διῄρηνται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτως· τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις, ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, [καὶ] τίνες εἰσίν, ἔσται φανερόν. λέγω δὲ δύναμιν ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὴν κυρίαν τῶν προσόδων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν τῆς φυλακῆς· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος δυνάμεως οἷον στρατηγίας καὶ τῆς τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν συμβολαίων κυρίας.

Λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν τριῶν περὶ δικαστηρίων εἰπεῖν. ληπτέον **16** δὲ καὶ τούτων τοὺς τρόπους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν τρισὶν ὅροις, ἐξ ὧν τε καὶ περὶ ὧν καὶ πῶς. λέγω δὲ ἐξ ὧν μέν, πότερον ἐκ πάντων ἢ ἐκ τινῶν· περὶ ὧν δέ, πόσα εἴδη δικαστηρίων· τὸ δὲ
2 πῶς, πότερον κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει. πρῶτον οὖν διαιρείσθω πόσα εἴδη δικαστηρίων. ἔστι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀκτώ, ἓν μὲν εὐθυντικόν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴ τίς τι τῶν κοινῶν ἀδικεῖ, ἕτερον ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει, τέταρτον καὶ ἄρχουσι καὶ ἰδιώταις ὅσα περὶ ζημιώσεων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, πέμπτον τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα
3 τό τε φονικὸν καὶ τὸ ξενικόν. φονικοῦ μὲν οὖν εἴδη, ἄν τ' ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικασταῖς ἄν τ' ἐν ἄλλοις, περί τε τῶν ἐκ προνοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκουσίων, καὶ ὅσα ὁμολογεῖται μέν, ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, τέταρτον δὲ ὅσα τοῖς φεύγουσι φόνου ἐπὶ καθόδῳ ἐπιφέρεται, οἷον Ἀθήνησι λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ δικαστήριον, συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα

ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσιν· τοῦ δὲ ξενικοῦ ἓν μὲν ξένοις πρὸς ξένους, ἄλλο ξένοις πρὸς 4 ἀστούς. ἔτι δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμιαῖα καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρῷ πλείονος· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν, οὐκ ἐμπίπτει δὲ εἰς δικαστῶν πλῆθος. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων 5 ἀφείσθω καὶ τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ξενικῶν, περὶ δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγωμεν, περὶ ὧν μὴ γινομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ κινήσεις. ἀνάγκη δ' ἤτοι πάντας περὶ πάντων κρίνειν τῶν διῃρημένων αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ, ἢ πάντας περὶ πάντων τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δ' αἱρέσει, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων τῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν κλήρῳ τοὺς δ' 1301 a αἱρετούς. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ τρόποι τέτταρες τῶν ἀριθμόν, το- 6 σοῦτοι δ' ἕτεροι καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκ τινῶν καὶ οἱ δικάζοντες περὶ πάντων αἱρέσει, ἢ ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἢ τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δὲ αἱρέσει, ἢ ἔνια δικαστήρια περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ κληρωτῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθησαν, οἱ τρόποι . . . τοῖς εἰρημένοις· ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ συνδυαζόμενα, λέγω δ' οἷον τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάν- 7 των τὰ δ' ἐκ τινῶν τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, οἷον εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δικαστηρίου εἶεν οἱ μὲν ἐκ πάντων οἱ δ' ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ ἀμφοῖν. ὅσους μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται τρόπους 8 εἶναι τὰ δικαστήρια, εἴρηται· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα δημοτικά, ὅσα ἐκ πάντων [ἢ] περὶ πάντων, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα ὀλιγαρχικά, ὅσα ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων, τὰ δὲ τρίτα ἀριστοκρατικὰ καὶ πολιτικά, ὅσα τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰ δ' ἐκ τινῶν.

Η′ (Ε′).

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ὧν προειλόμεθα σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων· ἐκ τίνων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων, καὶ τίνες ἑκάστης πολιτείας

φθοραί, καὶ ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται, ἔτι δὲ σωτηρίαι τίνες καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης εἰσίν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων ἂν μάλιστα σώζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστη, σκε-
2 πτέον ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλαὶ γεγένηνται πολιτεῖαι πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τούτου
3 δ' ἁμαρτανόντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὁτιοῦν ὄντας οἴεσθαι ἁπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἁπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἕν τι ὄντας ὅλως εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ' οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες
4 ἁπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι)· εἶτα οἱ μὲν ὡς ἴσοι ὄντες πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσι μετέχειν, οἱ δ' ὡς ἄνισοι
5 ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν· τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον. ἔχουσι μὲν οὖν τι πᾶσαι δίκαιον, ἡμαρτημέναι δ' ἁπλῶς εἰσίν· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἑκάτεροι τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες μετέχωσι τῆς πολιτείας,
6 στασιάζουσιν[1] . . . πάντων δὲ δικαιότατα μὲν ἂν στασιάζοιεν, ἥκιστα δὲ τοῦτο πράττουσιν οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες· μά-
7 λιστα γὰρ εὔλογον ἀνίσους ἁπλῶς εἶναι τούτους μόνον. εἰσὶ 1301 b δέ τινες οἳ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἴσων αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος. ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν αὗται καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεών εἰσιν, ὅθεν
8 στασιάζουσιν (διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται διχῶς· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἄλλην μεταστήσωσιν, οἷον ἐκ δημοκρατίας ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ δημοκρατίαν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἢ πολιτείαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐκ τούτων, ἢ ταύτας ἐξ ἐκείνων· ὁτὲ δ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν καθε-
στηκυῖαν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται τὴν αὐτήν, δι' αὐτῶν δ' εἶναι βούλονται ταύτην, οἷον τὴν

[1] The insertion here of c. 3. 1303 b 3, στασιάζουσι δὲ . . . 7, ὄντες is suggested in the critical note on 1301 a 39.

ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν· ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ 9
ἧττον, οἷον ἡ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχεῖ-
σθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ἢ δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον
δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν, ἢ ἵνα ἐπιταθῶσιν ἢ ἀνεθῶσιν· ἔτι πρὸς 10
τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας, οἷον ἀρχήν τινα κατα-
στῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί φασι Λύσανδρόν
τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ Παυσα-
νίαν τὸν βασιλέα τὴν ἐφορείαν· καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ με-
τέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον, ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρ-
χων βουλὴν ἐποίησαν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκές ἐστιν 11
ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν
ἐπιψηφίζηται ἀρχή τις, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ
εἷς ἦν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ)· πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον
ἡ στάσις· οὐ μὴν (εἰ) τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον (ἀίδιος
γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐν ἴσοις)· ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον
ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν. ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἴσον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ 12
ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ
πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον, κατ' ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ
λόγῳ, οἷον ὑπερέχει κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἴσῳ τὰ τρία τοῖν
δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ
ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός· ἴσον γὰρ μέρος τὰ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ
τὸ ἓν τῶν δυοῖν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἡμίση. ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ τὸ 13
ἁπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ
ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἱ μὲν ὅτι, ἐὰν κατά τι ἴσοι ὦσιν, ὅλως
ἴσοι νομίζουσιν εἶναι, οἱ δ' ὅτι, ἐὰν κατά τι ἄνισοι, πάν-
των ἀνίσων ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται 14
πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία· εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ
1302 a ἐν ὀλίγοις, ταῦτα δ' ἐν πλείοσιν· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀγα-
θοὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἑκατόν, εὔποροι δὲ πολλαχοῦ. τὸ δὲ
ἁπλῶς πάντῃ καθ' ἑκατέραν τετάχθαι τὴν ἰσότητα φαῦ-
λον. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος· οὐδεμία γὰρ μόνιμος
ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ 15

τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου μὴ ἀπαντᾶν εἰς τὸ τέλος κακόν τι. διὸ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ἀριθμητικῇ ἰσότητι χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ κατ' ἀξίαν. ὅμως δὲ ἀσφαλεστέρα καὶ
16 ἀστασίαστος μᾶλλον ἡ δημοκρατία τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐγγίγνονται δύο, ἥ τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσις καὶ ἔτι ἡ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μόνον, αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται τῷ δήμῳ στάσις· ἔτι δὲ ἡ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ δήμου ἢ [ἡ] τῶν ὀλίγων, ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἀσφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν.

'Επεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τίνων αἵ τε στάσεις γίγνονται **2** καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, ληπτέον καθόλου πρῶτον (τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας) αὐτῶν. εἰσὶ δὴ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τρεῖς τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἃς διοριστέον καθ' αὑτὰς τύπῳ πρῶτον. (δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν πῶς τε ἔχοντες στασιάζουσι καὶ τίνων ἕνεκεν) καὶ τρίτον τίνες ἀρχαὶ γίνονται τῶν πολιτι-
2 κῶν ταραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεων. τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν αἰτίαν καθόλου μάλιστα θετέον περὶ ἧς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰσότητος ἐφιέμενοι στασιάζουσιν, ἂν νομίζωσιν ἔλαττον ἔχειν ὄντες ἴσοι τοῖς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀνισότητος καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς, ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ
3 πλέον ἔχειν ἀλλ' ἴσον ἢ ἔλαττον (τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι δικαίως, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως)· ἐλάττους τε γὰρ ὄντες ὅπως ἴσοι ὦσι στασιάζουσι, καὶ ἴσοι ὄντες ὅπως μείζους. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες στασιάζουσιν, εἴρηται· περὶ ὧν δὲ στασιάζουσιν, ἐστὶ κέρδος καὶ τιμὴ καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις· καὶ γὰρ ἀτιμίαν φεύγοντες καὶ ζημίαν, ἢ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν
4 φίλων, στασιάζουσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· αἱ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων, ὅθεν αὐτοί τε διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν
5 ἑπτὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, ἔστι δ' ὡς πλείους. ὧν δύο μέν ἐστι ταὐτὰ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως· διὰ κέρδος γὰρ

καὶ διὰ τιμὴν παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ἵνα κτή-
40 σωνται σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἑτέ-
1302 b ρους ὁρῶντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δ' ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας
τούτων· ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν, διὰ φόβον, διὰ ὑπεροχήν, διὰ κα- 6
ταφρόνησιν, διὰ αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· ἔτι δὲ
ἄλλον τρόπον δι' ἐριθείαν, δι' ὀλιγωρίαν, διὰ μικρότητα,
3 δι' ἀνομοιότητα. τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι
δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδόν ἐστι φανερόν· ὑβριζόντων
τε γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ πλεονεκτούντων στασιάζουσι
καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τὰς διδούσας
τὴν ἐξουσίαν· ἡ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
10 ἰδίων, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμή, καὶ 2
τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αἰτία στάσεως· καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμα-
ζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλους ὁρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν· ταῦτα
δὲ ἀδίκως μὲν γίνεται, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἡ τιμῶνταί
τινες ἢ ἀτιμάζωνται, δικαίως δέ, ὅταν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν.
15 δι' ὑπεροχὴν δέ, ὅταν τις ᾖ τῇ δυνάμει μείζων, ἢ εἷς ἢ 3
πλείους, ἢ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολιτεύ-
ματος· γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μοναρχία ἢ
δυναστεία. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ εἰώθασιν ὀστρακίζειν, οἷον ἐν Ἄργει
καὶ Ἀθήνησιν· καίτοι βέλτιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ ἐνέ-
20 σονται τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες, ἢ ἐάσαντας γενέσθαι ἰᾶσθαι
ὕστερον. διὰ δὲ φόβον στασιάζουσιν οἵ τε ἠδικηκότες, δεδιό- 4
τες μὴ δῶσι δίκην, καὶ οἱ μέλλοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι, βουλόμε-
νοι φθάσαι πρὶν ἀδικηθῆναι, ὥσπερ ἐν Ῥόδῳ συνέστησαν
οἱ γνώριμοι ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας.
25 διὰ καταφρόνησιν δὲ καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον 5
ἔν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ μὴ μετέχον-
τες τῆς πολιτείας (κρείττους γὰρ οἴονται εἶναι), καὶ ἐν ταῖς
δημοκρατίαις οἱ εὔποροι καταφρονήσαντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ
ἀναρχίας, οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις
30 μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη, καὶ
ἡ Μεγαρέων δι' ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἡττηθέντων, καὶ ἐν

Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὁ
6 δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως. γίνονται δὲ καὶ δι' αὔξησιν
τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεταβολαὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὥσπερ
γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται καὶ δεῖ αὐξάνεσθαι ἀνά-
λογον, ἵνα μένῃ ἡ συμμετρία, εἰ δὲ μή, φθείρεται, ὅταν ὁ
μὲν ποὺς τεττάρων πηχῶν ᾖ τὸ δ' ἄλλο σῶμα δυοῖν σπι-
θαμαῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ κἂν εἰς ἄλλου ζῴου μεταβάλλοι μορφήν,
εἰ μὴ μόνον κατὰ ποσὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν αὐξά-
νοιτο παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, οὕτω καὶ πόλις σύγκειται ἐκ
μερῶν, ὧν πολλάκις λανθάνει τι αὐξανόμενον, οἷον τὸ
τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ πολιτείαις.
7 συμβαίνει δ' ἐνίοτε τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τύχας, οἷον ἐν Τάραντι
ἠττηθέντων καὶ ἀπολομένων πολλῶν γνωρίμων ὑπὸ τῶν
Ἰαπύγων μικρὸν ὕστερον τῶν Μηδικῶν δημοκρατία ἐγένετο
ἐκ πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἄργει τῶν ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ ἀπολομέ-
νων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Λάκωνος ἠναγκάσθησαν παραδέ-
ξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς, καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀτυχούντων
πεζῇ οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττους ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ ἐκ καταλόγου
8 στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον. συμβαίνει δὲ
τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, ἧττον δέ· πλειόνων γὰρ
τῶν εὐπόρων γινομένων ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐξανομένων μετα-
9 βάλλουσιν εἰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δυναστείας. μεταβάλλουσι
δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄνευ στάσεως διά τε τὰς ἐριθείας, ὥσ-
περ ἐν Ἡραίᾳ (ἐξ αἱρετῶν γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίησαν κληρω-
τάς, ὅτι ᾑροῦντο τοὺς ἐριθευομένους), καὶ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν, ὅταν
ἐάσωσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίας παριέναι τοὺς μὴ τῆς
πολιτείας φίλους, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὠρεῷ κατελύθη ἡ ὀλιγαρχία
τῶν ἀρχόντων γενομένου Ἡρακλεοδώρου, ὃς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας
10 πολιτείαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν κατεσκεύασεν· ἔτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ
μικρόν· λέγω δὲ παρὰ μικρόν, ὅτι πολλάκις λανθάνει με-
γάλη γινομένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παρορῶσι
τὸ μικρόν, ὥσπερ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ μικρὸν ἦν τὸ τίμημα, τέ-
λος δ' (ἀπ') οὐδενὸς ἦρχον, ὡς ἐγγὺς ὂν ἢ μηδὲν διαφέρον τοῦ

μηδὲν τὸ μικρόν. στασιωτικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον, ἕως 11
ἂν συμπνεύσῃ (ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πόλις
γίγνεται, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐν τῷ τυχόντι χρόνῳ)· διὸ ὅσοι ἤδη
συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλεῖστοι διεστασίασαν, οἷον
Τροιζηνίοις Ἀχαιοὶ συνῴκησαν Σύβαριν, εἶτα πλείους οἱ
Ἀχαιοὶ γενόμενοι ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Τροιζηνίους, ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος
συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις· καὶ ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρῖται τοῖς 12
συνοικήσασιν (πλεονεκτεῖν γὰρ ἀξιοῦντες ὡς σφετέρας τῆς
χώρας ἐξέπεσον)· καὶ Βυζαντίοις οἱ ἔποικοι ἐπιβουλεύοντες
φωραθέντες ἐξέπεσον διὰ μάχης· καὶ Ἀντισσαῖοι τοὺς Χίων
φυγάδας εἰσδεξάμενοι διὰ μάχης ἐξέβαλον, Ζαγκλαῖοι
δὲ Σαμίους ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον αὐτοί· καὶ Ἀπολ- 13
λωνιᾶται οἱ ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ ἐποίκους ἐπαγαγόμενοι
ἐστασίασαν· καὶ Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὰ τυραννικὰ τοὺς ξένους
1303 b καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας ποιησάμενοι ἐστασίασαν καὶ
εἰς μάχην ἦλθον· καὶ Ἀμφιπολῖται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδέων
ἀποίκους ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ τούτων οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν. [στασιάζουσι 14
δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἀδικούμενοι, ὅτι
οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἴσων, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἴσοι ὄντες,
ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ γνώριμοι, ὅτι μετέχουσι τῶν
ἴσων οὐκ ἴσοι ὄντες.] στασιάζουσι δὲ ἐνίοτε αἱ πόλεις καὶ διὰ 15
τοὺς τόπους, ὅταν μὴ εὐφυῶς ἔχῃ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τὸ μίαν
εἶναι πόλιν, οἷον ἐν Κλαζομεναῖς οἱ ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ πρὸς τοὺς
ἐν νήσῳ, καὶ Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς· καὶ Ἀθήνησιν οὐχ
ὁμοίως εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τὸν Πειραιᾶ οἰκοῦν-
τες τῶν τὸ ἄστυ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις αἱ διαβά- 16
σεις τῶν ὀχετῶν, καὶ τῶν πάνυ σμικρῶν, διασπῶσι τὰς
φάλαγγας, οὕτως ἔοικε πᾶσα διαφορὰ ποιεῖν διάστασιν.
μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἴσως διάστασις ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία, εἶτα
πλοῦτος καὶ πενία, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἑτέρα ἑτέρας μᾶλλον· ὧν
μία καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστίν. γίγνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ στάσεις οὐ
περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν, στασιάζουσι δὲ περὶ μεγάλων.
μάλιστα δὲ καὶ αἱ μικραὶ ἰσχύουσιν, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις

γένωνται, οἷον συνέβη καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις· μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ δύο νεανίσκων στασιασάντων, ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὄντων, περὶ ἐρωτικὴν αἰτίαν. 2 θατέρου γὰρ ἀποδημοῦντος ἑταῖρος ὤν τις τὸν ἐρώμενον αὐτοῦ ὑπεποιήσατο, πάλιν δ' ἐκεῖνος τούτῳ χαλεπήνας τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ ἀνέπεισεν ὡς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν· ὅθεν προσλαμβάνοντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας. διόπερ ἀρχομένων εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ διαλύειν τὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων στάσεις· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἁμάρτημα, ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἥμισυ εἶναι παντός, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἁμάρτημα ἀνάλογόν ἐστι πρὸς 4 τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν. ὅλως δὲ αἱ τῶν γνωρίμων στάσεις συναπολαύειν ποιοῦσι καὶ τὴν ὅλην πόλιν, οἷον ἐν Ἐστιαίᾳ συνέβη μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, δύο ἀδελφῶν περὶ τῆς τῶν πατρῴων νομῆς διενεχθέντων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορώτερος, ὡς οὐκ ἀποφαίνοντος [θατέρου] τὴν οὐσίαν οὐδὲ τὸν θησαυρὸν ὃν εὗρεν ὁ πατήρ, προσήγετο τοὺς δημοτικούς, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἔχων 5 οὐσίαν πολλὴν τοὺς εὐπόρους. καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν ὕστερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰωνισάμενός τι σύμπτωμα, ὡς ἦλθεν 1304 a ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην, οὐ λαβὼν ἀπῆλθεν, οἱ δ' ὡς ὑβρισθέντες ἐνέβαλον τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων θύοντος, κἄπειτα ὡς ἱερόσυλον ἀπέκτειναν. 6 καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο ἀρχὴ κακῶν καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ᾧ Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν· Τιμοφάνους γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπόντος δύο θυγατέρας, ὁ περιωσθεὶς καὶ οὐ λαβὼν τοῖς υἱέσιν αὐτοῦ Δέξανδρος ἦρξε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρώξυνε, 7 πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως. καὶ ἐν Φωκεῦσιν ἐξ ἐπικλήρου στάσεως γενομένης περὶ Μνασέαν τὸν Μνάσωνος πατέρα καὶ Εὐθυκράτη τὸν Ὀνομάρχου, ἡ στάσις αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἱεροῦ πολέμου κατέστη τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν. μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμικῶν· ὑπομνηστευσάμενος γάρ

τις [θυγατέρα], ὡς ἐζημίωσεν αὐτὸν ὁ τοῦ ὑπομνηστευθέντος πατὴρ γενόμενος τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἄτερος συμπαρέλαβε τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῆς πολιτείας ὡς ἐπηρεασθείς. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ 8 εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκιμῆσαί τι ἢ αὐξηθῆναι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μόριον τῆς πόλεως, οἷον ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκιμήσασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἐν Ἄργει οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες περὶ τὴν ἐν 9 Μαντινείᾳ μάχην τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεχείρησαν καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν, καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι Φόξον τὸν τύραννον μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων ὁ δῆμος ἀνελὼν εὐθὺς εἶχετο τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ πάλιν ὡσαύτως Περίανδρον συνεκβαλὼν τοῖς ἐπιθεμένοις ὁ δῆμος τὸν τύραννον εἰς ἑαυτὸν περιέστησε τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ ὅλως δὴ 10 δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν, ὡς οἱ δυνάμεως αἴτιοι γενόμενοι, καὶ ἰδιῶται καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ ὁποιονοῦν πλῆθος, στάσιν κινοῦσιν· ἡ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες τιμωμένοις ἄρχουσι τῆς στάσεως, ἢ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ θέλουσι μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων. κινοῦνται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι 11 καὶ ὅταν τἀναντία εἶναι δοκοῦντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἰσάζῃ
1304 b ἀλλήλοις, οἷον οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος, μέσον δ' ᾖ μηδὲν ἢ μικρὸν πάμπαν· ἂν γὰρ πολὺ ὑπερέχῃ ὁποτερονοῦν τῶν μερῶν, πρὸς τὸ φανερῶς κρεῖττον τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ θέλει κινδυνεύειν. διὸ καὶ οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες οὐ ποιοῦσι στάσιν 12 ὡς εἰπεῖν· ὀλίγοι γὰρ γίγνονται πρὸς πολλούς. καθόλου μὲν οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι τῶν στάσεων καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν τοῦτον ἔχουσι τὸν τρόπον· κινοῦσι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας ὁτὲ μὲν διὰ βίας ὁτὲ δὲ δι' ἀπάτης,

διὰ βίας μὲν ἢ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἢ ὕστερον ἀναγκάζοντες.
13 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διττή· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἑκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἶθ' ὕστερον βίᾳ κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, ψευσάμενοι δὲ κατέχειν ἐπειρῶντο τὴν πολιτείαν· ὁτὲ δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πείσαντες καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν πεισθέντων ἑκόντων ἄρχουσιν αὐτῶν. ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμβέβηκε γίγνεσθαι τὰς μεταβολάς·

Καθ' ἕκαστον δ' εἶδος πολιτείας ἐκ τούτων μερίζοντας τὰ συμβαίνοντα δεῖ θεωρεῖν. αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἰδίᾳ συκοφαντοῦντες τοὺς τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας συστρέφουσιν αὐτούς (συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς φόβος), τὰ δὲ κοινῇ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπάγοντες. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ
2 πολλῶν ἄν τις ἴδοι γιγνόμενον οὕτως. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Κῷ ἡ δημοκρατία μετέβαλε πονηρῶν ἐγγενομένων δημαγωγῶν (οἱ γὰρ γνώριμοι συνέστησαν) καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ· μισθοφοράν τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπόριζον, καὶ ἐκώλυον ἀποδιδόναι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τοῖς τριηράρχοις, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας ἠναγκάσθησαν συστάντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆ-
3 μον. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ὁ δῆμος μετὰ τὸν ἀποικισμὸν εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς· ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἱ γνώριμοι ἐξέπιπτον, ἔπειτα ἀθροισθέντες οἱ
4 ἐκπίπτοντες καὶ κατελθόντες κατέλυσαν τὸν δῆμον. παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία· οἱ γὰρ δημαγωγοί, ἵνα χρήματα ἔχωσι δημεύειν, ἐξέβαλλον πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων, ἕως πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν τοὺς φεύγοντας, οἱ δὲ κατιόντες ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι τὸν δῆμον καὶ κατέστησαν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. συνέβη δὲ ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ Κύμην ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἣν κατέλυσε Θρασύμαχος. 1305 a
5 σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄν τις ἴδοι θεωρῶν τὰς με-

ταβολὰς τοῦτον ἐχούσας τὸν τρόπον. ὁτὲ μὲν γάρ, ἵνα χαρίζωνται, ἀδικοῦντες τοὺς γνωρίμους συνιστᾶσιν, ἢ τὰς οὐσίας ἀναδάστους ποιοῦντες ἢ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις, ὁτὲ δὲ διαβάλλοντες, ἵν' ἔχωσι δημεύειν τὰ κτήματα τῶν πλουσίων. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγός, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγῶν γεγόνασιν. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίγνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μή, ὅτι τότε μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγούντων (οὐ γάρ πω δεινοὶ ἦσαν λέγειν), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ηὐξημένης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μέν, δι' ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται, πλὴν εἴ που βραχύ τι γέγονε τοιοῦτον. ἐγίγνοντο δὲ τυραννίδες πρότερον μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν καὶ διὰ τὸ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζεσθαί τισιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Μιλήτῳ ἐκ τῆς πρυτανείας· πολλῶν γὰρ ἦν καὶ μεγάλων κύριος ὁ πρύτανις. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τότε τὰς πόλεις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκεῖν τὸν δῆμον ἄσχολον ὄντα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις, οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου, ὅτε πολεμικοὶ γένοιντο, τυραννίδι ἐπετίθεντο. πάντες δὲ τοῦτο ἔδρων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευθέντες, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἦν ἡ ἀπέχθεια ἡ πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους, οἷον Ἀθήνησί τε Πεισίστρατος στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς πεδιακούς, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη ἀποσφάξας, λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπινέμοντας, καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν νεωτάτην· ὅπου γὰρ αἱρεταὶ μὲν αἱ ἀρχαί, μὴ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων δέ, αἱρεῖται δὲ ὁ δῆμος, δημαγωγοῦντες οἱ σπουδαρχιῶντες εἰς τοῦτο καθιστᾶσιν ὡς κύριον εἶναι τὸν δῆμον καὶ τῶν νόμων. ἄκος δὲ τοῦ ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἧττον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δῆμον. τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατιῶν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται πᾶσαι σχεδὸν διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας·

6 7 8 9 10 11

Αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι διὰ δύο μάλιστα τρό- 6
πους τοὺς φανερωτάτους· ἕνα μὲν ἐὰν ἀδικῶσι τὸ πλῆθος
(πᾶς γὰρ ἱκανὸς γίνεται προστάτης, μάλιστα δ' ὅταν ἐξ
αὐτῆς συμβῇ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεσθαι τὸν ἡγεμόνα, κα-
θάπερ ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις, ὃς καὶ ἐτυράννησεν ὕστερον τῶν
2 Ναξίων)· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφο- 1305 b
ράς· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εὐπόρων, οὐ τῶν ὄντων
δ' ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, γίγνεται κατάλυσις, ὅταν ὀλίγοι σφό-
δρα ὦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς, οἷον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ καὶ ἐν
Ἴστρῳ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι συμβέβη-
3 κεν· οἱ γὰρ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐκίνουν, ἕως μετέ-
λαβον οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πρότερον τῶν ἀδελφῶν, ὕστερον δ'
οἱ νεώτεροι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχουσιν ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν ἅμα πα-
τήρ τε καὶ υἱός, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ ὁ πρεσβύτερος καὶ ὁ νεώτερος
ἀδελφός· καὶ ἔνθα μὲν πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλιγαρχία,
ἐν Ἴστρῳ δ' εἰς δῆμον ἀπετελεύτησεν, ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ δ' ἐξ
4 ἐλαττόνων εἰς ἑξακοσίους ἦλθεν· μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Κνίδῳ
ἡ ὀλιγαρχία στασιασάντων τῶν γνωρίμων αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς
διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους μετέχειν καί, καθάπερ εἴρηται, εἰ πατήρ,
υἱὸν μὴ μετέχειν, μηδ' εἰ πλείους ἀδελφοί, ἀλλ' ἡ τὸν
πρεσβύτατον, ἐπιλαβόμενος γὰρ στασιαζόντων ὁ δῆμος, καὶ
λαβὼν προστάτην ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων, ἐπιθέμενος ἐκράτησεν,
5 ἀσθενὲς γὰρ τὸ στασιάζον. καὶ ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς
τῶν Βασιλιδῶν ὀλιγαρχίας ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, καί-
περ καλῶς ἐπιμελομένων τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ὅμως διὰ
τὸ ὑπ' ὀλίγων ἄρχεσθαι ἀγανακτῶν ὁ δῆμος μετέβαλε
τὴν πολιτείαν. κινοῦνται δ' αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ
6 διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων· ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διττή,
ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις (ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ δημαγωγὸς
κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγοι ὦσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν οἱ
περὶ Χαρικλέα ἴσχυσαν τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ
ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον),
ἢ ὅταν τὸν ὄχλον δημαγωγῶσιν οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὄντες,

οἷον ἐν Λαρίσῃ οἱ πολιτοφύλακες διὰ τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς
τὸν ὄχλον ἐδημαγώγουν, καὶ ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι
αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν
ἀρχαὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσὶν ἢ ἑταιριῶν, αἱροῦνται
δ' οἱ ὁπλῖται ἢ ὁ δῆμος, ὅπερ ἐν Ἀβύδῳ συνέβαινεν, καὶ 7
ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματός ἐστιν· δημαγω-
γοῦντες γὰρ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν,
ὅπερ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ἐγένετο τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ· ἔτι δ'
ὅταν ἔνιοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἔλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οἱ γὰρ τὸ
ἴσον ζητοῦντες ἀναγκάζονται βοηθὸν ἐπαγαγέσθαι τὸν δῆ-
μον. γίγνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν 8
ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι
καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἡ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ ἢ
1306 a κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον, ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συ-
ρακούσαις, καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, ᾧ ὄνομα ἦν Κλεότιμος, τοὺς
ἐποίκους τοὺς Χαλκιδέων ἤγαγε, καὶ ἐλθόντων διεστασίασεν
αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς εὐπόρους, καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὁ τὴν πρᾶξιν τὴν 9
πρὸς Χάρητα πράξας ἐνεχείρησε μεταβαλεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν
διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· ὁτὲ μὲν οὖν εὐθὺς ἐπιχειροῦσί τι κινεῖν,
ὁτὲ δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινά, ὅθεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς στασιάζουσιν
ἢ οὗτοι ἢ οἱ πρὸς τούτους μαχόμενοι κλέπτοντας, ὅπερ ἐν
Ἀπολλωνίᾳ συνέβη τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ. ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλι- 10
γαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὐτῆς. σημεῖον δὲ ἡ ἐν Φαρ-
σάλῳ πολιτεία· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν κύριοί εἰσι
διὰ τὸ χρῆσθαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καλῶς. καταλύονται δὲ
καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ἑτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐμποιῶσιν,
τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὀλίγου ὄντος τῶν 11
μεγίστων ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν οἱ ὀλίγοι πάντες, ὅπερ ἐν
Ἤλιδι συνέβη ποτέ· τῆς πολιτείας γὰρ δι' ὀλίγων οὔσης
τῶν γερόντων ὀλίγοι πάμπαν ἐγίνοντο διὰ τὸ ἀιδίους εἶναι
ἐνενήκοντα ὄντας, τὴν δ' αἵρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ
ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων. γίγνεται δὲ με- 12
ταβολὴ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ,

ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀπιστίαν στρατιώταις ἀναγκαζομένων χρῆσθαι (ᾧ γὰρ ἂν ἐγχειρίσωσιν, οὗτος πολλάκις γίγνεται τύραννος, ὥσπερ ἐν Κορίνθῳ Τιμοφάνης· ἂν δὲ πλείους, οὗτοι αὐτοῖς περιποιοῦνται δυναστείαν), ὁτὲ δὲ ταῦτα δεδιότες μεταδιδόασι τῷ πλήθει τῆς
13 πολιτείας διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ χρῆσθαι· ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ, ὃς ἐνίοτε γίνεται κύριος ἀμφοτέρων, ὅπερ συνέβη ἐν Λαρίσῃ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἀρχῆς τῶν περὶ Σῖμον καὶ ἐν
14 Ἀβύδῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἑταιριῶν ὧν ἦν μία ἡ Ἰφιάδου. γίνονται δὲ στάσεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περιωθεῖσθαι ἑτέρους ὑφ' ἑτέρων τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ καταστασιάζεσθαι κατὰ γάμους ἢ δίκας, οἷον ἐκ γαμικῆς μὲν αἰτίας αἱ εἰρημέναι πρότερον, καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἱπ-
15 πέων Διαγόρας κατέλυσεν ἀδικηθεὶς περὶ γάμον, ἐκ δὲ δικαστηρίου κρίσεως ἡ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ στάσις ἐγένετο καὶ ἐν Θήβαις, ἐπ' αἰτίᾳ μοιχείας δικαίως μὲν στασιωτικῶς δὲ ποιησαμένων τὴν κόλασιν τῶν μὲν ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ κατ' Εὐρυτίωνος, τῶν δ' ἐν Θήβαις κατ' Ἀρχίου· ἐφιλονείκησαν γὰρ 1306 b
αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ὥστε δεθῆναι ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ κύφωνι.
16 πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄγαν δεσποτικὰς εἶναι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τινῶν δυσχερανάντων κατελύθησαν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Κνίδῳ καὶ ἡ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλιγαρχία. γίγνονται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μεταβολαὶ καὶ τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ἐν ὅσαις ἀπὸ τιμήματος βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς
17 ἄρχουσιν. πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρῶτον τίμημα πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας καιρούς, ὥστε μετέχειν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὀλίγους ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς μέσους, εὐετηρίας γιγνομένης δι' εἰρήνην ἢ δι' ἄλλην τιν' εὐτυχίαν συμβαίνει πολλαπλασίου γίγνεσθαι τιμήματος ἀξίας τὰς αὐτὰς κτήσεις, ὥστε πάντας πάντων μετέχειν, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκ προσαγωγῆς καὶ

κατὰ μικρὸν γινομένης τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ λανθανούσης, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ θᾶττον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι 18
καὶ στασιάζουσι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας (ὅλως δὲ καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξίστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς ἐναντίας πολιτείας ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, οἷον ἐκ τῶν ἐννόμων δημοκρατιῶν καὶ ὀλιγαρχιῶν εἰς τὰς κυρίους καὶ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνας)·

7 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γίγνονται αἱ στάσεις αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν, ὅπερ εἴρηται κινεῖν καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναί πως· ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταὐτὸν ὀλίγοι, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἀριστοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία εἶναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν 2
ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν ᾖ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς ὅμοιον κατ' ἀρετήν, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι οἱ λεγόμενοι Παρθενίαι (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν), οὓς φωράσαντες ἐπιβουλεύσαντας ἀπέστειλαν Τάραντος οἰκιστάς, ἢ ὅταν τινὲς ἀτιμάζωνται μεγάλοι ὄντες καὶ μηδενὸς ἧττους κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐντιμοτέρων, οἷον Λύσανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων, ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κι- 3
νάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας, ἔτι ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀπορῶσι λίαν οἱ δ' εὐπορῶσιν (καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται· συνέβη δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὑπὸ τὸν Μεσσηνιακὸν πόλεμον· δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τοῦτο] ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς κα- 4
1307 a λουμένης Εὐνομίας· θλιβόμενοι γάρ τινες διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἠξίουν ἀνάδαστον ποιεῖν τὴν χώραν)· ἔτι ἐάν τις μέγας ᾖ καὶ δυνάμενος ἔτι μείζων εἶναι, ἵνα μοναρχῇ, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι δοκεῖ Παυσανίας ὁ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἄννων. λύονται δὲ μά- 5
λιστα αἵ τε πολιτεῖαι καὶ αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου παρέκβασιν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ μὴ μεμῖχθαι καλῶς ἐν μὲν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλι-

γαρχίαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ δύο· λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δῆμον καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν· ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαί τε πειρῶνται μιγνύναι καὶ
6 αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατιῶν. διαφέρουσι γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων πολιτειῶν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τούτῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἧττον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι αὐτῶν· τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινούσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας· διόπερ ἀσφαλέστεραι αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἑτέρων εἰσίν· κρεῖττόν τε γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἴσον ἔχοντες,
7 οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις, ἂν ἡ πολιτεία διδῷ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ὑβρίζειν ζητοῦσι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν. ὅλως δ' ἐφ' ὁπότερον ἂν ἐγκλίνῃ ἡ πολιτεία, ἐπὶ ταῦτα μεθίσταται ἑκατέρων τὸ σφέτερον αὐξανόντων, οἷον ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δῆμον, ἀριστοκρατία δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἢ εἰς τἀναντία, οἷον ἡ μὲν
8 ἀριστοκρατία εἰς δῆμον (ὡς ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ περισπῶσιν εἰς τοὐναντίον οἱ ἀπορώτεροι), αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν (μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ
9 αὑτῶν). συνέβη δὲ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν Θουρίοις· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλείονος τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἔλαττον μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία ὀλιγαρχικωτέρα ἦν, ὥστε ἐδύναντο πλεονεκτεῖν) . . .· ὁ δὲ δῆμος γυμνασθεὶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν φρουρῶν ἐγένετο κρείττων, ἕως ἀφεῖσαν τῆς χώρας ὅσοι πλείω ἦσαν ἔχοντες.
10 ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται· καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσιν, διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας, ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἂν
11 ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ. μάλιστα δὲ λανθάνουσιν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι μεταβάλλουσαι τῷ λύεσθαι κατὰ μικρόν, 1307 b

ὅπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, ὅτι αἴτιον τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ τὸ μικρόν ἐστιν· ὅταν γάρ τι προῶνται τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο μικρῷ μεῖζον εὐχερέστερον κινοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν πάντα κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον. συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων 12 πολιτείας. νόμου γὰρ ὄντος διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν στρατηγεῖν, γενόμενοί τινες πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει τῶν φρουρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντες, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ νομίζοντες ῥᾳδίως κατασχήσειν, τοῦτον τὸν νόμον λύειν ἐπεχείρησαν πρῶτον, ὥστ' ἐξεῖναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχῶς στρατηγεῖν, ὁρῶντες τὸν δῆμον αὐτοὺς χειροτονήσοντα προθύμως. οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχόν- 13 των, οἱ καλούμενοι σύμβουλοι, ὁρμήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐναντιοῦσθαι συνεπείσθησαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοῦτον κινήσαντας τὸν νόμον ἐάσειν τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν, ὕστερον δὲ βουλόμενοι κωλύειν ἄλλων κινουμένων οὐκέτι πλέον ἐποίουν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. πᾶσαι δ' αἱ πολι- 14 τεῖαι λύονται ὁτὲ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὁτὲ δ' ἔξωθεν, ὅταν ἐναντία πολιτεία ᾖ ἡ πλησίον ἢ πόρρω μὲν ἔχουσα δὲ δύναμιν. ὅπερ συνέβαινεν ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δήμους κατέλυον. ὅθεν μὲν οὖν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ αἱ στάσεις, εἴρηται σχεδόν·

8 Περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης πολιτείας ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἔχομεν δι' ὧν φθείρονται αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἔχομεν καὶ δι' ὧν σώζονται· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ σωτηρίᾳ ἐναντίον. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὖ κεκραμέναις πολι- 2 τείαις ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι δεῖ τηρεῖν ὅπως μηδὲν παρανομῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ μικρὸν φυλάττειν· λανθάνει γὰρ παραδυομένη ἡ παρανομία, ὥσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον. λανθάνει δὲ ἡ δαπάνη 3

διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίγνεσθαι· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διά- 35
νοια ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος· εἰ ἕκαστον μι-
κρόν, καὶ πάντα. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μὲν ὡς, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ· τὸ
γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ
4 μικρῶν. μίαν μὲν οὖν φυλακὴν πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν
δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, ἔπειτα μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς σοφίσματος χάριν 40
πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος συγκειμένοις, ἐξελέγχεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν 1308 a
ἔργων (ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν τῶν πολιτειῶν σοφίσματα, πρό-
5 τερον εἴρηται). ἔτι δ' ὁρᾶν ὅτι ἔνιαι μένουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀρι-
στοκρατίαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι
τὰς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ εὖ χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρ- 5
χαῖς γινομένους καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ
πολιτεύματι, τοὺς μὲν μὴ μετέχοντας τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
τῷ τοὺς ἡγεμονικοὺς αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ
τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς
εἰς κέρδος, πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας τῷ χρῆσθαι 10
6 ἀλλήλοις δημοτικῶς. ὃ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ζητοῦσιν οἱ
δημοτικοὶ τὸ ἴσον, τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐ μόνον δίκαιον
ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστίν. διὸ ἐὰν πλείους ὦσιν ἐν τῷ
πολιτεύματι, πολλὰ συμφέρει τῶν δημοτικῶν νομοθετημά-
των, οἷον τὸ ἐξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἵνα πάντες οἱ 15
ὅμοιοι μετέχωσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι
(διὸ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐγγίγνονται δημαγωγοὶ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ
7 εἴρηται πρότερον)· ἔπειθ' ἧττον εἰς δυναστείας ἐμπίπτουσιν αἱ
ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαι (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον κα-
κουργῆσαι ὀλίγον χρόνον ἄρχοντας καὶ πολύν, ἐπεὶ διὰ 20
τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ δημοκρατίαις γίγνονται τυ-
ραννίδες· ἢ γὰρ οἱ μέγιστοι ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ ἐπιτίθενται τυραν-
νίδι, ἔνθα μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἔνθα δ' οἱ δυνάσται, ἢ οἱ τὰς
8 μεγίστας ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, ὅταν πολὺν χρόνον ἄρχωσιν). σώ-
ζονται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν 25
διαφθειρόντων, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύς· φοβούμενοι
γὰρ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν· ὥστε δεῖ

τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ἵνα φυλάττωσι καὶ μὴ καταλύωσιν ὥσπερ νυκτερινὴν φυλακὴν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω ἐγγὺς ποιεῖν. ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν 9
νόμων πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ φυλάττειν, καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλονεικίας ὄντας, πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ γινόμενον κακὸν γνῶναι οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλὰ πολιτικοῦ ἀνδρός. πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα γιγνομένην 10
μεταβολὴν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ πολιτείας, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τοῦτο μενόντων μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τιμημάτων εὐπορίας δὲ νομίσματος γιγνομένης, συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκοπεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν, ἐν ὅσαις μὲν πόλεσι τιμῶνται κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον,
1308 b ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζοσι διὰ τριετηρίδος ἢ πενταετηρίδος, κἂν ᾖ πολλαπλάσιον ἢ πολλοστημόριον τοῦ πρότερον, ἐν ᾧ αἱ τιμήσεις κατέστησαν τῆς πολιτείας, νόμον εἶναι καὶ τὰ τιμήματα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνιέναι, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἐπιτείνοντας κατὰ τὴν πολλαπλασίωσιν, ἐὰν δ' ἐλλείπῃ, ἀνιέντας καὶ ἐλάττω ποιοῦντας τὴν τίμησιν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλι- 11
γαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις μὴ ποιούντων μὲν οὕτως ἔνθα μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔνθα δὲ δυναστείαν γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, ἐκείνως δὲ ἐκ μὲν πολιτείας δημοκρατίαν, ἐκ δ' ὀλιγαρχίας πολιτείαν ἢ δῆμον. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ καὶ ὀλι- 12
γαρχίᾳ [καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ] καὶ πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ μήτ' αὐξάνειν λίαν μηδένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πειρᾶσθαι μικρὰς καὶ πολυχρονίους διδόναι τιμὰς ἢ ταχὺ μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, καὶ φέρειν οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχίαν), εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γ' ἀθρόας δόντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι πάλιν ἀθρόας, ἀλλ' ἐκ προσαγωγῆς· καὶ μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι τοῖς νόμοις οὕτως ἄγειν ὥστε μηδένα ἐγγίγνεσθαι πολὺ ὑπερέχοντα δυνάμει μήτε φίλων μήτε χρημάτων, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους βίους νεωτερίζουσιν, δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν 13

ἀρχήν τινα τὴν ἐποψομένην τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσυμφόρως πρὸς
τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν,
ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ἑκάστῃ. καὶ τὸ εὐημεροῦν δὲ τῆς πόλεως
14 ἀνὰ μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· τούτου δ' ἄκος
τὸ ἀεὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς
πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (λέγω δ' ἀντικεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐπιει-
κεῖς τῷ πλήθει καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις) καὶ τὸ πει-
ρᾶσθαι ἢ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν
εὐπόρων ἢ τὸ μέσον αὔξειν· τοῦτο γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ
15 τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις. μέγιστον δὲ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ
καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ οὕτω τετάχθαι ὥστε
μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν. τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς
16 ὀλιγαρχικαῖς δεῖ τηρεῖν. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀγανακτοῦσιν εἰργό-
μενοι τοῦ ἄρχειν οἱ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαίρουσιν ἐάν τις
ἐᾷ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις σχολάζειν, ὡς ἐὰν οἴωνται τὰ κοινὰ
κλέπτειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, τότε δ' ἀμφότερα λυπεῖ, τό τε
17 τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχειν καὶ τὸ τῶν κερδῶν. μοναχῶς δὲ
καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν,
εἰ τοῦτο κατασκευάσειέ τις· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοὺς
γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἔχειν ἃ βούλονται ἀμφοτέρους. 1309 a
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς
18 γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τοῦτο δ'
ἔσται ὅταν μὴ ᾖ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν· οἱ γὰρ ἄπο-
ροι οὐ βουλήσονται ἄρχειν τῷ μηδὲν κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ εὔποροι δυνήσονται διὰ τὸ
μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν· ὥστε συμβήσεται τοῖς μὲν
ἀπόροις γίγνεσθαι εὐπόροις διὰ τὸ διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς
ἔργοις, τοῖς δὲ γνωρίμοις μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων.
19 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ ἡ παράδοσις γιγνέσθω
τῶν χρημάτων παρόντων πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἀντί-
γραφα κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλὰς τιθέσθωσαν·
τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν τιμὰς εἶναι δεῖ νενομοθετημένας

τοῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῶν 20
εὐπόρων φείδεσθαι, μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀνα-
δάστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρπούς, ὃ ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν
λανθάνει γιγνόμενον· βέλτιον δὲ καὶ βουλομένους κωλύειν
λειτουργεῖν τὰς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας,
οἷον χορηγίας καὶ λαμπαδαρχίας καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦ-
ται· ἐν δ' ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι
πολλήν, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφ' ὧν λήμματα τούτοις ἀπονέ-
μειν, κἂν τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ
ἐπιτίμια εἶναι ἢ ἂν σφῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας μὴ
κατὰ δόσιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος, μηδὲ πλειόνων ἢ μιᾶς
τὸν αὐτὸν κληρονομεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὁμαλώτεραι αἱ οὐσίαι
εἶεν καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων εἰς εὐπορίαν ἂν καθίσταιντο πλείους.
συμφέρει δὲ καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν 21
ἄλλων ἢ ἰσότητα ἢ προεδρίαν νέμειν τοῖς ἧττον κοινωνοῦσι
τῆς πολιτείας, ἐν μὲν δήμῳ τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἐν δ' ὀλιγαρ-
χίᾳ τοῖς ἀπόροις, πλὴν ὅσαι ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας,
ταύτας δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας ἐγχειρίζειν μόνοις ἢ
πλείοσιν.

9 Τρία δέ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄρξειν τὰς
κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν
πολιτείαν, ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς,
τρίτον δ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν
πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ
πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι
διαφοράς. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν, ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ ταῦτα 2
πάντα περὶ τὸν αὐτόν, πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν·
1309 b οἷον εἰ στρατηγικὸς μέν τις εἴη, πονηρὸς δὲ καὶ μὴ τῇ πο-
λιτείᾳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος καὶ φίλος, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι
τὴν αἵρεσιν; ἔοικε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν εἰς δύο, τίνος πλεῖον
μετέχουσι πάντες καὶ τίνος ἔλαττον. διὸ ἐν στρατηγίᾳ μὲν 3
εἰς τὴν ἐμπειρίαν μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς· ἔλαττον γὰρ στρα-
τηγίας μετέχουσι, τῆς δ' ἐπιεικείας πλεῖον· ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ

καὶ ταμιεία τἀναντία· πλείονος γὰρ ἀρετῆς δεῖται ἡ ὅσην
4 οἱ πολλοὶ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη κοινὴ πᾶσιν. ἀπορήσειε
δ' ἄν τις κἂν δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλία,
τί δεῖ τῆς ἀρετῆς; ποιήσει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δύο. 10
ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τοὺς τὰ δύο ταῦτα ἔχοντας ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι,
ὥστε καθάπερ καὶ αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπηρετοῦσιν εἰδότες καὶ φι-
λοῦντες αὐτούς, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἔχειν
5 ἐνίους; ἁπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέ-
γομεν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα σώζει τὰς πολιτείας, 15
καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν
ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ
6 μὴ βουλομένου. παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν,
ὃ νῦν λανθάνει τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, τὸ μέσον·
πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκούντων δημοτικῶν λύει τὰς δημοκρα- 20
7 τίας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας. οἱ δ' οἰόμενοι
ταύτην εἶναι μίαν ἀρετὴν ἕλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν,
ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι καθάπερ ῥίς ἐστι παρεκβεβηκυῖα μὲν τὴν
εὐθύτητα τὴν καλλίστην πρὸς τὸ γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμόν, ἀλλ'
ὅμως ἔτι καλὴ καὶ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, οὐ μὴν 25
ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐπιτείνῃ τις ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, πρῶ-
τον μὲν ἀποβαλεῖ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ μορίου, τέλος δ' οὕτως
ὥστε μηδὲ ῥῖνα ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ
τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ
8 περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων, συμβαίνει δὴ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς 30
ἄλλας πολιτείας. καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν
ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν ἱκανῶς, καίπερ ἐξεστηκυίας τῆς βελτίστης
τάξεως· ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπιτείνῃ μᾶλλον ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν, πρῶ-
τον μὲν χείρω ποιήσει τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δ' οὐδὲ πολι-
9 τείαν. διὸ δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν πο- 35
λιτικόν, ποῖα σώζει τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ ποῖα φθείρει τὴν
δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ποῖα τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν
ἄνευ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁμαλότης

βασιλικῆς ἀρχῆς, τοῖς δὲ τὴν τῆς τιμῆς, οἷον Φείδων μὲν περὶ Ἄργος καὶ ἕτεροι τύραννοι κατέστησαν βασιλείας ὑπαρχούσης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαρις ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν, Παναίτιος δ' ἐν Λεοντίνοις καὶ Κύψελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθήνησι καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις καὶ ἕτεροι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκ δημαγωγίας. καθάπερ οὖν 7 εἴπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν. κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν, ἢ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένους, ἢ κατ' εὐεργεσίας, ἢ κατὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ δύναμιν. ἅπαν- 8 τες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ δ' ἐλευθερώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κῦρος, ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν. βούλεται δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ 9
1311 a μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηδὲν ἄδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μηδέν· ἡ δὲ τυραννίς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ 10 μὲν χρήματα τυραννικά, τὰ δ' εἰς τιμὴν βασιλικὰ μᾶλλον· καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ μὲν πολιτική, τυραννικὴ δὲ διὰ ξένων. ὅτι δ' ἡ τυραννὶς ἔχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δη- 11 μοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, φανερόν, ἐκ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διαμένειν ἀναγκαῖον μόνως τήν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὴν τρυφήν) καὶ τὸ τῷ πλήθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν, διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦνται τῶν ὅπλων· καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφοτέρων κοινόν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος· ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ τὸ 12 πολεμεῖν τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ διαφθείρειν λάθρᾳ καὶ φανερῶς καὶ φυγαδεύειν ὡς ἀντιτέχνους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐμποδίους· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς

ἐπιβουλάς, τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν αὐτῶν βουλομένων, τῶν δὲ μὴ
13 δουλεύειν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμ-
βούλευμά ἐστιν, ἡ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων σταχύων κόλουσις, ὡς
δέον αἰεὶ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναιρεῖν. καθάπερ
οὖν σχεδὸν ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ νομίζειν περί τε
τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρ-
χίας· διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ διὰ κατα-
φρόνησιν ἐπιτίθενται πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ταῖς μοναρ-
χίαις, τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας μάλιστα δι' ὕβριν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ διὰ
14 τὴν τῶν ἰδίων στέρησιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταὐτά, καθά-
περ κἀκεῖ, καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας·
μέγεθος γὰρ ὑπάρχει πλούτου καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μονάρχοις,
ὧν ἐφίενται πάντες. τῶν δ' ἐπιθέσεων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα
γίγνονται τῶν ἀρχόντων, αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν
15 δι' ὕβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα. τῆς δ' ὕβρεως οὔσης πολυμεροῦς,
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον γίγνεται τῆς ὀργῆς· τῶν δ' ὀργιζο-
μένων σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται, ἀλλ'
οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν διὰ τὸ προ-
πηλακίσαι μὲν τὴν Ἁρμοδίου ἀδελφήν, ἐπηρεάσαι δ' Ἁρ-
μόδιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἁρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφήν, ὁ δ' Ἀρι-
16 στογείτων διὰ τὸν Ἁρμόδιον· ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάν-
δρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ διὰ τὸ συμπίνοντα μετὰ
τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρωτῆσαι αὐτὸν εἰ ἤδη ἐξ αὐτοῦ κύει· ἡ δὲ 1311 b
Φιλίππου ὑπὸ Παυσανίου διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν
ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ
Δέρδα διὰ τὸ καυχήσασθαι εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ
τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα
17 παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. πολ-
λαὶ δ' ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύ-
ναι τῶν μονάρχων τινάς, οἷον καὶ ἡ Κραταίου εἰς Ἀρχέ-
λαον· αἰεὶ γὰρ βαρέως εἶχε πρὸς τὴν ὁμιλίαν, ὥστε ἱκανὴ
καὶ ἐλάττων ἐγένετο πρόφασις, ἢ διότι τῶν θυγατέρων οὐδε-
μίαν ἔδωκεν ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν προτέραν,

οὕτως ἔχειν φάσκων ὡς, ὅπου περ ἂν δύνηται προελθεῖν, ἱκανὸν αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον μετασχεῖν τῆς πράξεως, οἷον εἰ μικρὸν ἐπιβάντα τῆς γῆς εὐθὺς συμβαίη τελευτῆσαι, τοῦτον καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτῷ τὸν θάνατον. φθείρεται δὲ τυραννὶς ἕνα 29
40 μὲν τρόπον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη πολιτειῶν, ἔξω-
1312 b θεν, ἐὰν ἐναντία τις ᾖ πολιτεία κρείττων (τὸ μὲν γὰρ βούλεσθαι δῆλον ὡς ὑπάρξει διὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῆς προαιρέσεως· ἃ δὲ βούλονται, δυνάμενοι πράττουσι πάντες), ἐναντίαι δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος μὲν τυραννίδι καθ' Ἡσίο- 30
5 δον ὡς κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία τυραννίς ἐστιν), βασιλεία δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατία διὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῆς πολιτείας (διὸ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πλείστας κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας καὶ Συρακούσιοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ὃν ἐπολιτεύοντο καλῶς)· ἕνα δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς, ὅταν οἱ μετέχοντες 31
10 στασιάζωσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον, ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος Θρασυβούλου τοῦ Ἱέρωνος ἀδελφοῦ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Γέλωνος δημαγωγοῦντος καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς ὁρμῶντος, ἵν' αὐτὸς ἄρχῃ, τῶν δὲ οἰκείων συστησάντων, ἵνα μὴ τυραννὶς ὅλως καταλυθῇ ἀλλὰ Θρασύβουλος, οἱ
15 δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν, ὡς καιρὸν ἔχοντες, ἐξέβαλον ἅπαντας αὐτούς· Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας, κηδεστὴς ὤν, καὶ 32 προσλαβὼν τὸν δῆμον, ἐκεῖνον ἐκβαλὼν διεφθάρη. δύο δὲ οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι' ἃς μάλιστ' ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίσι, μίσους καὶ καταφρονήσεως, θάτερον μὲν δεῖ τούτων ὑπάρχειν
20 τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μῖσος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι πολλαὶ γίνονται τῶν καταλύσεων. σημεῖον δέ· τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτη- 33 σαμένων οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ διεφύλαξαν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες εὐθὺς ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπολλύασι πάντες· ἀπολαυστικῶς γὰρ ζῶντες εὐκαταφρόνητοί τε γίγνονται καὶ
25 πολλοὺς καιροὺς παραδιδόασι τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. μόριον δέ τι τοῦ μίσους καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν δεῖ τιθέναι· τρόπον γάρ τινα τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτία γίνεται πράξεων. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρα- 34 κτικώτερον τοῦ μίσους· συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται διὰ τὸ

μὴ χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ· τὸ πάθος (μάλιστα δὲ συμβαίνει τοῖς θυμοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν διὰ τὴν ὕβριν, δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἥ τε τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν κατελύθη τυραννὶς καὶ πολλαὶ τῶν ἄλλων)· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργὴ. μετὰ λύπης πάρεστιν, ὥστε οὐ ῥᾴδιον λογίζεσθαι, ἡ δ' ἔχθρα ἄνευ λύπης. ὡς δὲ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπεῖν, ὅσας αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν τῆς τε ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας τῆς ἐσχάτης, τοσαύτας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος θετέον· καὶ γὰρ αὗται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι διαιρεταὶ τυραν-
36 νίδες. βασιλεία δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἔξωθεν ἥκιστα φθείρεται, διὸ καὶ πολυχρόνιός ἐστιν· ἐξ αὐτῆς δ' αἱ πλεῖσται φθοραὶ συμβαίνουσιν. φθείρεται δὲ κατὰ δύο τρόπους, ἕνα μὲν στασιασάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τυραννικώτερον πειρωμένων διοικεῖν, ὅταν εἶναι κύριοι
37 πλειόνων ἀξιῶσι καὶ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. οὐ γίγνονται δ' ἔτι βασιλεῖαι νῦν, ἀλλ' ἂν περ γίγνωνται, μοναρχίαι καὶ τυραννίδες μᾶλλον, διὰ τὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ἑκούσιον μὲν ἀρχὴν εἶναι, μειζόνων δὲ κυρίαν, πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσοῦτον ὥστε ἀπαρτίζειν πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὥστε διὰ μὲν τοῦτο ἑκόντες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν· ἂν δὲ δι' ἀπάτης ἄρξῃ τις ἢ βίας,
38 ἤδη δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις τιθέναι δεῖ τῆς φθορᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημέναις καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς εὐκαταφρονήτους, καὶ τὸ δύναμιν μὴ κεκτημένους τυραννικὴν ἀλλὰ βασιλικὴν τιμὴν ὑβρίζειν· ῥᾳδία γὰρ ἐγίνετο ἡ κατάλυσις· μὴ βουλομένων γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύς, ἀλλ' ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. φθείρονται μὲν οὖν αἱ μοναρχίαι διὰ ταύτας καὶ τοιαύτας ἑτέρας αἰτίας·

Σώζονται δὲ δῆλον ὡς ἁπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τῶν 11
ἐναντίων, ὡς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τῷ τὰς μὲν βασιλείας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐλαττόνων ὦσι κύριοι, πλείω χρόνον ἀναγκαῖον μένειν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν· αὐτοί

δενὶ χαίρειν σεμνῷ μηδ' ἐλευθέρῳ τυραννικόν· αὐτὸν γὰρ εἶναι μόνον ἀξιοῖ τοιοῦτον ὁ τύραννος, ὁ δ' ἀντισεμνυνόμενος καὶ ἐλευθεριάζων ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικὸν τῆς τυραννίδος· μισοῦσιν οὖν ὥσπερ καταλύοντας τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι συσσίτοις καὶ συνημερευταῖς ξενικοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικοῖς τυραννικόν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἀντιποιουμένους. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτήρια τῆς ἀρχῆς, οὐδὲν δ' ἐλλείπει μοχθηρίας. ἔστι δ' ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντα ταῦτα περιειλημμένα τρισὶν εἴδεσιν. στοχάζεται γὰρ ἡ τυραννὶς τριῶν, ἑνὸς μὲν τοῦ μικρὰ φρονεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους (οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἂν μικρόψυχος ἐπιβουλεύσειεν), δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστεῖν ἀλλήλοις· οὐ καταλύεται γὰρ πρότερον τυραννὶς πρὶν ἡ πιστεύσωσί τινες ἑαυτοῖς· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι πολεμοῦσιν ὡς βλαβεροῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι δεσποτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πιστοὺς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι καὶ μὴ καταγορεύειν μήτε ἑαυτῶν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων. τρίτον δ' ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις, ὥστε οὐδὲ τυραννίδα καταλύειν μὴ δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης. εἰς οὓς μὲν οὖν ὅρους ἀνάγεται τὰ βουλήματα τῶν τυράννων, οὗτοι τρεῖς τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες· πάντα γὰρ ἀναγάγοι τις ἂν τὰ τυραννικὰ πρὸς ταύτας τὰς ὑποθέσεις, τὰ μὲν ὅπως μὴ πιστεύωσιν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δ' ὅπως μὴ δύνωνται, τὰ δ' ὅπως μικρὸν φρονῶσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν εἷς τρόπος δι' οὗ γίγνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὁ δ' ἕτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἔστι δὲ λαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς τῶν βασιλειῶν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς βασιλείας εἷς τρόπος τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τυραννικωτέραν, οὕτω τῆς τυραννίδος σωτηρία ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικωτέραν, ἓν φυλάττοντα μόνον, τὴν δύναμιν, ὅπως ἄρχῃ μὴ μόνον βουλομένων ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ βουλομένων· προϊέμενος γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο προΐεται καὶ τὸ τυραννεῖν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ὑπόθε-

σιν δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν
ὑποκρινόμενον τὸν βασιλικὸν καλῶς, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ δοκεῖν
φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν, μήτε δαπανῶντα (εἰς) δωρεὰς τοιαύτας
ἐφ' αἷς τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅταν ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὲν
λαμβάνωσιν ἐργαζομένων καὶ πονούντων γλίσχρως, διδῶσι
δ' ἑταίραις καὶ ξένοις καὶ τεχνίταις ἀφθόνως, λόγον τε
ἀποδιδόντα τῶν λαμβανομένων καὶ δαπανωμένων, ὅπερ
ἤδη πεποιήκασί τινες τῶν τυράννων (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν τις διοι-
20 κῶν οἰκονόμος ἀλλ' οὐ τύραννος εἶναι δόξειεν· οὐ δεῖ δὲ φο-
βεῖσθαι μή ποτε ἀπορήσῃ χρημάτων κύριος ὢν τῆς πό-
λεως· ἀλλὰ τοῖς γ' ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας
καὶ συμφέρει τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἢ καταλιπεῖν ἀθροίσαντας·
ἧττον γὰρ ἂν οἱ φυλάττοντες ἐπιτιθεῖντο τοῖς πράγμασιν,
εἰσὶ δὲ φοβερώτεροι τῶν τυράννων τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσιν οἱ
21 φυλάττοντες τῶν πολιτῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συναποδημοῦσιν, οἱ
δὲ ὑπομένουσιν)· ἔπειτα τὰς εἰσφορὰς καὶ τὰς λειτουργίας
δεῖ φαίνεσθαι τῆς τε οἰκονομίας ἕνεκα συνάγοντα, κἂν
ποτε δεηθῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς καιρούς, ὅλως τε
αὐτὸν παρασκευάζειν φύλακα καὶ ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν ἀλλὰ
μὴ ὡς ἰδίων· καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ χαλεπὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνόν,
ἔτι δὲ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας
22 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αἰδεῖσθαι· τούτου μέντοι τυγχάνειν οὐ ῥᾴδιον
ὄντα εὐκαταφρόνητον, διὸ δεῖ κἂν μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν
ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆται, ἀλλὰ τῆς πολεμικῆς, καὶ δόξαν ἐμ-
ποιεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην· ἔτι δὲ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν φαί-
νεσθαι μηδένα τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑβρίζοντα, μήτε νέον μήτε
23 νέαν, ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν περὶ αὐτόν, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν γυναῖκας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, ὡς
καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ὕβρεις πολλαὶ τυραννίδες ἀπολώλασιν·
περί τε τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς τοὐναντίον ποιεῖν
ἢ νῦν τινὲς τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον εὐθὺς
ἔωθεν τοῦτο δρῶσιν, καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἀλλὰ
καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες, ἵν'

ὡς εὐδαίμονας καὶ μακαρίους θαυμάσωσιν), ἀλλὰ μάλιστα 24
μὲν μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε φαίνεσθαι
τοῖς ἄλλοις διαφεύγειν (οὔτε γὰρ εὐεπίθετος οὔτ' εὐκατα-
φρόνητος ὁ νήφων, ἀλλ' ὁ μεθύων, οὐδ' ὁ ἄγρυπνος, ἀλλ'
ὁ καθεύδων). τοὐναντίον τε ποιητέον τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων
σχεδὸν πάντων· κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δεῖ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν
πόλιν ὡς ἐπίτροπον ὄντα καὶ μὴ τύραννον· ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς 25
τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως (ἧττόν τε
γὰρ φοβοῦνται τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων,
1315 a ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φρον-
τίζειν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἧττον ὡς συμμάχους
ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεούς), δεῖ δὲ ἄνευ ἀβελτερίας φαίνεσθαι 26
τοιοῦτον· τούς τε ἀγαθοὺς περί τι γιγνομένους τιμᾶν οὕτως
ὥστε μὴ νομίζειν ἄν ποτε τιμηθῆναι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν πο-
λιτῶν αὐτονόμων ὄντων, καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμὰς ἀπο-
νέμειν αὐτόν, τὰς δὲ κολάσεις δι' ἑτέρων, ἀρχόντων καὶ δι-
καστηρίων. κοινὴ δὲ φυλακὴ πάσης μοναρχίας τὸ μηδένα 27
ποιεῖν ἕνα μέγαν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, πλείους (τηρήσουσι γὰρ ἀλλή-
λους)· ἐὰν δ' ἄρα τινὰ δέῃ ποιῆσαι μέγαν, μή τοι τό γε
ἦθος θρασύν (ἐπιθετικώτατον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦθος περὶ
πάσας τὰς πράξεις), κἂν τῆς δυνάμεώς τινα δοκῇ παρα-
λύειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς τοῦτο δρᾶν καὶ μὴ πᾶσαν ἀθρόον
ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἔτι δὲ πάσης μὲν ὕβρεως εἴργε- 28
σθαι, παρὰ πάσας δὲ δυεῖν, τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα [κο-
λάσεως] καὶ τῆς εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν. μάλιστα δὲ ταύτην ποιη-
τέον τὴν εὐλάβειαν περὶ τοὺς φιλοτίμους· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἰς
τὰ χρήματα ὀλιγωρίαν οἱ φιλοχρήματοι φέρουσι βαρέως,
τὴν δ' εἰς ἀτιμίαν οἵ τε φιλότιμοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν
ἀνθρώπων. διόπερ ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι δεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ τὰς 29
μὲν κολάσεις πατρικῶς φαίνεσθαι ποιούμενον καὶ μὴ δι'
ὀλιγωρίαν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ὁμιλίας δι' ἐρωτικὰς
αἰτίας ἀλλὰ μὴ δι' ἐξουσίαν, ὅλως δὲ τὰς δοκούσας ἀτι-
μίας ἐξωνεῖσθαι μείζοσι τιμαῖς. τῶν δ' ἐπιχειρούντων ἐπὶ 30

τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθορὰν οὗτοι φοβερώτατοι καὶ δέονται πλείστης φυλακῆς, ὅσοι μὴ προαιροῦνται περιποιεῖσθαι τὸ ζῆν διαφθείραντες. διὸ μάλιστα εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς ὑβρίζεσθαι νομίζοντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν· ἀφειδῶς γὰρ ἑαυτῶν ἔχουσιν οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ἐπιχειροῦντες, καθάπερ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος εἶπε, χαλεπὸν φάσκων εἶναι θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πόλεις ἐκ δύο συνεστήκασι μορίων, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀπόρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων, μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ σώζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τοὺς ἑτέρους ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων ἀδικεῖσθαι μηδέν, ὁπότεροι δ' ἂν ὦσι κρείττους, τούτους ἰδίους μάλιστα ποιεῖσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὡς, ἂν ὑπάρξῃ τοῦτο τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὔτε δούλων ἐλευθέρωσιν ἀνάγκη ποιεῖσθαι τὸν τύραννον οὔτε ὅπλων παραίρεσιν· ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος πρὸς τῇ δυνάμει προστιθέμενον, ὥστε κρείττους εἶναι τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων. περίεργον δὲ τὸ λέγειν καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων· ὁ γὰρ σκοπὸς φανερός, ὅτι δεῖ μὴ τυραννικὸν ἀλλ' οἰκονόμον καὶ βασιλικὸν εἶναι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις καὶ μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλ' ἐπίτροπον, καὶ τὰς μετριότητας τοῦ βίου διώκειν, μὴ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους καθομιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς δημαγωγεῖν. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω καὶ ζηλωτοτέραν τῷ βελτιόνων ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ τεταπεινωμένων μηδὲ μισούμενον καὶ φοβούμενον διατελεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πολυχρονιωτέραν, ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν διακεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἤτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα, καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλ' ἡμιπόνηρον.

[Καίτοι πασῶν ὀλιγοχρονιώτεραι τῶν πολιτειῶν εἰσὶν ὀλιγαρχία καὶ τυραννίς. πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον ἡ περὶ Σικυῶνα τυραννίς, ἡ τῶν Ὀρθαγόρου παίδων καὶ αὐτοῦ Ὀρθαγόρου· ἔτη δ' αὕτη διέμεινεν ἑκατόν. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐχρῶντο μετρίως καὶ πολλὰ τοῖς νόμοις ἐδούλευον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πολεμικοὺς γενέσθαι Κλεισθένης

οὐκ ἦν εὐκαταφρόνητος, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις ἐδημαγώγουν. λέγεται γοῦν Κλεισθένης τὸν ἀποκρίναντα 2
τῆς νίκης αὐτὸν ὡς ἐστεφάνωσεν· ἔνιοι δ' εἰκόνα φασὶν
εἶναι τοῦ κρίναντος οὕτω τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ
καθήμενον. φασὶ δὲ καὶ Πεισίστρατον ὑπομεῖναί ποτε προσ-
κληθέντα δίκην εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον. δευτέρα δὲ περὶ Κόριν- 3
θον ἡ τῶν Κυψελιδῶν· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη διετέλεσεν ἔτη τρία
καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ἐξ μῆνας· Κύψελος μὲν γὰρ ἐτυ-
ράννησεν ἔτη τριάκοντα, Περίανδρος δὲ τετταράκοντα καὶ
τέτταρα, Ψαμμίτιχος δ' ὁ Γορδίου τρία ἔτη. τὰ δ' αἴτια 4
ταὐτὰ καὶ ταύτης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος δημαγωγὸς ἦν
καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν διετέλεσεν ἀδορυφόρητος, Περίανδρος
δ' ἐγένετο μὲν τυραννικός, ἀλλὰ πολεμικός. τρίτη δ' ἡ 5
τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν Ἀθήνησιν, οὐκ ἐγένετο δὲ συνεχής· δὶς
γὰρ ἔφυγε Πεισίστρατος τυραννῶν, ὥστ' ἐν ἔτεσι τριάκοντα
καὶ τρισὶν ἑπτακαίδεκα ἔτη τούτων ἐτυράννευσεν, ὀκτωκαί-
δεκα δὲ οἱ παῖδες, ὥστε τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο ἔτη τριάκοντα
καὶ πέντε. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἡ περὶ Ἱέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα περὶ
Συρακούσας. ἔτη δ' οὐδ' αὕτη πολλὰ διέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ 6
σύμπαντα δυοῖν δέοντα εἴκοσι· Γέλων μὲν γὰρ ἑπτὰ τυ-
ραννεύσας τῷ ὀγδόῳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν, δέκα δ' Ἱέρων,
Θρασύβουλος δὲ τῷ ἐνδεκάτῳ μηνὶ ἐξέπεσεν. αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ
τῶν τυραννίδων ὀλιγοχρόνιαι πᾶσαι γεγόνασι παντελῶς.]

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς μο- 7
ναρχίας, ἐξ ὧν τε φθείρονται καὶ πάλιν σώζονται, σχεδὸν
1316 a εἴρηται περὶ πάντων· ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ
τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται κα-
λῶς· τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὔσης οὐ
λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν ἰδίως. φησὶ γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ μὴ 8
μένειν μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἔν τινι περιόδῳ μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχὴν δ'
εἶναι τούτων ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς δύο
ἁρμονίας παρέχεται, λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος
ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός, ὡς τῆς φύσεώς ποτε φυούσης

φαύλους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ λέγων ἴσως οὐ κακῶς· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἶναί τινας οὓς παι-
9 δευθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνδρας ἀδύνατον· ἀλλ' αὕτη τί ἂν ἴδιος εἴη μεταβολὴ τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνου λεγομένης ἀρίστης πολιτείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων πάντων; καὶ διά γε τοῦ χρόνου, δι' ὃν λέγει πάντα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἅμα ἀρξάμενα γίγνεσθαι ἅμα μεταβάλλει, οἷον εἰ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο τῆς
10 τροπῆς, ἅμα ἄρα μεταβάλλει; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει; πλεονάκις γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν μεταβάλλουσι πᾶσαι αἱ πολιτεῖαι ἢ τὴν σύνεγγυς. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταβολῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Λακωνικῆς, φησί, μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα
11 δὲ ἐκ δημοκρατίας. καίτοι καὶ ἀνάπαλιν μεταβάλλουσιν, οἷον ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς μοναρχίαν. ἔτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει οὔτ' εἰ ἔσται μεταβολὴ οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔσται, (οὔτ', εἰ ἔσται,) διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν καὶ εἰς ποίαν πολιτείαν. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἶχε λέγειν· ἀόριστον γάρ, ἐπεὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνον δεῖ εἰς τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην· οὕτω
12 γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο συνεχὲς καὶ κύκλος. ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὥσπερ ἡ Σικυῶνος ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος εἰς τὴν Κλεισθένους, καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Χαλκίδι ἡ Ἀντιλέοντος, καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ
13 Χαριλάου ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ . . . ἐν Καρχηδόνι. καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν Παναιτίου τυραννίδα καὶ ἐν Γέλᾳ εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου καὶ ἐν Ῥηγίῳ εἰς τὴν Ἀναξιλάου καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν
14 ὡσαύτως. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν διὰ τοῦτο μεταβάλλειν ὅτι φιλοχρήματοι καὶ χρηματισταὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι οἱ πολὺ ὑπερέχοντες ταῖς 1316 b

οὐσίαις οὐ δίκαιον οἴονται εἶναι ἴσον μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κεκτημένους μηδὲν τοῖς κεκτημένοις· ἐν πολλαῖς τε ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐκ ἔξεστι χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶν οἱ κωλύοντες, ἐν Καρχηδόνι δὲ δημοκρατουμένῃ χρηματίζονται καὶ οὔπω μεταβεβλήκασιν. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων. τί γὰρ αὕτη μᾶλλον τῆς Λακωνικῆς πέπονθεν ἢ ὁποιασοῦν ἄλλης, οὗ μὴ πάντες κέκτηνται ἴσα ἢ μὴ πάντες ὁμοίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες; οὐδενὸς δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου ἢ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἧττον μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς δῆμον ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἂν γένωνται πλείους οἱ ἄποροι, καὶ ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐὰν κρεῖττον ᾖ τοῦ πλήθους τὸ εὔπορον καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμελῶσιν οἱ δὲ προσέχωσι τὸν νοῦν. πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι' ὧν γίγνονται αἱ μεταβολαί, οὐ λέγει ἀλλὰ μίαν, ὅτι ἀσωτευόμενοι κατατοκιζόμενοι γίγνονται πένητες, ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς πλουσίων ὄντων πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς ἀπολέσωσι τὰς οὐσίας, καινοτομοῦσιν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδὲν γίγνεται δεινόν, καὶ μεταβάλλουσιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ τότε εἰς δῆμον ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κἂν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν, κἂν ἀδικῶνται ἢ ὑβρίζωνται, στασιάζουσι καὶ μεταβάλλουσι τὰς πολιτείας, κἂν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι τὴν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν· οὗ αἰτίαν τὴν ἄγαν ἐλευθερίαν εἶναί φησιν. πλειόνων δ' οὐσῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ δημοκρατιῶν, ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης ἑκατέρας λέγει τὰς μεταβολὰς ὁ Σωκράτης. . . .

Θ′ (Ζ′).

Πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραὶ καὶ τίνες τοῦ τε βουλευτικοῦ καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάξεως, καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων, καὶ ποία πρὸς ποίαν συντέτακται πολιτείαν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολι-

τειῶν, ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τετύχηκεν εἴδη πλείω δημοκρατίας ὄντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως πολιτειῶν, ἅμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ τι λοιπόν, οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι, καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἑκάστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπισκεπτέον πάντων τῶν τρόπων· ταῦτα γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. λέγω δὲ τοὺς συνδυασμούς, οὓς δεῖ μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν, οὐκ ἐσκεμμένοι δ' εἰσὶ νῦν, οἷον ἂν τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας ὀλιγαρχικῶς ᾖ συντεταγμένον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον ὀλιγαρχικῶς, ἀριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας, ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον μὴ πάντα συντεθῇ τὰ τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεῖα. ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν ἁρμότττει πόλιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ποίῳ πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν, εἴρηται πρότερον. ὅμως δέ, (ἐπεὶ) δεῖ γενέσθαι δῆλον μὴ μόνον ποία τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρίστη ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πῶς δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ ταύτας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, ἐπέλθωμεν συντόμως. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δημοκρατίας εἴπωμεν· ἅμα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης πολιτείας φανερόν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσί τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν. ληπτέον δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον πάντα τὰ δημοτικὰ καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συντιθεμένων τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ πλείους δημοκρατίας μιᾶς εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους. δύο γάρ εἰσιν αἰτίαι δι' ἃσπερ αἱ δημοκρατίαι πλείους εἰσί, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ λεχθεῖσα πρότερον, ὅτι διάφοροι οἱ δῆμοι (γίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν γεωργικὸν πλῆθος, τὸ δὲ βάναυσον καὶ θητικόν· ὧν τοῦ πρώτου τῷ δευτέρῳ προσλαμβανομένου, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου πάλιν τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις, οὐ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίω

35 1317 a

οὐσίαις οὐ δίκαιον οἴονται εἶναι ἴσον μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κεκτημένους μηδὲν τοῖς κεκτημένοις· ἐν πολλαῖς τε ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐκ ἔξεστι χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶν οἱ κωλύοντες, ἐν Καρχηδόνι δὲ δημοκρατουμένῃ χρηματίζονται καὶ οὔπω μεταβεβλήκασιν. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων. τί γὰρ αὕτη μᾶλλον τῆς Λακωνικῆς πέπονθεν ἢ ὁποιασοῦν ἄλλης, οὗ μὴ πάντες κέκτηνται ἴσα ἢ μὴ πάντες ὁμοίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες; οὐδενὸς δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου ἢ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἧττον μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς δῆμον ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἂν γένωνται πλείους οἱ ἄποροι, καὶ ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐὰν κρεῖττον ᾖ τοῦ πλήθους τὸ εὔπορον καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμελῶσιν οἱ δὲ προσέχωσι τὸν νοῦν. πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι' ὧν γίγνονται αἱ μεταβολαί, οὐ λέγει ἀλλὰ μίαν, ὅτι ἀσωτευόμενοι κατατοκιζόμενοι γίγνονται πένητες, ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς πλουσίων ὄντων πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς ἀπολέσωσι τὰς οὐσίας, καινοτομοῦσιν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδὲν γίγνεται δεινόν, καὶ μεταβάλλουσιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ τότε εἰς δῆμον ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κἂν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν, κἂν ἀδικῶνται ἢ ὑβρίζωνται, στασιάζουσι καὶ μεταβάλλουσι τὰς πολιτείας, κἂν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι τὴν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ ἐξεῖναί δ τι ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν· οὗ αἰτίαν τὴν ἄγαν ἐλευθερίαν εἶναί φησιν. πλειόνων δ' οὐσῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ δημοκρατιῶν, ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης ἑκατέρας λέγει τὰς μεταβολὰς ὁ Σωκράτης. . . .

Θ′ (Ζ′).

Πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραὶ καὶ τίνες τοῦ τε βουλευτικοῦ καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάξεως, καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων, καὶ ποία πρὸς ποίαν συντέτακται πολιτείαν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολι-

τειῶν, ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται
2 πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τετύχηκεν εἴδη πλείω δημοκρατίας ὄντα
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως πολιτειῶν, ἅμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ
τι λοιπόν, οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι, καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν
3 συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἑκάστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ
τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπισκεπτέον πάντων
τῶν τρόπων· ταῦτα γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας 1317 a
ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι καὶ
4 πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. λέγω δὲ τοὺς συνδυασμούς,
οὓς δεῖ μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν, οὐκ ἐσκεμμένοι δ' εἰσὶ νῦν, οἷον ἂν
τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας ὀλιγαρ- 5
χικῶς ᾖ συντεταγμένον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστο-
κρατικῶς, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον ὀλι-
γαρχικῶς, ἀριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας, ἢ
κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον μὴ πάντα συντεθῇ τὰ τῆς πολι-
5 τείας οἰκεῖα. ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν ἁρμότ- 10
τει πόλιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ποίῳ
πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν,
6 εἴρηται πρότερον. ὅμως δέ, (ἐπεὶ) δεῖ γενέσθαι δῆλον μὴ μόνον
ποία τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρίστη ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
πῶς δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ ταύτας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, ἐπέλ- 15
θωμεν συντόμως. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δημοκρατίας εἴπωμεν·
ἅμα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης πολιτείας φανερόν,
7 αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσί τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν. ληπτέον δὲ
πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον πάντα τὰ δημοτικὰ καὶ τὰ δο-
κοῦντα ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συντι- 20
θεμένων τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ
8 πλείους δημοκρατίας μιᾶς εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους. δύο γάρ
εἰσιν αἰτίαι δι' ἃσπερ αἱ δημοκρατίαι πλείους εἰσί, πρῶτον
μὲν ἡ λεχθεῖσα πρότερον, ὅτι διάφοροι οἱ δῆμοι (γίνεται
γὰρ τὸ μὲν γεωργικὸν πλῆθος, τὸ δὲ βάναυσον καὶ θητι- 25
κόν· ὧν τοῦ πρώτου τῷ δευτέρῳ προσλαμβανομένου, καὶ τοῦ
τρίτου πάλιν τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις, οὐ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίῳ

καὶ χείρω γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν)· δευτέρα δὲ περὶ ἧς νῦν λέγομεν· τὰ γὰρ ταῖς 9
30 δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεῖα ταύτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἑτέρας· τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω, τῇ δ' ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα, τῇ δ' ἅπαντα ταῦτα. χρήσιμον δ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν πρός τε τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἣν ἄν τις αὐτῶν τύχῃ βουλόμενος,
35 καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις. ζητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὰς πολιτείας 10 καθιστάντες ἅπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴρηται πρότερον. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ ὧν ἐφίενται λέγωμεν.

2 Ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία (τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν, ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ
1317 b ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἐλευθερίας· τούτου γὰρ στοχάζεσθαί φασι πᾶσαν δημοκρατίαν)· ἐλευθερίας δὲ ἓν μὲν τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ 2 ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, τούτου δ'
5 ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτ' εἶναι [καὶ] τέλος καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν· ὥστε ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις συμβαίνει κυριωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους τῶν εὐπόρων· πλείους γάρ εἰσι, κύριον δὲ τὸ τοῖς
10 πλείοσι δόξαν. ἓν μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας σημεῖον τοῦτο, ὃν 3 τίθενται πάντες οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρον, ἓν δὲ τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις· τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔργον εἶναί φασιν, εἴπερ τοῦ δουλεύοντος τὸ ζῆν μὴ ὡς βούλεται. τῆς 4 μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅρος οὗτος δεύτερος, ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἐλή-
15 λυθε τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ μηδενός, εἰ δὲ μή, κατὰ μέρος. καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. τούτων δ' ὑποκειμένων καὶ τοιαύ- 5 της οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα δημοτικά, τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς πάντας ἐκ πάντων, τὸ ἄρχειν πάντας μὲν

ἑκάστου ἕκαστον δ' ἐν μέρει πάντων, τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς
ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης,
τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος μηδενὸς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ ὅτι μι-
κροτάτου, τὸ μὴ δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλιγάκις ἢ
ὀλίγας ἔξω τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον, τὸ ὀλιγοχρονίους εἶναι τὰς
ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δικάζειν πάντας
καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ
τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ
πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων, τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν
κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων (ἢ τῶν μεγίστων), ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν
6 μηδενὸς ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων [ἢ τῶν μεγίστων] κυρίαν (τῶν δ'
ἀρχῶν δημοτικώτατον βουλή, ὅπου μὴ μισθοῦ εὐπορία πᾶσιν·
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὴν δύναμιν·
εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει τὰς κρίσεις πάσας ὁ δῆμος εὐπορῶν
μισθοῦ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ
7 ταύτης), ἔπειτα τὸ μισθοφορεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκ-
κλησίαν δικαστήρια ἀρχάς, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ
δικαστήρια καὶ βουλὴν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας τὰς κυρίας, ἢ
τῶν ἀρχῶν ἃς ἀνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων· [ἔτι ἐπειδὴ
ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται,
τὰ δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ τἀναντία τούτων εἶναι, ἀγένεια πενία
8 βαναυσία·] ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀίδιον εἶναι,
ἐὰν δέ τις καταλειφθῇ ἐξ ἀρχαίας μεταβολῆς, τό γε πε- 1318 a
ριαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς
9 ποιεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτ' ἐστί, συμ-
βαίνει δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικοῦ
(τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἅπαντας κατ' ἀριθμόν) ἡ μά-
λιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δῆμος· ἴσον γὰρ τὸ
μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ
κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξ ἴσου κατ' ἀριθμόν·
οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχειν νομίζοιεν τήν τ' ἰσότητα τῇ πολι-
τείᾳ καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

3 Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἕξουσι τὸ ἴσον, πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα διελεῖν χιλίοις τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἴσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἢ οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἰσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν αἱρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων. πότερον οὖν αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία δικαιοτάτη κατὰ 2 τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ μᾶλλον ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος; φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῇ πλείονι οὐσίᾳ· κατὰ πλῆθος γὰρ οὐσίας φασὶ κρίνεσθαι δεῖν. ἔχει δ' ἀμφότερα 3 ἀνισότητα καὶ ἀδικίαν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι, τυραννίς (καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἷς ἔχῃ πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος), εἰ δ' ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἀδικήσουσι δημεύοντες τὰ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. τίς ἂν οὖν εἴη ἰσότης ἣν ὁμολογήσουσιν ἀμφότεροι, σκεπτέον 4 ἐξ ὧν ὁρίζονται δικαίων ἀμφότεροι. λέγουσι γὰρ ὡς ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τοῦτ' εἶναι δεῖ κύριον. ἔστω δὴ τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι πάντως, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τετύχηκεν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πόλις, πλούσιοι καὶ πένητες, ὅ τι ἂν ἀμφοτέροις δόξῃ ἢ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ τἀναντία δόξῃ, ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους καὶ ὧν τὸ τίμημα πλεῖον. οἷον εἰ οἱ μὲν δέκα οἱ δὲ εἴκοσιν, ἔδοξε δὲ τῶν μὲν πλουσίων 5 τοῖς ἕξ, τῶν δ' ἀπορωτέρων τοῖς πεντεκαίδεκα, προσγεγένηνται τοῖς μὲν πένησι τέτταρες τῶν πλουσίων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις πέντε τῶν πενήτων· ὁποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει συναριθμουμένων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατέροις, τοῦτο κύριον. ἐὰν δὲ 6 ἴσοι συμπέσωσι, κοινὴν εἶναι ταύτην νομιστέον ἀπορίαν ὥσπερ νῦν, ἐὰν δίχα ἡ ἐκκλησία γένηται ἢ τὸ δικαστήριον· ἢ
1318 b γὰρ ἀποκληρωτέον ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον ποιητέον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, κἂν ᾖ πάνυ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅμως ῥᾷον τυχεῖν ἢ συμπεῖσαι

τοὺς δυναμένους πλεονεκτεῖν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἱ ἥττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν·

Δημοκρατιῶν δ' οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη μὲν ἡ πρώτη 4 τάξει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν αὕτη. λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὥσπερ ἄν τις διέλοι τοὺς δήμους· βέλτιστος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν, ὅπου ζῇ τὸ 2 πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχολος, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν· διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τἀναγκαῖα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβουσι καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἥδιον αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, ὅπου ἂν μὴ ᾖ 3 λήμματα μεγάλα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ὀρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχαίας τυραννίδας ὑπέμενον καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπομένουσιν, ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ κωλύῃ μηδ' ἀφαιρῆται μηδέν· ταχέως γὰρ οἱ μὲν πλουτοῦσιν αὐτῶν, 4 οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀποροῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ ἐλέσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν ἀναπληροῖ τὴν ἔνδειαν, εἴ τι φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσιν, ἐπεὶ παρ' ἐνίοις δήμοις, κἂν μὴ μετέχωσι τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλά τινες αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, τοῦ δὲ βουλεύεσθαι κύριοι ὦσιν, ἱκανῶς 5 ἔχει τοῖς πολλοῖς. καὶ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι σχῆμά τι δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ' ἦν. διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρότερον ῥηθείσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὑπάρχειν εἴωθεν, αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ εὐθύνειν καὶ δικάζειν πάντας, ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς μεγίστας αἱρετοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τὰς μείζους ἀπὸ μειζόνων, ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τιμη- 6 μάτων μὲν μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους. ἀνάγκη δὲ πολιτευομένους οὕτω πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς (αἵ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦντος) καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρίμοις ἀρκοῦσαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν τάξιν· ἄρξονται γὰρ οὐχ ὑπ'

ἄλλων χειρόνων, καὶ ἄρξουσι δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν
εἶναι κυρίους ἑτέρους. τὸ γὰρ ἐπανακρέμασθαι, καὶ μὴ πᾶν 7
ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ, συμφέρον ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἐξουσία
τοῦ πράττειν ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις οὐ δύναται φυλάττειν τὸ ἐν
1319 a ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαῦλον. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον συμβαί-
νειν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὠφελιμώτατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἄρχειν
τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας, μηδὲν ἐλαττουμένου τοῦ
πλήθους. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὕτη τῶν δημοκρατιῶν ἀρίστη, φανε- 8
ρόν, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν
δῆμον· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργὸν τὸν δῆμον τῶν
τε νόμων τινὲς τῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς κειμένων τὸ ἀρ-
χαῖον χρήσιμοι πάντες, ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτῆσθαι
πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπό τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ
καὶ τὴν πόλιν· ἦν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι 9
νενομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἐξεῖναι τοὺς πρώτους κλήρους,
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν Ὀξύλου νόμον εἶναι τοιοῦτόν τι δυ-
νάμενος, τὸ μὴ δανείζειν εἴς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης
ἑκάστῳ γῆς· νῦν δὲ δεῖ διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ Ἀφυταίων νόμῳ·
πρὸς γὰρ ὃ λέγομέν ἐστι χρήσιμος. ἐκεῖνοι γάρ, καίπερ 10
ὄντες πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὀλίγην, ὅμως πάντες γεωρ-
γοῦσιν· τιμῶνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τηλικαῦτα μόρια διαιροῦντες ὥστ' ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς
τιμήσεσι καὶ τοὺς πένητας. μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος 11
βέλτιστος δῆμός ἐστιν ὅπου νομεῖς εἰσὶ καὶ ζῶσιν ἀπὸ βο-
σκημάτων· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει τῇ γεωργίᾳ παραπλησίως,
καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις μάλισθ' οὗτοι γεγυ-
μνασμένοι τὰς ἕξεις καὶ χρήσιμοι τὰ σώματα καὶ δυ-
νάμενοι θυραυλεῖν. τὰ δ' ἄλλα πλήθη πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ 12
ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστᾶσι, πολλῷ φαυλότερα
τούτων· ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς
ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τό τε τῶν βαναύσων καὶ
τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικόν. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ 13
περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ κυλίεσθαι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον

γένος ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥᾳδίως ἐκκλησιάζει· οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ
τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὔτ' ἀπαντῶσιν οὔθ' ὁμοίως
14 δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης. ὅπου δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει τὴν
χώραν τὴν θέσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε τὴν χώραν πολὺ τῆς
πόλεως ἀπηρτῆσθαι, ῥᾴδιον καὶ δημοκρατίαν ποιεῖσθαι χρη-
στὴν καὶ πολιτείαν· ἀναγκάζεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀγρῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποικίας, ὥστε δεῖ, κἂν ἀγοραῖος
ὄχλος ᾖ, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκκλησίας ἄνευ
15 τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατασκευά-
ζειν τὴν βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην δημοκρατίαν, εἴρηται· φα-
νερὸν δὲ καὶ πῶς τὰς ἄλλας· ἑπομένως γὰρ δεῖ παρεκ-
βαίνειν καὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν. τὴν δὲ τελευ- 1319 b
ταίαν, διὰ τὸ πάντας κοινωνεῖν, οὔτε πάσης ἐστὶ πόλεως
φέρειν, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον διαμένειν μὴ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθε-
σιν εὖ συγκειμένην· ἃ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρότερον τὰ πλεῖστα
16 σχεδόν. πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δημοκρατίαν,
καὶ τὸν δῆμον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν εἰώθασιν οἱ προεστῶτες τῷ
προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστους καὶ ποιεῖν πολίτας μὴ μόνον
τοὺς γνησίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόθους καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ὁποτερουοῦν
πολίτου, λέγω δὲ οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός· ἅπαν γὰρ οἰκεῖον
17 τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι μὲν οὖν οἱ δημα-
γωγοὶ κατασκευάζειν οὕτως, δεῖ μέντοι προσλαμβάνειν μέ-
χρι ἂν ὑπερτείνῃ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν μέ-
σων, καὶ τούτου μὴ πέρα προβαίνειν· ὑπερβάλλοντες γὰρ
ἀτακτοτέραν τε ποιοῦσι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους
πρὸς τὸ χαλεπῶς ὑπομένειν τὴν δημοκρατίαν παροξύνουσι
μᾶλλον, ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἴτιον γενέσθαι περὶ
Κυρήνην· ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸν παρορᾶται, πολὺ δὲ
18 γινόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα κατασκευάσματα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν
τὴν τοιαύτην, οἷς Κλεισθένης τε Ἀθήνησιν ἐχρήσατο βουλό-
μενος αὐξῆσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ περὶ Κυρήνην οἱ τὸν

δῆμον καθιστάντες. φυλαί τε γὰρ ἕτεραι ποιητέαι πλείους 19
καὶ φρατρίαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὀλίγα
καὶ κοινά, καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνα-
μιχθῶσι πάντες ἀλλήλοις, αἱ δὲ συνήθειαι διαζευχθῶσιν
αἱ πρότερον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατασκευάσματα 20
δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ πάντα, λέγω δ' οἷον ἀναρχία τε δούλων
(αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη μέχρι του συμφέρουσα) καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
παίδων, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὅπως τις βούλεται παρορᾶν (πολὺ γὰρ
ἔσται τὸ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθοῦν· ἥδιον γὰρ τοῖς πολ-
λοῖς τὸ ζῆν ἀτάκτως ἢ τὸ σωφρόνως).

5 Ἔστι δ' ἔργον τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλομένων συν-
ιστάναι τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν οὐ τὸ καταστῆσαι μέγιστον
ἔργον οὐδὲ μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅπως σώζηται μᾶλλον· μίαν γὰρ
ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας οὐ χαλεπὸν μεῖναι πολιτευομένους
ὁπωσοῦν. διὸ δεῖ, περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτη- 2
ρίαι καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατα-
σκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβουμένους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα,
τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς
1320 a γεγραμμένους οἳ περιλήψονται μάλιστα τὰ σώζοντα τὰς
πολιτείας, καὶ μὴ νομίζειν τοῦτ' εἶναι δημοτικὸν μηδ' ὀλι-
γαρχικὸν ὃ ποιήσει τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατεῖσθαι
ἢ ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὃ πλεῖστον χρόνον. οἱ δὲ νῦν δη- 3
μαγωγοὶ χαριζόμενοι τοῖς δήμοις πολλὰ δημεύουσι διὰ
τῶν δικαστηρίων. διὸ δεῖ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιπράττειν τοὺς κη-
δομένους τῆς πολιτείας, νομοθετοῦντας μηδὲν εἶναι δημόσιον
τῶν καταδικαζομένων καὶ φερόμενον πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, ἀλλ'
ἱερόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντες οὐδὲν ἧττον εὐλαβεῖς ἔσονται
(ζημιώσονται γὰρ ὁμοίως), ὁ δ' ὄχλος ἧττον καταψηφιεῖ-
ται τῶν κρινομένων, λήψεσθαι μηδὲν μέλλων. ἔτι δὲ τὰς 4
γινομένας δημοσίας δίκας ὡς ὀλιγίστας αἰεὶ ποιεῖν, μεγά-
λοις ἐπιτιμίοις τοὺς εἰκῇ γραφομένους κωλύοντας· οὐ γὰρ
τοὺς δημοτικοὺς ἀλλὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἰώθασιν εἰσάγειν, δεῖ
δὲ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὔνους εἶναι τοὺς

πολίτας, εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γε ὡς πολεμίους νομίζειν τοὺς
5 κυρίους. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ τελευταῖαι δημοκρατίαι πολυάνθρωποί
τέ εἰσι καὶ χαλεπὸν ἐκκλησιάζειν ἀμίσθους, τοῦτο δ' ὅπου
πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πολέμιον τοῖς γνωρίμοις
(ἀπό τε γὰρ εἰσφορᾶς καὶ δημεύσεως ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι 20
καὶ δικαστηρίων φαύλων, ἃ πολλὰς ἤδη δημοκρατίας ἀνέ-
τρεψεν), ὅπου μὲν οὖν πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, δεῖ
ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας, καὶ δικαστήρια πολλῶν μὲν ὀλί-
6 γαις δ' ἡμέραις (τοῦτο γὰρ φέρει μὲν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ φο-
βεῖσθαι τοὺς πλουσίους τὰς δαπάνας, ἐὰν οἱ μὲν εὔποροι μὴ 25
λαμβάνωσι δικαστικόν, οἱ δ' ἄποροι, φέρει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ
κρίνεσθαι τὰς δίκας πολὺ βέλτιον· οἱ γὰρ εὔποροι πολ-
λὰς μὲν ἡμέρας οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἀπεῖναι, βρα-
7 χὺν δὲ χρόνον ἐθέλουσιν), ὅπου δ' εἰσὶ πρόσοδοι, μὴ ποιεῖν ὃ
νῦν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ποιοῦσιν (τὰ γὰρ περιόντα νέμουσιν· λαμ- 30
βάνουσι δὲ ἅμα, καὶ πάλιν δέονται τῶν αὐτῶν· ὁ τετρημέ-
νος γάρ ἐστι πίθος ἡ τοιαύτη βοήθεια τοῖς ἀπόροις). ἀλλὰ
δεῖ τὸν ἀληθινῶς δημοτικὸν ὁρᾶν ὅπως τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν
ἄπορον ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρα-
8 τίαν. τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος. ἐπεὶ 35
δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν προσ-
όδων γινόμενα συναθροίζοντας ἀθρόα χρὴ διανέμειν τοῖς
ἀπόροις, μάλιστα μὲν εἴ τις δύναται τοσοῦτον συναθροίζειν ὅσον
εἰς γῆδίου κτῆσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ
9 γεωργίας, καὶ εἰ μὴ πᾶσι δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φυλὰς ἤ 1320 b
τι μέρος ἕτερον ἐν μέρει διανέμειν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τὰς
ἀναγκαίας συνόδους τοὺς εὐπόρους εἰσφέρειν τὸν μισθόν, ἀφιε-
μένους τῶν ματαίων λειτουργιῶν. τοιοῦτον δέ τινα τρόπον
Καρχηδόνιοι πολιτευόμενοι φίλον κέκτηνται τὸν δῆμον. ἀεὶ 5
γάρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν
10 εὐπόρους. χαριέντων δ' ἐστὶ καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων γνωρίμων καὶ
διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀφορμὰς διδόντας τρέπειν
ἐπ' ἐργασίας. καλῶς δ' ἔχει μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ Ταραντίνων·

ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κοινὰ ποιοῦντες τὰ κτήματα τοῖς ἀπόροις ἐπὶ τὴν χρῆσιν εὔνουν παρασκευάζουσι τὸ πλῆθος· ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς πάσας ἐποίησαν διττάς, τὰς μὲν αἱρετὰς τὰς δὲ κληρωτάς, τὰς μὲν κληρωτὰς ὅπως ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν μετέχῃ, τὰς δ' αἱρετὰς ἵνα πολιτεύωνται βέλτιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δ' αἱρετούς. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς δημοκρατίας κατασκευάζειν, εἴρηται· 11

6 Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας πῶς δεῖ, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων γὰρ δεῖ συνάγειν ἑκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν δημοκρατίαν ἀναλογιζόμενον, τὴν μὲν εὔκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην— αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ, ᾗ δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα διαιρεῖν, τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω τὰ δὲ μείζω ποιοῦντας, ἐλάττω μὲν ἀφ' ὧν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μεθέξουσιν ἀρχῶν, μείζω δ' ἀφ' ὧν τῶν κυριωτέρων· τῷ τε κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν ἐξεῖναι τῆς πολιτείας, τοσοῦτον εἰσαγομένους τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος διὰ τοῦ τιμήματος, μεθ' οὗ κρείττονες ἔσονται τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων· ἀεὶ δὲ δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ βελτίονος δήμου τοὺς κοινωνούς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐπιτείνοντας δεῖ μικρὸν κατασκευάζειν. τῇ δ' ἀντικειμένῃ τῇ τελευταίᾳ δημοκρατίᾳ, τῇ δυναστικωτάτῃ καὶ τυραννικωτάτῃ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, ὅσῳ περ χειρίστη, τοσούτῳ δεῖ πλείονος φυλακῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν εὖ σώματα διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλῶς ἔχοντα . . . τοῖς πλωτῆρσιν ἐπιδέχεται πλείους ἁμαρτίας ὥστε μὴ φθείρεσθαι δι' αὐτάς, τὰ δὲ νοσερῶς ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκλελυμένα καὶ πλωτήρων τετυχηκότα φαύλων οὐδὲ τὰς μικρὰς δύνανται φέρειν ἁμαρτίας, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ χείρισται πλείστης δέονται φυλακῆς. τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅλως ἡ πολυανθρωπία σώζει· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν· τὴν δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δῆλον ὅτι τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ τῆς εὐταξίας δεῖ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μέν ἐστι μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους, 7
γεωργικὸν βαναυσικὸν ἀγοραῖον θητικόν, τέτταρα δὲ τὰ χρή-
σιμα πρὸς πόλεμον, ἱππικὸν ὁπλιτικὸν ψιλὸν ναυτικόν,
ὅπου μὲν συμβέβηκε τὴν χώραν εἶναι ἱππάσιμον, ἐνταῦθα
μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχει κατασκευάζειν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσχυράν
(ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τοῖς οἰκοῦσι διὰ ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, 10
αἱ δ' ἱπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσίν),
ὅπου δ' ὁπλιτικήν, τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν (τὸ γὰρ ὁπλι-
2 τικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀπόρων)· ἡ δὲ ψιλὴ
δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοτικὴ πάμπαν. νῦν μὲν οὖν
ὅπου τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθός ἐστιν, ὅταν διαστῶσι, πολλάκις 15
ἀγωνίζονται χείρω· δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φάρμακον παρὰ τῶν
πολεμικῶν λαμβάνειν στρατηγῶν, οἳ συνδυάζουσι πρὸς τὴν
ἱππικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ὁπλιτικὴν τὴν ἀρμόττουσαν τῶν
3 ψιλῶν. ταύτῃ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν οἱ δῆμοι
τῶν εὐπόρων· ψιλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες πρὸς ἱππικὴν καὶ ὁπλιτικὴν 20
ἀγωνίζονται ῥᾳδίως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων καθιστάναι ταύ-
την τὴν δύναμιν ἐφ' ἑαυτούς ἐστι καθιστάναι, δεῖ δὲ διῃρη-
μένης τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρεσβυτέρων τῶν
δὲ νέων, ἔτι μὲν ὄντας νέους τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκεσθαι
τὰς κούφας καὶ τὰς ψιλὰς ἐργασίας, ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ 25
4 παίδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων. τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν
γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἤτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται
πρότερον, τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις, ἢ, καθάπερ Θηβαίοις,
ἀποσχομένοις χρόνον τινὰ τῶν βαναύσων ἔργων, ἢ, καθά-
περ ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ, κρίσιν ποιουμένους τῶν ἀξίων τῶν ἐν τῷ 30
5 πολιτεύματι καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς
κυριωτάταις, ἃς δεῖ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν, δεῖ
προσκεῖσθαι λειτουργίας, ἵν' ἑκὼν ὁ δῆμος μὴ μετέχῃ καὶ
συγγνώμην ἔχῃ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὡς μισθὸν πολὺν διδοῦσι τῆς
6 ἀρχῆς. ἁρμόττει δὲ θυσίας τε εἰσιόντας ποιεῖσθαι μεγα- 35
λοπρεπεῖς καὶ κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν, ἵνα τῶν περὶ
τὰς ἑστιάσεις μετέχων ὁ δῆμος καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶν κοσμου-

μένην τὰ μὲν ἀναθήμασι τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομήμασιν ἄσμενος ὁρᾷ μένουσαν τὴν πολιτείαν· συμβήσεται δὲ καὶ τοῖς γνω-
40 ρίμοις εἶναι μνημεῖα τῆς δαπάνης. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο νῦν οἱ περὶ 7
τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας οὐ ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον· τὰ λήμματα
γὰρ ζητοῦσιν οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὴν τιμήν, διόπερ εὖ ἔχει λέγειν
1321 b ταύτας εἶναι δημοκρατίας μικράς. πῶς μὲν οὖν χρὴ κα-
θιστάναι τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, διωρίσθω
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·

8 Ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι καλῶς
5 τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, πόσαι καὶ τίνες καὶ τίνων, καθάπερ
εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν χω-
ρὶς ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κό-
σμον ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς. ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐν μὲν 2
ταῖς μικραῖς ἐλάττους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγά-
10 λαις πλείους, ὥσπερ τυγχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον· ποίας
οὖν ἁρμόττει συνάγειν καὶ ποίας χωρίζειν, δεῖ μὴ λανθά-
νειν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν 3
ἀγοράν, ἐφ' ᾗ δεῖ τινὰ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορῶσαν περί τε
τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον
15 πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ μὲν ὠνεῖσθαι τὰ δὲ πωλεῖν πρὸς
τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑπογυιότα-
τον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, δι' ἣν δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν
συνελθεῖν. ἑτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ 4
σύνεγγυς ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄστυ δημοσίων καὶ ἰδίων, ὅπως
20 εὐκοσμία ᾖ, καὶ τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν
σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις, καὶ τῶν ὁρίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
ὅπως ἀνεγκλήτως ἔχωσιν, καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἄλλα τῆς ἐπι-
μελείας ὁμοιότροπα. καλοῦσι δ' ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν 5
τοιαύτην ἀρχήν, ἔχει δὲ μόρια πλείω τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὧν
25 ἑτέρους ἐφ' ἕτερα καθιστᾶσιν ἐν ταῖς πολυανθρωποτέραις
πόλεσιν, οἷον τειχοποιοὺς καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ λιμένων
φύλακας. ἄλλη δ' ἀναγκαία τε καὶ παραπλησία ταύτῃ· 6
περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν γάρ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν ἐστὶ καὶ [τὰ]
περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἄστεος· καλοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας τούτους

οἱ μὲν ἀγρονόμους οἱ δ' ὑλωρούς. αὗται μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί 30
εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς, ἄλλη δ' ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν αἱ πρόσοδοι τῶν
κοινῶν ἀναφέρονται, παρ' ὧν φυλαττόντων μερίζονται πρὸς
ἑκάστην διοίκησιν· καλοῦσι δ' ἀποδέκτας τούτους καὶ ταμίας.
7 ἑτέρα δ' ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ τά τε ἴδια συμ-
βόλαια καὶ τὰς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς 35
αὐτοῖς τούτοις καὶ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ
τὰς εἰσαγωγάς. ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν οὖν μερίζουσι καὶ ταύτην εἰς
πλείους, ἔστι δὲ μία κυρία τούτων πάντων· καλοῦνται δὲ ἱερο-
μνήμονες καὶ ἐπιστάται καὶ μνήμονες καὶ τούτοις ἄλλα ὀνό-
8 ματα σύνεγγυς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιο- 40
τάτη δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ
τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων
κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν σωμάτων. 1322 a
9 χαλεπὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαν, ὥστε
ὅπου μὴ μεγάλα ἔστι κερδαίνειν, οὔτ' ἄρχειν ὑπομένουσιν
αὐτὴν οὔθ' ὑπομείναντες ἐθέλουσι πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους·
ἀναγκαία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελος γίνεσθαι μὲν δίκας περὶ 5
τῶν δικαίων, ταύτας δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ὥστ' εἰ μὴ
γιγνομένων κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ πράξεων μὴ
10 γιγνομένων. διὸ βέλτιον μὴ μίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν,
ἀλλ' ἄλλους ἐξ ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, καὶ περὶ τὰς προθέσεις
τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων ὡσαύτως πειρᾶσθαι διαιρεῖν, ἔτι δ' 10
ἔνια πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς
τῶν ἔνων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἑτέρας
καταδικασάσης ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, οἷον ἀστυνό-
μους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἑτέ-
11 ρους. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐλάττων ἀπέχθεια ἐνῇ τοῖς πραττομένοις, 15
τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον λήψονται τέλος αἱ πράξεις· τὸ μὲν οὖν τοὺς
αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς καταδικάσαντας καὶ πραττομένους ἀπέχθειαν
ἔχει διπλῆν, τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν.
πολλαχοῦ δὲ διῄρηται καὶ ἡ φυλάττουσα πρὸς τὴν πραττο-
12 μένην, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν (ἡ) τῶν ἕνδεκα καλουμένων. διὸ βέλτιον 20
καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ζητεῖν καὶ περὶ ταύ-

την. ἀναγκαία μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐχ ἧττον τῆς εἰρημένης, συμβαίνει δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς φεύγειν μάλιστα ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ποιεῖν κυρίους· αὐτοὶ γὰρ δέονται φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἢ φυλάττειν ἄλλους δύνανται. διὸ δεῖ μὴ μίαν ἀποτεταγμένην ἀρχὴν εἶναι πρὸς 13
αὐτοῖς, μηδὲ συνεχῶς τὴν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τε νέων, ὅπου τις ἐφήβων ἢ φρουρῶν ἐστὶ τάξις, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν δεῖ κατὰ μέρη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑτέρους. ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ὡς ἀναγκαιοτάτας θετέον εἶναι πρώτας, μετὰ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀναγκαίας μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι τεταγμένας· καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται πολλῆς. τοιαῦται δ' εἶεν ἂν αἵ τε περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πό- 14
λεως, καὶ ὅσαι τάττονται πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ πυλῶν τε καὶ τειχῶν φυλακῆς ὁμοίως ἐπιμελητὰς εἶναι καὶ ἐξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πολιτῶν. ἔνθα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἀρχαὶ πλείους εἰσίν, ἔνθα δ' ἐλάττους, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσι μία περὶ πάντων. καλοῦσι δὲ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολεμάρχους 15
1322 b τοὺς τοιούτους. ἔτι δὲ κἂν ὦσιν ἱππεῖς ἢ ψιλοὶ ἢ τοξόται ἢ ναυτικόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἑκάστων ἐνίοτε καθίστανται ἀρχαί, αἷ καλοῦνται ναυαρχίαι καὶ ἱππαρχίαι καὶ ταξιαρχίαι, καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αἱ ὑπὸ ταύτας τριηραρχίαι καὶ λοχαγίαι καὶ φυλαρχίαι καὶ ὅσα τούτων μόρια· τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἕν τι τούτων ἐστὶν εἶδος, ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτην 16
τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνιαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσαι, διαχειρίζουσι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν, αὐτὴν μηδὲν διαχειρίζουσαν ἕτερον· καλοῦσι δὲ τούτους οἱ μὲν εὐθύνους, οἱ δὲ λογιστάς, οἱ δ' ἐξεταστάς, οἱ δὲ συνηγόρους. παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ μάλιστα 17
κυρία πάντων ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφορὰν ἢ προκάθηται τοῦ πλήθους, ὅπου κύριός ἐστιν ὁ δῆμος· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ συνάγον τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας. καλεῖται δὲ ἔνθα μὲν πρόβουλοι διὰ τὸ προβουλεύειν, ὅπου

18 δὲ πλῆθός ἐστι, βουλὴ μᾶλλον. αἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν
ἀρχῶν σχεδὸν τοσαῦταί τινές εἰσιν, ἄλλο δ' εἶδος ἐπιμε-
λείας ἡ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, οἷον ἱερεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν
περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαί τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι
τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτα-
19 κται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. συμβαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτην
ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσιν, ἐνια-
χοῦ δὲ πολλὰς καὶ κεχωρισμένας τῆς ἱερωσύνης, οἷον ἱερο-
ποιοὺς καὶ ναοφύλακας καὶ ταμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων.
20 ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοι-
νὰς πάσας, ὅσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ'
ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἑστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμήν· καλοῦσι δ' οἱ μὲν
21 ἄρχοντας τούτους, οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις. αἱ μὲν
οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι περὶ τούτων, ὡς εἰπεῖν συγκε-
φαλαιωσαμένους, περί τε τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ
καὶ περὶ τὰς προσόδους καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀναλισκόμενα, καὶ περὶ
ἀγορὰν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἔτι
τὰ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ συναλλαγμάτων ἀναγραφὰς
καὶ πράξεις καὶ φυλακὰς καὶ ἐπιλογισμούς τε καὶ ἐξε-
τάσεις καὶ προσευθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, καὶ τέλος αἱ περὶ
22 τὸ βουλευόμενόν εἰσι τῶν κοινῶν· ἴδιαι δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικω-
τέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐημερούσαις πόλεσιν, ἔτι δὲ φροντιζού-
σαις εὐκοσμίας, γυναικονομία νομοφυλακία παιδονομία
γυμνασιαρχία, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυ- 1323 a
μνικοὺς καὶ Διονυσιακούς, κἂν εἴ τινας ἑτέρας συμβαίνει
23 τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας. τούτων δ' ἔνιαι φανερῶς εἰσὶν οὐ
δημοτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, οἷον γυναικονομία καὶ παιδονομία·
τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν
24 ὥσπερ ἀκολούθοις διὰ τὴν ἀδουλίαν. τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν ἀρχῶν
καθ' ἃς αἱροῦνταί τινες ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίους, νομοφυλάκων προ-
βούλων βουλῆς, οἱ μὲν νομοφύλακες ἀριστοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρ-
χικὸν δ' οἱ πρόβουλοι, βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν
τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν· . . .

CRITICAL NOTES.

BOOK VI (IV).

1288 b 16. *ἔργον* Π^1 Vat. Pal. marg. P^4 Sus.: om. Π^2 Bekk. **18.** †*μηδὲν ἧττον* . . . **19.** *δύναμιν*†] There can be little doubt that these words have come down to us in a corrupt and probably imperfect form. Bekk.[2] reads *οὐδὲν* in place of *μηδὲν*. *Τε* can hardly be right. Π^1 marg. P^4 have *ἔτι* in place of *ἐστὶ* (Vat. Pal. *εστιν*). Possibly we should read *οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦ παιδοτρίβου τε καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ παρασκευάσαι καὶ ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν*, but it is difficult to be certain how the text originally stood. **24.** *ἁρμόττουσα* Π^2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *ἁρμόζουσα* M^8 P^1 Sus. and possibly Γ. See critical note on 1338 b 3. **27.** *ἀγαθὸν* Π^1 Vat. Pal. marg. P^4 Sus.: om. Π^2 Bekk. **29.** *ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο*] '*γίνοιτο*?' Sus., but cp. Xen. Cyrop. 4. 3. 8, *ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἐννοεῖτε πῶς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο*. **32.** *τε*] See explanatory note on 1288 b 30 sqq. **33.** *παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα*] See critical note on 1282 a 40. **36.** Vet. Int. adds *tamen* before his equivalent for *τῶν γε χρησίμων*.

1289 a 1. *ἐπαινοῦσιν* Bekk. Sus., *ἐπαινοῦσι* Π^2 corr. P^1: *ἐπαινοῦμεν* Γ M^8 pr. P^1. **3.** *κοινωνεῖν* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *κινεῖν* M^8 pr. P^1: Vet. Int. has *prosequi*, and I am not certain what this represents. **5.** *τοῦ* Π^2 Bekk.: *ἡ* Π^1 Sus. A word is sometimes displaced in Π^1 by another word wrongly repeated from a neighbouring line, and here *ἡ* from the preceding line has probably displaced *τοῦ*. **8.** *δὲ* Π^2 Bekk.: *γὰρ* Γ M^8 Sus., *γὰρ δὴ* P^1. **11.** *μετὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] See explanatory note. **17.** *ἑκάστοις* Γ P^1 Sus. (Vet. Int. *singulis*): *ἑκάστης* M^8 Π^2 Ar. Bekk. less well. *τῆς κοινωνίας*] z has *communicationis*, which sometimes represents *κοινωνίας* in the *Vetus Versio* (e. g. in 1252 a 7) and may possibly be right: the other MSS. have *communionis*. **24.** Vet. Int. does not translate *δὴ* after *εἴπερ*: did Γ omit it? *πλείους* Π^1 corr. P^2 Bekk. Sus.: *πλείω* P^3 C^4 Π^3 pr. P^2: see explanatory note on 1289 a 24. **26.** *περὶ* om. Π^1. **33.** *κεχορηγημένην*] Vet. Int. *diffusam*, which might suggest that he

misread the word as *κεχυμένην*, were it not that he has *distributores* for *χορηγοί* in 1299 a 19.

1289 b 1. *τοῦ βασιλεύοντος*] Vet. Int. *regis*, but we must not infer any difference of reading in Γ, for in 1291 b 4 Vet. Int. has *agricolas* for *γεωργοῦντας*, in 1298 b 22 *consiliarios* for *τοὺς βουλευομένους*, in 1304 a 3 *sacrificatorem* for *θύοντος*, in 1305 a 31 *demagogi* for *δημαγωγοῦντες*, in 1306 a 8 *fures* for *κλέπτοντας*, and in 1319 a 30 *terrae cultores* for *οἱ γεωργοῦντες*. The reverse inexactness also occurs: thus in 1320 b 29 we have *communicantes* for *τοὺς κοινωνούς*. **13.** Π^1 Sus. add *εἰσίν* or *εἰσιν* after *πολιτειῶν*. **25.** *ἑκάστης* M^a P^1 Bekk. Sus.: *ἑκάστου* Π^2: Vet. Int. *uniuscuiusque* leaves it uncertain which reading he found in Γ. *ταῦτα* Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: *ταύτας* Π^2 Ar. **32.** *δὲ ἄνοπλον* Π^2 Bekk.: *δ' ἄοπλον* M^a P^1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *autem sine armis* which reading he found in Γ. *Ἄνοπλος* 'seems to be a later and less correct form, v. Dind. Steph. Thes. s.v.' (Liddell and Scott s.v. *ἄοπλος*): still it may be right here, for in Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 b 12 all MSS. have the form *ἄνοπλος*. The form *ἄνοπλον* occurs in Plato, Euthyd. 299 B, though we find the form *ἄοπλον* in Protag. 320 E and 321 C, where the word is used in a wider sense than in the Euthydemus. **38.** *πολέμους* Γ Bekk.[2] Sus. (Vet. Int. *bella*): *πολεμίους* Π Bekk.[1] As to the second *πρὸς* see explanatory note. **39.** *ἐπὶ Μαιάνδρῳ*] Vet. Int. *sub Maeandro* probably represents *ἐπὶ Μαιάνδρῳ*, for in 1306 b 35 *ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάῳ* is rendered *sub Agesilao*, and in 1271 a 39 *ἐπὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι sub regibus*.

1290 a 1. *κἂν εἴ* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *καὶ εἴ* M^a P^1 and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. has *et si*, but *et si* seems sometimes to represent *κἂν εἰ* in Vet. Int. (see critical note on 1278 b 7). *δὴ* Γ P^1 Bekk. Sus.: *δεῖ* M^a Π^2 (corrected in P^4 and in ink which may or may not be that of the MS. in P^2). **2.** *διειλόμεθα* P^1 Bekk.: Vet. Int. *divisimus*, which represents *διείλομεν* in 1290 a 24 and 1295 a 8, but *διειλόμεθα* in 1289 a 26, so that we cannot be certain which reading Vet. Int. found in his text: *διειλόμεν* over an erasure P^4: *διειλόμην* M^a $P^{2\,3\,6}$ etc. Perhaps the chances are in favour of *διείλομεν*, the reading of Göttling and Sus., as Γ Π have *διείλομεν* in 1290 a 24. See critical note on 1257 b 33. **18.** *δημοκρατίαν* Γ Π Bekk. Sus.: *δημοκρατίας* Lamb. Schn. Cor., but not, I think, rightly. **21.** Q^b, a MS. of little authority, followed by Bekk., adds *τὴν* before *φρυγιστί*. **32.** *οὐδ' . . .* 33, *ὀλίγοι τῆς πολιτείας* is placed after 37, *τούτους*, in $P^{2\,6}$ Q^b U^b V^b L^a Ald., marg. rec. P^3, and pr. P^4, and

after 39, προσαγορεύσειεν, over an erasure in pr. P^s, so that only Π^1 and marg. P^4, and probably Vat. Pal., place these words in their right place. We may infer this as to Vat. Pal., for, though the fragment preserved by it begins only with 36, ὁμοίοις (see vol. i. p. viii), we note that it does not give the words either in 37 or in 39: therefore it probably placed them rightly in 32. Γ M^s and marg. P^4 place ὀλίγοι after τῆς πολιτείας.

1290 b 2. πολλοὺς Π^2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: πλείους Π^1 Sus. **15.** ὀλιγαρχία Bojesen, Sus., Welldon: δῆμος Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk. ἂν is added after οἷον in Π^2 Vat. Pal., but is omitted by Π^1 Bekk. Sus. and expunged by corr. P^4. It probably comes from the preceding line. **19.** ὀλιγαρχία Π^1 Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus., but χι is over an erasure in P^1: ὀλιγαρχίαι Π^2. **22.** Vet. Int. has *et plures* for πλείους, but he sometimes adds *et* where no καὶ existed in his Greek text (see critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, 1264 a 9, and 1284 b 32). **25.** προηρούμεθα Π^2 Vat. Pal. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *vellemus*): προηρήμεθα M^s and perhaps pr. P^1, for in P^1 ηρου is over an erasure. πρῶτον μὲν Π^1 Sus.: πρῶτον Π^2 Vat. Pal. Bekk. **26.** ὅπερ Γ Π Bekk. Sus. Richards would read ὅσαπερ or ἅπερ. **29.** εἴδη Γ Π Vat. Pal. is probably a repetition of εἰ δή, unless it is repeated erroneously from τοσαῦτ' εἴδη, 36 (see critical notes on 1298 b 35 and 1309 a 29). Or should εἴη be read in place of it? Supply μόρια with τοσαῦτα from μορίοις, 28. As to εἰ δὴ see explanatory note. **33.** ταὐτὸν P^{2s} Vat. Pal. etc.: ταὐτὸ M^s, ταυτό P^1: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 'Forma generis neutrius ταὐτά saepe legitur non solum ante vocales, verum etiam ante consonantes' (Bon. Ind. 125 b 16). So in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 39 all MSS. have ταὐτὸν before καὶ. **39.** μερῶν Π^2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: μορίων M^s P^1 Sus.: Vet. Int. *partibus* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. Μορίων is perhaps here repeated from two lines above, for this kind of error occurs occasionally in Π^1.

1291 a 1. τὸ after τοῦτο is omitted in Π^3 Bekk., but Π^3 often omit the article, e.g. in 1291 b 3, where these MSS. omit τοὺς before προπολεμοῦντας, in 1292 a 22, 1297 a 35, and 1305 b 10. **4.** τρίτον δ' ἀγοραῖον Π Vat. Pal.: Γ probably read τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἀγοραῖον (Vet. Int. *tertia autem quae circa forum*). But the article is often expressed and omitted irregularly in enumerations: see critical note on 1317 b 37, Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 211 (§ 237 F), and Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon, critical note on c. 1. § 1. **7.** τὸ προπολεμῆσον] Vet. Int. *quod propugnans*, but we must not

infer a difference of reading in Γ, for in 1291 a 23 Vet. Int. has *reddentem et iudicantem* for τὸν ἀποδώσοντα καὶ κρινοῦντα and in 1298 a 19 *audientes* for ἀκουσομένους, though he renders the future participle correctly in 1298 a 21, 26. **8.** Vet. Int. has *si debeant non servire invadentibus*, which probably stands for εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ δουλεύσειν τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν, for in 1283 a 6 we have *si differat* for εἰ διαφέρει and in 1331 b 25 *civitatem quae debet esse beata* stands for τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν. μὴ γὰρ ἓν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ᾖ] Vet. Int. *nihil enim minus impossibilium quam*: it is difficult to guess what he found in his Greek text. **11.** κομψῶς] Vet. Int. *leviter*: he probably misread κομψῶς as κούφως. **14.** αὐτάρκων] Vet. Int. *necessariis*, which probably comes from *necessaria* a little further on. Whether the error is that of Vet. Int. or of his Greek text, it is impossible to say. See critical note on 1330 b 7. **17.** τε $P^{2\,3}$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.[2] Sus., τὲ P^{1}, τὸ M^{s}, γε Π^{2} Bekk.[1] Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε. **21.** τῆς is not rendered by Vet. Int. and may have been omitted in Γ, but see critical note on 1306 a 30. ἁπτομένης Π^{1} Bekk. Sus.: ἁπτομένων Π^{2} Vat. Pal. **29.** Vat. Pal. agrees with Π^{1} in adding γὰρ after οὐδέν, but probably wrongly. For other passages in which the MSS. differ as to the insertion or omission of γὰρ, see critical notes on 1272 b 36 and 1324 a 22. **34.** ὃ Π^{2} Vat. Pal.: ὅπερ M^{s} P^{1}: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *quam* which reading he found in Γ, for he often fails to render περ. **35.** τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν] z has here rightly *quae circa principatus administrat*: other MSS. *aministrat* or *amministrat*. **39.** ἀρτίως] Vet. Int. *perfecte*. Did he misread ἀρτίως as ἀκριβῶς? βουλευόμενον Π^{2} Vat. Pal. Bekk.: βουλευσόμενον Π^{1} Sus. κρῖνον Π^{s} Bekk., κρίνον $P^{2\,3}$: κρινοῦν P^{1} Vat. Pal. Sus., κινοῦν M^{s}, κοινωνοῦν Γ (Vet. Int. *communicat*). **41.** γενέσθαι] Vet. Int. *fieri*, which often stands for γενέσθαι (e.g. in 1340 b 25). καλῶς γενέσθαι Schn. Bekk.[2] Sus. probably rightly: καλῶς γίνεσθαι Π Vat. Pal. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *fieri*).

1291 b 1. ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν] Richards would add τῆς after ἀρετῆς. **3.** τοὺς before προπολεμοῦντας om. Π^{s}, but see critical note on 1291 a 1. **6.** ἀρχὰς om. Π^{2} (P^{2} however has τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς over an erasure), but not Π^{1} or Vat. Pal. **8.** οἱ before ἄποροι is omitted in pr. $P^{1\,2}$, but it is inserted in both these MSS. in the same ink as the MS. **12.** καθιστᾶσι $P^{1\,2\,3}$ etc. Bekk. Sus., καθιστασιν Vat. Pal., καθιστάσι P^{4}, καθιστᾶσθαι M^{s}. Vet. Int. has *consistant*, which probably represents καθιστᾶσι, for *consistere* stands for καταστῆσαι in 1287 b 11 and for καθιστάναι in 1321 a 21. I do not think with

Sus. that *consistant* here necessarily represents *καθίστασθαι*. **16.** *τοῦτο καὶ* Γ Π^2 Bekk.: *τοῦτο* M^s P^1: *καὶ τοῦτο* Sus. *Et* is absent in z and in the edition of the Vetus Versio contained in the Works of Albertus Magnus, ed. Lyons, 1651. **24.** *πορθμευτικὸν* Camerarius (Interp. p. 150), Bekk., Sus.: *πορθμικὸν* Π: Vet. Int. *transvectivum* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. All MSS. of Vet. Int. have *transvectivum autem*, but whether he found *δὲ* in Γ is doubtful (see critical notes on 1308 b 28 and 1318 a 35). **27.** *μὴ* Π^2 corr. P^1: *μὲν* Γ M^s pr. P^1 (for the *ἡ* of *μὴ* in P^1 is over an erasure). **28.** *ἕτερον* Ar. Bekk.[2] Sus.: *ἑτέρου* Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.[1] (Vet. Int. *alterius*). **29.** *τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν*] Vet. Int. *his similia dicta secundum eandem differentiam*, where *similia* probably represents a gloss *ὅμοια* which the translator renders as part of the text. The same thing happens in 1318a 17: see also 1287a 10. **32.** *τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους*] Vet. Int. *nihil magis existere egenis vel divitibus* (*τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ τοῖς εὐπόροις* Γ?). As to *ὑπάρχειν* see explanatory note. **40.** *βραχέων δὲ*] Vet. Int. *et brevibus*, but see critical notes on 1274 b 40 and 1311 a 37.

1292 a 3. *τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι*] *ταλλαμεν ειναι* Vat. Pal., and probably *τἆλλα μὲν εἶναι* pr. P^1, for *τὸ πᾶσι* is over an erasure and *εἶναι* is corrected from *εἶναι*: Vet. Int. has *alia quidem esse*, if we follow b g k l m z, or *alia quidem esse eadem*, if we follow a c h, so that Γ will have had either *τἆλλα μὲν εἶναι* or *τἆλλα μὲν εἶναι ταὐτὰ*. This erroneous reading evidently arises from the substitution of words from 4–5 for the true reading. **4.** *δὲ* is added after *ἕτερον* in Γ P^4 L^s Ald. **6.** *τοῦτο*] z has *hoc*, the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *haec*. **13.** *ἀγαθὴν* M^s pr. $P^{2\,s}$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *bonam*), followed by Sus., *ἀγαθήν* P^1, *αγαθην* Vat. Pal.: *ἀγαθὸν* Π^s Bekk. and corr.[1] $P^{2\,s}$ (i. e. a correction in these MSS. in the ink of the MS.). **17.** Vet. Int. has *quare et* for *ὥστε*, but see critical note on 1290 b 22. *ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος* Π^2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *ὁ δῆμος οὗτος* Π^1 Sus. Compare the readings in 1332 b 40. **22.** (*παρ'*) *ἑκατέροις*] *ἑκατέροις* Π Vat. Pal.: Vet. Int. *apud utrosque* (*παρ' ἑκατέροις* Γ?). *Παρ'* is added by Vict. Bekk. Sus., probably rightly, for all MSS. have *παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις* or *παρὰ τυράννοις*: the dative without *παρά*, however, is not perhaps impossible, cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 28, *Θηβαίοις*, and *Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς* 17. 478 b 27 sq. and 18. 479 b 3 sq. (compare with the two latter passages Plato, Rep. 546 A). It is not certain that Vet. Int. found *παρ'* in Γ, for he has *apud populos tales* in 23 for *τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς*

τοιούτοις, where no MS. has παρὰ and where it may well be dispensed with. τοῖς is omitted before τυράννοις in Q^b V^b Ald. Bekk. and pr. P^4, but see critical note on 1291 a 1. **29.** πρόκλησιν Π^2 Bekk.: προσκλησιν Vat. Pal., πρόσκλησιν Π^1 Sus. (P^1 however has a dot under the first σ of πρόσκλησιν to expunge it: see Sus.[1]). See explanatory note. **33.** εκαστα or εκαστον Vat. Pal. **35.** ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται] Γ P^1 perhaps had ψηφίσματα in place of ψηφίσμασι, for Vet. Int. has *in qua sententiae omnia dispensant*, and in P^1 the σι of ψηφίσμασι is over an erasure.

1292 b 1. μακρῶν Π^1 Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *immensis*): μικρῶν Π^2, but ι in P^4 is over an erasure. **5.** εἰσίῃ Π^2 Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: εἷς εἴη Π^1 (corrected in the margin of P^1 in the ink of the MS.). **9.** εἴπομεν M^s P^1 Sus.: εἴπαμεν Π^2 Vat. Pal. Bekk. The reading of Γ is of course uncertain. See Bon. Ind. 222 a 16 sqq. K^b has εἴπαμεν in Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 b 9 and 1. 12. 1101 b 21, but εἴπομεν is probably the correct reading. In Pol. 2. 11. 1273 b 14 and 3. 16. 1287 a 4 all MSS. have εἴπομεν. **10.** δὴ] Vet. Int. *etiam*, as in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1304 a 33. **13.** Vat. Pal. leaves room for three letters after κατα. **14.** ἔθος Π^1 Vat. Pal. Sus. (Vet. Int. *assuetudinem*): ἦθος Π^2 Bekk. πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς] All MSS. of Vet. Int. except z have *politizet et democratice*: z rightly omits *et*. Vat. Pal. adds δε after πολιτευεσθαι. **15.** τοὺς νόμους $P^{2\,3}$ Vat. Pal. Ald. Bekk.: νόμους $P^{1\,4}$ Q^b V^b L^s Sus., νόμον M^s: Vet. Int. *leges* may stand for either τοὺς νόμους or νόμους. **19.** μικρὰ] Vet. Int. *paulatim*, which stands for κατὰ μικρόν in 1278 a 32 and 1307 b 1. In 1314 a 16 μικρά is rendered *modica*. **29.** ἀναγκαίας] Vet. Int. *necessariissimas*, but he is not always exact in rendering degrees of comparison. **30–33.** I follow Rassow and Sus. in their reconstitution of the text. Π^2 omit διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν, and Π^1 place these words after νόμων, 30, but Rassow and Sus. are probably right in adding δημοκρατικόν after ἐξεῖναι (I prefer to add πᾶσι δημοκρατικόν), and in inserting διὸ . . . μετέχειν after δημοκρατικόν. It then becomes necessary to add δ' after σχολάζειν, 33. I prefer this reconstitution of the text to any other which has been suggested, but it is less doubtful that a lacuna exists after the second ἐξεῖναι than that no more has dropped out than δημοκρατικόν or πᾶσι δημοκρατικόν, and it must also be admitted that it is not easy to see why it is a democratic course to give access to office to all who possess a certain property-qualification, seeing that the first form of oligarchy goes as far as that (1293 a

14 sq.). Κτησαμένοις in 32 is the reading of all the MSS. which do not omit διὸ ... μετέχειν (Vet. Int. has *possidentibus*, which probably represents it): κτωμένοις Vict. Bekk. **31.** μὲν after τὸ is omitted in Π^1, but Bekk. and Sus. retain it. δὲ δὴ] Vet. Int. *autem*: see critical note on 1286 a 38. **35.** διαίρεσιν] See explanatory note. **36.** δυναμένους] δυναμένοις Π^1 L^a Ald. corr. P^4 Bekk.: δυναμένους the rest followed by Sus. **39.** ὅσοι ἄν] Vet. Int. *quicunque*: so we have *quicunque excesserint* (without any *utique* to represent ἄν) for ὁπότεροι ἂν ὑπερέχωσι in 1296 a 24 (cp. 29). Sus.[1] adds *utique* here without necessity.

1293 a 3. προσόδων] πρόσοδον M^a, προσόδον apparently pr. P^1, corrected to προσόδων in the ink of the MS. καὶ is added before εὐπορίας in Γ M^a pr. P^1. **7.** οὐ γὰρ Π^2 Bekk.: οὐδὲ γὰρ Π^1 Sus. **9.** οὔτε Π: οὐδὲ Bekk. Sus. Stahr retains οὔτε (see his note in his edition of the Politics). See critical note on 1257 b 12, and compare, in addition to the passages there referred to, 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 15 sq.: Demosth. De Fals. Leg. cc. 159, 160: see also Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 536. 2 b, where reference is made, among other passages, to Lys. Or. 16. pro Mantith. c. 3, οὐχ ἵππευον οὔτ' ἐπεδήμουν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα, Isaeus 8. 1 (οὐκ...οὔτε), and Plato, Rep. 398 A. **12.** τὰ δὲ Γ Π Bekk.: τάδε δὲ Bojesen, Sus. **18.** ἀμελοῦντες Spengel, Sus. (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 863, Obs. 9): ἀμελοῦνταs Π Bekk. **21.** ἢ οἱ Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: εἰ μὲν $P^{2\,3}$ pr. P^4 etc. τὸ om. M^a P^1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *quam qui prius*). **24.** ἄλλων Π^2 Bekk.: πολλῶν Π^1 Sus. **25.** δὲ om. $P^{2\,3\,4}$ etc. **26.** τῶ Π^2, τῷ Bekk.: τὸ Π^1 Sus. **28.** αὐτῶν Γ P^1, αὐτῶν M^a $P^{2\,3\,4}$ Ald. Γ P^1 make a similar correction in 1274 a 23, 1302 a 33, 1308 a 10, 1312 b 9, and 1314 b 17, 23, and P^1 in 1293 b 7, 1303 b 25, 1305 b 22, and 1315 a 28. See also Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* in 1301 b 3 and 1312 b 39. In 1252 b 28 Γ P^1 have ἤδη rightly, all the other MSS. ἡ δὴ or ἡ δὲ. μὲν om. Γ M^a pr. P^1: it is supplied in P^1 in the ink of the MS. **37.** τέτταρας Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: τέτταρα M^a P^1: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain.

1293 b 8. καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι] See explanatory note. **10.** γε] γὰρ M^a, but no weight attaches to the unsupported testimony of M^a. Vet. Int. has *vero*, which probably represents δὲ here, as it does in 1299 b 26 and 1323 a 9, though δέ is usually rendered *autem*. In 1286 b 22 *vero* stands for δὲ δή: it frequently stands for μέντοι. **11.** αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία] See explanatory note. **17.** εἰς ἀρετήν τε Π^2 Bekk.: εἴς τε ἀρετὴν M^a P^1 Sus. We cannot tell from Vet. Int. *ad virtutem* which reading he found in Γ. See critical note

on 1277 b 29. **22.** *ὀνομαζομένης* Π^1 and corr. P^4, followed by Bekk.^{2} Sus.: *νομιζομένης* $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Bekk.^{1} and pr. P^4. **24.** *ἄρτι ῥηθείσας* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *ἀποδοθείσας* Π^1. **32.** *φανερωτέρα* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *φανερωτάτη* Π^1. See critical notes on 1299 a 27 and 1315 b 11. **39.** *καγαθοὺς* Γ Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *καὶ ἀγαθοὺς* M^s P^1.

1294 a 1. *τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατουμένην*] See explanatory note on 1293 b 42. **7.** *κακῶς* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *καλῶς* Π^1 (corrected in P^1 in the ink of the MS.). **11.** *ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ*] Vet. Int. *quodcunque videatur* (see critical note on 1287 a 27). **18.** As to the absence of *τὴν* before *τῶν καλῶν καγαθῶν* see explanatory note on 1294 a 17. **22.** *ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή* Π^2 Bekk. (except that P^4 omits *καὶ*): *ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος ἀρχαῖος* Π^1 Sus. There is this to be said for the order of Π^1 that in 1301 b 3 we have *εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος*, where *ἀρετὴ* precedes *πλοῦτος*: on the other hand, *προγόνων*, which answers to *ἀρχαῖος*, is placed first, and *ἀρχαῖος* is probably rightly placed by Π^2 before the substantives which it accompanies, for it thus acquires emphasis (see explanatory note on 1275 a 32). **36.** *ἃ* M^s P^1 Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *quae*): *ὧν* Π^2 Bekk. **37.** *ἑκάτεραι* Π^2 Bekk.: *ἑκάτεροι* Π^1 Sus. In 34 we have *ἀφ' ἑκατέρας*, though it is true that in 1294 b 2 all MSS. have *ἑκάτεροι*, not *ἑκάτεραι*.

1294 b 2. *ἕτερος*] Vet. Int. *alterum* (*ἕτερον* Γ?). **5.** *τιμήματος* M^s Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *τίμημα* Γ P^1 Q^b. **8.** P^1 Bekk.^{1} add *τὸ* before *κληρωτὰς*, and we cannot be certain that Γ did not do so too, but in the absence of evidence as to Γ it would be rash to follow P^1. **26.** *διάδηλος* Π^1 (Vet. Int. *distinctus*): *ἄδηλος* Π^2, though this is corrected in $P^{2\,3\,4}$ (in P^2 in the ink of the MS.). **29.** *τῶ* Γ P^1, *τῷ* Bekk. Sus.: *τῶν* M^s Π^2. **37.** *ἔξωθεν* is rightly bracketed by Thurot and Sus.: it may have found its way into this line by repetition from the preceding one. z has *ab extrinsecus* for *ἔξωθεν* possibly rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *extrinsecus*. In 1312 a 40 all MSS. have *ab extrinseco* for *ἔξωθεν*. In 1294 b 36 *ἔξωθεν* is rendered *ab extra*. **38.** *τῶ* Π^1, *τῷ* Bekk. Sus.: *τὸ* Π^2. **39.** *πόλεως* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *πολιτείας* Π^1. See critical note on 1318 a 9. **40.** *δεῖ καθιστάναι πολιτείαν*] Vet. Int. *videtur consistere politia*. Γ no doubt had *δοκεῖ* with M^s in place of *δεῖ*, but whether it had *καθεστάναι πολιτεία* in place of *καθιστάναι πολιτείαν*, which is the reading of all the extant MSS., may well be doubted. Vet. Int. may have emended his Greek text to suit the false reading *δοκεῖ* (see vol. ii. p. lxiv). It is not, indeed, quite certain that *consistere* represents

καθεστάναι here, for it represents *καταστῆσαι* in 1287 b 11 and *καθιστάναι* in 1321 a 21. See critical note on 1291 b 12.

1295 a 6. *ἀσύμφορος* M^s $P^{1\,2\,3}$ Sus.: *ἀσύμφορον* Π^2 Bekk.: Vet. Int. *inexpediens* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. Compare the various readings in 1301 b 28. **12.** *μονάρχους* Π^2 Bekk. and also Γ, for all MSS. of Vet. Int. (including z) have *monarchos*, though in the next line Vet. Int. has *monarchae*. **13.** *μόναρχοι* M^s $P^{1\,4}$ Ald. Bekk. and pr. $P^{2\,3}$: *μονάρχαι* Γ corr. $P^{2\,3}$ Sus. **15.** *διὰ μὲν τὸ κ.τ.λ.*] Sus.[1] queries whether *propterea quidem quod* in Vet. Int. should not be *propter quidem quod*, but see critical note on 1328 b 4. **20.** *ἄρχει* $P^{2\,4}$ Q^b Ald. Bekk. Sus. and rec. P^3, *ἄρχῃ* V^b and pr. P^3, *ἀρχὴ* Γ M^s, *ἀρχή* P^1. **27.** *τὴν*] Vet. Int. *esse* (*εἶναι* Γ?). **28.** *ἥ*] *ἃ* Γ Π, except L^s and a MS. mentioned by Camerarius (Interp. p. 163), which have *ἥ*. Bekker and Sus. are probably right in reading *ἥ*, for the antecedent appears to be *παιδείαν*, not *ἀρετὴν* and *παιδείαν*. **38.** Chandler and Richards would add *τὸν* after *βέλτιστον*. Π^1 add *δὲ*, and marg. P^4 *δ'*, after *τῆς*, possibly repeating it from *μεσότητα δὲ* in the preceding line.

1295 b 7. *ὑπέρπτωχον*] Spengel would insert *ὑπέραισχρον ἢ* before *ὑπέρπτωχον* to make the correspondence exact, but not rightly: see explanatory note on 1323 b 35. **8.** *καὶ* Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *aut*, but he has *aut* or *vel* in 1262 a 8, 1298 b 29, and 1317 b 26, where Π have *καὶ*. **12.** *ἔτι . . .* **13.** *πόλεσιν*] See explanatory note. *φυλαρχοῦσι* P^1 Ald. Bekk. and corrections in $P^{2\,3\,4}$ in the ink of the MSS., *φιλαρχοῦσι* Γ M^s Q^b V^b L^s pr. $P^{2\,3\,4}$ Sus. **17.** *οὐδ' ἐν* $P^{2\,4}$ L^s Ald. Bekk. and a correction in P^3 in the ink of the MS., *οὐδὲν* Q^b V^b pr. P^3: *οὐδὲ* Π^1 Sus. *τοῖς διδασκαλείοις* $P^{3\,4}$ Ald. Bekk., *τοῖς διδασκαλίοις* P^2 and the margin of L^s, *ταῖς διδασκαλίαις* pr. L^s: *τοῖς διδασκάλοις* Π^1 Sus. See critical note on 1259 a 13. **20.** *οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ*] *οὐδεμίαν ἀρχήν* Spengel, Sus. **21.** *καὶ* before *δούλων* om. Π^1: I follow Sus. in bracketing it, though not without hesitation. See critical note on 1282 a 17. **31.** *τῆς τούτων*] Vet. Int. *substantiam horum*, but we must not suppose that he found *οὐσίας* added in Γ, for in 1317 b 23 he translates *τὸ μὴ δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν non bis eundem principari nullo principatu*, where he adds *principatu*. **34.** *θέλω* Γ P^1 Bekk. Sus.: *θέλων* M^s $P^{2\,4}$ V^b Ald. pr. P^3. **39.** *εὐτυχία μεγίστη*] Vet. Int. *eufortunium maximum*. Had Γ *εὐτύχημα μέγιστον*? *Eufortunium* stands for *εὐτύχημα* in 1333 b 18 and 1295 b 14, whereas *εὐτυχία* is always, I think, in the Politics rendered by *bona fortuna*. **40.** *τοὺς* om. M^s P^1 and possibly Γ.

1296 a 8. *στάσεις*] See explanatory note. **9.** *τῶν πολιτῶν* Ar. Bekk.[2] Sus.: *τῶν πολιτειῶν* Γ Π Bekk.[1] **28.** *τὰς* is added before *μάχας* in M^s P^1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *pugnas* whether it was added in Γ. **32.** *ἔτι* Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: *ἔστι* P^3 Π^2 and pr. P^2, where it is corrected in the ink of the MS. **34.** *δημοκρατίας*, and **35.** *ὀλιγαρχίας*] Vet. Int. *democratiam* and *oligarchiam*, but he sometimes renders the plural by the singular: thus in 1338 b 11 he has *speciem* for *τὰ εἴδη*, in 1303 a 14 *verecundiam* for *τὰς ἐριθείας*, and in 1310 b 34 *beneficium* for *εὐεργεσίας*. **35.** *καθίσταται* Γ P^2 Ald. rec. P^3 Bekk. Sus., *καθιστᾶσιν* P^1, *καθιστᾶσι* P^6, *καθίστασιν* P^4 Q^b V^b L^s and pr. P^3, *καθιστῶσιν* M^s.

1296 b 4. *φαμὲν* $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Bekk.: *ἔφαμεν* Π^1 P^4 Sus. **7.** *ἀεὶ* Spengel Bekk.[2] Sus., *δεῖ* Γ Π Bekk.[1] **10.** *τὸ* om. P^1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *dico autem ad hypothesim*), but cp. 1300 b 17, *τὸ δὲ πῶς* (sc. *λέγω*), which Vet. Int. translates *quomodo autem*. **11.** *κωλύει*] *κωλύσει* Π^3 Bekk. **26.** *ἐνταῦθα* om. M^s P^6 L^s and pr. P^4 (it is supplied in the margin of P^4). **29.** *μισθαρνούντων*] z has *mercedem agentium*, the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *mercede agentium*: z *may* be right, for in 1303 b 1 *τοὺς μισθοφόρους* is translated *merces portantes*. **31.** *μᾶλλον* $P^{4\,6}$ L^s U^b Ar. Bekk.: om. Π^1 $P^{2\,3}$ Q^b V^b Ald. Sus. inserts it in angular brackets. **32.** *δὲ* om. Π^1 Ar. **34–38.** See explanatory note. **36.** *τοὺς* om. M^s P^1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *leges* whether he found it in Γ or not. **38.** *πλῆθος* Π Ar. Bekk.: Vet. Int. *multitudine*, whence Sus. reads *πλήθει*, but does not Vet. Int. take *πλῆθος* wrongly with *ὑπερτείνει* as in the acc., and translate it as if it were *τὸ πλῆθος*? **40.** *μόνιμον* Π^2 Bekk. Sus., except that P^4 has *μόνυμον*: *νόμιμον* Γ M^s and probably pr. P^1 (corrected into *μόνιμον* in text and margin).

1297 a 1. *τούτους*] *τούτῳ* P^1, *τού* with *τ* superscribed over *ύ* M^s: Vet. Int. *super hoc*, which stands for *ἐπὶ τούτῳ* in 1307 b 13. **2.** *βουλήσονται*] z has *volent* rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *volunt*. *τοῖς ἑτέροις* om. Π^1. **6—b 28.** See explanatory note on 1296 b 34. **9.** The second *ἐν* is omitted in M^s P^1 and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. *in praeteraudiendo populum* may stand for *τῷ παρακροῦεσθαι* (*παρακούεσθαι* Γ M^s) *τὸν δῆμον*, just as in 1309 a 15 *in non faciendo possessiones aeque partiales* stands for *τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀναδάστους*. See also critical note on 1253 a 36. **11.** *ψευδῶς*] *ψευδῶν* Vict. Bekk. and possibly Ar. **14.** *τε* is added after *ὅσα* in M^s P^1 and may have been added in Γ, for Vet. Int. seldom translates *τε*. **17.** *γυμνασίαν* Π^2 Ar. Bekk.: *γυμνάσια* P^1

Sus., *τὰ γυμνάσια* M^s and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *exercitia*). **24.** *δ' ἔξεστιν* is added after *ἀπογραψαμένοις* in Π^1 and *δὲ* in P^4: *δ' ἔξεστιν* is evidently repeated in Π^1 from *δ' ἔξεστι* just before, an error into which these MSS. occasionally fall, as we have already seen. **28.** Vet. Int. has *neque* for *μὴ* before *δικάζωσι*. **35.** *τὰ* om. Π^2 Bekk., but see critical note on 1291 a 1. **40.** *μὴ* is added before *ζημίαν* in Π^1, but expunged in P^1 by a corrector. **41.** *ἂν* om. Π^1.

1297 b 1. *μόνον* P^1 Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *μόνων* Γ M^s. **2.** *μόνον* Π^2 Bekk.: *μόνων* Π^1 Sus. **3.** *ὁρισαμένους* $P^1\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus. (see explanatory note on 1297 b 1): *ὡρισαμένου* M^s: Vet. Int. *determinata* (in agreement with *honorabilitate*), which perhaps represents *ὡρισμένου*. **4.** *ποῖον* Γ Π Bekk.: *πόσον* Lindau, Sus. **7.** *ἐὰν* Π^2 Bekk., but there is an erasure in P^3 between *ἐ* and *α*, and the accents and breathings are corrected (see Sus.[1]): *ἂν* M^s P^1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *si* what reading he found in Γ. *μήτε* Π^1 Sus.: *μὴ* Π^2 Bekk. (corrected to *μήτε* in P^4), which *may* be right (see critical notes on 1257 b 12, 1330 b 16, and 1293 a 9). **11.** *ὀκνεῖν* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *κινεῖν* Γ M^s pr. P^1. **18.** *ἐν*] z has *in*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *ex*: Sus.[1] '*in*?' **19.** *ὁ πόλεμος*] Vet. Int. *proelium*, as in 1330 a 22. **25.** *καὶ* is added after *δὲ* in Π^1, but P^1 omits *αἱ*, so that *καὶ* in Γ M^s may be a repetition of *αἱ*. **27 sq.** See explanatory note. **35.** Vet. Int. adds *cum dixerimus* after his equivalent for *Πάλιν δὲ*, but whether these words represent anything in his Greek text is very doubtful. He may possibly have found a gloss *λέξαντες* or *εἰπόντες* in the margin of his MS. *λέγωμεν* Γ Ald. Ar. Bekk. Sus. and pr. P^2: *λέγομεν* M^s $P^{1\,3\,4}$ Q^b V^b and a correction in P^2 in the ink of the MS. **41.** *μὲν τί* Congreve, Sus. (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 12, *ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἓν μὲν τίνες οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς ἀρχάς κ.τ.λ.*): *μέν τι* Π^1 Ald. Bekk. and a correction in P^2 in the ink of the MS., *μέν τοι* $P^{3\,4}$ Q^b V^b and pr. P^2.

1298 a 2. *γίγνεσθαι* Π^2 Bekk.[1], *γίνεσθαι* Bekk.[2] Sus.: *γενέσθαι* M^s, and perhaps P^1 (for *γίνε* in P^1 is over an erasure) and Γ (for Vet. Int. *fieri* often stands for *γενέσθαι*). **3.** *τί* M^s P^1 Bekk. Sus., *τὶ* P^4, *τι* Γ $P^{2\,3}$. **6.** *καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεως* om. Π^2 Bekk. (the words are added in P^4 by a corrector). **7.** *ἀποδεδόσθαι* P^1 Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *ἀποδίδοσθαι* M^s and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. has *dare*, though this might also stand for *ἀποδεδόσθαι*, for he has *determinare* for *διωρίσθαι* in 1290 b 7. **8.** *οἷον* Π^1 $P^{2\,3}$ Bekk. Sus.: *ἢ* $P^{4\,6}$ Q^b V^b L^s and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 167). **17.** *διέλθη* Π^2,

διέλθῃ Bekk. (in P^2 however ἐλ is written in darker ink over an erasure) and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. *pertranseat* may well represent διέλθῃ, as in 1300 a 26: ἐξέλθῃ M^2, διεξέλθῃ P^1, διεξέλθῃ Sus. (apparently an amalgamation of the two other readings). **21.** *αἱρησομένους* is bracketed by Sus. probably rightly. **31.** *προανακρίνειν* Π^2 Bekk. Sus. (cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 32): *ἀνακρίνειν* M^2, *ἀνακρίνειν* pr. P^1 (*προανακρίνειν* marg. P^1): Vet. Int. *referre* (*ἀναφέρειν* Γ?, for *referuntur* stands for *ἀναφέρονται* in 1321 b 32: it stands, however, for *ἐπανάγειν* in 1298 b 37).

1298 b 4. *ὀλιγαρχικὴν* Γ Π: *ὀλιγαρχικωτάτην* or *ὀλιγαρχί(αν δυναστευτι)κὴν* Coray, Sus.: *ὀλιγαρχικωτάτην* Welldon. **5.** All the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a z, which have *quidem* wrongly for *quidam*, fail to give an equivalent for *τινές*. **6.** *καὶ ὑπὲρ* $P^{1\,2}$ Π^2, *ὑπὲρ* P^2, *καὶ ὥσπερ* M^2, *ὥσπερ καὶ* Γ (Vet. Int. *sicut et*), *καὶ* Vict. Bekk. **7.** [*ἢ κληρωτοί*] I follow Brandis Sus. and Welldon in bracketing: see explanatory note on 1298 b 5. Possibly, however, *μὴ* should be read in place of *ἢ*. **8.** *ἡ* Π^1 Sus. probably rightly: *ἢ* Π^2: *μὲν ἡ* Bekk. following two MSS. of little authority. See explanatory note on 1298 b 5. **12.** *διοικεῖται* possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *disponitur*), but Vet. Int. occasionally renders an active by a passive verb (see vol. ii. p. lxiii, note 6): *διοικεῖ* Π Bekk. Sus. *Διοικεῖται* is probably right, cp. 1298 a 31, and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 27. l. 11, *προῃρεῖτο τὴν πολιτείαν διοικεῖν αὐτός*. **13.** *διορισμόν*] *τρόπον* Γ M^2 and after *δημοκρατία* pr. P^1 (corrected in the margin in paler ink). *Τρόπον* has evidently crept in from the preceding line and displaced *διορισμόν*: blunders of this kind occasionally occur in Π^1, as has been already pointed out. **14.** *τε*] See explanatory note on 1298 b 13. Π^1 add *ἡ* before *νῦν*: see explanatory note on 1298 b 13. **15.** *καὶ τῶν νόμων*] z has *etiam legum*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *et legum*. **16.** *τε αὐτὸ* Γ Π (Vet. Int. *meliusque ipsum facere*): Ar. Schn. Bekk. read *τὸ αὐτό*. Sus. brackets *τε* and adds *τὸ* before *αὐτό*. **19.** *τοῦτο δὲ*] Richards would read *τοῦτο δή*. See explanatory note. **20.** *βουλεύσονται* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *βουλεύονται* Π^1. **23.** *ἴσως* Π^2 Bekk.: *ἴσους* Γ M^2 pr. P^1 Sus. *κἂν*] Vet. Int. *si*, but see critical notes on 1282 b 8 and 1309 b 9. **27.** *προσαιρεῖσθαί*] See explanatory note. **28.** *ἐν* om. Π^2: see critical note on 1275 b 7. **29.** *καὶ νομοφύλακας*] Vet. Int. *vel legis servatores*, but see critical note on 1295 b 8. [*καὶ*] *περὶ τούτων*] I follow Coray and Sus. in bracketing this *καί*. **32.** *ἡ* before *ταὐτὰ* is omitted in Π^1: these MSS. omit *ἡ* before *ταῦτα* in 1268 a 6, and they are apt to omit

the first ἤ where one ἤ follows another (see critical note on 1282 a 17). **33.** τῆς συμβουλῆς] τοῖς συμβούλοις Γ (Vet. Int. *consiliariis*), τοῖς συμβουλῆς L^a Ald. **35.** τὸ πλῆθος is added after δεῖ ποιεῖν in $P^{2\,3}$, evidently because δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος occurs in the next line (see critical notes on 1290 b 29 and 1309 a 29). ἀποψηφιζόμενον . . . 36, ποιεῖν is omitted in $P^{4\,6}$ etc. and pr. P^3 Q^b: P^2 has ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, and Π^1 Bekk. ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος. Sus. follows Π^1, and brackets εἶναι, placing it between κύριον and δεῖ. In P^3 two alternative readings, εἶναι and ποιεῖν, seem to have found their way into the text together. **38.** ἀνεστραμμένως] See explanatory note.

1299 a 1. πλείους Γ Mª Sus.: πλείστους P^1 Π^2 Bekk. **2.** δὴ Γ P^4 L^a Bekk. Sus. and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 169): δεῖ M^a $P^{1\,2\,3\,6}$ etc. διωρίσθω Γ P^4 Ar. Bekk. Sus., διωρίσθαι $P^{1\,2\,3\,6}$ etc. M^a omits τοῦτον, 2 . . . πολιτείας, 4. **8.** καὶ πότερον εἶναι δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς om. Γ M^a pr. P^1 (the words are supplied in P^1 by a corrector in the margin). **9.** πλεονάκις] Vet. Int. *saepe* (πολλάκις Γ?). **14.** πολιτεῖαι Γ Π Bekk., except a correction in P^1 probably in the ink of the MS.: πολιτείαις corr. P^1 Ar. Sus. probably rightly. **16.** οὐ is added before πάντας by Rassow and Sus., but see Bonitz, Ind. 539 a 59, who remarks on the passage before us, 'negatio simplex, quae ad universum enunciatum pertineat, omissa est propter negationes singulorum membrorum,' and compares Hist. An. 2. 12. 503 b 34, χεῖρας δ' οὐδὲ πόδας προσθίους ἔχει. Cp. also Pol. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 20, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὔτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας θεατὰς νομοθετητέον κ.τ.λ. The following sentence occurs in a letter addressed by the United States Venezuelan Boundary Commission to Mr. Olney, the Secretary of State—'The present Commission neither by the mode of its appointment nor by the nature of its duties may be said to belong to tribunals of this character' (*Times*, Jan. 22, 1896). **19.** δὲ χορηγοὶ Π^2 Bekk.: δὲ καὶ χορηγοὶ M^a P^1 Sus.: καὶ χορηγοὶ Γ? (Vet. Int. *adhuc et distributores*). πρεσβευταὶ Γ Π: πρεσβευτάς Congreve probably rightly, if αἱροῦνται in a passive sense is not to be supplied with ἔτι δὲ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες. Four lines lower we have αἱροῦνται σιτομέτρας. In Lex. Rhet. Cant. p. 672. 20 (quoted by Sandys on Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 54. § 2) we read Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὕτως λέγει· λογισταὶ δὲ αἱροῦνται δέκα, but Sandys suggests that κληροῦνται should be read in place of αἱροῦνται. However, in Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. lii (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 250) we have τὸν

πολιτῶν προστατεῖν αἱρούμενον. It is possible therefore that πρεσβευταί may be right. See Liddell and Scott s. v. αἱρέω C. ii. **24.** καὶ Γ Π Sus., om. Vict. Bekk.: but cp. 2. 7. 1266 a 32, τῶν καθεστηκυιῶν καὶ καθ' ὃς πολιτεύονται νῦν. **26.** ἀποδέδοται Π: Vet. Int. *attribuitur*. See critical note on 1275 b 16. **27.** ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν Γ Π Bekk.[1]: ἀρχικώτατον ἐστίν Bekk.[2], ἀρχικώτατόν ἐστιν Sus. A similar doubt arises in 1256 b 3, where all the MSS. and Γ have ἐνδεέστατον, but Bernays and Susemihl read ἐνδεέστερον: see also critical notes on 1293 b 32 and 1315 b 11. **29.** οὐ γάρ πω] Vet. Int. *non enim unquam*, which stands for οὐ γάρ πω, for *nulli enim unquam* stands for οὐδενὶ γὰρ πώποτε in 1336 b 29, and *nihil unquam tale* for οὐδέν πω τοιοῦτον in 1269 a 40. **31.** αἱ is added after δ' in $P^{2\,3}$: om. M^{8} P^{1} Π^{3} Bekk. Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. **33.** Vet. Int. does not translate τε δή. **37.** τὰς μέν, and **38.** τὰς δ' Π Bekk.[1]: τοὺς μὲν and τοὺς δ' Vict. Bekk.[2] Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain.

1299 b 6. τῶν αὐτῶν Γ Π Bekk.: αὐτῶν F. Thurot, Sus. **12.** δεῖ is questioned by Susemihl (see Sus.[3 a] and Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, lxxix. 1894, p. 273, where he commends Norden's suggestion of ἐνδέχεται in place of it), and others. I am not satisfied with any of the substitutes which have been suggested. συνάγοι] συνίδοι Bojesen, Sus., probably rightly. **14.** ἁρμόττει ... δεῖ Γ Π. Sus., following Aretinus' translation, interchanges the position of these two words, but in 18 we have δεῖ διαιρεῖν, not ἁρμόττει διαιρεῖν. Camerarius (Interp. p. 171) would read in 13 εἰς μίαν ἀρχήν, ἢ μὴ ἁρμόττει. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Ἁρμόττει may be repeated from the preceding line, and may have taken the place of some other word, such as δεῖ or χρή. ποίων, and 15, πολλά Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 74), Sus., probably rightly: ποῖα, and 15, πολλῶν Γ Π Bekk. **22.** I bracket καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ in 1308 b 11, and it might be asked whether καὶ μοναρχίᾳ should not be bracketed here. There is no reference to μοναρχία in 24 sqq., but only to aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy; still I think that it would be hypercritical to bracket καὶ μοναρχίᾳ. **24.** δ' om. Γ M^{8} L^{8}. οὐδ' Γ M^{8} $P^{4\,6}$ L^{8} Ar. Bekk., οὐδὲ P^{1}, οὐκ $P^{2\,3}$ Q^{b} V^{b} Ald. ἑτέρων pr. P^{1} Sus.: ἕτερα the other MSS. and Γ Bekk. **27.** καὶ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν Γ M^{8} pr. P^{1}, καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν Π^{2} Bekk.[1], καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς διαφοραὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν Vict. Bekk.[2], whom I now incline to follow, though in vol. ii. p. 362 I favoured the reading καὶ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς διαφοραὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν. Thurot (Études sur Aristote,

p. 75) would read *κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς πολιτείας διαφορὰ τῶν ἀρχῶν*, and this reading also is a possible one. **29.** *διαφέρουσιν* is queried by Bonitz (Ind. 191 a 60). After *διαφέρουσι* M^{a} P^{1} add *διὰ ταύτας* and Γ *διὰ ταῦτα* or *διὰ τοῦτο*, for some MSS. of Vet. Int. have *propter haec* and others *propter hoc*. Is not *διὰ ταύτας* an alternative reading for *κατὰ ταύτας*, 27, which has crept from the margin into the text of these MSS.? **33.** *ἀσχολῶν* $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Bekk. Sus., *ἀσχόλων* P^{4}: *ἄσχολον* M^{a}, *ἀσχολον* P^{1}: Vet. Int. *non vacans*, which probably stands for *ἄσχολον* here as elsewhere. **34.** *δ' ἐὰν* $P^{2\,3}$ Q^{b} V^{b} Bekk. and corr. P^{4}: *δὲ ἂν* P^{1} Ald. and perhaps pr. P^{4} (for *δ' ἐὰν* is over an erasure in P^{4}): *δέ, ἂν* Sus.: *δὲ ἐπὰν* Γ M^{a} (Vet. Int. *autem cum*). **36.** *αὗται αἱ* Ar. Vict. Bekk. Sus., *αὐταὶ αἱ* Π^{2} and a correction in pale ink in the margin of P^{1}: *αἱ αὐταὶ* Γ M^{a} pr. P^{1}.

1300 a 2. *μισθοῦ* Spengel, Bekk.^{2}: *ἢ μισθὸς* Γ Π Ar. Bekk.^{1}: [*ἢ*] *μισθοῦ* Sus. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 31, *ὅπου μὴ μισθοῦ εὐπορία πᾶσιν*, and 33, *ὁ δῆμος εὐπορῶν μισθοῦ*. **2.** *τέτταρες* M^{a} P^{1} Sus.: *τέσσαρες* Π^{2} Bekk.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain, but the form *τέτταρες* is the form which is usually found in Aristotle's writings. M^{a} P^{1} have *τέσσαρα* and Π^{2} *τέτταρα* in 1315 b 26. **2.** *ἢ γὰρ πάντες . . .* **1300 b 5**, *ἀριστοκρατικόν*] As to the text of this passage, see Sus.$^{1\,2\,3}$: Spengel, Aristotelische Studien, 3. 53 sqq.: Thurot, Études sur Aristote, p. 75 sqq.: H. Rabe in *Jahrbücher für class. Philol.* 1894, pp. 450–453. **4.** Either we must bracket *ἢ* before *ἐξ ἁπάντων* (with Schn., Thurot, Spengel, and Sus.) or we must read *εἰ* in place of it with a corrector in pale ink in the margin of P^{1} and with Coray. The former course is probably the better (see Thurot, Études sur Aristote, p. 75). Vet. Int. does not translate *ὡς* in *ὡς ἀνὰ μέρος*: he has simply *divisim*. **6.** *πολιτῶν* Ar. Lamb. Bekk. Sus.: *πολιτικῶν* Γ Π (Vet. Int. *civiles*). I follow Conring and Spengel in bracketing *καὶ* after *ἁπάντων* and inserting *ἢ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ἢ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ*. **7.** *ἢ* before *τὰ μὲν* om. Π^{2} wrongly. Γ Π Bekk. have *τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ* here and in 29 and 30: Spengel, followed by Sus., substitutes *τὰς* for *τὰ* in all the six places, but perhaps Rabe is right in thinking this change unnecessary; he considers *τὰ . . . τὰ* to be used adverbially as in c. 16. 1300 b 40, 1301 a 4, 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 7 sq., 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 22 sqq., and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 38, and adds, 'the fact that in 1300 a 33 we have *τὰς . . . τὰς* does not make in favour of the change, since *τῶν ἀρχῶν* is added in that passage.' **10.** After *κλήρῳ* I insert *καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ*, following Sus., who however has *τὰς μὲν*

and τὰς δὲ in place of τὰ μὲν and τὰ δὲ. **31.** See explanatory note. **32.** πάνταs Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: πάντα Γ M^s pr. P^1 (corrected in pale ink). **33.** I bracket γίνεσθαι with Thurot, Spengel, and Sus. It may be an alternative reading for γίνονται, 31, which has found its way into the text in a wrong place. **35.** δ' om. Γ M^s pr. P^1 (corrected in pale ink). I bracket ἢ ἐκ τινῶν with Spengel. **36.** I add ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ after τινῶν with Spengel. **37.** πολιτικόν . . . **40,** ὀλιγαρχικόν om. pr. P^1, but in the margin is added in pale ink ἄλλως πολιτικόν. καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ ἢ ἀμφοῖν ὀλιγαρχικόν (where τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει is omitted before ὀλιγαρχικόν), and also τῆς καλουμένης ἐστι πολιτείας· τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων καθιστάναι τοὺς μὲν αἱρέσει τοὺς δὲ κλήρῳ ὀλιγαρχικόν (where τῆς καλουμένης ἐστι πολιτείας takes the place of πολιτικόν and, among other variations, the words ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει are omitted). This latter reading is the one translated by Ar. **38.** καὶ τὸ . . . **1300 b 3,** ἀμφοῖν] Spengel reconstructs this passage as follows—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ· τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς (ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει) ἢ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ· τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν (αἱρέσει) ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν ὀλιγαρχικόν, ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δὲ τὸ αἱρέσει ἢ τὸ ἀμφοῖν. Thurot reconstructs it thus—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς· καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει, πολιτικόν, ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δέ. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν: and Susemihl thus—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς, καὶ τὸ (τινὰς) ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν, ὀλιγαρχικώτερον (ἢ κλήρῳ) ἢ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ· τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν (αἱρέσει) ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, μὴ γενόμενον δ' ὁμοίως, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν. I incline to suggest the following text—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ, ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δέ, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν (αἱρέσει) ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν. Ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, 40, means 'from a combination of some and all': cp. c. 16. 1301 a 8 sq. With τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν I supply τινὰς καθιστάναι from what precedes. I omit ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει (39), because I regard these words as

a various reading for *τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ* which has been noted in the margin and has crept into the text. I omit *ὀλιγαρχικόν*, 40, because it may well be an alternative reading for *ὀλιγαρχικώτερον*: Γ M^s omit it. In 1300 b 3 I omit *μὴ γενόμενον δ' ὁμοίως* (Π^2) or *μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως* (M^s P^1 and possibly Γ: Vet. Int. *non factum autem similiter*) for a different reason. I think that this clause is out of place where it stands, and venture to suggest the possibility that *μὴ γινομένων δ' ὁμοίως* should be read, and that these words should be transposed to after *κινήσεις* in c. 16. 1300 b 38. They may have been omitted in 1300 b 38 in the archetype and wrongly inserted in the margin opposite to 1300 b 3 instead of 1300 b 38. Compare the error by which *εὐθὺς* is inserted in the margin of P^4 in 1305 b 41 instead of 1306 a 6 (see critical note on the latter passage). For *μὴ γινομένων* cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 6 sqq. **39.** *τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ*] *τε ἢ κλήρῳ* M^s and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *aut sorte*. **40.** Vet. Int. does not translate *δὲ* after *ὀλιγαρχικώτερον*. **41.** *τὸ δὲ* om. Γ M^s pr. P^1 (the words are added in P^1 in pale ink).

1300 b 1. *τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ὀλιγαρχικόν*] Lamb. translates, 'at quosdam ex quibusdam electione fieri oligarchiae convenit': thus he adds *αἱρέσει* before *ὀλιγαρχικόν*. In this he is followed by Conring, Spengel, and Sus., probably rightly. 'Fieri' in Lambinus' rendering should have been 'facere' or some such word. **4.** Vet. Int. has *quosdam autem ex simul omnibus non oligarchiçum*. He probably found *οὐκ ὀλιγαρχικόν* added as a gloss in the margin of Γ and translated these words as part of the text, for they appear as a red-ink gloss in P^2. *τό τε* Ar.: *τό τε* [*δὲ*] Sus., *τὸ τέ δὲ* a pale-ink correction in P^1, *τό τε δέ* a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 172): *τὸ δὲ* Γ M^s Ald. Bekk. and pr. P^1: *τότε δὲ* $P^{2\,3\,4}$ Q^b V^b L^s. In several MSS., it will be seen, the two alternative readings *τε* and *δὲ* have found their way into the text together. Thurot and Spengel would read *καὶ τὸ*. *πάντας αἱρέσει* Spengel, Sus., probably rightly: *αἱρέσει πάντας* Γ Π. **8.** *καὶ* om. Γ M^s pr. P^1 (it is added in P^1 in pale ink). Sus. omits it also: I bracket it, though not without doubt, for the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of small words. **13.** Π^2 have *λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν τριῶν τὸ δικαστικὸν εἰπεῖν*: Π^1 *λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν τριῶν εἰπεῖν τὸ δικαστικὸν περὶ δικαστηρίων*, except that P^1 has *δικαστηρίας*. In Π^1 two alternative readings have evidently together found their way into the text. *Τούτων*, 14, suggests that *περὶ δικαστηρίων*

has preceded and should be substituted for τὸ δικαστικόν, which is itself an unusual expression in the sense in which it is used here. In the recapitulation contained in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 33 we have καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων. Welldon reads περὶ δικαστηρίων and brackets τὸ δικαστικόν: Sus.[3] takes the reverse course. **17.** M^s pr. P^1 have περὶ δὲ ὧν δέ: Π^2 Bekk. Sus. περὶ ὧν δέ. Vet. Int. has *de quibus autem*, which might stand for either περὶ ὧν δέ or περὶ δὲ ὧν. See critical note on 1277 b 29. **27.** ἀμφισβητεῖται] Vet. Int. *altercantur*: the translator's eye has probably wandered to ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, 22. **28.** ἐπιφέρεται Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: φέρεται Π^1. οἷον . . . δικαστήριον is bracketed by Chandler perhaps rightly (cp. 1322 a 20). **29.** ἐν φρεαττοῖ P^1 Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: ἐν φρεατοῖ M^s: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *quod in puteum compulit iudex* what reading he found in Γ. The reading of M^s may be correct: see Sandys' critical note on Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 57. l. 22, ἐν Φρεάττου. **30.** παντὶ Π^2 Bekk.: παρόντι Π^1 Sus. See explanatory note on 1300 b 29. **32.** ἀστούς Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: αὐτούς Γ M^s pr. P^1, for στ is over an erasure in P^1. **38.** After κινήσεις should possibly be inserted μὴ γινομένων δ' ὁμοίως from 1300 b 3 (see critical note on 1300 a 38–b 3). Translate, 'and similarly if they are not instituted at all.' For ὁμοίως cp. c. 13. 1297 b 31, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. For the contrast of γενέσθαι and καλῶς γενέσθαι cp. c. 4. 1291 a 41. δ'] δὴ Γ (Vet. Int. *ilaque*). **41.** κλήρῳ Γ Π Bekk.[1]: κληρωτοὺς Lamb. Bekk.[2] Sus.

1301 a 3. See explanatory note. **6.** See explanatory note on 1301 a 5. **8.** αὐτοῦ om. Π^1. **12.** Sus. appears to be right in thinking that ἢ, the reading of Γ Π, must either be bracketed or replaced by καὶ.

BOOK VII (V).

1301 a 22. εἰς ποίας Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: ἐφ' ὁποίας M^s P^1 and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. has *ad quales*, and he often renders ἐπί by *ad* (e. g. in 1280 b 27, 1287 a 41, and 1304 a 2), while *qualis* is his ordinary equivalent for ὁποῖος. **23.** ἔτι δὲ . . . **24,** ἑκάστη] See explanatory note on 1301 a 22. **27.** τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον] See explanatory note on 1301 a 26. τούτου δ' ἁμαρτανόντων] Most MSS. of Vet. Int. have *ad hoc autem peccantibus*, but a z have *ab* in place of *ad* and are probably right: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 25, where διημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας is rendered *sunt vitiatae a rectis-*

sima politia. **30.** *ὅτι . . . εἶναι* om. $P^{2\,3}$ V^b Ald., *ὅτι . . . νομίζουσιν* om. $P^{4\,6}$ L^s Ar., *εἶναι . . . εἶναι* om. pr. Q^b. **31.** *ἔν τι* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *ἔτι* M^s, *ἑ* followed by a space sufficient for one letter and then *τι* pr. P^1 (corrected into *ἔν τι* in pale ink): Vet. Int. *in quocunque*, which is his equivalent for *ὁτιοῦν* in 29; perhaps his eye wandered from *ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἔν τι ὄντας*, 31, to the similar phrase *ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὁτιοῦν ὄντας*, 29, unless indeed Busse (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 15) is right in regarding *ὁτιοῦν*, 31, as a conjecture of Vet. Int. **36.** Γ M^s add *αἱ πολιτεῖαι* before *πᾶσαι* and M^s omits *τι*, but *αἱ πολιτεῖαι* is a gloss which has crept into the text; *αἱ πολιτεῖαι δηλονότι* appears as a red-ink gloss in P^2. **38.** *ἦν* om. P^3 Π^3 and pr. P^2 (where it is supplied in darker ink than that of the MS.): it is placed after *ἑκάτεροι* in M^s P^1, but Vet. Int. has *quam forte habent utrique*, so that it probably stood before *ἑκάτεροι* in Γ. *τυγχάνουσιν* Π^1 Bekk. Sus., *τυγχάνωσιν* P^3 Π^3 pr. P^2 (corrected in darker ink than that of the MS.). **39.** *στασιάζουσιν*] After this word I propose to insert c. 3. 1303 b 3, *στασιάζουσι δὲ . . .* 7, *ὄντες*, as to which see explanatory note on 1303 b 3.

1301 b 3. Γ $P^{1\,4}$ and perhaps P^3 (Sus.[1]) have the correct reading *αὐτοὺς*, while M^s P^2 Ald. have *αὐτοὺς*. See critical note on 1293 a 28. **6.** *δικῶς* Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: *δικαίως* Π^2. **8.** *μεταστήσωσιν*] *καταστήσωσιν* is the reading of two MSS. of little weight (R^b V^b) and, Sus.[2] thinks, perhaps of Γ. Vet. Int. has *ex instituta aliam constituant*, and *constituere* undoubtedly often represents *καθιστάναι*, whereas *μεθιστάναι* is usually rendered by *transferre*: still *constituit* stands for *περιέστησε* in 1304 a 33, and it is possible that *constituant* may stand for *μεταστήσωσιν* here. **10.** *οὐ* P^1 Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *οὐδὲ* Γ M^s. **17.** *ἢ ἵνα*] Vet. Int. *ut aut* (*ἵνα ἢ* Γ?). **26.** *ἦν* om. Π^1, but see explanatory note on 1301 b 25. *πανταχοῦ* Π^1 P^2 Bekk. Sus.: *πάντων* $P^{3\,4}$ V^b Ald. and pr. Q^b according to Sus.[1 2]: Sus.[3] probably errs in ascribing the reading *πάντων* to Π^2, for St. Hilaire (Politique d'Aristote, ed. 1837, vol. ii. p. 344) finds *πανταχοῦ* in P^2. **27.** *οὐ μὴν* M^s Π^2 Bekk., *οὐ μὴν δὲ* P^1: Vet. Int. *non solum*, which probably stands for *οὐ μήν*, for, though he usually renders *οὐ μὴν non tamen*, a frequent equivalent for *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ* is *non solum sed*. I add *εἰ* after *οὐ μήν*: see as to the whole passage explanatory note on 1301 b 26. **28.** *ἄνισος* Π^2 Bekk.[1] (corrected into *ἄνισον* in $P^{2\,3}$): *ἄνισον* Π^1 Bekk.[2] Sus. Compare the various readings in 1295 a 6. **32.** *ἴσῳ* Γ M^s pr. P^1, *ἴσῳ* Sus.: *ἴσον* Π^2 Bekk. **33.** *λόγῳ δὲ τὰ* M^s corr. P^1 Bekk.[2] Sus. and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *ratione autem quatuor*): *λόγῳ δὲ* P^2 Bekk.[1]

and corr. P^3: λέγω δὲ R^b Ar. Ald. pr. P^3, λέγω δὲ τὰ perhaps pr. P^1: κατ' ἀξίαν δὲ λέγω ἴσον ὑπερέχειν τὰ $P^{4\,6}$ L^a and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 177). τοῖν δυοῖν M^a $P^{1\,2}$ corr. P^3 Bekk. Sus.: τῶν δύο $P^{4\,6}$ L^a pr. P^2 (corrected in the ink of the MS.): the reading of Γ is uncertain. **35.** τῶν δυοῖν pr. P^1 (corrected into τοῖν δυοῖν by Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS., perhaps rightly), τῶν δύω M^a, τῶν δυεῖν $P^{2\,3}$: the reading of Γ is uncertain. In c. 3. 1302 b 37 M^a P^1 Sus. have δυοῖν σπιθαμῶν (the reading of Γ is of course uncertain). In c. 10. 1310 b 5 all MSS. have δυοῖν (or δυεῖν) κακῶν. In Hippocr. ap. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 17 *sub fin.*, we have δυοῖν πόνων. ἡμίση Π, though Vet. Int. has *dimidium* (ἥμισυ Γ?). The earlier Attic form is ἡμίσεα, and this is the form which is used in Attic inscriptions of the fourth century B.C., though ἡμίση appears in an inscription of B.C. 180 or thereabouts (Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 118). However, ἡμίση occurs in several passages of Demosthenes Cod. Σ and in Hyperid. c. Demosth. col. 10. 28 (Kühner, Ausführl. Gramm. der gr. Sprache, ed. Blass, 1. 443). The only instance of ἡμίσεα in Aristotle's writings given in the Index Aristotelicus is Phys. 8. 8. 263 b 8, to which 263 a 30 should be added. Immediately above in 263 a 23, 26, 28 we have ἡμίση. τὸ ἁπλῶς] Vet. Int. does not translate τὸ.

1302 a 2. εὔποροι M^a $P^{1\,2\,4}$ etc. Sus. and pr. P^3: ἄποροι Γ Bekk. Εὔποροι is probably right, though Aristotle speaks otherwise in 3. 8. 1280 a 4 sq. πολλοὶ is added before πολλαχοῦ in $P^{4\,6}$ L^a Ald. Bekk., but πολλοὶ and πολλαχοῦ are probably two alternative readings which in these MSS. have together found their way into the text. **10.** ἐγγίγνονται Π^2 Harl.: ἐγγίνονται M^a P^1 Bekk. Sus. **14.** ἐγγυτέρω] Vet. Int. *propinquior* (ἐγγυτέρα Γ?). For the confusion of α and ω compare 1305 b 10. The second ἡ is omitted by $P^{4\,6}$ $L^a V^b$ Bojesen Sus. probably rightly. **15.** τοιούτων om. $P^{1\,4}$ L^a. **18.** εἰσὶ Γ Π^2 Bekk.: ἔστι M^a P^1. δὴ $P^{2\,3\,4}$ V^b Ald. Bekk.: δὲ Π^1 R^b Ar.: γὰρ Sus. **31.** περὶ ὧν δὲ Π^2 Bekk.: περὶ δὲ ὧν M^a P^1 Sus.: Vet. Int. *de quibus autem* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. See critical notes on 1277 b 29 and 1300 b 17. **33.** αὐτῶν Γ P^1 Bekk. Sus.: the rest αὐτῆς. See critical note on 1293 a 28.

1302 b 4. διὰ μικρότητα Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: διὰ σμικρότητα M^a P^1: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. The forms μικρός, μικρότης are far more common in Aristotle's writings than σμικρός, σμικρότης. Still in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 1 all MSS. but M^a have διὰ σμικρότητα. **6.** πῶς

Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: *πόσ'* Π^2 (*πόσα* R^b). **28.** *τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας*] Vet. Int. *eos qui sine ordine et sine principatu* (*τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ ἀνάρχων* Γ?). But see critical note on 1326 b 19. **29.** *οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις*] z has *velut et in thebis*, the other MSS. *velut in thebis*. **30.** *πολιτευομένων* Π^2 Bekk. and a correction in pale ink in P^1: *πολιτευομένοις* M^s P^1 Sus. and probably Γ (though Vet. Int. *politizantibus* may represent either of the two readings). **36.** *ἡ* om. Π^2 Bekk. before *συμμετρία*: whether Γ added it, is of course uncertain. It dropped out easily after *μένῃ*, just as in 1305 b 24 *ἡ* drops out after *διττή* in $P^{2\,3}$ R^b V^b. **37.** *ᾗ* om. Π^1. *δυοῖν σπιθαμαῖν* $P^{2\,3\,4}$ etc. Bekk.: *δυοῖν σπιθαμῶν* M^s P^1 Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. *duorum palmorum*). See critical note on 1301 b 35. **38.** *μεταβάλλοι* Γ M^s Π^3 Bekk. Sus.: *μεταβάλλῃ* with *οι* written above the last letter P^1: *μεταβάλοι* $P^{2\,3}$. **39.** *τὸ* is added before *ποσὸν* by only one MS. and that of little importance. Its absence is amply justified by the passages collected by Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 1.

1303 a 2. *ταῖς* om. M^s P^1: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. **5.** *μικρὸν*] Vet. Int. *paulo*, which usually represents *μικρῷ*. He has *paulo posterius a Medicis* for *μικρὸν ὕστερον τῶν Μηδικῶν*: *a* is perhaps repeated from *a* before *Iapygis*. **11.** *γὰρ* Π^2 Bekk.: *γὰρ δὴ* M^s P^1 Sus. and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. has *enim*, and this represents *γὰρ δὴ* in 1284 b 29 and 1328 a 5. **13.** See explanatory note. **14.** *τὰς ἐριθείας*] Vet. Int. *verecundiam*, but see critical note on 1296 a 34–35. **22.** *γινομένη* P^1 Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *γενομένη* M^s: Vet. Int. *facta* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. **24.** (*ἀπ'*) *οὐδενὸς ἦρχον, ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄν*] *ἀπ'* om. Γ Π (Vet. Int. *nullius*): it is added by Schn., Bekk.^{2}, Sus., and probably they are right. In place of *ἐγγὺς ὄν* all MSS. have *ἔγγιον*, except possibly Γ, which may have had *ἐγγὺς ὄν*, for Vet. Int. has *tanquam propinquum sit*, and in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 13 Vet. Int. has *tanquam hoc ad fortitudinem maxime sit conferens* for *ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον*. However in 2. 2. 1261 a 15 he renders *ὡς ἄριστον ὄν tanquam optimum ens*: therefore it is not certain that he found *ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄν* in Γ. *Propinquum* might stand for *ἔγγιον* (see critical note on 1271 b 6 and compare the renderings of Vet. Int. in 1283 a 35 and 1287 b 9, to mention no others), and the auxiliary verb is often added without support from MSS. (vol. ii. p. lxii, note 2). **28.** *διεστασίασαν* Π^1 $P^{2\,3}$ Sus., *δ' ἐστασίασαν* V^b: *ἐστασίασαν* P^6 L^s Ald. Bekk., *ἐστασίασαν* P^4. **35.** *Ζαγκλαῖοι*] *ζαγλαῖοι* Π^1, *ζακχαῖοι* P^4. **36.** *καὶ* is added before *αὐτοί* in P^4 V^b L^s Ald. Bekk.

'Απολλωνιᾶται] ἀπολλωνιάται M^s, ἀπολλωνειάται $P^{2\,3}$ R^b V^b Ald., ἀπολλωνείαται P^4. **38.** συρακούσιοι Π Bekk. Sus.: see critical note on 1286 b 40.

1303 b 3. ἀποίκους Γ Π Bekk. (Vet. Int. *expulsos*): ἐποίκους Spengel, Sus., possibly rightly (cp. 1306 a 3, where all MSS. have ἐποίκους: Coray, however, would read ἀποίκους there as well as here). In 1319 a 36, where Π have ἀποικίας (Vet. Int. *habitacula*), Coray, followed by Sus., would read ἐποικίας. στασιάζουσι δὲ . . . 7, ὄντες] See critical note on 1301 a 39. **9.** Χύτρῳ] See explanatory note. **11.** τὸν Πειραιᾶ] Vet. Int. *suburbium*. **12.** αἱ διαβάσεις τῶν ὀχετῶν] Vet. Int. *penetrationes aperturarum* (is ὀχετῶν connected by Vet. Int. with οἴγειν?). **31.** τὰ R^b and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *ea quae in aliis partibus*): τὰς M^s $P^{1\,2\,3\,4}$ etc. **33.** μηδικά M^s $P^{1\,4\,6}$ etc.: δημοτικά $P^{2\,3}$ etc.: μιδικά probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *midica* (z *nudica*). **34.** τῶν πατρῴων] $Π^2$ πατρώων (τῶν add. Vict. Bekk.): $Π^1$ πατρῴας (Vet. Int. *de paterna hereditate*), Sus. πατρῴας. **35.** θατέρου is added after ἀποφαίνοντος in $P^{4\,6}$ U^b L^s Ald. Bekk. See critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1304 a 15, 1309 b 2, and 1313 b 32.

1304 a 3. θύοντος] θύοντες P^1: Vet. Int. *sacrificatorem*, which may perhaps represent θύοντα. See critical note on 1289 b 1. **4.** Μιτυλήνην] μυτιλήνην pr. P^3. See critical note on 1285 a 35. ἐξ ἐπικλήρων] Vet. Int. *ex hereditatibus*. See critical note on 1274 b 25. **8.** ὁ περιωσθεὶς $P^{1\,2\,3}$ Bekk. Sus.: ὁ περιωθεὶς R^b: ὁ περιωρυσθεὶς M^s P^4 etc. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *coartatus*). **9.** δέξανδρος $Π^1$ P^3 Sus.: δόξανδρος P^5 $Π^2$ Bekk. **11.** μνασέαν $Π^2$ Bekk.: μνασίαν $Π^1$ Sus. The Phocian whom Aristotle mentions here is probably the same man as the Mnaseas of Diod. 16. 38. For the forms Mnaseas, Mnasias, and Mnesias see Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der gr. Eigennamen. Both Mnaseas and Mnasias seem to have been forms used in Phocis. Μνάσωνος] μνήσωνος P^1 $Π^2$ Bekk.: μνήσωρος Γ M^s: the translation of Vet. Int., however, in the form in which it appears in the works of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus has *Mnasonis* (Sus.), and Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 445. 3), whom Susemihl follows, adopts the reading Μνάσωνος. **15.** θυγατέρα is added after τις in $P^{4\,6}$ L^s U^b Ald. Bekk. See critical note on 1303 b 35. **17.** πολιτείας] πολ followed by a lacuna pr. M^s, πόλεως P^1, which shows that the archetype of these two MSS. contained ambiguous contractions. **18.** καὶ is added before ἐκ in $Π^1$ Sus.: om. $Π^2$ Bekk. **29.** μετέβαλεν] Vet. Int. *transmutatio facta est*, but he will have found μετέβαλεν in Γ: cp. 1305 a 8, where

μετέβαλλον is rendered *fiebat transmutatio*, 1316 a 18, where μεταβάλλει is rendered *fit transmutatio*, and 1309 a 5, where τῷ μηδὲν κερδαίνειν is rendered *eo quod nullum sit lucrum*. **33.** εἰς ἑαυτὸν περιέστησε] Vet. Int. *in se ipso constituit*. δὴ Γ Π (Vet. Int. *etiam*, which stands for δὴ in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1292 b 10).

1304 b 1. ᾗ] ἢ Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: ἡ Π^2. μηδὲν ἧ μικρὸν Π^1 Sus.: μικρὸν ἡ μηδὲν Π^2 Bekk. For μικρὸν πάμπαν cp. 1270 a 17, 1294 b 4. **6.** αἰτίαι Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: αἱ Π^2. Π^2 should probably have had αἱ αἰτίαι in place of αἰτίαι, the reading of Π^1, but omitted αἰτίαι after αἱ. It is doubtful whether the right reading is αἰτίαι or αἱ αἰτίαι, for while in 1302 a 18 we have τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν, in 1302 a 34 we have αἱ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων. **12.** οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν] Vet. Int. *velut in trecentis qui populum deceperunt*, whence it would seem that οἱ was added in Γ before τὸν δῆμον. τετρακοσίων Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: τριακοσίων Π^1. In 1305 b 27 Π^1 have τριακοσίοις in place of τετρακοσίοις wrongly. The two words are often confused in the MSS. See critical note on 1286 a 13. **23.** αὐτούς is not translated by Vet. Int. τοὺς ἐχθίστους] Vet. Int. *separatissimos*. **25.** οὕτω Π^2, οὕτως Bekk.: om. Π^1. **27.** μισθοφοράν] μισθοφορᾶν M^s and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *tractare stipendia*. **28.** τε γὰρ om. Π^1 $P^{4\,6}$ L^s, γὰρ om. pr. P^2 (it is supplied by a correction in pale ink, and in the margin is added in the same pale ink ἐν ἄλλῳ· μισθοφορὰν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ καὶ ἐξῆς). Sus. brackets τε γὰρ. **30.** δίκας] Vet. Int. *iniurias*, probably an error for *vindictas*. **34.** κατελθόντες] Vet. Int. *supervenientes* (ἐπελθόντες Γ?, for ἐπέρχεσθαι is rendered *supervenire* in 1289 b 24 and 1310 a 39). **35.** ἡ ἐν Μεγάροις] Vet. Int. does not render ἡ, but neither does he render ἡ in 1313 a 24, ἡ περὶ Μολοττούς. See critical note on 1306 a 30. **36.** ἐξέβαλλον M^s Π^2 (except Ald.) Bekk. Sus.: ἐξέβαλον $P^{1\,2\,s}$ Ald.: Vet. Int. *eiecerunt*, which probably represents ἐξέβαλον.

1305 a 3. ὁτὲ Γ Π^2 Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *quandoque*): τοτὲ P^1, τότε M^s. **13.** δημαγωγοῦσι μέν] Vet. Int. *fiunt demagogi*. **24.** στασιάσας] Vet. Int. *seditionem movit*, but see critical note on 1286 b 10. **32.** καὶ τῶν νόμων] z has *etiam legum*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. wrongly *legum*. τοῦ ἡ] ἡ om. Π^1: see critical note on 1282 a 17.

1305 b 4. ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ] M^s has the form Μασαλία here and M^s P^1 in 1321 a 30 (where see critical note), but Head (Hist. Num. p. 7) does not mention the occurrence of this form on the coins, some of which have the inscription ΜΑΣΣΑ. In both passages

z has *massalia*, though most MSS. of Vet. Int. have *masalia* in the passage before us and some of them in 1321 a 30. **6.** *μετέλαβον* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *μετέβαλον* pr. P^1 (corrected in pale ink), *μετέβαλλον* M^s V^b, *μετέβαλον* or *μετέβαλλον* Γ (Vet. Int. *donec transmutarent*). **8.** *οἱ νεώτεροι*] z has *iuniores*, the usual equivalent; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. less well *minores*, though it is possible that, as *ὁ νεώτερος* occurs in the next line and is rendered *iunior*, Vet. Int. may have preferred, as he sometimes does, to render it otherwise in 8. **10.** *ἔνθα*] Vet. Int. *in cho* (b g h k l m) or *in tho* (a c s: z has *intho*). He probably misread *ἔνθα* as *ἐν θῷ*: see critical note on 1302 a 14. *ἡ* is omitted in P^4 L^s V^b Ald. Bekk.^{2}, but as to the omission of the article in these MSS. see critical notes on 1291 a 1, b 3, and 1292 a 22. **11.** *ἀπετελεύτησεν*] Vet. Int. *remissa fuit*. **16.** *ἐπιλαβόμενος*] Vet. Int. *insurgens*. His translation of *ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν* in Rhet. 3. 16. 1417 b 6 (*deprehenduntur in oculis*) is equally wide of the mark, but *insurgere* is a frequent equivalent for *ἐπιτίθεσθαι* in Vet. Int., and it is possible that Γ had *ἐπιβέμενος* in 16 as well as in 17. **17.** *ἐπιβέμενος*] Vet. Int. *invalescens* should probably be *invadens* (for *invadere* represents *ἐπιτίθεσθαι* in 1272 b 16, 1327 a 23, 1330 b 27, and 1331 a 17). **20.** *ἐπιμελομένων* Π, except M^s Ald., which have *ἐπιμελουμένων*. The form used elsewhere in the Politics is *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, and in 1339 a 38 Π have *ἐπιμελουμένων*. The word does not occur again in the present Book. The form *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* is always used in the *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, except in one passage (c. 50. l. 10), where the papyrus has *ἐπιμέλονται*. In Attic inscriptions between B.C. 380 and 30 *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* is found far more often than *ἐπιμέλεσθαι* (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 139). **24.** *ἡ* om. $P^{2\,3}$ R^b V^b. See critical note on 1302 b 36. *ἐγγίγνεται* $P^{2\,3\,4}$: *ἐγγίνεται* $M^s P^1$ etc. **25.** *πάνυ*] Vet. Int. *omnino*, which represents a variety of words, among them *πάμπαν*, but may possibly stand for *πάνυ* here, though *πάνυ* is rendered *valde* in 1318 b 2. **26.** *ἴσχυσαν*] Vet. Int. *habuerunt* should probably be *valuerunt*, as Sus.[1] suggests. In 1292 a 22 *ἰσχύουσιν* is rendered *valent*. **27.** *τετρακοσίοις* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.; *τριακοσίοις* Π^1. See critical notes on 1304 b 12 and 1286 a 13. **34.** *ἐστὶ* Π^2, *ἐστι* Ald., *ἐστιν* Bekk.[1], *ἐστίν* Bekk.[2]: *εἰσὶ* M^s, *εἰσι* P^1 Sus. (Vet. Int. *sunt* or *sint* after *praetoria* leaves the reading in Γ uncertain).

1306 a 3. *ἀποίκους* Γ Π: see critical note on 1303 b 3. *τοὺς* Π^2 Bekk.: *τῶν* M^s P^1 Sus.: Vet. Int. *advenas Chalcideorum* leaves the

reading of Γ uncertain. **6.** Π^1 add *εὐθὺς* after *μὲν οὖν*, probably rightly, for Π^2 sometimes omit single words, e. g. in 1288 b 16, 27, 1259 a 37, and 1276 a 33. In the margin of P^4 *εὐθὺς* is added not here, but after *καὶ* in 1305 b 41, probably, as Sus. suggests, by an oversight. See critical note on 1300 a 38. *ἐπιχειροῦσί*] z has *conantur*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *conatur* wrongly. **8.** *κλέπτοντας*] Vet. Int. *fures*, but see critical note on 1289 b 1. **13.** *ἐμποιῶσιν*] Vet. Int. *inducunt*, which might represent *εἰσάγωσιν*. Ἐμποιεῖν is rendered *efficere* or *facere* elsewhere in the Politics and mostly in the Rhetoric, but it is rendered *insinuare* in Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 2, and *inducunt* may possibly stand for *ἐμποιῶσιν* here. **21.** *ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ*] See explanatory note. **22.** *ἐγχειρίσωσιν*] Vet. Int. *manus iniecerint* probably stands for *ἐγχειρίσωσιν* and not *ἐγχειρήσωσιν*, the reading of M^s, for *ἐγχειρεῖν* is always rendered *conari* or *invadere*. In 27 *ἐγχειρίζουσι* is rendered *muniunt* or *minuunt* (so z): should *manuunt* be read, or *mandant*? In 1314 a 24 *ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις* is rendered *manum mittit ad impossibilia*. **24.** *αὑτοῖς*] z has *ipsis* (*αὐτοῖς* Γ); the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *amplius* wrongly. **30.** Ἀλεναδῶν] *ἀλωαδῶν* Γ M^s pr. P^1 (corrected in P^1 in the ink of the MS.). *τῶν περὶ Σῖμον*] Vet. Int. *circa Samum*: thus he does not translate *τῶν*, but whether (as Sus.$^{3\,a}$ thinks) *τῶν* was omitted in Γ is doubtful (see critical notes on 1304 b 35 and 1313 a 24). *Σῖμον* Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 188, note 84): *σάμον* Γ Π. 'Corruptelam primus suspicatus est Camerarius' (Sus.^{3}): see Camerarius, Interp. p. 201. **31.** *ἑταιριῶν* P^1 Ald. Bekk. Sus.: *ἑταιρειῶν* the rest. In 1272 b 34 all MSS. have *ἑταιριῶν*, but in 1305 b 32 pr. M^s $P^{1\,s}$ have *ἑταιρειῶν*, and in 1313 a 41 pr. P^3 has *ἑταιρείαν*. In Ἀθ. Πολ. the form *ἑταιρεία* is always used. **36.** *δὲ* is added after *Διαγόρας* in Π^2 except in P^4, which omits it in a lacuna: it is bracketed in Bekk.$^{1\,2}$. **37.** *καὶ ἐν*] Should *ἢ* be added between *καὶ* and *ἐν* (cp. 1306 b 5)? **38.** *στασιωτικῶς* Π^2 Bekk.: *στασιαστικῶς* M^s P^1: Vet. Int. *seditionaliter* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. **39.** Εὐρυτίωνος P^5 R^b and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 202), Vict. Bekk.: *εὐριτίωνος* $P^{2\,4}$ V^b and probably pr. P^3 (for P^3 has *εὐαιτίωνος* with *εἰαι* over an erasure), *εὐεκτίωνος* Γ, *εὐετίωνος* M^s P^1. Perhaps the name of Eurytion is the more likely to be right. Eurytion was one of the Argonauts (Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography s. v.: Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der gr. Eigennamen, s. vv. Εὐρυτίων and Εὔρυτος), and it was claimed that the Argonauts on their way to Colchis landed on the coast where

Heracleia was afterwards founded (Preller, Gr. Mythol. 2. 332). The tomb of the prophet Idmon, an Argonaut, was to be seen in the marketplace of Heracleia (Preller, p. 333, note).

1306 b 2. *αὐτοὺς*] See explanatory note on 1306 b 1. **4.** *τινῶν* is left untranslated by Vet. Int. **8.** *ἄλλας* Π^2 Ar. Bekk.: om. Π^1. Sus. brackets it. **9 sqq.** See explanatory note. **18.** *αἱ* is added before *ὀλιγαρχίαι* in M^s P^1 Sus.: om. Π^2 Bekk.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. **20.** *ἐννόμων*] *νόμων* Γ M^a (Vet. Int. *ex legibus democraticis et oligarchicis in eas quae dominae*). *τὰς* $P^{2\,3}$ R^b Ald. pr. P^1 Bekk. Sus.: *τοὺς* M^s P^4 etc. and probably Γ, *τους* a correction in P^1 in pale ink. **28.** Congreve's conjecture of *τι* for *τὸ* deserves to be mentioned, though I do not adopt it. See explanatory note. **35.** *Ἀγησιλάου* Schn. Cor. Bekk.^{2} Sus.: *ἀγησιλάῳ* Γ Π Bekk.^{1}, for Vet. Int. *sub Agesilao* stands for *ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάῳ* (see critical note on 1289 b 39 and cp. 1271 a 39). **38.** *καὶ τοῦτο* Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *hoc et* (*τοῦτο καὶ* Γ?). *μεσσηνιακὸν* $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Bekk.: *μεσηνιακὸν* Π^1 P^4 V^b Sus.^{3} Π Sus.^{3} have *μεσήνιοι* in 1269 b 4 and M^s $P^{1\,2\,3\,4}$ Sus.^{s} *μεσηνίους* in 1270 a 3. Thus in the Politics the MSS. are divided. But in Rhet. 2. 23. 1397 a 11 and 3. 17. 1418 b 11 the best MSS. have *μεσσηνιακῶ* and *μεσσηνιακῆ*, and in Rhet. 1. 13. 1373 b 18 all the MSS. have *μεσσηνιακῶ*. On coins we find the form *Μεσσανίων*, and the form with one sigma is of rare occurrence in inscriptions (see for an instance of it Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 181, where both forms occur). **39.** *δῆλον δὲ* [*καὶ τοῦτο*] *κ.τ.λ.*] I bracket *καὶ τοῦτο*, suspecting (as I see since writing this note that Mr. A. W. Verrall in *Class. Rev.* 10. 273, note, also does) that it has found its way into the text by repetition from the preceding line. This error is of frequent occurrence in Π^1, but it probably now and then affects all the MSS.

1307 a 5. *ἄννων* Π Bekk. The MSS. of Vet. Int. have various corruptions of the word all beginning with h, whence Sus. reads *Ἅννων*. But Herodotus (7. 165), Polybius, Plutarch (Timol. c. 19), Diodorus, and Justin all give the name without the aspirate. **22.** *αὐξανόντων*] z has *augmentantibus*, which is perhaps the reading of a: the other MSS. have *augentibus*. In 1303 a 12 *αὐξανομένων* is rendered *augmentatis*. **31.** *ἐδύναντο* Π^2 Bekk.: *ἠδύναντο* M^s P^1 Sus. (Γ uncertain). See critical note on 1253 b 33. Schneider, followed by Sus., believes, probably rightly, that a lacuna exists before *ὁ δὲ δῆμος*. It is difficult to say what has dropped out: possibly *ἐστασίαζον* or some such word or words. **32.** *τῶν φρουρῶν* om. Π^1. **33.** *τῆς*

χώρας] τὴν χώραν M^s P^2 V^b. **38.** θέλουσιν M^s P^1 Sus. and possibly Γ: θέλωσι Π^2, θέλωσιν Bekk.

1307 b 1. All the MSS. of Vet. Int. add *quod* after *aristocratiae*. This is probably repeated by anticipation from *eo quod solvantur* or *quod quidem dictum est* in the following line. In much the same way in 1308 a 38 Vet. Int. has *honorabilitatis* for νομίσματος, repeating it from *honorabilitatis communis* immediately after. **12.** χειροτονήσοντα Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: χειροτονήσαντας P^1, χειροτονησαν with τ superscribed over α M^s (=probably χειροτονήσαντα): Vet. Int. *ordinantem* (z *ordinantes*), which may stand either for χειροτονήσαντα or for χειροτονήσοντα, for βλέψας is rendered *aspiciens* in 1289 b 6 and ἀκουσομένους *audientes* in 1298 a 19. **18.** μετέβαλεν Γ P^1 corr. M^s etc. Bekk. Sus. (for Vet. Int. *transmutatus est* stands for μετέβαλεν, as *transmutata fuit* does in 1301 b 21, 1303 b 21, 1304 b 26, and 1305 b 12): μετέβαλλεν P^4 pr. M^s: μετέβαλλον $P^{2\,3}$ etc. **30.** ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὖ κεκραμέναις πολιτείαις] z has *in bene temperatis quidem igitur politiis*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. wrongly add *autem* after *bene*. **31.** παρανομῶσι] z has *praevaricentur* rightly; a *praevaricetur*, and the other MSS. *privarentur*. **32.** παραδυομένη . . . **34.** δὲ om. Π^2 Ar. pr. P^2 (no doubt owing to the recurrence of λανθάνει in 34), so that we are dependent for these words on Γ M^s P^1. M^s P^1, followed by Göttling, have λανθάνει γὰρ παραδυομένη ἡ παρανομία, ὥσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον (ι of γινόμενον in P^1 over an erasure). λανθάνει δὲ (γὰρ P^1 Göttl. in place of δέ), and this reading I have adopted. Vet. Int. has *latet enim subintrans praevaricatio, sicut substantias parvae expensae consumunt saepe factae. latet autem*, so that he may have found in his Greek text *al* μικραὶ δαπάναι ἀναιροῦσι πολλάκις γινόμεναι, but I do not think this very likely, for he renders δαπάνη (sing.) by *expensae* (plur.) in 1330 a 13 and 1321 a 40. *Praevaricatio* stands for παρανομία, for *praevaricentur* represents παρανομῶσι in 31. That Victorius' conjecture of ἐπεισδύουσα for παραδυομένη (in which Bekker follows him) and of παράβασις or παρέκβασις for παρανομία is wrong (he probably obtained his version of the passage by retranslation from Vet. Int.) is evident from Plato, Rep. 424 D (quoted in explanatory note on 1307 b 30), from which passage the sentence is repeated, a fact which seems hitherto to have escaped notice. [Since the foregoing note was written, Sus.$^{3\,a}$ has called attention to this and adopted the reading of M^s P^1.] **34.** ἡ δαπάνη P^1 Π^2 (bracketed by Sus.): ἡ ἀπάτη M^s and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *seductio* and

seductis stands for *ἐξαπατηθέντων* in Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 23: *ἡ μετάβασις* Vict. Bekk. **36.** *ὁ* om. M^s P^1 (it is supplied in P^1 in the ink of the MS.) and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *sicut sophistica oratio*).

1308 a 3. *ἔτι* $Π^1$ Bekk. Sus.: *ἔστι* $Π^2$. **10.** *αὐτοὺς* Γ and, as it would seem, P^1 (see critical note on 1293 a 28): *αὐτοὺς* M^s $Π^2$. **17.** *ἐγγίγνονται*] Vet. Int. *fiunt*, as in 1288 a 13, 1302 a 10, 13, and 1304 b 26. **33.** *παρειλῆφέναι*] Vet. Int. *comprehendantur*, but he often renders the active by the passive. **35.** *διὰ τὰ τιμήματα*] *διὰ τιμήματα* P^4: *διὰ τιμήματος* Γ M^s V^b (Vet. Int. *per honorabilitatem*). **39.** *κοινοῦ* Γ Π Bekk.: *καινοῦ* Coray, Sus. **40.** *κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον* is placed in $Π^2$ before *ἐν ὅσαις*, 39, and Bekker places these words there between brackets: $Π^1$ Sus. rightly place them after *ἐνιαυτόν*. Bekk.[1] had already remarked in his note on 1308 a 39 that the Vet. Int. did so.

1308 b 6. See explanatory note. **10.** *ἐν* is added before *ὀλιγαρχίᾳ* in $Π^1$ Sus. **11.** *καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ* is added in $Π^1$, but crossed through with red ink in P^1: om. $Π^2$ Bekk.[2]: *καὶ μοναρχίᾳ* Vict. Casaubon Bekk.[1], but Casaubon and Bekk.[1] bracket the words, and *καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ* is bracketed by Sus. I bracket *καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ*, though not without hesitation, for in 1301 b 13 we have a reference to *μοναρχία*. See also critical note on 1299 b 22. **13.** *ταχὺ μεγάλας* Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *breviter magnos* (so z with all MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, which has *breviter et magnos*): did he find *βραχὺ* in place of *ταχὺ* in Γ? **14.** *πάντὸς*] z has *omnis* rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. (except a recent hand in b and m) have *omnes*. **15.** *μή τοί γ'* Bekk. Sus.: *μήτοι γ'* P^4 Ald., *μή τοι γ'* P^6 L^s: *μή τι γ'* $P^{2\,3}$ etc.: *μήτ'* Γ M^s, *μή τ'* P^1. In c. 11. 1315 a 10 all MSS. have *μή τοι τό γε ἦθος θρασύν*. In 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 16 P^4 L^s Ald. have *μή τοι γε*, and all the other MSS. *μή τι γε*. In Metaph. Z. 10. 1035 a 29 we have *ἢ ὅλως ἢ οὕτοι οὕτω γε*. See Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 70, and cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2. 3. 24. **16.** *καὶ* om. $Π^2$ (it is supplied in P^4 by a corrector). **17.** *οὕτως ἄγειν* $Π^2$ Bekk., but in P^2 is added in the ink of the MS. *ἐν ἄλλῳ· οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν* and in the margin in pale ink *οὕτω ῥυγμίζειν*: *οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν* M^s P^1: Vet. Int. has *sic ordinare*, which may stand here for *οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν*, but *ordinare* in Vet. Int. commonly stands for *τάττειν*. **22.** M^s P^1 omit the second *τὴν*: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. But these MSS. have little authority in questions as to the omission of small words. **25.** *τούτου* $Π^2$ Bekk. Sus.: *τοῦτο* $Π^1$. **26.** *τὸ* om. M^s P^1: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. *firmare* might

stand either for *ἐγχειρίζειν* or for *τὸ ἐγχειρίζειν* (cp. 1314 a 10, where *uti* stands for *τὸ χρῆσθαι*, and 1315 a 8, where *nullum unum facere magnum* stands for *τὸ μηδένα ποιεῖν ἕνα μέγαν*). **28.** Π^1 may possibly be right in omitting the first *καὶ* (see critical notes on 1254 b 14 and 1260 a 26), but no great weight attaches to the omission of *καὶ* by these MSS. Vet. Int. adds *autem* after his equivalent for *τοὺς ἀπόρους*, but see critical note on 1318 a 35. **34.** *ὀλιγαρχικαῖς* Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *in oligarchiis*. **37.** Vet. Int. does not translate *δ'*.

1309 a 5. *βουλήσονται*] z has *volent*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *volunt* or *valent*. **10.** *τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι*] Vet. Int. *et ut non furentur*. Had Γ *καὶ τοῦ μὴ κλέπτεσθαι*? M^s omits *οὖν*. **12.** *λόχους* Γ P^4 Ald. Ar. and a correction in pale ink in P^1 (Vet. Int. *contubernia*): *λόγους* M^s $P^{2\,3}$ etc. and pr. P^1. *τιθέσθωσαν*] Vet. Int. *reponantur*, which stands for *τιθέσθωσαν* here as *reposito* does for *τεθέντος* in 1259 a 23. **15.** *τῶ* Γ M^s Lamb. Cor. Sus., *τοῦ* P^1: om. Π^2 Bekk. In 1319 b 7 Π^1 omit *τῷ*. **29.** Π^1 add *ταύτης* after *τῆς πολιτείας*, probably owing to the occurrence of *τῆς πολιτείας ταύτας* (or *ταῦτα*) a line below. Sus.$^{3\,a}$ brackets *ταύτης*. See critical notes on 1290 b 29 and 1298 b 35. **31.** *ταύτας* Π^2 (except P^2, which omits *ταύτας δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας*) Bekk. Sus.: *ταῦτα* Π^1. **35.** *δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς*] Vet. Int. *potentiam maximorum operum principatus*, but *maximorum* is probably a clerical error for *maximam*. **40.** *αἱρεσιν* corr. P^4 Sus. and other editors: *διαίρεσιν* all other MSS. and Bekker. *Αἵρεσιν* is probably right: cp. 1309 b 2 sq.

1309 b 2. *μὴ στρατηγικὸς δὲ* is added in $P^{4\,6}$ L^s after *φίλος*, but see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35, and 1304 a 15. **7.** *τἀναντία* P^1 Π^2 Bekk.: *τοὐναντίον* Γ M^s Sus. **9.** *κἂν δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλία* Stahr, Sus., while Eucken would place *τῆς πολιτείας* after *φιλία*. All the MSS. and Vet. Int. place *τῆς πολιτείας* before *καὶ*. They are probably wrong, as Π^1 are probably wrong in 1312 a 27, where Π^1 read *δι' ἣν ὀνομαστοὶ γίνονται τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ γνώριμοι* in place of *δι' ἣν ὀνομαστοὶ γίγνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις*, which is the reading of Π^2. Vet. Int. has *si* for *κἂν*, but he probably found *κἂν* in Γ (see critical notes on 1282 b 8 and 1298 b 23). **10.** *καὶ τὰ* Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: *κατὰ* $P^{2\,3\,6}$ etc. and pr. P^4: *τὰ* corr. P^4. For a similar error see 1319 b 24. **14.** *ἐνίους* Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: *ἐνίοις* Π^2. **19.** *νῦν* P^1 Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *δὴ* Γ M^s. **25.** *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ*] Vet. Int. *non tamen*, which stands for *οὐ*

μὴν in 1275 b 6 and 1289 b 6 and for οὐ μέντοι in 1306 b 25, but may possibly stand for οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ here, for in 1312 a 30 *sed tamen* stands for οὐ μὴν ἀλλά. Should *sed tamen* be read here in place of *non tamen?* **27.** ἀποβαλεῖ Π^1 Bekk. Sus., ἀποβάλει Ald.: ἀποβάλῃ P^3 and pr. P^2: ἀποβάλλει Ar. and a correction in P^2 in the ink of the MS., ἀποβάλλῃ P^4 V^b L^a, ὑπερβαλεῖ R^b. **28.** ποιήσει] ποιήσῃ M^a pr. P^2 (corrected in P^3 in the ink of the MS.), ποιῃ with σ superscribed over η P^3: ποιήσει the rest and Γ. **30.** τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας] See explanatory note. **37.** ποῖα Π^1 R^b Ald. Bekk. Sus.: ποῖαι $P^{2\,3\,4}$ Q^b V^b. **38.** μὲν γὰρ Π^2 Bekk. (γὰρ μὲν γὰρ corr. P^4): γὰρ Π^1. Sus. brackets μέν.

1310 a 18. εἴπερ Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: ἤπερ Π^1. **19.** ἔστι δὲ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ τοῦτο, τὸ ποιεῖν οἷς χαίρουσιν] Vet. Int. *est autem erudiri ad faciendum non hoc quibus gaudent* (so z with the other MSS., except that the symbol in z may stand for either *hoc* or *haec*). The words should probably run—*est autem erudiri ad politiam non hoc, facere quibus gaudent.* **21.** ἢ M^a Π^2 Bekk.: καὶ Γ P^1 Sus. **22.** Vet. Int. *democratizare* stands for δημοκρατεῖσθαι as in 1290 a 36 (cp. 1292 a 8). **33.** εἰς ὃ χρῄζων] εἰς ὃ χρῄζειν $P^{4\,6}$ L^a. Vet. Int. *ad quod abundat.* Perhaps he misread χρῄζων as χορηγῶν (cp. 1325 b 38, where *abundantia* stands for χορηγίας). **39.** καὶ om. Π^1.

1310 b 5. δυοῖν] δυεῖν P^2 pr. P^3. z (with b alone) has *duobus* rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *duabus.* **9.** τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον] See explanatory note. **10.** ἐκ om. Π^1. **15.** δημαγωγῶν] δημαγωγοῦ $P^{2\,3}$. **17.** τῶν τυραννίδων $P^{2\,3\,4}$ etc. Bekk. Sus.: αἱ τυραννίδες Π^1. **21.** τὰς δημουργίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας] Vet. Int. *conditores populi et prospectores.* See critical notes on 1326 b 19 and 1302 b 28. **24.** τούτοις Π^2 Bekk.[1] Sus. and corr. P^1: τοῦτο εἰς Γ M^a pr. P^1: Bekk.[2] omits τούτοις. **29.** Κύψελος] κύψελλος $P^{1\,4}$. So in 1315 b 24 M^a and perhaps Γ have κύψελλος and in 1315 b 27 P^1 V^b and perhaps Γ, and in 1315 b 23 P^4 has κυψελλιδῶν. In 1313 b 22 all MSS. have κυψελιδῶν or κυψελίδων, and we find κυψελιδων in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 17. l. 14. In Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 13 the form Κύψελλος occurs. In Hist. An. 9. 30. 618 a 31 there is a various reading κυψέλλους for κυψέλους ('swifts'), and in 34 a various reading κυψελλίσιν for κυψελίσιν. **33.** γένους Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: γένος Π^1. **37.** Κόδρος] κέδρος $P^{2\,3}$ V^b and perhaps Γ. **40.** Μολοττῶν] z has *molottorum*; all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have some corruption or other. δέ] Vet. Int. *enim*, but whether Γ had γὰρ is doubtful.

1311 a 6. *χρήματα* Π Bekk.: Vet. Int. *pecuniarum* (*χρημάτων* Γ?). *βασιλικὰ*] z has *regales* (agreeing with *supergressiones*); the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *regalis*. **10.** *τὸ τὸ* Ar. corr. P^6 Bekk. Sus.: *τῷ τὸ* Γ M^a Π^2 pr. P^5: *τῷ* P^1. **11.** *τροφήν* Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: *τροφήν* Π^2. **13.** *κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον*] Vet. Int. *suspectam habere turbam*; *suspectam* is probably corrupt, for *κάκωσις* is rendered *anxietas* in Rhet. 2. 7. 1385 a 24 and *afflictio* in Rhet. 2. 8. 1386 a 8 (*κακοῦν* does not occur again in the Politics or at all, it would seem, in the Rhetoric). Should *subiectam* be read in place of *suspectam*? **15.** *καὶ* is added after *δὲ* in Γ M^a; two MSS. of Vet. Int., however (a z), omit *et*. **21.** *ἐστιν*] Vet. Int. *fuit*. See critical note on 1316 b 10. **22.** *καθάπερ οὖν σχεδὸν ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς κ.τ.λ.*] Σχεδόν is often used with *εἴρηται* and similar words to soften the statement that such and such a topic has been dealt with (Bon. Ind. s.v. *σχεδόν*), but there seems to be less reason for its use here in the simple repetition of an assertion, and in 1310 a 40 (the passage referred to) we have *σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὰς βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας*, so that Spengel may well be right in reading *καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, σχεδὸν τὰς αὐτὰς κ.τ.λ.* **28.** *ταὐτά* Γ Mª Bekk. Sus., *ταυτά* P^1: *ταῦτα* Π^2. **30.** *μονάρχοις* Π^2 Bekk.: *μοναρχαις* M^a P^1 Sus.: Vet. Int. *monarchis* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. **36.** *διὰ . . .* **39.** *Ἁρμόδιον* is cited, as Sus. points out, in Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. 980, but the passage occurs only in the Aldine edition. Dindorf's note is 'Omittunt Ravennas et Suidas. Videntur eiusdem esse auctoris qui Aristotelis locum inseruit scholio v. 92.' See critical note on 1287 b 31. **37.** Vet. Int. renders *δὲ* by *et*, as in 1291 b 40 and 1312 a 18. *Ἁρμόδιον*] *ἁρμοδίῳ* M^a and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *illusisse Harmodio*). **38.** z has *aristogiton*; of the other MSS. of Vet. Int. a has *aristogilaton* and the rest *aristoginton*.

1311 b 5. *διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ*] Vet. Int. *quia enim mulier recusavit filium ipsius*, where *παρελέσθαι* has probably been misread or misunderstood by the translator. **7.** *αἰσχῦναι* Sus.: *αἰσχύναι* M^a P^1 and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *verecundiam fecerunt*: *αἰσχύνεσθαι* is rendered *verecundari* in 1324 b 34 and 1313 a 31): *αἰσχύνεσθαι* Π^2 Bekk., accepting which reading Vict., followed by Bonitz (Ind. 22 a 30), would insert *ὑπὸ* before *τῶν μονάρχων*. **8.** *μονάρχων* Π Bekk.: *μοναρχῶν* Γ Sus. (Vet. Int. *monarcharum*). *κραταιοῦ* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *κραταιοῦ* M^a P^1: Vet. Int. *Crataei*, which leaves the reading of Γ uncertain: *Κρατεύου* Scaliger,

comparing Ael. Var. Hist. 8. 9. **10.** ἡ Π^2 Sus.: ἡ M^s P^1 and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. gives no equivalent for it, and he often gives no equivalent for the article: om. Vict. Giph. Bekk. **12.** Should τοῦ be added before πρὸς? **13.** ἐλμείας Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: ἐλμβείας Π^2 Ar., but a mark resembling a colon (:) is placed in P^4 over λ (see Sus.[1]). The letters μ and β are interchanged in some words, e.g. in Σερμυλιῆς, which appears also in Attic inscriptions as Σερβυλιῆς (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, pp. 59–60). But ἐλμβείας is probably merely the mistake of a copyist for ἐλμείας, the letters μ and β having been for a considerable period very similar in form in minuscule writing. **14.** υἱεῖ Π^2 Bekk.: υἱῷ M^s P^1 Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. In 1304 a 8 and 1313 a 32 all MSS. have υἱέσιν, in 1277 a 18 οἱ υἱεῖς, in 1293 a 29 τοὺς υἱεῖς, but on the other hand all have υἱοί in 1261 b 39 and υἱοὺς in 1270 b 4. The Index Aristotelicus records no instance of the occurrence of the forms υἱοῖς and υἱέος in Aristotle's writings: υἱοῦ occurs in Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1149 b 11. In the Ἀθ. Πολ. the forms υἱεῖς (nom. and acc.), υἱέων are exclusively found. As to the use of these various forms see Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 113, who remarks that after B.C. 350 the forms of the word used in Attic inscriptions are generally those of the second declension, and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 1. 506 sqq. ἥκιστα] Vet. Int. *nihil.* **20.** πάρρων Π^2 Bekk. and a correction in P^1 in the ink of the MS.: πύρρων Γ M^s pr. P^1 (Vet. Int. *pirron* or *pyrron*: z has *pirron*): Πύθων Fabius Benevolentius ap. Vict. *ad locum*, followed by Sus. The murderer of Cotys is usually called Πύθων: thus the best MS. of Diogenes Laertius, the Burbonicus, has Πύθων (so Prof. Bywater informs me) in 3. 46, and Demosthenes has Πύθων in c. Aristocr. cc. 119, 127, 163, and so has Plutarch in Adv. Colot. c. 32, De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando, c. 11, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 20, and elsewhere. In Diog. Laert. 9. 65, indeed, it is implied that Diocles called the murderer of Cotys Πύρρων, but the passage is thought by Casaubon and Menage to be a gloss on ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι a dozen lines above which has crept from the margin into the text and has been severed in the process from the words on which it was a comment. There is much, therefore, to be said for the reading Πύθων in the passage before us. I hesitate, however, to depart from the reading of the MSS., as Aristotle may have written Πάρρων or Πύρρων, though he may have been in error in doing so. Zeller (Plato, Eng. Tr., p. 30, note 64) apparently

accepts the reading Πάρρων, for he distinguishes between Parrhon and Pytho. **25.** καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς] Vet. Int. *et ea quae circa principatus*. He takes τῶν to be neuter and appears to make τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ. dependent on διέφθειραν and ἐνεχείρησαν. **27.** πενθαλίδας Γ Π Bekk., except that pr. M^s has πενθαλήδας and R^b πενταλίδας: Πενθιλίδας Schn. Sus. Almost all MSS. have πένθιλον or πενθίλον in 29. We find the form Πενθίλος in Strabo, p. 582, and Paus. 3. 2. 1. περιόντας $P^{1\,4}$ R^b Ar. Bekk. Sus.: περιόντας M^s $P^{2\,3}$ V^b Ald. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *circumstantes*: he renders περιουσία in 1329 b 28 by *circumstantia*). **29.** Σμέρδις Camotius (editor of the Aldina minor in 1552), Sylburg, Bekk. Sus. etc.: σμέρδης Γ Π Ar. See explanatory note. **30.** καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ' ἐπιθέσεως] Vet. Int. does not translate δέ, but this he fails to do in some other passages in which καὶ . . . δὲ occurs (1252 a 13, 1313 b 32 sq.). **35.** τοιαύτας Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: τοιαύτης Π^2. **37.** καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας om. Γ M^s pr. P^1 (the words are added in the margin of P^1 in pale ink). **40.** συγγνώσεσθαι Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: συγγνῶσθαι M^s and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *indulgeri*), συγγνώσθαι pr. P^1 (corrected in pale ink).

1312 a 1. Σαρδανάπαλλον Bekk.[2] Sus.: σαρδανάπαλον Γ Π Bekk.[1]. ξαίνοντα] Vet. Int. *percutientem se*. **2.** ἀληθῆ] Vet. Int. *vere* (ἀληθῶς Γ?). **4.** τοῦτο Γ P^1 Sus., τοῦτο with τ superscribed over the second τ M^s (two alternative readings being thus offered, 1. τοῦτο, 2. τοῦτ' or τοῦτο τό, it is uncertain which): τὸ $P^{2\,3}$ R^b V^b: om. P^4 Ald. Bekk. **6.** μεθύοντα] After this word I propose to insert 17, μάλιστα δὲ . . . 20, ἐπιθέσεις. See explanatory notes on 1312 a 6, 17. **7.** διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεύεσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν ὡς λήσοντες] Vet. Int. *propter confidere enim contemnunt tanquam oblituri*. Πιστεύεσθαι is elsewhere in the Politics rendered *credi* or *credibilis fieri*. *Confidere* stands for παρρησιάζεσθαι in 1313 b 15, 16, and the translator may have misread πιστεύεσθαι as παρρησιάζεσθαι. Perhaps *latituri* should be read in place of *oblituri*. **10.** καὶ om. Π^1 (z omits *et* with most of the MSS. of Vet. Int., unlike a). **11.** μονάρχοις Π Bekk. Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. The first family of MSS. usually has the form μονάρχης (vol. ii. p. liii). **12.** Ἀστυάγει] ἀστυάγη L^s Ald. (Ἀστυάγη Bekk.): ἀστηάγει P^4. See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 1. 513, Anm. 2, and Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch d. gr. Eigennamen, s. v. Ἀστυάγης. **14.** θρᾷξ Π^2 (Θρᾷξ Bekk.[2] Sus.[2]): θρᾲξ M^s P^1 (Θρᾲξ Bekk.[1] Sus.[2a]). **16.** z has *ariobar sa ē* (perhaps = *ariobarsanem*); most of the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *ario-*

barsane or *ariobar sane.* **18.** *παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις*] Vet. Int. *a monarchis.* *μονάρχοις* Π Bekk. Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. **19.** *θράσος* Π Bekk. (*θ* in P^1 over an erasure): *θάρσος* Giph. (p. 678) Sus. probably rightly: Vet. Int. *audacia,* which may represent either *θράσος* or *θάρσος,* for it represents *θρασύτης* in 1269 b 35 and *θάρσος* in 1258 a 11. **26.** *ὥσπερ κἂν*] Vet. Int. *ac si utique*: so in 1278 a 37 *ὡσεί* is rendered *ac si.* **28.** *γίγνονται*] Vet. Int. *fierent* is probably a clerical error caused by *fieret* in the preceding line. See however critical note on 1313 a 14. **29.** *μονάρχοις* P^1 Π^2 Bekk.: *μονάρχαις* Γ M^s Sus. **30.** *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ*] Vet. Int. *sed tamen*: see critical note on 1309 b 25. **31.** *οἱ* om. M^s P^1 and perhaps also Γ. **32.** *μὴ* om. Γ M^s pr. P^1 (it is added in P^1 in paler ink) possibly rightly, but these MSS. are prone to omit, and especially to omit small words. **34.** *ἐγγενέσθαι πολλοῖς* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *γενέσθαι πολλοῖς* M^s P^1: Vet. Int. *adesse multis,* which probably stands for *ἐγγενέσθαι πολλοῖς,* though *adesse* is not the usual equivalent for *ἐγγενέσθαι.* **36.** *ὅπου*] *ὅποι* Thompson Sus., but Xenophon sometimes wrote *ὅπου* where he should have written *ὅποι* (Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 115: see Liddell and Scott on *ὅπου* and *οὗ*), and it is possible that Aristotle wrote *ὅπου* here. **37.** *αὑτῷ* Γ (Vet. Int. *sibi*): *αὐτῷ* Π Bekk. **38.** *τὸν βίον* is added after *τελευτῆσαι* in P^1 and marg. P^4: for similar explanatory additions in MSS. of the first family see critical note on 1255 b 12.

1312 b 4. *αἱ* om. M^s P^1 Sus. and perhaps Γ. **5.** *κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ* Π^1 Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note on 1311 a 17 and Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 25): *κεραμεῖ κεραμεύς* Π^2 Bekk. **9.** *ἕνα*] z has *aliquando* with all the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, which has *alii,* probably a miswriting of the contraction for *aliquando.* Did Vet. Int. find *ἐνίοτε* in Γ? More probably he substitutes *aliquando* for *uno* for the sake of clearness. *ὅταν οἱ μετέχοντες στασιάζωσιν*] Vet. Int. *quando qui participant seditiones fecerunt. Fecerunt* should probably be *fecerint.* **10.** *ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα*] Vet. Int. *sicut qui circa Gelonem.* Sus.[1] rightly suggests that *quae eorum* has dropped out before *qui.* **13.** *ἄρχῃ*] z has *participaretur* wrongly with all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. in place of *principetur* or *principaretur.* *συστησάντων* $P^{1\,3\,4}$ R^b V^b Ald. Sus.: *συστάντων* Γ M^s P^2 Bekk. (Vet. Int. has *congregatis* and renders *συστάντες* in 15 by *congregati*). **14.** Should *ἡ* be added before *τυραννὶς*? **15.** *αὐτῶν*] Sus. '(*μετ'*) *αὐτῶν*?, si omnino correctione opus est.' **20.** *ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατα-*

φρονεῖσθαι] Vet. Int. *ex contemptu autem.* **23.** ἀπολλύνσι Π² Bekk. pr. P² (corrected in the ink of the MS.) and corrections in P¹ in pale ink and in the margin of P²: ἀπολλύουσι M² pr. P¹ ³ Sus. See explanatory note on 1324 b 20.

1313 a 9. ἂν Π² Bekk.: ἐὰν M² P¹ Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. **11.** πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημέναις] z has *cum his quae dictae sunt*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *cum his quae dicta sunt.* **14.** ἐγίνετο] Vet. Int. *fieret.* See critical note on 1312 a 28. **18.** δῆλον Γ Π: it is bracketed by Schneider, Coray, and Bekk.² (see also Bon. Ind. 173 b 38 sqq.), but Vahlen, whom Sus. follows, is probably right in suggesting that δῆλον ὅτι should be read (Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 4. 432 sq.). **20.** ἂν om. Π¹. **24.** ἡ περὶ Μολοττοὺς] Vet. Int. does not translate ἡ, but see critical notes on 1304 b 35 and 1306 a 30. **32.** παρέλαβεν] z has *acceperat*, a *acciperat*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *accepit.* **33.** "οὐ δῆτα" φάναι] Vet. Int. *non oportet haec dicere*, but it is more likely that he misread his Greek text than that he found οὐ δεῖ ταῦτα φάναι in it. **38.** τῶν is added after τῆς in P⁴ ⁶ Vᵇ Ald. Bekk.: om. M² P¹ ³ Sus. (the reading of Γ is of course uncertain): in pr. P³ τῶν takes the place of τῆς, but is altered into τῆς by a corrector in the ink of the MS. **39.** τά τε Γ Π² Bekk. Sus.: τὰ M² P¹. Bekk.¹ conjectures οἴονται for οἰόν τε, and is followed by Sus., but Bekk.² has οἰόν τε. Οἴονται seems to me to give a wrong sense; it implies that the advocates of this mode of preserving tyrannies are mistaken in thinking that it is preservative of them, whereas Aristotle admits that it is so (1314 a 12 sq., 29 sqq.), but says that it is wicked (1314 a 13 sq.). **41.** συσσίτια] Vet. Int. *communicationes*: elsewhere in the Politics συσσίτια is always rendered *convivia.* Should *concenationes* (or *convivationes*) be read? *Convivare* stands for συσσιτεῖν in 1317 b 38. *Communicationes* usually stands for κοινωνίας.

1313 b 2. φρόνημά τε P¹ ⁵ Rᵇ Ar. Bekk. Sus. and a MS. used by Victorius, and also the edition of the Vetus Interpres' translation contained in Albertus Magnus' Works: φρονήματά τε Γ M² P² ³ ⁴ Qᵇ Vᵇ Ald. (see Sus.¹). **7.** καὶ om. Γ M² pr. P¹ (it is supplied in P¹ in the ink of the MS.). **8.** φρονεῖν] Vet. Int. *deprehendere.* Sus.¹ suggests that he may have found φωρᾶν in Γ, but perhaps he misread φρονεῖν as φωρᾶν. Φωρᾶν, however, is rendered by *depraedare* in 1303 a 34 and 1306 b 30. **13.** συρακούσας P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: συρρακουσίους M² (*Syracusanos* Vet. Int.). τοὺς ὑπερκουστὰς ἐξέπεμπεν

Π^2 Bekk.: *τοὺς ὠτακουστάς, οὓς ἐξέπεμπεν* Π^1 Sus.: *οὓς ὠτακουστὰς ἐξέπεμπεν* Coray. But if with Π^2 we omit *οὓς*, the structure of the sentence introduced by *οἷον*, 12, will resemble that of not a few other passages (see explanatory note). **14.** *ὁ* is added before *Ἱέρων* in M^s P^1 Sus.: whether Γ added it is uncertain. **15.** Vet. Int. has *confident* for *παρρησιάζονται*, which is the reading of Π Bekk. Sus., and *latebunt* for *λανθάνουσιν* (Π Bekk. Sus.), but he sometimes renders the present by the future: thus in 1281 a 19 he has *corrumpet* for *φθείρει* and in 1287 a 31 *interimet* for *διαφθείρει*. **19.** *μήτε*] See explanatory note on 1313 b 18. **20.** *πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες*] Vet. Int. *occupati circa cotidiana*. Did he find not *τῷ*, but *τοῖς* in Γ? **23.** *Ὀλυμπίου* Γ Π: *Ὀλυμπιείου* Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note). **24.** *τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια*] Vet. Int. *eorum quae de Samo opera multi imperi*. Sus.[1] suggests that Γ had *παρὰ* in place of *περὶ*, but see 1258 b 40 and 1317 b 26 sqq., where *de* represents *περὶ*. See explanatory note. **28.** *δὴ* om. Π^2 Bekk. probably wrongly: Π^2 are probably wrong in omitting *δὴ* in 1330 a 37. **32.** *τούτων* is omitted in Γ M^s. *αὐτὸν καθελεῖν* is added after *τούτων* in $P^{4\,6}$ L^s Ald. Ar., but see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35, and 1304 a 15. **33.** *δὲ* Π^2 Bekk.: *δ' ἔτι* M^s P^1 Sus. and possibly Γ, for though Vet. Int. has *adhuc* (=*ἔτι*) only and does not translate *δὲ*, he sometimes fails to give an equivalent for *δὲ* in rendering *καὶ . . . δὲ* (see critical note on 1311 b 30). **39.** *ἀμφοτέροις* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *ἀμφοτέραις* Π^1 (Vet. Int. *utrasque*).

1314 a 2. *οὐδ' ἂν εἷς* P^1 Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *οὐδεὶς ἂν* Γ M^s. **4.** *ἢ*] Vet. Int. *si* (*εἰ* Γ?). **5.** *μηδενὶ* Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: *μηδὲν* Π^2 (corrected in P^2 in the ink of the MS.). **7.** Vet. Int. does not render *τοιοῦτον*. **8.** *καὶ* before *ἐλευθεριάζων* om. Π^2. **10.** *συσσίτοις*] *συσσιτίοις* Γ M^s R^b: *συσσιτίοις* P^1 with a dot under the second *ι* to erase it. **13.** *δ' ἐλλείπει* Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: *δὲ λείπει* P^1, *δὲ λύπει* M^s: Vet. Int. *autem deficit* (*δ' ἐλλείπει* probably Γ). **18.** *πιστεύσωσί* Π^1 Sus. (Vet. Int. *credant*): in P^3 *ου* is written by the scribe himself over an erasure, so that *πιστεύσωσί* may have been the original reading: *πιστεύσουσί* $P^{2\,4}$ R^b V^b Ald. Bekk. and a correction in P^3. **19.** *ἑαυτοῖς*] *αὐτοῖς* the third Basle edition of Aristotle followed by Vict. and Bekker: *αὐτοῖς* L^s Ald.: the rest *ἑαυτοῖς*, and so Sus. **25.** *οὖν* Γ P^1 Bekk. Sus.: om. M^s Π^2. **31.** *σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας*] Vet. Int. *ut ex contrario* (*ut* om. z with g h m n). Had Γ *ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας*? **40.** *τὸν* M^s $P^{1\,2\,3\,4}$ R^b Sus.: *τὸ* Γ P^s L^s V^b Ar. Bekk. *τοῦ* Π^1 Sus. (Vet. Int. *ut videatur*): om. Π^2 Bekk.

1314 b 1. δαπανῶντα] Vet. Int. *expendat* (the whole sentence running, *primo quidem, ut videatur curare communia neque expendat gratuita talia*), and so in 5 ἀποδιδόντα *reddat*. Schn. Bekk.[2] and Sus., but not Coray, add εἰς before δωρεὰς, probably rightly. **3.** διδῶσι Π[2] Bekk. Sus.: διδόασι M[s] P[1]. **7.** δόξειεν Π[1] Bekk.[2] Sus.: δόξει Π[2] Bekk.[1] **9.** γ' om. M[s] P[1]: the reading of Γ is uncertain, as Vet. Int. usually fails to render γε. **11.** ἐπιτιθεῖντο P[2 4] Rb Vb Bekk. and corr. P[3], ἐπιτιθεῖν τὸ Ald.: ἐπιτίθοιντο P[1] Sus., ἐπιτιθοῖντο pr. P[3], ἐπίθοιντο M[s]: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain (Vet. Int. *insilient*: z *insiliet*). See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, § 282, Anm. 5, where Plato, Laws 922 B, is referred to for τιθεῖντο, and Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10 for τιθοῖτο. Τιθείμην occurs in Plato, Laws 674 A etc. In 2. 11. 1273 b 6 all MSS. except M[s] have προεῖτο. **16.** τε] Vet. Int. *autem*, as in 1336 a 5, where see critical note. **17.** κοινῶν Π[1] P[4] Bekk. Sus. and over an erasure P[2]: κοινὸν P[3] Rb Vb. **22.** πολεμικῆς Madvig (Adv. Critica, 1. 468)—who compares c. 12. 1315 b 16, διὰ τὸ πολεμικὸς γενέσθαι Κλεισθένης οὐκ ἦν εὐκαταφρόνητος, and 1315 b 28 sq.—and also Sus.: πολιτικῆς Γ Π Bekk. **26.** ἄλλας Π[2] Bekk.: τῶν ἄλλων Π[1] Sus. So in 1260 a 26 M[s] P[1] have τι τοιοῦτον, the rest τι τῶν τοιούτων, and in 1331 a 34 M[s] Π[2] corr. P[1] have μηδένα τοιοῦτον and pr. P[1] (perhaps Γ also) μηδένα τῶν τοιούτων. See critical notes on 1331 a 34 and 1336 b 8. **32.** θαυμάσωσιν Π, except corr. P[5] which is of no authority: θαυμάζωσιν corr. P[5] Cor. Bekk.[2] Sus. The reading of Γ is of course uncertain. See explanatory note. **33.** τό γε] Vet. Int. *tunc* (τότε Γ?). See critical note on 1318 a 1.

1315 a 3. ἀβελτερίας] ἀβελτηρίας Bekk.[1] (see Liddell and Scott): ἀμελτηρίας P[4], the rest ἀβελτερίας. **7.** ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων] See explanatory note. **11.** περὶ Π[2] Bekk.: παρὰ Π[1] Sus. **15.** δυεῖν M[s] P[1 2 3] Sus.: δυοῖν Π[2] Bekk. See critical note on 1310 b 5. τὰ σώματα Π[2] Bekk.: τὸ σῶμα M[s] P[1] Sus. and probably Γ, for though a has *corporum*, several MSS. of Vet. Int. (including z) have *corpus*. κολάσεως is bracketed by Schneider Bekk.[2] and Sus. probably rightly. **20.** ἢ μὴ is omitted in Γ in a lacuna; no blank, however, is left in z. **31.** ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖσθαι] Vet. Int. *animae enim pretium fieri*. **38.** παραίρεσιν P[2] etc. Bekk. and probably pr. P[1] (for ἀφ is over an erasure), παραίνεσιν pr. P[3 4]: ἀφαίρεσιν M[s] Sus. corr. P[1]: the reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. *ablationem*, which is his equivalent for παραίρεσιν in 1311 a 12). Παραίρεσιν is probably right, for all the MSS. have παραίρεσιν or παραίνεσιν in 1311 a 12, and in the

'Aθ. Πολ. (see Sandys' Index) παραιρεῖσθαι is exclusively used with ὅπλα, though in Plato, Rep. 569 B we have ἀφελόμενος τὰ ὅπλα. **40.** τῶν before ἐπιτιθεμένων om. M^s pr. P^1 (it is supplied in P^1 in the ink of the MS.): the reading of Γ is of course uncertain.

1315 b 6. τῶ $P^{2\,3}$ etc., τῷ Bekk. Sus.: τῶν M^s $P^{1\,4}$ L^s. Vet. Int. has *quam quod meliores principentur et non humiles* (τοῦ βελτίονας ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ τεταπεινωμένους Γ?). **11.** As to the brackets within which I have placed 1315 b 11–39 see explanatory note on 1315 b 11. ὀλιγοχρονιώτεραι] ὀλιγοχρονιώταται or rather ὀλιγοχρονιωτάτη and ἐστὶ in place of εἰσὶν, the words ὀλιγαρχία καὶ being omitted, Spengel (Aristot. Studien, 3. 63). Ὀλιγοχρονιώταται should probably be read. See critical notes on 1293 b 32 and 1299 a 27. **14.** ἔτη δ' αὕτη διέμεινεν ἑκατόν] Vet. Int. has *enim ipsa* for δ' αὕτη (γὰρ αὐτὴ Γ?). M^s has δ' αὐτὴ, P^1 δ' αὐτη. **18.** γοῦν Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: οὖν Π^1. See critical note on 1320 a 29. **24.** ἐτυράννησεν Π^2 Bekk.: ἐτυράννευσεν M^s Sus., ἐτυράνευσεν P^1: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. In 32 all MSS. have ἐτυράννευσεν (P^1 ἐτυράνευσεν), except P^2, which has ἐτυράννησεν, and in 36 all have τυραννεύσας. It seems likely, therefore, that the form τυραννεύω should be preferred in all these three passages, though in 31 all MSS. have τυραννῶν. The form τυραννεύω, however, occurs nowhere else in the Politics, and the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of it from Aristotle's writings; its occurrence here, therefore, throws additional doubt on the genuineness of 1315 b 11–39. The rare fem. ὀλιγοχρόνιαι also occurs in 39 (ὀλιγοχρόνιοι P^1 pr. P^3 only). The Index Aristotelicus gives no reference for it to Aristotle's writings. In 1317 b 24 we have the fem. ὀλιγοχρονίους. **26.** τέτταρα Π^2 Bekk.: τέσσαρα M^s P^1: Vet. Int. *quatuor* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. See critical note on 1300 a 23. Susemihl is probably right in adopting T. Hirsch's emendation ἥμισυ. The symbol occasionally used in Greek MSS. to represent ἥμισυ is one which it would be easy to confound with that for τέτταρα: see Gardthausen, Gr. Palaeographie, p. 268. Ψαμμίτιχος] ψαμμίτιχος Π^1 $P^{2\,3}$ Sus.: 'ψαμμήτιχος R^b V^b Ald. Bekk. (recte, ut videtur), ψαμμήτικος P^4' (Sus.). See Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch d. gr. Eigennamen for the two forms of the name and their use by various authors. The famous Greek inscription (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 4) has the forms ψαμάτιχος and ψαμμάτιχος. Γορδίου] So Γ Π Bekk.: Sus. Γόργου, which is the correct name (it appears on two coins of Ambracia: see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 642. 6), but

it is possible that the writer of the passage made a slip: Γοργίου Röper and a MS. of the Vet. Int. (m), which has *gorgie*, not *gordie*, like the rest, and Plut. Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 17 sqq. **27.** ταὐτὰ Γ P^4 Bekk. Sus., ταυτὰ L^8: ταῦτα the rest (M^8 has ταυ with τ over the υ). **28.** ἀδορυφόρητος] z has *sine armatorum custodia* perhaps rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *sine armorum custodia*. **31.** ἔφυγε] z has *fugit* rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *fuit*. **34.** Bojesen and Sus. insert τῶν before περὶ Ἱέρωνα, but without necessity: see explanatory note. περὶ συρακούσας P^1 Sus., περὶ συρακούσσας M^8: Vet. Int. *circa siracusam* or *syracusam* (περὶ συρακούσαν Γ?): περὶ συρακούσσαις $P^{2\,3\,4}$ V^b Ald. Bekk.[1] (παρὰ Συρακουσίοις Schn. Bekk.[2]). **35.** ἔτη δ' οὐδ' αὕτη πολλὰ διέμεινεν] Vet. Int. *non autem permansit ipsa multis annis* (ἔτη δ' οὐκ αὐτὴ πολλὰ διέμεινεν Γ?). M^8 P^1 have οὐδ' αὐτή. **36.** δυοῖν P^1 Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: δυεῖν M^8 $P^{2\,3}$.

1316 a 1. τοῦ πλάτωνος is added after τῇ in $P^{4\,6}$ L^8 Ald. Ar., but see critical note on 1313 b 32. **9.** μὲν οὖν is left untranslated by Vet. Int., οὖν om. M^8. **14.** γε corr. P^6 Cor. Bekk.[2] Sus.: τε M^8 P^1 Π^2 Bekk.[1]: Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε. δι' ὃν] *propter quod* b c g h k l m n rightly, for διά with the accusative is commonly rendered *propter* by Vet. Int.: *per quod* a z. **17.** ἅρα om. Γ P^1 (οἷον, 16 . . . μεταβάλλει, 17, is omitted in M^8): ἆρα ἅμα μεταβάλλει Thompson, Sus.[3 a]. **26.** Casaubon, followed by Sus., is probably right in adding οὔτ' εἰ ἔσται after ἔσται. **28.** καὶ is added after δεῖ in Π^1. **29.** συνεχὲς Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: συνεχῶς Π^2. **32.** τῶν . . . **33.** ὥσπερ ἡ om. Γ M^8, so that for these words P^1 is the only representative of the first family of MSS., and P^1 has τοῦ in place of τῶν in 32. **34.** Καρικάου] See critical note on 1271 b 25. καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι om. pr. P^8. Kluge (Aristoteles de Politia Carthaginiensium, p. 86) is perhaps right in thinking that something has dropped out after καὶ. He says, 'nomen quidem huius Poenorum regis, sub quo haec mutatio imperii facta fuerit, aut textu excidit aut philosophus ignorasse videtur.' Η followed by the name of the tyrant in the genitive has perhaps dropped out. **36.** αἱ om. M^8 P^1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *plurimae*). **38.** ἀναξικλάου $P^{1\,4}$ Bekk. Sus.: ἀνεξικλάου Γ M^8 $P^{2\,3}$ R^b V^b Ald.

1316 b 1. πολὺ Γ P^1 Vict. (who however translates οἱ πολλοί) Schn. Cor. Göttl. Bekk.[2] Sus.: πολλοὶ M^8 Π^2 Bekk.[1] **2.** εἶναι P^1 Π^2 Bekk.: om. Γ M^8: it is bracketed by Sus. See critical note on 1252 a 8. ἴσον] z has *equaliter* with a; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *equale* or *equalem*. τῆς πόλεως] z has *per civitates* with a; the

other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *per civitatem*. See critical note on 1253 a 10. **5.** δημοκρατουμένη] See explanatory note on 1316 b 3. χρηματίζονται] z has *pecuniosi fiunt*, not *pecuniosi sunt*, as most of the other MSS., and probably rightly, for χρηματίζεσθαι is rendered *pecuniosum fieri* in 1316 b 4. **6.** δὲ] z has *autem* with a; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *enim*. **8.** αὕτη Π^1 Sus.: αὐτὴ Π^2 Bekk. **10.** εἰσὶν] ἦσαν Γ M^a (Vet. Int. *erant*). See critical note on 1311 a 21. **16.** Lamb. Bekk.[2] Sus. add καὶ before κατατοκιζόμενοι, but see critical note on 1260 a 26. **20.** οὐδὲ τότε Camotius in the later Aldine (or Camotian) edition of Aristotle's writings published at Venice in 1552, followed by Bekk.[2] and Sus.: οὐδέποτε Γ Π Bekk.[1] **23.** See explanatory notes on 1316 b 23, 24. **24.** P^1 adds οἱ after ἐξεῖναι, M^a οι, Γ οἳ (Vet. Int. *sibi*): [οἱ] Sus. The word is probably repeated from ὃ τι, which follows. **25.** φησιν Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: φασὶ P^2 Π^2 Ar., φᾶσί P^a. **27.** As to the existence of a lacuna here see explanatory note.

BOOK VIII (VI).

1316 b 33. ποία M^a $P^{1\,4}$ etc. Sus.: ποῖα Γ Ar. Bekk. and pr. P^2: ποια P^2.

1317 a 2. τε is placed after ὀλιγαρχικάς in M^a P^1, but not by Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain, as Vet. Int. seldom renders τε. **5.** Spengel Bekk.[2] Sus. add περὶ τὸ before βουλευόμενον. ὀλιγαρχικῶς . . . **8.** ἀρχαιρεσίας om. M^a. **6.** τὰ δὲ . . . **7.** μὲν om. $P^{4\,6}$ R^b L^a Ald. Ar. and pr. P^a, so that for these words we are dependent on Γ $P^{1\,2}$ (a recent correction in the margin of P^2 has been erased). Spengel and Bekk.[2] read τὸ δὲ in place of τὰ δὲ. **11.** ὀλιγαρχιῶν Γ P^2 Ar. Vict. Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *oligarchiarum*, though one MS., g, has *oligarchicarum*): all the MSS. except Γ P^2 have ὀλιγαρχικῶν. **12.** τίς R^b Ar. Bekk. Sus.: τὶ P^1, τί Γ M^a $P^{2\,3\,4}$ etc. **13.** Schneider, following the translations of Lamb. and Ramus, and followed by Bekk.[2], is probably right in adding ἐπεὶ before δεῖ. **23.** ἅσπερ Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: ἃς M^a P^1: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. often fails to render περ. **28.** ἀλλὰ καὶ] z has *sed et* rightly; a has *sed* and the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *sed ex*. **36.** συναγαγεῖν Π^2 Bekk.: συνάγειν M^a P^1: Vet. Int. *congregare* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. For similar differences of

reading see critical note on 1284 a 5. **39.** λέγωμεν Π^1 R^b Ar. Bekk. Sus.: λέγομεν $P^{2\,3\,4}$ etc.

1317 b 3. δημοτικὸν Π^2 Bekk.: δημοκρατικὸν M^s P^1 Sus. Vet. Int. has *democraticum*, which probably represents δημοκρατικὸν, though δημοτικός is rendered *democraticus* in 1292 b 13, 16 and 1299 b 32. In 1318 a 18 all MSS. have τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον, though in 1318 a 4 all have τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικοῦ and in 3. 9. 1280 a 8 all have τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. **6.** τοῦτ' εἶναι [καὶ] τέλος] καὶ om. Π^1 and Ar. does not translate it. Π^1 may be right, and I have bracketed καὶ, though the authority of these MSS. is small in cases of omission. Sus. follows Thurot in reading καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τέλος, but τοῦτο is probably the antecedent of ὅ τι. Compare for the form of the sentence 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 33, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἕκαστοι οὗ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες, and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 30 sq. **12.** τὸ is added before τῆς in M^s P^1 Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. **13.** δουλεύοντος Π^1 Bekk.[2] Sus.: δούλου ὄντος Π^2 Bekk.[1] Πρώτου ὄντος takes the place of πρωτεύοντος in some MSS. in Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 16. I see no such reason for ὄντος here as exists in Plato, Laws 728 B, τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὖσι κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν: Aristot. De Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 12: Demosth. in Lept. c. 7. **17.** τούτων Π^2 Bekk.: τοιούτων Π^1 Sus. **24.** Π^1 Sus. may be right in adding εἶναι after ὀλιγοχρονίους: it is omitted by all MSS. in the somewhat similar passage 2. 12. 1273 b 40, but there it can be more easily supplied from what precedes. **27.** περὶ is added after εὐθυνῶν καὶ in M^s P^1 Sus. and possibly also in Γ, but this is uncertain because 'praepositionem cum plurium nominum casibus copulatam ante unumquodque eorum repetere solet Guilelmus' (Sus.[1] p. xxxiii: see vol. ii. p. 65), and here he repeats *de* not only before his equivalent for πολιτείας, but also before his equivalent for τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων. **29.** πάντων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων] In Γ Π Bekk. the words ἢ τῶν μεγίστων follow ὀλιγίστων, 30, but (with Schn. Cor. and Sus.) I follow the third Basle edition of Aristotle in placing them after πάντων. It is possible that owing to the similar ending of μεγίστων and ὀλιγίστων the words ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων were omitted by the writer of the archetype and subsequently added by him in the margin without a sufficiently clear indication of the place at which he intended them to be inserted. The only thing which throws doubt on this transposition is the presence in the text of the second κυρίαν, which seems needless if

we adopt the transposition, but I do not think that this is sufficient to turn the scale. **30.** *ὀλιγίστων*] *ὀλιγοστῶν* M^s pr. P^1 (corrected into *ὀλιγιστῶν* in P^1 in the ink of the MS.) and possibly Γ. In 1320 a 12 P^1 has *ὀλιγοστὰς* with *ι* superscribed over the second *ο*. In Metaph. I. 1. 1053 a 9 A^b, and in Phys. 5. 3. 226 b 28 pr. E, have *ὀλιγοστὸν* (see also the various readings in De An. 3. 3. 428 b 19 and De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 a 18, and Soph. Antig. 625, referred to by Liddell and Scott). **37.** *καὶ βουλὴν*] *καὶ βουλὰς* Γ M^s (Vet. Int. *consilia*). Schneider and Bekker add *τὴν* before *βουλὴν*, but as to the omission of the article in enumerations see critical notes on 1291 a 4 and 1274 a 21, and cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 31 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 545 A. Sus. brackets *καὶ βουλὴν*, and no doubt it has just been implied that the Boulê is one of the magistracies, from which it is here distinguished, but Aristotle is sometimes inconsistent. *Ἀρχαί* and *βουλαί* are mentioned separately in a similar way in Plut. Solon, c. 16, *πάντα δ' ὁμαλῶς ἐπιτρέψαντες, ἀρχὰς ἐκκλησίας δικαστήρια βουλάς.* That the payment of the Boulê was of importance in a democracy we see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 99, *πῶς οὐ δεινόν, εἰ διὰ τὸν νόμον, ὃν σὺ τέθεικας μισθὸν λαβών, ἄμισθος ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἔσται;* **38.** *ἔτι . . .* **41.** *βαναυσία*] See explanatory note. **41.** *ἔτι* Ar. Lamb. Sus.: *ἐπὶ* Γ Π Bekk.

1318 a 1. *καταλειφθῇ*] Vet. Int. *deficiat* (we expect *relicta sit* or *derelicta sit*: *deficere* usually represents *ἐλλείπειν*). *τό γε* Cor. Sus.: *τότε* Γ Π. See critical note on 1314 b 33. **3.** *ταῖς δημοκρατίαις* $Π^2$ Bekk. Sus.: *τῆς δημοκρατίας* $Π^1$. **7.** P^6 Ar. Bekk.^{2} Sus. have *τοὺς εὐπόρους ἢ τοὺς ἀπόρους*: P^5 has *τοὺς εὐπόρους* (corrected into *ἀπόρους*) *ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους*: all other MSS., including Γ, have *τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους*. The authority of P^6 is very small. As to *ἄρχειν* see explanatory note on 1291 b 32. **9.** *πολιτεία* $Π^2$ Ar. Bekk.: *πόλει* $Π^1$ Sus. *Πολιτείᾳ* seems preferable to *πόλει*: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq. **12.** *χιλίοις*] *τοῖς χιλίοις* Γ (Vet. Int. *ipsis mille*). **14.** *κατὰ τοῦτο*] Vet. Int. *in his* (*κατὰ τούτων* Γ with P^1?). **16.** *αἱρέσεων* Camot. Vict. Lamb. Schn. Bekk.^{2} Sus. Bonitz (Ind. 180 b 59): *διαιρέσεων* Γ Π Bekk.^{1} See critical note on 1332 b 36. ΔΙ easily drops out and is easily added before ΑΙ. **24.** *δίκαιος μόνος*] Vet. Int. *solum iustum* (*δίκαιον μόνον* Γ?). **27.** *ὁμολογήσουσιν* P^3 R^b Ald. Bekk. Sus.: *ὁμολογοῦσιν* $Π^1$ $P^{3\,4}$ L^s Ar. **32.** *τὸ* is added after *τοῦτο* in Γ M^s. **34.** *εἰ* om. $Π^2$ Bekk. These MSS. omit *εἰ* in 1287 b 6 also. **35.** *προσγεγένηται*] Vet. Int. *adiunganlur autem*. Compare his addition of *autem* in 1308 b 28,

37. *ὁποτέρων* Π^2 Bekk. Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *quorumcunque*): *ποτέρων* M^a pr. P^1 (corrected in the ink of the MS.). 40. *δίχα* $P^{2\,4}$ R^b Ald. Bekk. and a recent correction in P^3, *δι* followed by a lacuna pr. P^3: *διχῇ* P^1, *διχθῇ* M^a and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *divisa in duo*): *διχῇ* Sus. *Δίχα* is probably right: cp. Hdt. 6. 109, *τοῖσι δὲ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῖσι ἐγίνοντο δίχα αἱ γνῶμαι.*

1318 b 3. *συμπεῖσαι*] Vet. Int. *permittere* should probably be *persuadere*. 4. *τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον* Π^2 Bekk.: *τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἴσον* Π^1 Sus. In 2 all the MSS. have *τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου*, and this is the usual order. It is possible that Π^1 are right (compare the change from *τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγήν* in 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 14 to *τῇ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν* in 1292 b 16), but it is more likely that Π^2 are. For similar diversities of order in the two families of MSS., see critical notes on 1331 b 41 and 1333 b 36. 9. *διέλοι*] *διέλῃ* $P^{1\,2}$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *sicut si quis distinguat populos*). 14. *αὐτοῖς* Π^1 Sus.: om. Π^2 Bekk. 17. *ἢ* P^4 L^a Ald. and P^6 in the margin, followed by Bekk. and Sus.: Γ also may have had *ἢ* (Vet. Int. *magis appetunt lucrum quam honorem*): om. M^a $P^{1\,2\,3}Q^b$ R^b. 36. *ἀρκοῦσαν εἶναι*] Vet. Int. *sufficere*.

1319 a 1. *φαῦλον*] *φῦλον* M^a pr. P^1 and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *tribuale*). 7. *τοῖς πολλοῖς* Π^2 Ar. Bekk.: *τοῖς παλαιοῖς* Π^1 Sus., the acceptance of which reading necessitates the omission of *τὸ ἀρχαῖον*, which all MSS. have. The reading of Π^2 is confirmed by the similarity of the language in 10. 10. *γε* om. M^a P^1 and possibly Γ, but this is doubtful, for Vet. Int. seldom renders *γε*. 14. *Ἀφυταίων* Sepulveda (p. 193 b), Camerarius (Interp. p. 253), Lambinus: *ἀφυτάλων* Γ P^1 Π^2 Ar. (λ however is over an erasure in P^3): *ἀφυτάλω* M^a. 15. *καίπερ*] a z have *equidem* rightly, for Vet. Int. renders *καίπερ equidem* in 1309 b 32; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *quidem*, except k, which has *quidam*. 22. *τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις*] *τὰς πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ πράξεις* Γ (Vet. Int. *actionibus ad bellica*), *τὰ πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ πράξεις* M^a. Sus. (following Schn.) brackets *τὰ*. 24. *θυραυλεῖν*] Vet. Int. *venari*. Did he misread *θυραυλεῖν* as *θηρεύειν*? 29. *κυλίεσθαι*] z has *conversatur* probably rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *conversantur*. 33. The second *τὴν χώραν* is bracketed by Coray and Sus. and might well be dispensed with, but surplusage of a somewhat similar kind may be noted elsewhere in the Politics—e.g. in 3. 3. 1276 a 19–21 (see critical note on 1276 a 21), 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23 sqq., 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 38–40 (cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3) and 1340 a 33, 34, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 10 sq., 6 (4). 12. 1296 b

19 sqq. Cp. also Hist. An. 2. 11. 503 a 23 sqq., Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 21, § 5, [τὸ]ν νόμον τοῦτον ἤν τις θέλῃ [συγ]χέαι ἢ προθῆτα[ι] ψῆφον ὥστε μ[ὴ ε]ἶναι τὸν νόμον τοῦτον, and see critical note on 1319 b 35. **37.** δημοκρατίαις Lamb., Camerarius (Interp. p. 253), Bekk., Sus.: δημοκρατικαῖς Γ Π, because almost all the MSS. read ἐκκλησίαις, not ἐκκλησίας. ἐκκλησίας L^a Ald. Ar. Vict. Lamb. Bekk. Sus. and corr. P^3 and pr. P^6: all the rest of the MSS. (including all the better ones) ἐκκλησίαις.

1319 b 7. ἰσχυρὸν] Vet. Int. *impotentem.* τῷ Π^2, τῷ Bekk.: om. Π^1 Sus. **8.** ποιεῖν] Vet. Int. *aliquando* (ποτὲ Γ?). **11.** τοῦτο om. Π^1. **12.** μέχρι M^a P^1 and possibly Γ (see critical note on 1336 b 39): μέχρις Π^2 Bekk. Sus. **21.** οἷς Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: οἷον Γ M^a pr. P^1 (οἷο corr. P^1). **24.** καὶ τὰ P^1 and (with γρ.) corr. P^4 in the margin: κατὰ Γ M^a $P^{2\,3}$ R^b Ald. Ar. pr. P^4. For this difference of reading cp. 1309 b 10. **26.** διαζευχθῶσιν] Vet. Int. *coniungantur*, which should probably be *disiungantur*, for διαζευχθῆναι is rendered *disiungi* in 1276 a 21. **27.** πρότερον Π^2 Bekk.: πρότεραι Π^1 Sus. corr. P^4. **33.** Vet. Int. *consistere* probably stands for συνιστάναι (not συνεστάναι, as Sus.[1 2] thinks): see critical note on 1291 b 12. **35.** ἔργον is bracketed by Bekk.[2] and Sus., following Lamb., but cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 19 sqq., where δεῖν is repeated in a similar way, and 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 38 sqq., and see critical note on 1319 a 33.

1320 a 4. ἢ Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: μηδ' Γ M^a, μὴ δ' pr. P^1 (corrected in the ink of the MS.). This μηδὲ is probably an intruder from two lines above. **8.** φερόμενον Bernays (Ges. Abhandlungen, 1. 173. 1), Sus.[3 a], φερομένων Γ P^1, φερόντων the rest followed by Bekk. **10.** καταψηφιεῖται corrections in $P^{2\,3}$ in the ink of those MSS. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *corrumpet sententias*), followed by Bekk. Sus.: καταψηφίζεται M^a $P^{1\,4}$ and pr. $P^{2\,3}$. **13.** ἐπιτιμίοις Π^2 Bekk.: ἐπιζημίοις Π^1 Sus. (Vet. Int. *damnis*, which probably stands for ἐπιζημίοις, for ἐπιτίμια is rendered *increpationes* in 1309 a 23 and ἐπιζήμιον *damnosum* in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399 b 35). Π^2 are likely to be right, for ἐπιζήμια does not occur in this sense in the Politics, and the only instance of its use in this sense in Aristotle's writings given in the Index Aristotelicus is from Probl. 29. 14. 952 b 12. **16.** τοι P^4 L^a Ald., τοί Bekk. Sus.: τι the rest. See critical note on 1308 b 15. **21.** δικαστηρίων φαύλων] Vet. Int. *praetoria malorum*, but whether he found δικαστήρια φαύλων in Γ is very doubtful. **23.** ὀλίγας δ' ἡμέρας Π^2 Bekk. pr. P^1 and a correction in P^2 in the ink of the MS.:

ὀλίγαις δ' ἡμέραις M^s P^3 pr. P^2 and a correction in P^1 in the ink of the MS., followed by Sus. Vet. Int. has *paucis autem diebus*, which may represent either reading, for in 27 and 1314 b 30 *multis diebus* stands for πολλὰς ἡμέρας. **29.** ἐθέλουσιν Π^2 Bekk. (over an erasure in P^3): θέλουσιν M^s P^1 Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. In the preceding line all MSS. except P^4 have ἐθέλουσιν. Π^1 are rather apt to omit the first letter of words (see for instance critical notes on 1265 b 19, 1324 b 30, and 1315 b 18). **30.** τὰ γὰρ περιόντα] Vet. Int. *obvenientia enim* (τὰ γὰρ παριόντα Γ? In 1303 a 17 Vet. Int. translates παριέναι *intrare*). **35.** γένοιτο $P^{2\,3}$ Rb Ald. Bekk.: γένοιτο ὁ (ὁ over an erasure) P^4: γίνοιτο M^s P^1 Sus.: Vet. Int. *fiat* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. Γένοιτο is probably right: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 29, θεωρεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο. **38.** συναθροίζειν Sus., συναθροίζων M^s P^1 and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *congregans*, but this verb represents ἀθροίζειν in 1314 b 10): ἀθροίζων Π^2 Bekk.[1], ἀθροίζειν Ar., the third Basle edition of Aristotle, Bekk.[2] **39.** ἐμπορίας Π^1 Ar. Bekk. Sus.: εὐπορίας Π^2.

1320 b 3. ἀφιεμένους Γ P^1 Bekk.[1] Sus. (Vet. Int. *respuentes vanas oblationes*): ἐφιεμένους M^s Π^2: ἀφειμένους Schn. Bekk.[2] **6.** περιοικίδας M^s $P^{1\,2}$ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *negotia domus*, which perhaps stands for περιοικίας, the reading of Ald., for in 1269 b 3 *praedia circa domos* represents περιοίκους): περιοικιδίας $P^{3\,4\,6}$. **9.** τὰ ταραντίνων Π^2 Bekk.: τὴν ταραντίνων M^s P^1, but M^s has a lacuna after ταραντίνων: τὴν ταραντίνων ἀρχήν Γ? (Vet. Int. *Tarentinorum principatum*). If Γ had τὴν ταραντίνων ἀρχήν, and *principatum* was not merely supplied *e conj.* by Vet. Int., ἀρχήν may have been repeated from ἀρχὰς, 11. For if τὴν ταραντίνων is right, one would be inclined to add πόλιν rather than ἀρχήν. **15.** τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς Γ Schn. Cor. Bekk.[2] Sus. (Vet. Int. *de eodem principatu*): τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῆς Π Bekk.[1] **25.** τῷ τε κτωμένῳ Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: τῶν τε κτωμένων Π^2. **26.** εἰσαγομένους Π^1 Sus. (see explanatory note): εἰσαγομένου Π^2 Bekk. **29.** τοὺς κοινωνούς] Vet. Int. *communicantes*. See critical note on 1289 b 1. **30.** μικρὸν] z has *parum*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. probably rightly *parvum*. **35.** Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 91) would add καὶ before τοῖς πλωτῆρσιν, while Rassow, followed by Sus., would add τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ in the same place. Something seems to be missing, and either Thurot or Rassow may be right. **38.** δύνανται Π Sus. and probably Γ: δύνανται Ald. Bekk.

1321 a 3. δῆλον ὅτι Γ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *palam quod*): δηλονότι M^s P^1 Π^2. **5.** μάλιστα Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: καλλιστα Π^2. **6.** βαναυσικὸν Π Sus., except that R^b and a recent marginal correction in M^s have βάναυσον (so Bekk.): ναυσικὸν pr. M^s (Vet. Int. *nautica*). The Index Aristotelicus does not include the word βαναυσικός. **12.** ὁπλιτικήν Camerarius (Interp. p. 258), Sus., and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *armativam*): ὁπλίτην M^s P^1 Π^2 Bekk.[1], ὁπλίτῳ Lamb. Schn. Cor. Göttl. Bekk.[2] **14.** δημοτικὴ] δημοκρατικὴ L^s Ald. Bekk. **16.** χείρω Π^2 Bekk.[1]: χεῖρον M^s P^1 Bekk.[2] Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *deterius*). **19.** δῆμοι Π Bekk. Sus.: δημοτικοὶ Γ (Vet. Int. *populares*). **20.** The MSS. of Vet. Int. add *et* before the equivalent for πρὸς ἱππικὴν, but z omits this *et*. ἱππικὴν καὶ ὁπλιτικὴν Γ $P^{2\,3}$ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *equestrem et armativam*): ἱππικὸν καὶ ὁπλιτικὸν M^s P^1: καὶ ὁπλιτικὴν is omitted in $P^{4\,6}$ L^s. **22.** ἐφ' ἑαυτούς $P^{2\,3}$ R^b Ald. Bekk.: ἐφ' αὑτοῖς P^1, ἐπ' αὐτοῖς M^s, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς P^4: αὑτοῖς Γ (Vet. Int. *sibi ipsis*): ἐφ' αὑτούς Sus. Cp. ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας in 3. 14. 1285 a 28. **26.** τὴν μετάδοσιν] Vet. Int. *appositionem* (πρόσθεσιν Γ?). He does not elsewhere render μετάδοσις thus. In Rhet. 3. 2. 1405 b 3 William of Moerbeke renders πρόσθεσις by *appositio*. **30.** Μασσαλίᾳ] μασαλία M^s P^1 and perhaps Γ (*masalia* b g m n, *masilia* k). See critical note on 1305 b 4. For the various emendations of the words τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι which have been proposed see Sus.[3a]. I have myself been sometimes tempted to substitute τιμήματι for πολιτεύματι (for τῶν ἐν τῷ τιμήματι cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19), but I do not believe that any change in the text is called for. **31.** τῆς πόλεως is added after ἔξωθεν in Γ M^s. **33.** προσκεῖσθαι] Vet. Int. *apponere*, but he probably found προσκεῖσθαι in Γ, for he often renders the passive by the active voice, and in 1297 a 17, 26 ἐπικεῖσθαι is rendered *imponi*. **35.** εἰσιόντας] Vet. Int. *immittentes* (εἰσιέντας Γ or εἰσιόντας misread as εἰσιέντας?). **37.** κοσμουμένην] z has *ornatam* rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *armatam*. **40.** τῆς δαπάνης] Vet. Int. *expensarum*, but see critical notes on 1287 a 27 and 1307 b 32–34.

1321 b 16. ἀλλήλων] z has *invicem* probably rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *ad invicem*. The equivalent for ἀλλήλων in Vet. Int. is usually *invicem* or *ab invicem*, not *ad invicem*. ὑπογυώτατον R^b Bekk.: ὑπογυώτατον M^s P^1 Sus.: ὑπογυότατον $P^{2\,3\,4}$ Q^b Ald.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. The form ὑπόγυιος occurs in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric (see Bon. Ind. s.v.): the Index Aristotelicus gives one reference for ὑπόγυος to the

genuine writings of Aristotle (De Gen. An. 3. 7. 757 a 28, where however Z has *ὑποξ . . . οις*). **26.** *λιμένων* Π^2 Ar. Bekk.: *λιμένος* Π^1 Sus. In 1322 b 33 all MSS. have *λιμέναs*, not *λιμένα*. **28.** *καὶ* [*τὰ*] *περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἄστεος*] Vet. Int. *et de eo quod extra oppidum*: hence it is likely that the first *τὰ* was omitted in Γ; it is omitted by Bekk.[2] and bracketed by Sus. In place of the second *τὰ* M^a has *τοῦ* and Γ also apparently. **35.** *τὰs* is added before *ἐκ* by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Aristoteles und Athen, 1. 235, note), but see explanatory note on 1334 b 12. We might compare 2. 8. 1268 a 1, *τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας ᾤετο γίνεσθαι δεῖν*, if it were clear that *ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις* should here be taken closely with *τὰς κρίσεις*. **38.** *ἔστι δὲ* Γ Π Ar. Bekk.: *ἔστι δ'* (*οὖ*) Thurot, Sus.

1322 a 9. *ἄλλους* $P^{3\,4}$ etc. Bekk. Sus.: *ἄλλας* $P^{1\,2}$ Ald., *ἄλας* M^a. Γ may have had *ἄλλας*, for Vet. Int. has *propter quod melius non unum esse hunc principatum, sed alios ex aliis praetoriis*, where *alios* may agree with *principatus* understood. **11.** For the third *τὰs* Sus.[2 a], following Niemeyer, reads *τὰ*, and also for *τὰs* in *τὰs τῶν ἐνεστώτων*, 12, and in *τὰs παρὰ* and *τὰs δὲ* in 14, in all which passages Γ Π Bekk. have *τὰς*. See explanatory note on 1322 a 8. **12.** *ἕνων* Scaliger, Sus.: *νέων* Γ Π Bekk. **14.** *τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων*] *παρὰ* om. Π^1 (Vet. Int. *eos qui agoranomon*), but not Bekk. or Sus. **18.** See explanatory note on 1322 a 16. **20.** *οἷον Ἀθήνησιν* (*ἡ*) *τῶν ἕνδεκα καλουμένων* is bracketed by Sus., and he may well be right (see explanatory note and cp. 1300 b 28). Coray, followed by Bekk.[2] and Sus., is probably right in adding *ἡ*. **25.** Γ adds *ἄλλων* before *μᾶλλον* (Vet. Int. *custodia aliorum magis*) and M^a has *ἄλλων* in place of *μᾶλλον*. **26.** *πρὸς αὐτοῖς*] Vet. Int. *apud ipsos*, but Sus.[1] is mistaken in inferring from this that he found *παρ' αὐτοῖς* in Γ, for in 1331 b 10 *apud forum* represents *πρὸς ἀγορᾷ* (see critical note on 1329 b 18). **27.** *τὴν αὐτὴν* Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *eosdem* (if we follow a b z: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *eodem*), with which however it is possible that *principatus* should be supplied; in that case *eosdem* would represent *τὰs αὐτάs*. **33.** *ἂν* Π^1 Sus.: om. Π^2 Bekk.[1]: Bekk.[2] adds *ἂν* before *εἶεν*.

1322 b 2. *ἑκάστων* P^1 Π^3 Bekk.: *ἕκαστον* Γ Mª Sus. *καθίστανται ἀρχαί* Π^1 Bekk. Sus. (except that P^1 has *ἀρχαὶ* and pr. M^a *ἀρχαῖς*): *καθίσταται ἀρχή* Π^2. **9.** *προσευθυνοῦσαν* Bekk. and many editors before him: *προσευθύνουσαν* Π Sus. (except that M^a has *προσεὐθύνουσαν*). Vet. Int. has *sumentem rationem et emendantem* for *τὴν*

λῃψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν (or προσευθύνουσαν). **14.** εἰσφοράν Π^2 Bekk. Sus.: ἐφορείαν Π^1. ἢ M^s Bekk.[2] Sus., ἡ P^{1234} etc. Bekk.[1], ἤ Γ (Vet. Int. *qua*). **16.** καλεῖται] καλοῦνται P^1 and perhaps Γ (for a z have *vocantur*). **18.** σχεδὸν om. Γ M^s pr. P^1 (supplied in P^1 in the ink of the MS.). **32.** The second περὶ is omitted in Π^1 and bracketed by Sus. See critical note on 1331 b 24. **34.** τὰ before περὶ is bracketed by Schneider and Sus. and expunged by Bekk.[2], but cp. 1317 a 6. συναλλαγμάτων Π^1 Bekk. Sus.: συναλλάγματα Π^2. **35.** ἐπιλογισμούς] Vet. Int. *circa ratiocinationes* (περὶ λογισμούς Γ?). **36.** πρὸς εὐθύνας M^s P^1 Π^2 Bekk.: προσευθύνας Sylburg, Göttling, Sus., and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *et correctiones*). **37.** ἴδιαι Π^1 Sus.: ἰδία Π^2 Ar.: ἰδίᾳ Bekk.

1323 a 2. συμβαίνει Π^2 Bekk. Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *accidit*): συμβαίνῃ M^s P^1. **3.** γίνεσθαι M^s $P^{1\,2\,3}$ Bekk. Sus.: γενέσθαι Π^2: Vet. Int. *fieri* may stand for either. **7.** καθ' is bracketed by Schn. Göttl. Bekk.[2], following Heinsius, whose paraphrase is, 'cum tres in civitatibus plerisque eligantur magistratus, qui sunt omnium supremi' (Politica, p. 758). It is omitted by Coray. **10.** I follow Conring and Sus. in placing the mark of a lacuna after πασῶν.

NOTES.

BOOK VI (IV).

10. Ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις κ.τ.λ. As to the absence of a connecting particle see note on 1274 b 26. I am not aware of any other passage in which Aristotle sets forth with equal fulness the manifold problems to which any art or science that lays claim to completeness must address itself, but we are more or less prepared for his teaching on this subject by Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 10 sqq., Top. 1. 3. 101 b 5 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 3 sqq. See vol. ii. p. 397 sqq. In *ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις* Aristotle must be speaking of *ποιητικαί* and *πρακτικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι*, not of *θεωρητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι*, for the latter are not concerned with *τὸ ἁρμόττον*. For *ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις* cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 34–36, 3. 12. 1282 b 14, and 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 37. Ἐπιστήμη is interchanged with *τέχνη* in 1288 b 21, 22: cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 34–38, where *ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη* is said to be one of the *τέχναι καὶ δυνάμεις*. As to the various problems to which Political Science is here required to address itself, see vol. i. p. 488. They are as follows—it must seek to ascertain C. 1. 1288 b.

1. *τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἁρμόττον* in its two forms,
   - A. the constitution which suits those who possess the best natural gifts and the best equipment, i.e. *ἡ ἀρίστη πολιτεία*,
   - B. that which suits those who are less well circumstanced (*ἡ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη* or *ἡ ἐνδεχομένη ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*),
2. how any given constitution (*ἡ δοθεῖσα* or *ἡ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολιτεία*) is to be brought into being and kept in existence as long as possible,
3. *ἡ μάλιστα πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁρμόττουσα πολιτεία*, or *ἡ ῥᾴων καὶ κοινοτέρα ἁπάσαις*,
4. what are *οἱ ἄριστοι νόμοι* and *οἱ ἑκάστῃ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἁρμόττοντες*.

See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 707. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripa-

tetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 235. 3), and Sus.², Note 1116. Aristotle's enumeration of the various problems with which Political Science has to deal prepares the way for a descent in the last three Books of the Politics to less exalted questions than those with which he has so far been dealing. It was something new to say that the inquiry how democracy or oligarchy or tyranny should be constituted so as to last holds as legitimate a place among the inquiries of Political Science as the inquiry respecting the best or the best attainable constitution.

ταῖς μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, 'which do not come into being in a fragmentary shape': cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 21, καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον (Sus. 'theilweise'), and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 28, μήτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατ' εὐχὴν γενομένην. That Political Science was often studied in a fragmentary way we know from Plato, Laws 630 E, quoted in vol. i. p. 375, note 1. For the contrast of κατὰ μόριον and τέλειος, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 24 sqq.

11. γένος ἕν τι, 'one whole class of subject-matter': cp. Plato, Laws 916 D, κιβδηλείαν δὲ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα διανοηθῆναι καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀπάτην ὡς ἕν τι γένος ὄν.

12. μιᾶς (sc. τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης), 'one and the same art and science': cp. 22, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης.

ἕκαστον γένος, 'each description of thing,' whether it be κάλλιστα πεφυκὸς καὶ κεχορηγημένον or otherwise.

17. ἱκνουμένης = προσηκούσης (Bon. Ind. s.v.).

18. According to Bon. Ind. 8 a 16, where Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 a 8 and Probl. 30. 11. 956 b 16 are compared, ἀγωνία is here 'idem quod ἀγών.'

18. †μηδὲν . . . 19. δύναμιν†. This sentence appears to be corrupt or mutilated. See critical note.

τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ. The γυμναστικός imparts the correct ἕξις of body and the παιδοτρίβης skill and science in the performance of athletic feats (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.). See note on 1338 b 7. For τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ, 'the master of gymnastic science,' cp. Plato, Polit. 295 C, Gorg. 464 A, and Protag. 313 D.

19. καὶ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, 'this inferior degree of capability also' (i.e. this inferior grade of bodily constitution and science).'

20. There is a roughness about ἐσθῆτα (i.e. ἐσθῆτος ποίησιν, Bon. Ind. 289 a 15) which is not without occasional parallels in the style of the Politics (see note on 1258 b 19). We expect ὑφαντικήν (cp. 4

(7). 4. 1325 b 41, *ὑφάντῃ καὶ ναυπηγῷ*), but *ἐσθῆτα* is more definite, because other things are woven besides clothes, and then again the difference between one quality of clothes and another may not be in the weaving but in the dyeing or something else. The word *ἱματιουργική* is used by Plato in Polit. 280 A and would have suited Aristotle's purpose here, but this word seems either to have been invented by Plato on this occasion or at any rate to have been rarely used. No general word for 'clothes-making' is given by Pollux in 7. 33 sq., 159. The non-repetition of *περί* before *ἐσθῆτα* links the making of ships and garments together as to a certain extent cognate: cp. c. 14. 1298 a 4 sqq. and 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 7–10.

23. *τίς ἐστι, καὶ ποία τις ἂν οὖσα κ.τ.λ.* The answer to *τίς* comes in a definition of the best constitution, the answer to *ποία τις* in a full description of it (see note on 1274 b 32).

24. *τίς τίσιν ἁρμόττουσα.* Cp. Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 30 sqq.

25. *τὴν κρατίστην τε ἁπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην.* For the combination of *κρατίστην* and *ἀρίστην* here Bonitz (Ind. 408 b 21 sqq.) compares Eth. Eud. 1. 3. 1215 a 4 sq.

26. *τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην*, 'the best that the assumed circumstances allow' (cp. 32, *τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*). The phrase *ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων* does not seem to occur elsewhere in the Politics.

27. *τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν.* See note on 1274 b 36 and cp. c. 14. 1297 b 38, *τὸν σπουδαῖον νομοθέτην*, and Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 8, *ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός*: also Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 23, *ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν*, and Plato, Rep. 564 C, *τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν τε καὶ νομοθέτην πόλεως*, and 489 C, where *οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνῆται* are contrasted with *οἱ νῦν πολιτικοὶ ἄρχοντες.*

28. *ἔτι δὲ τρίτην τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, sc. *πολιτείαν θεωρῆσαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης*, 'and still further it is the business of the same science to study as a third constitution that which is based on something given and presupposed'—for instance, it may be given and presupposed that the constitution to be studied is not to be either the best or the best attainable, but inferior to both (30 sqq.). So when the gymnastic trainer is asked to produce an *ἕξις* falling short of *ἡ ἱκνουμένη ἕξις*, he is asked to produce an *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἕξιν* (16 sqq.). In c. 11. 1296 b 9 sqq., as Sus.[2] (Note 1306) points out, *πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν* is used in a different sense. Contrast the tone of [Plato,] Epist. 7. 330 E, *τοῖς δ' ἔξω τὸ παράπαν βαίνουσι τῆς*

ὀρθῆς πολιτείας καὶ μηδαμῇ ἐθέλουσιν αὐτῆς εἰς ἴχνος ἰέναι, προαγορεύουσι δὲ τῷ ξυμβούλῳ τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν ἐᾶν καὶ μὴ κινεῖν, ὡς ἀποθανουμένῳ ἐὰν κινῇ, ταῖς δὲ βουλήσεσι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν ὑπηρετοῦντα ξυμβουλεύειν κελεύουσι, τίνα τρόπον γίγνοιτ' ἂν ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστα εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, τὸν μὲν ὑπομένοντα ξυμβουλὰς τοιαύτας ἡγοίμην ἂν ἄνανδρον, τὸν δ' οὐχ ὑπομένοντα ἄνδρα: cp. Plato, Laws 684 B sq.

29. ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο. This question has been raised as to the best constitution in 3. 18. 1288 b 2 sqq., and we are told in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30 sqq. how the polity comes into being, and in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 7 sqq. how kingship and tyranny come into being, but the question most often raised by Aristotle as to constitutions is rather *πῶς δεῖ καθιστάναι* or *κατασκευάζειν* (see for instance 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 40, 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 14 sqq., 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 38 sqq., and 8 (6). 7. 1321 b 1 sqq.). The reason why this latter question is raised more often than the former probably is that the really important and difficult thing is not to bring a constitution into being, but to frame it so as to last (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq.).

30. λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. The structure of this sentence deserves study. **Μήτε**, 31, is clearly answered by *μήτε*, 32, but what is the place of *ἀχορήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων* in the sentence? Does *τε* answer to *μήτε*, 31, in the way in which *τε* often answers to *μήτε* (i.e. in the sense of 'not only not—but': cp. 2. 10. 1272 b 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 35 sqq.)? It is possible, but I have not noticed a parallel in Aristotle's writings or elsewhere to this sequence of *μήτε—τε—μήτε*, and it seems better to regard *ἀχορήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων* as a parenthetical addition to *μήτε τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν*, and not as taking up *μήτε*, 31. Richards, regarding it thus, would read *δέ* in place of *τε*.

31. τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν. Cp. 2. 5. 1262 b 38 sq. and Plut. Phocion, c. 27, *πολιτευομένοις δὲ τὴν πάτριον ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτείαν*.

32. ἀχορήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, 'and indeed to be unprovided even with the things that are necessary to it,' much more with those that are merely desirable and expedient with a view to it. For *ἀχορήγητον καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων* cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 33, *τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγώγους*, and see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 421. 4. Anm. 5, 6 (ed. Gerth, § 421. Anm. 5–7).

35. ὡς οἱ πλεῖστοι κ.τ.λ. That Political Science should make *τὸ χρήσιμον* its aim as well as *τὸ ὀρθῶς ἔχον*, we have already been told (see notes on 1253 b 14 and 1260 b 32). For *ὡς*, 'since,' cp.

1289 a 3. The Index Aristotelicus does not appear to notice this use of ὡς with the indicative.

36. καὶ εἰ by no means implies that the fact is so.

38. τὴν δυνατήν, i.e. *τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*, 32, and *τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην*, 26.

τὴν ῥᾴω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἁπάσαις, 'that which is easier and more attainable by all States.' Supply *ταῖς πόλεσιν*. For other instances of the omission of the word *πόλις* see notes on 1266 b 1 and 1293 b 12.

39. δεομένην πολλῆς χορηγίας. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 37 sq. and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sqq.

41. τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιροῦντες πολιτείας, 'abolishing the existing constitutions.' Aristotle no doubt refers to Plato among others: cp. Rep. 501 A, where Plato commends the lawgiver who makes the tablet a clean surface before he writes his laws upon it, and Rep. 540 E sq., and compare what Plutarch says of Lycurgus in Lycurg. c. 5.

1. τινα ἄλλην, such as the State sketched by Plato in the Laws: 1289 a.
cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 2 sqq., where it is implied that this State is allowed by Plato to approach that of the Republic too nearly to be practicable.

χρὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but a lawgiver should introduce a constitution of such a kind that those for whom he legislates will easily, starting from their existing constitutions, be induced and be able to live under it.' Aristotle apparently regards the constitution which he has described in 1288 b 38 as *τὴν ῥᾴω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν* as answering to this description, and looks upon its discovery as one way among others of amending (*ἐπανορθῶσαι*, 3) a constitution. See note on 6. He probably has before him a saying of Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 15), *ἀλλ' ἥ μὲν ἄριστον ἦν, οὐκ ἐπήγαγεν ἰατρείαν οὐδὲ καινοτομίαν, φοβηθεὶς μὴ συγχέας παντάπασι καὶ ταράξας τὴν πόλιν ἀσθενέστερος γένηται τοῦ καταστῆσαι πάλιν καὶ συναρμόσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον· ἃ δὲ καὶ λέγων ἤλπιζε πειθομένοις καὶ προσάγων ἀνάγκην ὑπομένουσι χρήσασθαι, ταῦτ' ἔπραττεν, ὡς φησιν αὐτός,*

ὁμοῦ βίην τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας.

Ὅθεν ὕστερον ἐρωτηθείς, εἰ τοὺς ἀρίστους Ἀθηναίοις νόμους ἔγραψεν, "ὃν ἄν," ἔφη, "προσεδέξαντο τοὺς ἀρίστους": cp. also Dio Chrys. Or. 80 (2. 437 R), *Σόλωνα μέντοι καὶ αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι φασὶν ὡς αὑτῷ μὴ ἀρέσκοντα εἰσηγεῖτο Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ' οἷς αὐτοὺς ὑπελάμβανε χρήσεσθαι*, Isocr. Areop. § 57, and Plato, Polit. 296 A and Laws 684 B sq.,

where Plato disagrees with the common view that lawgivers ought to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive. Ἦν (sc. *τάξιν*) *κοινωνεῖν* I take to be a construction with a cogn. acc., *τάξιν* standing for *κοινωνίαν*: for *κοινωνεῖν κοινωνίαν* cp. Plato, Laws 881 E. I prefer this interpretation of the passage to taking *ἥν* (*τάξιν*) as equivalent to *καθ' ἣν τάξιν* and comparing 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13, *νενεμῆσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν.*

2. **καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται.** We expect rather *καὶ δυνήσονται καὶ πεισθήσονται* (cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 2, *ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος*), but see note on 1264 b 18.

3. **ὃς ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.** Solon had been appointed *διορθωτὴς καὶ νομοθέτης τῆς πολιτείας* (Plut. Solon, c. 16 *sub fin.*), and the greatness of his task was well known. Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (Works, ed. Bohn, 2. 439) speaks to much the same effect as Aristotle does here. 'At once to preserve and to reform is quite another thing' (i.e. calls for much ability). 'When the useful parts of an old establishment are kept, and what is superadded is to be fitted to what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady, persevering attention, various powers of comparison and combination, and the resources of an understanding fruitful in expedients, are to be exercised.'

τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. For the contrast cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 33 sqq., and for the omission of *τό* before *κατασκευάζειν* cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 19, and see note on 1263 a 15. The difference of tense in *ἐπανορθῶσαι* and *κατασκευάζειν* should be noticed (see note on 1331 b 21). For *ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν* cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 35, l. 12 sq., Isocr. Areop. § 15, *ἧς* (*πολιτείας*) *ἡμεῖς διεφθαρμένης οὐδὲν φροντίζομεν, οὐδὲ σκοποῦμεν ὅπως ἐπανορθώσομεν αὐτήν*, and Strabo, p. 398, where we read of Demetrius Phalereus that he *οὐ μόνον οὐ κατέλυσε τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπηνώρθωσε.*

5. **πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις**, i.e. in addition to studying the best constitution and a constitution like the Lacedaemonian, more attainable than the best, but still involving for its realization the abolition of the existing constitution.

6. **ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις βοηθεῖν** probably includes not only the discovery of a constitution the realization of which will not involve the sacrifice of the existing constitution, and in particular the discovery of *τὴν ῥᾴω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι*, but also *τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν* in general, and perhaps in addition the

study of the question how any given constitution may be so instituted as to last as long as possible. The inquiry in 8 (6). 4–7 as to the way in which the different kinds of democracy and oligarchy should be framed so as to last illustrates the meaning of the expression. There was a proverb *τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν*: see Stallbaum on Plato, Gorg. 499 C, and Meineke on Cratin. *Πυλαία*, Fragm. 3 (Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 113),

ἄνδρας σοφοὺς χρὴ τὸ παρὸν πρᾶγμα καλῶς εἰς δύναμιν τίθεσθαι.

Cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 b 35 sqq. and 10. 10. 1180 b 25 sqq.

7. *πρότερον*, in 1288 b 28–39.

τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον κ.τ.λ., 'and this it is impossible to do, if one is ignorant how many kinds there are of a constitution' (for the sing. *πολιτείας* cp. c. 4. 1290 b 25, *ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῴου προηρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἴδη*). If we supply *ποιεῖν*, the case of *ἀγνοοῦντα* is explained. Compare (with Büchsenschütz, Studien zu Aristoteles' Politik, p. 5, note) Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 17 sqq. In amending democracies and oligarchies it is necessary to distinguish between the different kinds of these constitutions and to deal with each kind in a different way, so that those who recognize only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy cannot amend these constitutions aright.

9. *τινες* here, as sometimes elsewhere (e.g. in 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 39), refers to Plato: cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 25 sqq.

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές. For the use in reference to Plato of this blunt expression cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 16, where see note.

10. *τὰς διαφορὰς τὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν* I take to mean 'the varieties of each constitution,' cp. 20 sqq. and c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq. Sus., however, appears to understand the words otherwise, translating 'die sämmtlichen Unterschiede unter den Verfassungen,' and Welldon also translates 'all the shades of difference between the various polities.'

11. *συντίθενται ποσαχῶς*, sc. *αἱ τῶν πολιτειῶν διαφοραί*, 'in how many ways the varieties of each constitution are compounded.' This is explained by 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 29, *τὰ γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεῖα ταύτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἑτέρας· τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττῳ, τῇ δ' ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα, τῇ δ' ἅπαντα ταῦτα*: cp. 1317 a 20 sqq.

μετὰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης κ.τ.λ., 'and with the help of this same kind of scientific insight the man of political science should discover the best laws,' etc. In 1288 b 22 we have *τῆς*

αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης. For *φρόνησις* used as here in much the same sense as *γνῶσις* or *ἐπιστήμη*, cp. Metaph. M. 4. 1078 b 15, *εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἔσται καὶ φρόνησις*, Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 24, *ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι*, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 831 b 4 sqq. I have followed the text of the MSS., but there is some strangeness about *μετὰ τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως*. Has *ταῦτα* fallen out after *δέ* (cp. c. 2. 1289 b 20, *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*)? Since the above was written, I see that my suggestion has been anticipated by an annotator on the margin of the copy of Morel's edition of the Politics used by Stahr (see Stahr and Sus.[1]).

18. *πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας* κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 11. 1282 b 10, and see explanatory note on 1282 b 8. For *τίθεσθαι* (not *τιθέναι*), see note on 1283 b 38. We should have been glad if Aristotle had illustrated this remark and shown us by instances how laws vary to suit constitutions. Of course the laws in which the constitution is embodied will vary, and such laws as that prohibiting a repeated tenure of offices would be especially found in democracies, but other laws also would vary—for instance, laws as to inheritance (see note on 1309 a 23) and as to the disposal of orphan heiresses in marriage (note on 1270 a 21). Oligarchies tended to allow full freedom in these matters (cp. Plato, Rep. 552 A sq., 555 C: *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 35, l. 14 sqq.) and to ignore the claims of relatives (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.).

15. *πολιτεία μὲν γάρ* κ.τ.λ. This gives the reason why the laws must be adjusted to the constitution and not the constitution to the laws. The constitution embodies the end, the laws the rules to be followed by the magistrates and others with a view to that end. The sharp distinction here drawn between the constitution and the laws (cp. c. 14. 1298a 17, *συνιέναι δὲ μόνον περί τε νόμων θέσεως καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας*) is not, however, always maintained; thus in c. 5. 1292 b 15, *τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πολιτείαν*, it seems to be implied that the constitution is embodied in laws: on the other hand in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 12 sqq. we have *τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας . . . καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας*, as if *τὸ περὶ νομοθεσίας* was a part of *τὸ περὶ πολιτείας*, and not the latter a part of the former. So in Laws 735 A Plato had brought under the common head of *πολιτεία* the two things distinguished by Aristotle in the passage before us, for he there says, *ἐστὸν γὰρ δὴ δύο πολιτείας εἴδη, τὸ μὲν ἀρχῶν καταστάσεις ἑκάστοις, τὸ δὲ νόμοι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀποδοθέντες*. Yet he seems to distinguish between *πολιτεία* and *νομοθεσία* in Laws 678 A. The distinction

between *πολιτεία* and *νόμοι* passed to Cicero, who marks off the 'optimus rei publicae status' from 'leges' (De Leg. 1. 5. 15), and has been inherited by ourselves. With the account here given of the nature of a constitution cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq., where *τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως* is identified with *τὸ πολίτευμα*, and see vol. i. p. 243, note 1. That each form of constitution assigns a different end to the State, we see from such passages as 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 9 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 1 (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 10 sq. and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37–b 2). See also Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 2–6. Then again the normal constitutions aim at the common good and the deviation-forms do not.

16. *νενέμηνται.* For the perfect see notes on 1280 a 16 and 1282 b 24.

19. *φυλάττειν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας αὐτούς*, 'watch and check those who transgress them', for *φυλάττειν* probably here means something more than 'to watch': see Bon. Ind. s.v. and cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 40.

20. *τὰς διαφοράς*, 'the varieties': see above on 10.

21. *τὸν ἀριθμόν*, sc. *τῶν διαφορῶν*. Cp. c. 4. 1290 b 32.

24. *εἴπερ δή* according to Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 48, does not occur elsewhere in Aristotle's writings. As P^2 C^4 Π^5 and pr. P^2 have *πλείω* in place of *πλείους*, Stahr, followed by Eucken, proposes to read *εἴδη* in place of *δή* (cp., with Eucken, c. 2. 1289 b 13). *Εἴπερ δή* occurs, however, as Eucken points out, in Theophr. Hist. Plant. 6. 6. 3, and *πλείους* is supported by c. 11. 1296 b 4, *ἐπειδὴ πλείους δημοκρατίας καὶ πλείους ὀλιγαρχίας φαμὲν εἶναι.*

26. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* After the statements of c. 1 we expect to be told in c. 2 that, the best constitution having already been dealt with, it remains to deal with the other questions marked out for consideration in c. 1, but in place of this we are unexpectedly carried back to the list of constitutions given in 3. 7 and are informed that two of these constitutions have now been dealt with, and that it remains to deal with the rest. An attempt is, in fact, made in c. 2 to represent the Sixth (old Fourth) Book of the Politics as taking up the programme set forth in 3. 7 *init.* in addition to that of the first chapter of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book. See vol. i. p. 489. C. 2.

ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. This term does not include the First Book (cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 12), but it probably includes the Second, and certainly the Third, possibly also the Fourth (old Seventh) and Fifth (old Eighth). See vol. ii. p. xx sqq. Aristotle evidently regards the investigation on which he is entering

as a *δευτέρα μέθοδος περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν*, probably because he is about to deal with an inferior group of constitutions to that with which he has hitherto been dealing, for though polity is a normal constitution, it is inferior to kingship and aristocracy.

30. *καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας κ.τ.λ.* That the study of the best constitution is in fact equivalent to the study of kingship and aristocracy is implied in the closing chapter of the Third Book, where we are told that, if we wish to bring a kingship or an aristocracy into existence, we must ask what education and habits will produce citizens of the best State, or in other words good men. As it is implied here that the best constitution has been already dealt with, some inquiry on the subject must have intervened, or, if it was still unwritten, must have been intended to intervene, between the end of the Third Book and the beginning of the Sixth (old Fourth), but that this inquiry is that contained in our Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books we are not in a position to prove. It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 295) that while in the last chapter of the Third Book kingship and aristocracy are classed together as the best of constitutions, true kingship is dismissed as no longer practicable in our Fourth Book (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq.). It seems strange that Aristotle should treat an inquiry respecting the best constitution as equivalent to a discussion of kingship and aristocracy, when he has in that inquiry dismissed kingship as impracticable. This inconsistency may be accounted for either by supposing that after writing the Third Book Aristotle passed on at once to the composition of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book, and that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books had not yet been written when the passage before us was penned, or by supposing that the Fourth and Fifth Books are a second edition of the original inquiry on the subject of the best constitution, and that the reference in the passage before us escaped revision after the substitution of the second edition for the original inquiry. See on this subject vol. ii. p. xxv sq. and p. xxxi, note 2. I do not feel sure that Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Aristoteles und Athen, i. 356) and Sus.[4] (1. 660, 662) are right in holding that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books were written before the Sixth (old Fourth). The remark in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14, *ἄρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον*, may be a reminiscence of 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq., and that in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2–5 a reminiscence of 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.

Compare also 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 25 sqq. with 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2 sqq., 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sqq. with 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sqq., and 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq. with 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3 sqq., though it is impossible to say whether the passages in the one Book were written earlier than those in the other. It is true, however, that we are reminded of 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 40 sqq. when we are told in the passage before us that the best constitution is based on fully equipped virtue. That aristocracy and kingship are based on virtue is implied in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq.

32. *περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων.* Cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 270, *περὶ δὲ σοφίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας τοῖς μὲν περὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἀγωνιζομένοις οὐκ ἂν ἁρμόσειε λέγειν περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων*, i.e. about the things called by these names.

33. *κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην*, 'to be constituted on the basis of virtue furnished with external means' (Welldon), just as the best constitution is. Cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 9, *ὅταν ᾖ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, and 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 19 sq. We do not hear of *πολιτεῖαι συνεστηκυῖαι κατὰ πλοῦτον* or *κατ' ἐλευθερίαν*, though oligarchy and democracy might conceivably be thus described. Not all forms of aristocracy can be said to be 'constituted on the basis of virtue furnished with external means' —this can hardly be said, for instance, of those aristocracies which combine only democracy and oligarchy and differ from polities solely in inclining to oligarchy more than polities do: see c. 7. 1293 b 20 sq. and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.—but aristocracy at its best aims at being thus constituted.

ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία. This has been explained in 3. 7. 1279 a 33 sqq., 3. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq., and 3. 16. 1287 b 35–17. 1288 a 15.

34. *καὶ πότε δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν.* This has been explained in 3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq. For *νομίζειν*, 'to adopt,' cp. 3. 1. 1275 b 7, *οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν.*

38. *φανερὸν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* *Μὲν οὖν* appears to be answered by *ἀλλά* in 1289 b 11. Aristotle's remark is suggested by his identification of aristocracy and kingship with the best constitution, which implies that they are the best of the normal constitutions (cp. 3. 18. 1288 a 32 sqq.); hence the *καί* in *καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκβάσεων* ('of these deviation-forms also'). Another reason for the remark is that the better a constitution is, the better is its claim

to priority of consideration (c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.), and the fewer precautions are needed for its preservation (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq.). Thus the question which is the worst of the deviation-forms, and which is the worst but one and so forth, has a bearing on the task which lies before Aristotle. Besides, Plato had already considered it (Rep. 544 C: Polit. 302 B sqq.). Aristotle's solution of it seems to be that the worst deviation-form is that which deviates most from the normal constitution of which it is the deviation-form, and the least bad one that which deviates least. This is the case with democracy, as we are told in Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19, *ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος.*

39. *ἀνάγκη γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. Plato also had placed tyranny lowest in Rep. 544 C and 576 D, and Aristotle himself in Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 8 sqq. Cp. Plato, Rep. 491 D, and Shakespeare's lines (Ninety-Fourth Sonnet),

> 'For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds,
> Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds.'

Τυραννὶς is said in 28 and in 3. 7. 1279 b 4 sq. to be the *παρέκβασις* of kingship, but here we learn that it is the *παρέκβασις* of the absolute form of kingship (cp. c. 10. 1295 a 17 sqq.). It is said in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 5 sqq. to be 'the most injurious of constitutions to the ruled', and, if Aristotle sometimes groups the worst forms of democracy and oligarchy with it and calls them 'divided tyrannies' (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 17 sq.: 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 34 sqq.: 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq.), he does not probably intend to say that they are as bad as tyranny (see note on 1292 a 17). *Καὶ θειοτάτης* is added after *τῆς πρώτης* to explain in what sense kingship is said to be the first of constitutions; it is the first in the sense in which what is divine is first (cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 11 sq.). Kingship is most divine, because the rule of Zeus is the rule of a king (1. 12. 1259 b 12 sqq.: 1. 2. 1252 b 24 sq.): cp. also Plut. Amat. c. 16. 759 D, *καθότι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν δύο ταῦτα, βασιλείαν καὶ ἀρετήν, θειότατα καὶ νομίζομεν καὶ ὀνομάζομεν.* A note on the passage before us written by Macaulay in his copy of the Politics runs, 'I think narrow oligarchy on the whole the worst form of government in the world' (*Macmillan's Magazine*, July, 1875, p. 221).

41. *τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν* κ.τ.λ., i.e. but kingship must necessarily be the first and most divine of constitutions.

τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ οὖσαν, like the kingship of a κληρωτὸς βασιλεύς (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 6).

1. ἢ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος. Cp. 3. 13. 1289 b. 1284 a 3 sqq., 3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq., and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10 sqq.

2. χειρίστην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας. As Thurot points out (Études sur Aristote, p. 56), we expect rather χειρίστην εἶναι πλεῖστον ἀπέχουσαν πολιτείας, but see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 960 B.

πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, 'to be furthest removed from a constitution': cp. c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.

4. μετριωτάτην δέ, sc. εἶναι. See notes on 1279 b 7 and 1334 b 25.

5. ἤδη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by οὐ μήν, 6, as in 2. 7. 1267 a 37 sqq., except that οὐ μήν here introduces a participial clause. For ἤδη with the aorist see note on 1303 a 27.

τις τῶν πρότερον, Plato in Polit. 303 A sq.

6. οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ βλέψας ἡμῖν, 'not however keeping in view the same thing as ourselves' (Vict. 'non tamen ad idem respiciens quod nos'). Plato took as his guide the principle that there is a good and a bad sort of oligarchy and democracy, Aristotle the principle that both oligarchy and democracy are perversions, and that there is no good sort of either. For βλέπειν εἰς or πρός, see Plato, Rep. 477 C–D, Laws 965 D, Cratyl. 389 A: Andoc. 3. 35: Isocr. De Pace § 142.

ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for he [recognized a good and a bad form of each of these polities and] held,' etc. (Welldon). Cp. Plato, Polit. 303 A, διὸ γέγονε (sc. ἡ τοῦ πλήθους ἀρχή) πασῶν μὲν νομίμων τῶν πολιτειῶν οὐσῶν τούτων χειριστη, παρανόμων δ' οὐσῶν ξυμπασῶν βελτίστη, καὶ ἀκολάστων μὲν πασῶν οὐσῶν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ νικᾷ ζῆν, κοσμίων δ' οὐσῶν ἥκιστα ἐν ταύτῃ βιωτέον. Plato had not, however, called the good sort of oligarchy 'good oligarchy' but 'aristocracy' (Polit. 301 A).

9. ἡμεῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 19 sq. and 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 35 sq.

ἐξημαρτημένας. The Index Aristotelicus gives no other reference for ἐξαμαρτάνειν to the genuine writings of Aristotle.

11. ἧττον δὲ φαύλην. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19 sqq. As Susemihl has already pointed out (Sus.², Note 1140), Aristotle does not always observe this rule; thus we find the epithets βελτίων and βελτίστη applied to varieties of democracy in c. 11. 1296 b 6 and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6.

ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. 'The judgement of which we have spoken' is the judgement in what order of demerit the deviation-forms stand. The subject does not seem to be farther considered in what we possess of the Politics, for in c. 11. 1296 b 3 sqq. the question raised relates to the order of merit in which the varieties of democracy and oligarchy stand.

12. ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. As to this programme of the remaining inquiries of the Politics, see vol. i. p. 492 sqq., where we have seen that it does not fully harmonize with the contents of c. 1. The recapitulations in c. 13. 1297 b 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10 sqq. should be compared with it. The first question suggested for examination—the question how many varieties of constitution there are—is one suggested for examination in c. 1. 1289 a 7–11, a passage which appears to be taken up in *πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν* here, though the words *εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας* seem to imply that the inquiry will be confined to varieties of democracy and oligarchy, a limitation for which we are not distinctly prepared in c. 1. 1289 a 7–11. Some sort of answer to the question how many varieties of constitution there are is obtainable from cc. 3 and 4 (see c. 3. 1290 a 11 sqq. and c. 4. 1290 b 34 sqq.), though in the recapitulation in c. 4. 1291 b 14 sq. the question which has been under consideration is said to have been the question whether there are more constitutions than one and why, not how many varieties of constitution there are (cp. c. 13. 1297 b 28 sqq.). It should be noticed that in *εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας* a fact is assumed the truth of which forms the subject of a separate inquiry in c. 4. 1291 b 15–30.

13. πλείονα (neut. plur.), not *πλείω*: cp. c. 4. 1290 b 8.

14. ἔπειτα κ.τ.λ. That *ἡ κοινοτάτη πολιτεία* and *ἡ αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν* are not necessarily the same, we have learnt in 2. 6. 1265 b 29 sqq. Aristotle's language here leads us to expect to find in c. 11, where the topic now referred to is dealt with, a discussion both of the question what is the most generally attainable constitution and of the question what constitution is the most desirable after the best, but in fact he there asks what constitution is the best for most States and most men, and decides that it is *ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων*. Nothing is said in c. 11 of any constitution other than this which is at once 'aristocratic and well organized and suitable to most States.' The recapitulation in c. 13. 1297 b 32 sq. corresponds better with the actual contents of c. 11 than

does the preliminary announcement before us. Aristotle probably adds *κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλη κ.τ.λ.*, because he does not wish to exclude in advance the consideration of forms to which the superlatives *κοινοτάτη καὶ αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν* do not apply, but which are at once 'aristocratic' in the broader sense of the word and suitable to most States. Many aristocratic constitutions are not 'suitable to most States' (c. 11. 1295 a 31 sqq.).

17. *ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή*, 'next which among the other constitutions also' [i. e. other than those just referred to] 'is desirable for whom.' This question is dealt with in c. 12. 1296 b 13 sqq. As Sus.[3] points out (Note 1142), the addition of *καί* before *τῶν ἄλλων* prepares us to find the question *τίς τίσιν αἱρετή* considered with reference to other constitutions than democracy and oligarchy, and we do in fact find that it is considered with reference to the polity (c. 12. 1296 b 38 sqq.), though not with reference to the so-called aristocracy.

20. *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.* This question is dealt with to some extent in 6 (4). 14–16, though not, as we should expect from the passage before us, exclusively with reference to the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy (see 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 35 sq.). The question is more fully dealt with, so far at least as the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy are concerned, in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book, cc. 1–7, and we are led in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 36 sqq. and 1317 a 14 sq. to expect to learn in the Eighth Book how to construct the other constitutions also, but our expectation is disappointed. Thus promise and performance are at variance both in the Sixth (old Fourth) and in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book. There is, indeed, a further discrepancy between the intimation given in the passage before us and the sequel of the Sixth Book, for we find in c. 9. 1294 a 31 sq. (cp. 1294 b 40 sq.) an inquiry how the polity and the so-called aristocracies should be constructed, which is more than the passage before us leads us to expect.

22. *τέλος δέ κ.τ.λ.* This question is dealt with in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book, which is often implied to be *περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν* (8 (6). 1. 1317 a 37 sq.: 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 37 sq.). The passage before us certainly leads us to expect that the old Fifth Book will be the last Book of the Politics, whereas the MSS. unanimously place the old Sixth Book after it. The insertion of the old Seventh and Eighth Books after the Third is justified by (among other things) indications in the MSS. at the close of the

Third that the old Seventh at one time followed immediately after it, but there are no similar indications in the MSS. to justify the insertion of the old Sixth Book between the old Fourth and the old Fifth. Aristotle may have come to see, as he progressed with his work, that his study of the way in which each form of democracy and oligarchy should be constructed in order to last (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq.) should follow, and not precede, his study of the causes which prevent constitutions from lasting. That he did so seems likely from 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 37–1320 a 4. See vol. i. p. 493 sq. Vet. Int. takes *τέλος δὲ πάντων τούτων* together, translating 'tandem autem post omnia haec,' but the words can hardly be taken together, and a genitive is also needed after *ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν*. *Πάντων τούτων* is emphasized by being placed before *ὅταν*: cp. Aristoph. *Τελμησῆς*, Fragm. 1, 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1159),

φέρε δὴ τοίνυν, ταῦθ' ὅταν ἔλθῃ, τί ποιεῖν χρή μ', ὦ Τελεμησσεῖς;

and Philemon, *Ἀνακαλύπτων* Fragm. (Meineke, 4. 5),

λυπουμένῳ δ' ὅταν τις ἀκολουθῶν λέγῃ
χαῖρ', ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὗτος οἰμώζειν λέγει.

24. *τίνες φθοραὶ* κ.τ.λ., 'what forms are assumed by the destruction and preservation of constitutions, both of constitutions in general and of each constitution separately, and by reason of what causes these destructions and preservations tend most to come about.' '*Φθοράς* et *σωτηρίας* rerum publicarum vocat interitus et incolumitates' (Camerarius, Interp. p. 144). Sepulveda translates *τίνες φθοραὶ κ.τ.λ.*, 'quae res interitum afferant et quae vicissim rebus publicis sint salutares,' and many translate in a similar way (so Sus. 'welches die Mittel zur Zerstörung und zur Erhaltung der Verfassungen sind'), but I prefer the above rendering. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 34, *ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον*. We are not prepared in the passage before us for the separate treatment of the way in which monarchies are destroyed and preserved which we find in 7 (5). 10–12.

25. For *ταῦτα* referring to fem. substantives, see Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 7, and see notes on 1263 a 1 and 1291 a 16.

C. 3. **27.** As to the Third and Fourth Chapters see vol. i. Appendix A. We look to these chapters for an answer to the inquiry suggested in c. 2. 1289 b 12–14 and in c. 1. 1289 a 7–11 and 20 sqq., the inquiry how many varieties of each constitution, and especially of democracy and oligarchy, there are, and, as has been said above on

1289 b 12, we find in them some sort of answer to this question, but the answer which we find in them is by no means distinct, and the main aim of the two chapters seems rather to be to explain why there are many constitutions (an inquiry for which we have not been prepared in the opening chapters of the Book, though it is referred to in c. 13. 1297 b 28 sqq. as having been dealt with), and at once to account for and to disprove the view that there are only two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy, a heresy of which we hear nothing in cc. 1 and 2. A further defect of the Third and Fourth Chapters is that (as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 495, note 1, and Appendix A: see also below on 1290 b 21–24) they give mutually inconsistent accounts of the parts of the State without distinctly substituting the one for the other. The first discussion traces the variety of constitutions to a variation in the way in which office is distributed to the different kinds of δῆμος and γνώριμοι, the second to a variation in the combinations made of the various forms assumed by the cultivators, artisans, deliberators, judges, and other necessary parts of the State. According to the first discussion, again, the reason why democracy and oligarchy are thought to be the only two constitutions is that the one represents the rule of the many and the other the rule of the few, and that the remaining constitutions are deviation-forms of these, while according to the second the reason is that a constitution implies the rule of a distinct class and the only necessarily distinct classes in a State are the rich and the poor, the former ruling in oligarchy and the latter in democracy. It is more easy to see that these chapters are unsatisfactory as they stand than to say how it happens that they are not more satisfactory than they are. There seems to be little doubt that both of them are from Aristotle's pen—it is, indeed, possible that, as has been pointed out above on 1289 a 30, a reminiscence of a passage in the Fourth Chapter (1291 a 24 sqq.) is contained in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2–5—but it is difficult to think that he intended the two disquisitions, c. 3. 1289 b 27–c. 4. 1290 b 20 and c. 4. 1290 b 21–1291 b 13, to stand together in the text of the Politics. He may have written the second of these disquisitions in the margin of his manuscript of the Politics with the intention of substituting it for the first, or with the intention of using the two disquisitions as materials for a third, which would take their place on a final revision of the work, and an editor, finding the manuscript in this state and misinterpreting Aristotle's purpose, may have

added whatever was necessary to make a connected whole of them. Throughout the Sixth (old Fourth) Book there is much to suggest the suspicion that an editor's hand has been at work, piecing together materials which Aristotle had left in an unconnected state, or which at any rate were unconnected, whatever the cause. Susemihl brackets as interpolated the entire passage 1289 b 27–1291 b 13, but then the succeeding sentence 1291 b 14, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον*, ceases to have anything to refer to, unless we take it to refer to 3. 6. 1278 b 6 sqq. Besides, 1291 b 16, *φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*, appears to refer to 1289 b 32 sqq.

Τοῦ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. *Μὲν οὖν* has nothing to answer to it. Other explanations why there are more constitutions than one are to be found in 3. 6–7, in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37 sqq., and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. In these passages Aristotle shows that there are more constitutions than one, and why this is so, but he does not show how large the number of possible constitutions is. He shows in 3. 6–7 that six constitutions exist, for rule may be in the hands of one man, or a few, or many, and the one, the few, or the many may rule for the common advantage or for their own, and elsewhere he shows that rule may be awarded for virtue, as in kingship and aristocracy, or for military virtue, as in polity, or for wealth, as in oligarchy, or for free birth, as in democracy, or it may be won by force and deceit, as in tyranny. But now he shows that the number of possible constitutions is not limited to six, but is very large. Constitutions, he now tells us, vary in relation to the parts of the State; these parts vary and rule is distributed among the varying parts in a varying way (c. 3), or the varying parts are combined in a varying way (c. 4). It may be noted that the explanations given in the chapter before us and in the succeeding chapter do not seem to account for the existence of kingship and tyranny.

29. ἔπειτα πάλιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 11. 1295 b 1 sqq., and contrast 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 30 sq.

31. καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed of the well-to-do and the poor the one part, [the well-to-do,] heavy-armed, and the other part, [the poor,] without heavy arms.' Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 33, where *οἱ ὁπλῖται* are distinguished from *ὁ δῆμος*, and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12, *τὸ γὰρ ὁπλιτικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀπόρων*. Yet see note on 1294 a 41. Aristotle cannot mean to say that a part both of the

well-to-do and of the poor was heavy-armed and a part not, for surely none of the well-to-do would be *ἄνοπλοι*.

32. *καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὁρῶμεν ὄντα, τὸν δ' ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάναυσον.* Aristotle usually divides the demos into four classes, not three—cultivators, artisans, traders, and day-labourers (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 5 sq.)—or into five, if we add herdsmen and shepherds (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19–28). In 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. he adds *τὸ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν* and *τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*. Thus he omits in the passage before us day-labourers and herdsmen and shepherds, to say nothing of the two last-named classes. See note on 1319 a 24, and as to the *ἀγοραῖοι* note on 1291 a 4.

33. *καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων κ.τ.λ.* Here, as often elsewhere, the antithesis to *ὁ δῆμος* is *οἱ γνώριμοι*, a wide term including not only *οἱ πλούσιοι*, but also those whose claims were based on birth or virtue (cp. c. 4. 1291 b 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.). See note on 1304 b 1.

34. *καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας.* Bonitz (Ind. 357 b 34) remarks as to the first *καί*, 'Ad *καί* praeparativum post aliquod intervallum *ἔτι* referri videtur in Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 34, 40.' *Τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας* is probably added to make it clear in what sense *ὁ πλοῦτος* is here used, for the word was sometimes used in the sense of *ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κτήσεως* (1. 13. 1259 b 20). For the absence of *κατά* before *τὰ μεγέθη* see critical note on 1330 b 31.

35. *οἷον ἱπποτροφίας*, sc. *διαφορά ἐστι*. For the genitive of Epexegesis, see note on 1322 b 5 and Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 124, who quotes Apol. 29 B, *ἀμαθία . . . αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν*, and other passages. For the fact mentioned cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11, *αἱ δ' ἱπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσίν*: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.: Xen. Ages. 1. 23. Why were rich men alone able to rear horses? We never find the same thing said of the rearing of horned cattle or sheep (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 14), or even of mules. The reason must be that horses were used in ancient Greece mainly for war, racing, or similar purposes, and that it did not pay to keep them.

36. *διόπερ κ.τ.λ.* The sense is—and hence it was that in ancient times States whose strength lay in their cavalry were ruled by the wealthy, for the wealthy alone could rear horses, and that oligarchies existed in them. Aristotle's language implies that this was not as much the rule in later days, though it would seem that even in later days the more pronounced type of oligarchy found a congenial

home in States whose territory was suited to cavalry (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.).

38. ἐχρῶντο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and they were in the habit of using horses for their wars with their neighbours.' It would be difficult in early times to transport horses by sea for use in distant campaigns. The fact stated shows how important horses were to the State, and explains why supremacy in the State fell to those who were able to keep them. Wars with neighbours were more trying and more full of peril than any others (Demosth. Olynth. 2. 21: De Cor. c. 241). For one thing it was easy during such wars for slaves to desert *en masse* (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Blümner, 4. p. 89). For *χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους*, cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 22, *τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλοις*, and Aristot. Fragm. 499. 1559 a 31, *Ἀριστοτέλης δέ φησιν ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείᾳ χρῆσθαι Λακεδαιμονίους φοινικίδι πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους*. The sentence would be improved if the second *πρός* were omitted (for *πόλεμος ἀστυγείτων* cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 17 sq.), but see note on 1328 a 19. We have in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 35, if the text is correct, *ἐκ προκρίτων ἐκ τῶν χιλίων*.

39. As to the oligarchy of the Hippobotae at Chalcis see Strabo, p. 447 (Aristot. Fragm. 560. 1570 a 40 sqq.), and as to the oligarchy of the Knights at Eretria see 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 35 sq. The Thessalians were *ἱπποτρόφοι* (Heraclid. Pont. ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 c–e). As to Magnesia on the Maeander we read in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 22, *ἱπποτρόφοι δ' εἰσίν, ὃν τρόπον καὶ Κολοφώνιοι, πεδιάδα χώραν ἔχοντες*. In *τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν* there is no doubt a reference to Colophon (cp. Strabo, p. 643): Cyme also is probably among the cities referred to ([Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 11. 6). See notes on 1297 b 16 and 1321 a 8. Caria is said to be unsuitable for cavalry in Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 12 (cp. Julian, Or. 7. 205 D), and though this cannot have been true of the lower part of the valley of the Maeander, Aristotle is probably not speaking in the passage before us of most of the Greek cities of Caria. No doubt also he is not speaking of the islands off the coast of Asia Minor.

40. ἔτι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 711 D, *μεγάλαις τισὶ δυναστείαις, ἢ κατὰ μοναρχίαν δυναστευούσαις ἢ κατὰ πλούτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφερούσαις ἢ γενῶν*.

1290 a. **1.** κἂν εἴ τι δὴ κ.τ.λ. To what is this a reference? According to Susemihl (Sus.[3a], Appendix, p. 366), to 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 17–9. 1329 a 39, and it is true that *τούτων γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. (1290 a 3 sqq.) may

refer to 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sqq., but we hear nothing in 4 (7). 7–9 of a *διαφορὰ τῶν γνωρίμων κατὰ γένος*, or indeed of *διαφοραὶ τῶν γνωρίμων* of any kind. Is not the reference rather to 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq.? See vol. ii. p. xxv.

8. τούτων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν κ.τ.λ., '[for these parts are the cause of the existence of a plurality of constitutions,] for sometimes all of them share in the constitution, and sometimes a smaller number of them and sometimes a larger.' In democracy, for instance, all kinds of *γνώριμοι* and all kinds of demos share in the constitution (4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32 sq.), while in the more extreme forms of oligarchy only *ἱπποτρόφοι* share in it.

7. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added to explain and justify what has just been said, that the existence of parts of the State differing in kind involves the existence of constitutions differing in kind. A constitution is an ordering of the parts of the State in relation to their participation in magistracies. One constitution gives the magistracies to the rich, another to the poor, another to rich and poor together, and constitutions differ according as they give the magistracies to one part of the State or to another. I repeat here for the sake of convenience the translation of the passage already given in vol. i. p. 566—'for a constitution is the ordering of the magistracies of the State, and this ordering all men distribute among themselves either according to the power of those who are admitted to political rights or according to some common equality subsisting among them—I mean, for example, the power of the poor or the rich—or some power common to both. Thus there will necessarily be as many constitutions as there are ways of ordering the magistracies of a State according to the relative superiorities and differences exhibited by the parts.' For *κατά τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητα κοινήν*, cp. Plato, Laws 695 C, *νόμους ἠξίου θέμενος οἰκεῖν ἰσότητά τινα κοινὴν εἰσφέρων*, and Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sqq., in addition to 3. 6. 1279 a 9, *ὅταν ᾖ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, and other passages referred to in vol. i. p. 566, note 1. With *τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων* I supply *τὴν δύναμιν*, and with *ἡ κοινήν τιν' ἀμφοῖν* I supply *δύναμιν*. In 12, *κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων*, it is implied that constitutions vary both according to the superiorities (in wealth, birth, or virtue, or in numbers) possessed by this or that part of the State and according to the differences between the parts (for instance, the *γνώριμοι* may be *γνώριμοι κατὰ πλοῦτον* or *κατὰ γένος* or *κατ' ἀρετήν*, and the demos may

be agricultural or trading or artisan). Τῶν μορίων is emphatic. Each constitution reflects a difference in *the parts of the State* and the way in which office is assigned to them. For κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχάς, cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 22 sq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 11, ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστᾶσι, καὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 1: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26 sqq.

13. μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο . . . 16. ὀλιγαρχία. For the structure of the sentence see note on 1253 b 35–37. Demosthenes took this view (vol. i. p. 494, note 1). Nothing is said about monarchy, but perhaps the inquirers here referred to regarded it as a form of oligarchy. Those who viewed ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφορά as a διαφορὰ τῶν γνωρίμων (1289 b 40 sqq.) would naturally be led to class ἀριστοκρατία as a kind of oligarchy; Aristotle himself, in fact, admits in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 24 that it is ὀλιγαρχία πως. Polities, again, were accounted democracies in early times (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 24). Not many, however, can have held the view that there were only two constitutions, for we are told in c. 7. 1293 a 35 sqq. that the existence of four constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and the so-called aristocracy—was recognized by all, though polity was generally ignored. There is a reference to the opinion that there are only two winds in Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19 sqq. and in Strabo, p. 29, where Posidonius is quoted as saying that it was not accepted by Aristotle or by Timosthenes (a Rhodian writer of the first half of the third century B.C.) or by the astronomer Bion. Some held that there were only two elements and not four (De Gen. et Corr. 2. 3. 330 b 13, οἱ δ' εὐθὺς δύο ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ γῆν, τὰ μεταξὺ μίγματα ποιοῦσι τούτων, οἷον ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ), and some recognized only two Greek dialects, identifying the ancient Attic dialect with the Ionic and the Doric with the Aeolic (Strabo, p. 333). In the same way some studied dichotomy in their divisions of animals (De Part. An. 1. 2. 642 b 5 sqq.). This tendency would be favoured by the influence of Heraclitus' teaching (see Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 15). But the view that there were only two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy, may well have been suggested by the fact that most constitutions in ancient Greece were democratic or oligarchical (c. 11. 1296 a 22 sq.: 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 39 sq.), just as the view that there were only two winds, the North and the South, may well have been suggested by the fact that the wind blew oftenest from these

quarters (Meteor. 2. 4. 361 a 6: cp. Theophrast. Fragm. 5. 2 Wimmer).

15. οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, sc. εἴδη δοκεῖ εἶναι: cp. 20, καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τίθενται εἴδη δύο.

18. ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19, ὅλως δὲ τὰ μὲν βόρεια τούτων καλεῖται, τὰ δὲ νότια. προστίθεται δὲ τὰ μὲν ζεφυρικὰ τῷ βορέᾳ (ψυχρότερα γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ δυσμῶν πνεῖν), νότῳ δὲ τὰ ἀπηλιωτικά (θερμότερα γὰρ τῷ ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς πνεῖν). For the reversal in the order of the words, τὸν μὲν ζέφυρον τοῦ βορέου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὖρον, cp. 27–29 and see note on 1277 a 31.

19. τοῦ βορέου, sc. εἴδος.

24. ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν κ.τ.λ. The inquirers criticized by Aristotle regarded democracy and oligarchy as the forms of constitution of which the rest are deviations, but Aristotle is always inclined to point to a mean form as the best and to regard the extremes between which it lies as deviations from it. Each of the moral virtues, for instance, is a μεσότης between two extreme states which are deviations from it (Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 27 sqq.: 2. 9. 1109 b 18, ὁ μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων), and the Dorian mode is a midway mode between two deviation-forms (Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 42 sqq.). That the correct form of constitution assumes only one or two shapes, while the deviation-forms are many, is quite what we should expect: cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 28, ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς, where Aristotle follows Plato, Rep. 445 C, ἓν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἄπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας. Cp. also 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 26 sqq., where the existence of a multiplicity of constitutions is traced to the fact that men err (ἁμαρτανόντων) in their attempts to realize τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον. Ἀληθέστερον καὶ βέλτιον, because it is better so to classify constitutions as to give prominence to the best. Ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, i.e. in c. 2, where ἀριστοκρατία and βασιλεία are said to be the best constitution, and oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny to be deviation-forms (1289 a 38, b 9). Aristotle, however, speaks in the passage before us as if the polity was also a deviation-form, but this is probably by inadvertence; he speaks more exactly in c. 8. 1293 b 23 sqq. Plato had already said in Rep. 445 D, 449 A, that the best constitution may take the form either of a kingship or of an aristocracy, and that all other constitutions are deviation-forms of it. Aristotle's teaching in 3. 7.

1279 b 4 sqq. (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 26–30) is different (see vol. i. p. 218).

27. ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν κ.τ.λ. Oligarchy is here compared with tense modes like the mixo-Lydian (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 42 sqq.) and democracy with relaxed modes like the softer variety of the Ionian. The metaphor recurs in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20 sqq. and in Plut. Pericl. c. 15, Coriolan. c. 5 *sub fin.*, and Lycurg. c. 29 *sub fin.* Cp. also Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 26. l. 2, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαινεν ἀνίεσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθύμως δημαγωγοῦντας, and Demosth. c. Androt. c. 51, πάντα πραότερά ἐστιν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ.

C. 4. 30. Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ. In τινες Aristotle probably refers among others to Plato, who had said in Polit. 291 D, ΞΕ. καὶ μετὰ μοναρχίαν εἶποι τις ἄν, οἶμαι, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστείαν. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς δ' οὔ; ΞΕ. τρίτον δὲ σχῆμα πολιτείας οὐχ ἡ τοῦ πλήθους ἀρχή, δημοκρατία τοὔνομα κληθεῖσα; The reason why Aristotle takes so much pains here to correct this definition of democracy and oligarchy appears to be that he holds that it tends to facilitate the error of reducing all constitutions to these two forms. He seeks, therefore, to show that democracy and oligarchy cannot be defined as forms in which supremacy falls to the majority or to the few, or even (though we thus approach nearer to the truth) as forms in which supremacy falls to ἐλευθερία or to wealth; they are rather forms in which the ἐλεύθεροι being a majority, and the rich being a few, rule. Two things (ἐλευθερία and superior numbers), or even three, if we add poverty, must be conjoined in those who are supreme in a democracy, and two things (wealth and paucity), or three, if we add high birth, in those who are supreme in an oligarchy. If we thus define democracy and oligarchy, it becomes impossible to group all constitutions under these two heads and to treat polity as a kind of democracy and aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy, for in the polity the hoplites rule, who do not belong to the poorer class, and in the aristocracy rule falls not to wealth or to high birth, but to virtue. It is evident, then, that this inquiry as to the true definition of democracy and oligarchy is not altogether out of place here, looking to what precedes it, but we are surprised that no notice is taken in it of the similar inquiry in 3. 8, especially as a different definition of democracy and oligarchy is there arrived at, and one which takes fuller account of the difficulties of the question. For if in a democracy the free-born and poor being a majority rule, and in an oligarchy the rich and noble being few

in number rule, what are we to call the constitutions in which the free-born and poor not being a majority rule, and those in which the rich and noble not being few rule? They cannot be called democracies, nor can they be called oligarchies. This difficulty is considered and solved in 3. 8, but it is neither considered nor solved in the chapter before us. It should be noted that, notwithstanding what he says here and in c. 8. 1294 a 11 sqq., Aristotle takes *τὸ κύριον εἶναι τὸ δόξαν τοῖς πλείοσιν* as a mark of democracy in 1291 b 37 sqq., in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq., and in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 4 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 18 sqq., 24 sqq.).

31. **ἁπλῶς οὕτως**, 'in this unqualified way': cp. Plato, Gorg. 468 C (where Stallbaum translates, 'sic simpliciter, ita ut nihil aliud respiciamus'), Protag. 351 C, and other passages referred to by Ast, Lex. Platon. s. v. *ἁπλῶς*.

καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πλέον μέρος κύριον, i.e. *τὸ πλέον μέρος τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας* (cp. c. 8. 1294 a 11 sqq.).

35. **τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν κ.τ.λ.**, 'to those who are but three hundred in number and poor, though free-born' (or perhaps 'of citizen-birth') 'and alike in all other respects.' For *τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν*, cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 25, *τὰ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἐλαττόνων*, and 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22, *τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος*, and Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 47, *τοὺς πένητας καὶ πεζοὺς τοῖς εὐπόροις καὶ ἱππεῦσι συνέκρουσεν*.

37. **τούτους**, i.e. the members of the *πόλις* in which this is the case.

εἰ πένητες μὲν ὀλίγοι εἶεν, κρείττους δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'if there were a few men poor but stronger,' etc.

39. **τὴν τοιαύτην**, sc. *πολιτείαν*. For similar omissions see notes on 1266 b 1 and 1279 a 9.

3. **ἐλεύθεροι μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλούσιοι δ' ὀλίγοι**, 'for there are many free-born, but few rich.' 1290 b.

4. **καὶ γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ.**, 'for otherwise,' etc. (i.e. if we define oligarchy as the rule of a few).

5. **τινες**. Herodotus says (3. 20: see above on 1282 b 27) that the Ethiopians chose their kings in this way (Schneider, Eaton). The case, however, which Aristotle is imagining is the choice not of kings, but of magistrates for their stature. In Hist. An. 2. 1. 499 a 20, *ὥσπερ λέγουσί τινες*, Herodotus (3. 103) is similarly referred to.

ἢ κατὰ κάλλος. For the choice of kings on this principle, see

(with Schneider, Eaton, and Sus.[2]) Athen. Deipn. 566 c, Strabo, pp. 699 and 822, and Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 142 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 463), but these passages refer to kings, not magistrates.

7. **οὐδὲ τούτοις μόνον**, i.e. *πλούτῳ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ*.

8. **ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ** κ.τ.λ., 'but since there are more elements than one both in a democracy and in an oligarchy, we must add this further distinction that,' etc. It is implied that democracy does not exist unless all its elements (the free-born, the many, and the poor) are present in the ruling class, nor oligarchy, unless all its elements (the rich, the few, and the noble) are present in the ruling class. **Δῆμος** here = *δημοκρατία*, as in 1290 b 1 and c. 3. 1290 a 16. For the expression *μόρια τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας*, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24, *τὰ δ' ἄλλα πλήθη πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστᾶσι, πολλῷ φαυλότερα τούτων*. The elements of a democracy or an oligarchy seem here to be the elements of which the dominant class in each is composed. The term *μόριον τῆς πολιτείας* is otherwise used in c. 14. 1297 b 37, c. 15. 1299 a 4, and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 22. For *πλείονα* neut. plur. (not *πλείω*), cp. c. 2. 1289 b 13. The neuter plural substantive *μόρια* is followed, as often elsewhere, by a verb in the plural.

9. **οἱ ἐλεύθεροι** must here mean 'those of full citizen-birth.' In Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf (for *κόλπῳ* is to be supplied, see note on 1329 b 20) and in Thera no one seems at one time to have been accounted of full citizen-birth who was not a descendant of the earliest settlers. **Ἦσαν**, 12, implies that this was no longer the case in Aristotle's day. Compare 3. 2. 1275 b 23 sqq., where we read that there were those who denied the name of citizen to any one who could not trace back his origin to two or three or more citizen grandfathers. Apollonia and Thera in a similar spirit required of those who held office a pedigree reaching back to the very foundation of the colony. Oligarchy in these two cities was evidently of an old-world type, based on nobility of birth rather than on wealth. Apollonia was in many respects a kind of foil to its neighbour Epidamnus; it was an *εὐνομωτάτη πόλις* (Strabo, p. 316), whereas Epidamnus was famous for its civil broils (Thuc. 1. 24. 3). It was situated nearly seven miles from the sea, and more than one mile from the river Aous (Strabo, ibid.), whereas Epidamnus was a seaport; unlike Epidamnus, it kept strangers at a distance, just as Sparta did (Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 15, *ὅτι Ἀπολλωνιᾶται ξενηλασίας ἐποίουν κατὰ τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον νόμον· Ἐπιδάμνιοι δὲ ἐπιδημεῖν παρεῖχον τῷ βουλομένῳ*).

12. οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας. *Καί* seems here to be explanatory; nobility in these two States was based on descent from the earliest settlers, for *πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας* no doubt includes the descendants of the original settlers, as well as the original settlers themselves. *Οἱ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας* were the founders not only of the State but of its worships (Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1423 a 36, *καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οἰκιζόντων τὰς πόλεις καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἱδρυσαμένων τὰ ἱερὰ μάλιστα δεῖ διαμένειν τὰς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπιμελείας*). Compare the monopoly of the more important offices at Thurii by the Sybarite element in its citizen-body (Diod. 12. 11. 1: Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 31 sqq.), and similar distinctions within the citizen-bodies of some Phoenician settlements (Freeman, Sicily, 1. 294). The same thing happened at Venice according to Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, 1. 6 *init.* 'As a great number of people were forced to retire into those isles where Venice now stands, and the multitude at last increased to such a degree that it became necessary to make some laws, in order to live peaceably and securely together, they established a form of government, and assembling frequently in council to deliberate on the affairs of the city, when they thought they were numerous enough to form a State, they ordained that nobody that should come thereafter to live amongst them should have any share in the government; and in course of time, when a sufficient number of inhabitants outside the government had settled in the place to give distinction to those who governed, they called themselves Gentlemen, and the others men of the People' (Farneworth's Translation with some modifications). Compare the way in which in the South African Republic the Boers have excluded the Uitlanders from full participation in the suffrage.

14. ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν. For this use of the partitive genitive, cp. Plato, Tim. 39 C, *τῶν δ' ἄλλων τὰς περιόδους οὐκ ἐννενοηκότες ἄνθρωποι, πλὴν ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν.*

οὔτε ἂν οἱ πλούσιοι κ.τ.λ., 'nor if the rich rule [not because of their wealth, but] simply because they are more numerous than the poor, does an oligarchy exist.' Cp. 3. 8. 1280 a 1, *ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἄν τ' ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν*, where *διὰ πλοῦτον* is emphatic. As to the reading *ὀλιγαρχία* see critical note on 1290 b 15.

15. οἷον ἐν Κολοφῶνι τὸ παλαιόν. For the fact cp. Athen. Deipn.

526 a sqq. The war with the Lydians referred to occurred during the reign of Gyges, who captured Colophon (Hdt. 1. 14), and therefore during the first half of the seventh century before Christ (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 458). Colophon was not only strong in cavalry at the time of which Aristotle speaks, but also had a fleet (Strabo, p. 643).

16. *μακρὰν οὐσίαν.* Cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11.

18. *κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὦσιν*, 'have rule in their hands': cp. 1290 a 33, *κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας*, and 35, *μὴ μεταδιδοῖεν ἀρχῆς.* The phrase is not a common one. For *τῆς ἀρχῆς* cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 8, *πρός τε τὴν ἀρχήν.*

21. *Ὅτι μὲν οὖν* ... **24.** *πόλιν.* The first of these sentences is repeated in 1291 b 14 sq., and it is likely enough that the disquisition which finds a place between these two identical remarks is a subsequent addition, whether it was inserted here by Aristotle or by some later hand. The sentences from 21, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν*, to 24, *πόλιν*, look as if they had been added by some editor, who has sought to link together two inconsistent disquisitions on the plurality of constitutions found by him in Aristotle's manuscript or among his papers. See note on 1289 b 27. The inquiry just concluded is said to have shown that there are more constitutions than one and why—an inadequate account of its drift—and the inquiry now announced is said to be designed to show that there are more constitutions than 'those which have been mentioned' and what they are and why this is so, but in reality the two inquiries deal with the same subject, though they are not at all in agreement (see note on 1289 b 27). Congreve, Sus., and others take 'the constitutions which have been mentioned' (*τῶν εἰρημένων*, 22) to be democracy and oligarchy, and certainly it is not easy to see what else the words can mean. But then it seems difficult not to attach the same meaning to *τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν* in 37; yet, if we do so, we must conclude that the inquiry which commences in 22 is intended to prove, not that there are more kinds of constitution than democracy and oligarchy, but that there are many varieties of democracy and oligarchy. This, however, can hardly be what it is intended to prove, for it is a point to the proof of which a separate inquiry (1291 b 15–30) is devoted. We seem, therefore, to be compelled to fall back on the only alternative open to us, which is to explain *τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν* in 37 differently from *τῶν εἰρημένων* in 22, and to take the former expression to refer to the six constitutions enumerated in c. 2.

1289 a 26–30, and the latter to refer to the two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy.

28. τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον, in c. 3. 1289 b 27.

25. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῴου προῃρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἶδη κ.τ.λ. Eucken (Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung, p. 54) distinguishes this deductive mode of arriving at a classification of animals from the inductive method by which the classification of animals is arrived at which we find in Aristotle's zoological works (for this see Dr. Ogle, Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, p. xxxiii). The two methods are mentioned side by side, as Eucken points out, in Top. 1. 8. 103 b 3 sqq. in reference to the inquiry contained in that passage how many kinds of *ταὐτόν* there are. The teaching, however, of the text as to the nature of a zoological species agrees in the main with that of the zoological works. Both there and here Aristotle bases identity of species on identity of parts: see Ogle, p. 148, who says, 'When the individuals in a group are precisely alike in all their parts, the group is a species,' and p. 141, and cp. Hist. An. 1. 6. 491 a 14 sqq. and De Part. An. 1. 4. 644 b 7 sqq. We note, indeed, one difference between the passage before us and the teaching of the zoological works, for while in them we are told that a difference in any one part suffices to produce a difference of species, we are told here that only a difference in a necessary part does so. The question then arises, what parts are necessary to an animal. The list of necessary parts here given is a good deal longer than that which we find in De Part. An. 2. 10. 655 b 29, *πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ τελείοις δύο τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα μόριά ἐστιν, ᾧ τε δέχονται τὴν τροφὴν καὶ ᾧ τὸ περίττωμα ἀφήσουσιν*, or in Hist. An. 1. 2. 488 b 29, *πάντων δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζῴων κοινὰ μόρια, ᾧ δέχεται τὴν τροφὴν καὶ εἰς ὃ δέχεται . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλλα κοινὰ μόρια ἔχει τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ζῴων πρὸς τούτοις, ᾧ ἀφίησι τὸ περίττωμα τῆς τροφῆς [καὶ ᾧ λαμβάνει]· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῦτο. καλεῖται δ' ᾧ μὲν λαμβάνει, στόμα, εἰς ὃ δὲ δέχεται, κοιλία* (where Aubert and Wimmer omit *καὶ ᾧ λαμβάνει*), or in *Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως* 2. 468 a 13, *τριῶν δὲ μερῶν ὄντων εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται πάντα τὰ τέλεια τῶν ζῴων, ἑνὸς μὲν ᾧ δέχεται τὴν τροφήν, ἑνὸς δ' ᾧ τὸ περίττωμα προΐεται, τρίτου δὲ τοῦ μέσου τούτων, τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς μεγίστοις τῶν ζῴων καλεῖται στῆθος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνάλογον . . . ὅσα δ' αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πορευτικά, πρόσκειται καὶ μόρια τὰ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν, οἷς τὸ πᾶν οἴσουσι κύτος, σκέλη τε καὶ πόδες καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν.* In the passage before us Aristotle appears rightly to mark off the parts which serve for locomotion from those which it is necessary that every animal should

possess. He can hardly mean that any and every difference in a necessary part suffices to constitute a difference of species, for in that case blue-eyed men would belong to a different species from black-eyed men. Bonitz (Ind. 151 b 54 sqq.) points out that *εἴδη* is used here and in 36 interchangeably with *γένη*, 33. See above on 1258 b 32.

πρῶτον has nothing to answer to it, for it does not seem to be taken up by *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις*, 28; the second step, however, apparently is to point out the possible varieties of each part. A similar question arises as to the use of *πρῶτον* in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 (see note).

26. *ἔνιά τε τῶν αἰσθητηρίων.* Organs of touch and taste are regarded by Aristotle as the most indispensable (De An. 3. 12. 434 b 11 sqq.): next come organs of smell. Aristotle doubts whether some animals possess organs of sight and hearing (Hist. An. 4. 8. 535 a 13 sqq.).

27. *τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικόν*, i. e. the mouth: cp. Hist. An. 2. 5. 501 b 29, *ὁ δ' ἐλέφας ὀδόντας μὲν ἔχει τέτταρας ἐφ' ἑκάτερα, οἷς κατεργάζεται τὴν τροφήν*, and *Περὶ νεότητος* 3. 469 a 2, *φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι μίαν μέν τινα ἐργασίαν ἡ τοῦ στόματος λειτουργεῖ δύναμις, ἑτέραν δ' ἡ τῆς κοιλίας περὶ τὴν τροφήν.*

28. *οἷς κινεῖται μορίοις*, like c. 5. 1292 b 8, *ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἴπομεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις.*

29. *εἰ δὴ τοσαῦτα [εἴδη] μόνον.* Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 b 12, where *εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ* similarly refers back to what has preceded. I cannot follow Thurot and Sus. in reading *εἰ δέ* in place of *εἰ δή*. As to *εἰ δή* see note on 1331 a 10, and as to *[εἴδη]* see critical note. Supply *μόρια* with *τοσαῦτα* from *μορίοις*, 28.

30. *στόματός τινα πλείω γένη.* So birds have a peculiar kind of mouth (Hist. An. 2. 12. 504 a 19, *στόμα δ' οἱ ὄρνιθες ἔχουσι μὲν ἴδιον δέ· οὔτε γὰρ χεῖλη οὔτ' ὀδόντας ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ ῥύγχος*). As to differences in the *κοιλία*, see De Part. An. 3. 14. 674 a 21 sqq. 'In homine pars motus est pes, in ave ala, in pisce pinna, et rursus in homine bini pedes, in beluis fere quaterni, et rursus in quaternis alii fissi, alii solidi' (Giph. p. 431). As to *τινὰ πλείω γένη* see note on 1319 b 34.

32. *τούτων*, sc. *τῶν διαφορῶν* (cp. 34, *διαφοράς*).

33. *πλείω γένη ζῴων.* In 25 we have *ζῴου* (not *ζῴων*) *εἴδη*. In just the same way we have in Plato, Rep. 445 D, *πέντε (τρόποι εἰσὶ) πολιτειῶν*, and in Laws 735 A, *δύο πολιτείας εἴδη.*

ταὐτὸν ζῷον, 'the same kind of animal.'

35. *τούτων*, sc. *τῶν διαφορῶν.*

συνδυασμοί, cp. c. 9. 1294 b 1 sq.

36. τοῦ ζῴου. See note on 1286 b 17.

37. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν, 'and it is the same with the constitutions that have been mentioned': i. e. there are as many kinds of them as there are possible combinations of the various forms of necessary parts of the State. For the gen. see above on 1253 b 27. As to 'the constitutions that have been mentioned' see above on 21–24. It is easy to see how differences in some of the parts of the State enumerated here (e.g. in the fighting, the judicial, the well-to-do, the deliberative, and the official classes) would cause a difference in the constitution, but how would differences in the cultivating or day-labouring class or in the class of artisans or shopkeepers do so? And to what differences in these classes does Aristotle refer? Probably he refers partly to differences in the relative numbers of these classes (for the effect of such differences on the constitution see c. 12. 1296 b 26 sqq.) and partly to differences in their composition. For instance, if the βάναυσοι or the ἀγοραῖοι or the θῆτες consisted to a large extent of persons open to exception on the score of their extraction (half-servile, it may be, or half-alien or illegitimate), and persons of this kind had access to the deliberative, the dicasteries, and the magistracies, the result would be that an advanced form of democracy would exist.

39. ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, in 3. 1. 1274 b 38 sqq., 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq., 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 27 sq., and 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 23 sq.

ἓν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For the differences between this list of the necessary parts of a State and that given in 4 (7). 8, see vol. i. p. 97.

40. οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί. Here, as in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 20 sqq., Aristotle omits from his enumeration herdsmen, shepherds, fishermen, and hunters, though these also are providers of food; perhaps he is concerned both here and there only with those whose services cannot be dispensed with. Plato had spoken in the same way in Rep. 369 D. As to the expression οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί see note on 1331 b 9.

2. ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι. We see from 3. 12. 1283 a 1291 a.
20 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 6 sqq.) that this phrase includes both the things without which a State cannot exist and the things without which it cannot exist nobly.

3. τὰς δὲ εἰς τρυφὴν ἢ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν. These are the two opposites to that which is necessary, for τὰ ἀναγκαῖα are contrasted both with

τὰ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27 sqq.) and with *τὰ καλά* (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 32 sq.).

4. τρίτον δ' ἀγοραῖον κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the article before *ἀγοραῖον* see critical note. For *τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὠνάς* cp. 1291 b 19, *τὸ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ ὠνὴν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατρῖβον*: Eth. Eud. 1. 4. 1215 a 31, *χρηματιστικὰς δὲ (τέχνας) τὰς πρὸς ἀγορὰς μὲν (ἀγοράσεις* Sylburg, Sus.) *καὶ πράσεις καπηλικάς*: Plato, Rep. 525 C, *οὐκ ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας*: and Xen. De Vect. 3. 12. Neither *τὸ ἀγοραῖον* nor *τὸ θητικόν* is included among the necessary parts of a *πόλις* in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 4 sqq., though it is afterwards implied that *τὸ θητικόν* is among them (see vol. i. p. 97), but in 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 14 sqq. buying and selling are treated as necessary incidents of life in a *πόλις*, and in the passage before us Aristotle goes farther and treats *ἔμποροι* and *κάπηλοι* as necessary classes. The term *τὸ ἀγοραῖον* is used here apparently in a sense inclusive both of *ἔμποροι* and of *κάπηλοι*, but in Xen. De Vect. 3. 12 sq. (cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 7. 6 and Plato, Rep. 371 D) *ἔμποροι* are distinguished from *ἀγοραῖοι*. The *ἀγοραῖοι* were so called because most selling was done in or near the agora (see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 469 sq.). The *βάναυσοι τεχνῖται* and the *θῆτες*, however, were frequenters of the agora as well as *οἱ ἀγοραῖοι* (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 28 sqq.). In *τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὠνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας* one *περί* serves for all the substantives because the things they represent are nearly akin. Compare the use of *περί* in 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 16 sqq. and 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 6 sqq.

6. τὸ θητικόν. The existence in ancient Greece of a numerous class of this kind deserves notice, for, according to Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 474. 4, 'the working of free persons for hire was confined in Italy within narrow limits.'

7. ὃ τούτων οὐδὲν ἧττόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. For the construction see note on 1329 a 35.

8. μὴ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for is it not impossible that it should be meet to give the name of State to a State which is by nature the slave of others?' For *ἄξιον εἶναι* cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 17 sq. For the use of *μή* here see note on 1263 a 41. As to the importance of valour to a State compare a Delphic response to Lycurgus quoted in Diod. 7. 14. 2 and the comment of Ephorus in the next section, and also Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 480.

9. τὴν φύσει δουλην, not *τύχῃ*: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 3, *ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην*.

10. αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὐταρκες. For the reversal in the order of the words see note on 1277 a 31.

τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὐταρκες. Cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 26–34, and 1. 5. 1254 b 20 sqq.

11. For ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ see note on 1342 a 32. The reference is to Rep. 369 B–371 E. For *κομψῶς, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἴρηται* Bonitz (Ind. s.v. *κομψός*) compares De Caelo, 2. 9. 290 b 14 sq. and 2. 13. 295 b 16.

φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. Contrast Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 31, *οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις.*

14. πάλιν δὲ προστίθησιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 370 D.

16. ἔτι δ' ἔμπορόν τε καὶ κάπηλον. Cp. Rep. 371 A–D. The word *κάπηλος* is often used by Plato, but seldom by Aristotle, who here repeats it from Plato. It is omitted by mistake in the Index Aristotelicus.

ταῦτα πάντα, neuter, though referring to men: see notes on 1263 a 1, 1289 b 25, and 1307 a 39, and Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 6. 13, *τἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα*, who compares Demosth. Phil. 1. 8, *κατέπτηχε πάντα ταῦτα*, and refers to Jebb's note on Soph. O. T. 1195. As to the order *ταῦτα πάντα*, not *πάντα ταῦτα*, see critical note on 1282 a 40.

γίνεται, 'comes to be': cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 5, 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39, and 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24.

17. τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7 sqq.

ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε χάριν πᾶσαν πόλιν συνεστηκυῖαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον, ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. All that Plato says is that the *πόλις comes into being* for the supply of the physical needs of those who form it, and Aristotle himself describes the πόλις in 1. 2. 1252 b 29 as *γινομένη τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν*. Still a real difference exists between them, for it is evident from the passage before us that in Aristotle's view soldiers and judges and deliberators must find a place even in the *πρώτη πόλις*, whereas Plato thinks that soldiers need not, and says nothing about judges and deliberators. Plato's language is open, in Aristotle's opinion, to another objection also. It implies that shoemakers are as necessary to a *πόλις* as cultivators, which is far from being the case.

19. τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 373 D, *οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον . . . πολεμήσομεν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαύκων*; According to 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 7 sqq. a military force is necessary not only for defence against external foes, but also to control insubordinate members of the State.

20. πρὶν ἢ . . . καταστῶσιν. See note on 1336 b 21.

22. ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . **33.** πόλεως. Cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 19–13. 1283 a 26 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 16–25. For the necessity of a judicial authority within the State, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 13 sqq.: 1. 2. 1253 a 37 sq.: 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 5 sqq. For καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι καὶ τοῖς ὁποσοισοῦν κοινωνοῖς, where ἐν is not repeated, see note on 1289 b 34.

25. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'parts of the aforesaid kind,' i. e. χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον, not πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν. For the contrast cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 28 sqq.

27. δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς. Compare the account of ἡ τῆς τῶν δικαστῶν δυνάμεως ἰδία ἀρετή given in Plato, Polit. 305 B. The reference to the δικαιοσύνη δικαστική possessed by judges and to the σύνεσις πολιτική possessed by deliberators serves to sharpen the contrast between judges and deliberators on the one hand and τὰ εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν συντείνοντα on the other, and to suggest a resemblance between the former classes and the soul.

τὸ βουλευόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 5. 1140 a 25, δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. I incline, looking to this passage, to translate σύνεσις πολιτική here as 'political prudence,' and not as 'the political art,' as Sus.[3] Ind. s. v.

28. καὶ ταῦτ' εἴτε κ.τ.λ., 'and whether these three kinds of work fall to separate classes or to the same persons makes no difference to the argument, for it often happens to the same persons to be hoplites and cultivators [and yet hoplites and cultivators are distinct parts of the State].' For the construction οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἴτε . . . εἴτε, cp. Rhet. 3. 15. 1416 a 5.

31. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα, i. e. both parts contributing to political life and parts contributing to merely necessary uses, or in other words both parts which constitute the soul of the State and parts which constitute its body.

32. τό γε ὁπλιτικόν, 'the hoplite force at any rate,' whatever we may think of other branches of the fighting class, such as trireme-oarsmen: cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 8, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς (i. e. τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον) μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως.

33. ἕβδομον. The sixth part has not been named, and some think that a mention of it has been lost in a lacuna before ἕβδομον, but probably the judicial authority (22 sqq.) is the sixth, notwith-

standing the renewed reference to it in 39 sq. That the rich are a necessary part of the State, we see from Dio Chrys. Or. 38 (2. 130 R), *εἰ δὲ πάσαις μὲν ταῖς πόλεσι, μᾶλλον δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις, δεῖ μὲν καὶ τῶν πλουσίων, ἵνα καὶ χορηγῶσι καὶ φιλοτιμῶνται ταυτὶ τὰ νενομισμένα δαπανήματα.*

34. ὄγδοον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Καί is explanatory, as often elsewhere. Hesych. (s. v. *δημιουργός*), *παρὰ τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, τὰ δημόσια πράττοντες*: Etym. Magn. (s. v. *δημιουργός*), *δημιουργοὶ δὲ ἐκαλοῦντο παρά τε Ἀργείοις καὶ Θεσσαλοῖς οἱ περὶ τὰ τέλη* (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 327. 3).

35. λειτουργοῦν. See above on 1279 a 11.

36. τοὺς δυναμένους ἄρχειν, 'those who are fit to serve as magistrates': cp. 1291 b 6 and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32.

40. ταῦτα, i. e. *τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν.* Sus.[2] (Note 1189) misses a reference to the work of *τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν*, but we often note an absence in the Politics of absolute completeness and precision.

1. ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναί τινας ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. 1291 b. These words have been interpreted in different ways. Some have taken *τῶν πολιτικῶν* as in the genitive after *τινας*: so Vet. Int. ('necessarium et aliquos politicorum esse participantes virtute'), Vict., Congreve, and Welldon. Sepulveda, however, following Aretinus and followed by Giph. and Schn., translates 'utique necesse est ut aliqui sint virtutis res civiles attingentis compotes,' while Sus. (and perhaps Lamb.) takes *τῶν πολιτικῶν* as in the genitive after *ἀρετῆς*, but makes the words masc. and not neuter. Sepulveda is probably right: cp. Plato, Laws 643 D, *τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς* (Stallbaum, 'virtutis quam negotium ipsius postulat').

2. τὰς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 25 sqq. The cultivator in ancient Greece seems to have been sometimes also a handicraftsman—an interesting fact. This is confirmed by Diod. 1. 74. 7, *παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις* (i. e. other races than the Egyptian) *ἰδεῖν ἔστι τοὺς τεχνίτας περὶ πολλὰ τῇ διανοίᾳ περισπωμένους καὶ διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν μὴ μένοντας τὸ παράπαν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐργασίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφάπτονται γεωργίας, οἱ δ' ἐμπορίας κοινωνοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.*: cp. also Plato, Rep. 397 E, 551 E sq. That cultivators and handicraftsmen were often also soldiers is well known. Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἀλλά, 7. Δυνάμεις, 'powers' or 'capacities,' such as the capacity to fight or to till the soil.

5. ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες, so that they would not admit that a separate class of men possessed of virtue is a necessary

part of the State. 'Virtue also,' as well as serving in war, tilling the soil, judging, etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 a 10, *πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι*, and 1166 b 3 sq., and also the sarcastic line of Cratinus (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 141: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 221),

ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστων πᾶσα γαργαίρει πόλις.

6. καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς ἄρχειν οἴονται δύνασθαι, so that they would not admit that a separate official class is a necessary part of the State. That the demos did not claim a share in all offices, we see from [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3 (cp. Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.). According to King George the Third (quoted by Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 484) 'every man is good enough for any place he can get.'

7. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὔποροι καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. Ταῦτα, i.e. *οἱ πενόμενοι καὶ οἱ πλουτοῦντες*, or, in Aristotle's own words, *οἱ εὔποροι καὶ οἱ ἄποροι*. **Ταῦτα** (= *οὗτοι*), like *ταῦτα* in 10, is attracted into the gender of *μέρη* (cp. *αὗτη* in 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32). Aristotle on the contrary holds that a fighting class, judges, and deliberators are parts of the State in the fullest sense, and not the rich and the poor (1291 a 24 sqq.).

9. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to *ταῦτα* see preceding note. The rich and the poor are again referred to. Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 38, *κινοῦνται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ ὅταν τἀναντία εἶναι δοκοῦντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἰσάζῃ ἀλλήλοις, οἷον οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος*, and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq., where the *ἄποροι* and the *εὔποροι* are spoken of as *ἀντικείμενα μόρια*. *Ἐναντία* is emphatic—not only parts of the State, as the rich and the poor have been said to be in 7 sq., but also opposite parts of the State, and it is into opposite parts embodying attributes which cannot be combined that a whole should be divided (cp. De Part. An. 1. 3. 643 a 31, *ἔτι τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις διαιρεῖν· διάφορα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τἀντικείμενα, οἷον λευκότης καὶ μελανία καὶ εὐθύτης καὶ καμπυλότης*). These inquirers, therefore, had something to urge in defence of their view, but they erred in supposing that all men have virtue and capacity for office. Besides, the rich and the poor are not as much opposites to each other as the good and the bad (7 (5). 3. 1303 b 15 sq.). For *μέρη . . . μορίων* see note on 1339 b 38.

11. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ., 'so that they [not only treat the rich and the poor as opposite parts of the State, but also],' etc.

κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστᾶσι. Cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 20–24 and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 27–32.

14–30. That the first sentence of this passage repeats 1290 b 21 has been remarked already (see above on 1290 b 21–24). The doctrine of c. 3 that the parts of the State are the various kinds of *δῆμος* and *γνώριμοι* reappears here intact, notwithstanding the totally different account of the parts of the State given in c. 4. 1290 b 21–1291 b 13 (see vol. i. Appendix A). Much of what is said in 1291 b 14–30 has already been said with less detail in c. 3. 1289 b 27–1290 a 2, and we hardly expect to find the ground gone over again. In severing the artisan class from *τὸ χερνητικόν* (19, 25) the passage before us differs from 3. 4. 1277 a 38 sqq.; it may also be not quite in accord with 1291 a 4 sqq. (see note on 21). We are surprised to observe that little or no account is taken of its teaching when the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy come to be distinguished in 1291 b 30–c. 6. 1293 a 34.

15. *ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ* κ.τ.λ. Plato in the Politicus (302 D sq.) had already distinguished democracy according to law from the opposite kind, and Isocrates (Areop. §§ 60, 70) had distinguished well constituted democracies from others. The Theban orator in Thuc. 3. 62. 4 had implied that a distinction exists between an *ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος* and a *δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν*, and Plato in the Politicus (301 A) had marked off oligarchy according to law, which he calls aristocracy, from oligarchy not according to law. Isocrates implies that there are two kinds of oligarchy in Panath. § 132. Aristotle advances further in the same track.

16. *καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*, 'even from what has been already said' (in c. 3. 1289 b 28 sqq.): cp. c. 6. 1292 b 23, *ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ἐστιν*. Aristotle says nothing here as to the other cause for the existence of different kinds of democracy which he points out in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 22 sqq., a passage which may probably have been written later than that before us.

18. *οἷον δήμου μὲν εἴδη* κ.τ.λ. In the terminology of the passage before us whatever does not fall under the head of *οἱ γνώριμοι* falls under that of *ὁ δῆμος*. *Ὁ δῆμος* thus becomes a term of wide extension; it includes not a few who were by no means poor; many *τεχνῖται*, for instance, were well-to-do (3. 5. 1278 a 24) and many *ἔμποροι*. The *μέσοι* or moderately well-to-do, again, of whom we read in c. 3. 1289 b 31, must here be reckoned among the demos. But the term *ὁ δῆμος* is not always thus used. We sometimes find it used in contrast not to *οἱ γνώριμοι*, but to *οἱ εὔποροι* (c. 11. 1296 a 28: c. 12. 1297 a 9 sq.: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 5 sqq.).

The demos then becomes the part of the citizen-body which is not *εὔπορον*, not the part which does not consist of *γεωρμοι*, and is consequently a less extensive class. In 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 1 sq. and 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 12 sq., again, *ὁ δῆμος* is opposed to *οἱ πλούσιοι*, and in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25 to *οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες*. The poorest classes within the demos would be the fishermen (Theocr. Idyll. 21. 16) and the day-labourers (here called *τὸ χερνητικόν*). The trireme-oarsmen at Athens must also have been poor. A demos of trireme-oarsmen would be a demos of a very special type; it would have much more national feeling than a demos of *ἔμποροι* bent on gain and wandering from one seaport to another (see Herondas, 2. 55 sqq.), but it would be somewhat inclined to war: cp. Diod. 18. 10. 1, where we read of the Athenian assembly at the outbreak of the Lamian War, *πολὺ τοῖς πλήθεσιν ὑπερεῖχον οἱ τὸν πόλεμον αἱρούμενοι καὶ τὰς τροφὰς εἰωθότες ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ μισθοφορεῖν· οἷς ποτ' ἔφησεν ὁ Φίλιππος τὸν μὲν πόλεμον εἰρήνην ὑπάρχειν, τὴν δὲ εἰρήνην πόλεμον* (this, however, was said by Philip of the orators of the Athenian assembly: see his Letter to the Athenians, c. 19). There must have been a large contingent of trireme-oarsmen in the demos of Carthage, if Meltzer (Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 136) is right in thinking that the oarsmen and sailors of the Carthaginian fleet were taken as a rule and in the main from the demos. Aristotle includes the *γεωργοί* in his enumeration here, but not *οἱ νομεῖς*, as to whom see 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sqq.

20. *καὶ τούτου κ.τ.λ.* For the distinction between *τὸ πορθμευτικόν* and *τὸ ἁλιευτικόν*, cp. Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 23, *πολλὰ καὶ ἁλιευτικὰ* (sc. *πλοῖα*) *ἔλαβε καὶ πορθμεῖα ἀνθρώπων μεστὰ καταπλέοντα ἀπὸ νήσων*, and as to the class of vessels designated by the word *πορθμεῖα* see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 483. 8. Many Tenedians seem to have been employed as sailors in vessels carrying passengers from Tenedos or other islands to the mainland, or from one side of the neighbouring Hellespont to the other. Another city in which many of the inhabitants were similarly engaged was the Boeotian city of Anthêdon on the Euripus (Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus, c. 24, *προσπεπονθότες πορθμοῖς οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ ναυπηγοί*: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 259). As to *οἱ πορθμεύοντες εἰς Ἐρυθράς* in Chios see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 592. Büchsenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 348) says, 'as to the crews of trading vessels we have no information (fehlt es uns an Nachrichten), still it is probable that they consisted to a large extent of slaves,' and he refers to Demosth.

in Apatur. c. 8, but it would seem from the passage before us that their crews often formed part of the demos and therefore must often have consisted of freemen and citizens. The Athenian orator Demades had been a *ναύτης* and a *πορθμεύς* (see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 19. 4), and the lowness of his birth was a stock reproach to him. There was a proverb *ἀπὸ κώπης ἐπὶ βῆμα*, indicating the length of the step from the one to the other. As to the fishermen of Tarentum, see Mr. A. J. Evans in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 7. 35, and as to Byzantium, Dio Chrys. Or. 35, 2. 73 R, *φέρε δή, τίνας ἄλλους τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ἀκούομεν; Βυζαντίους, χώραν τε ἀρίστην νεμομένους καὶ θάλατταν εὐκαρποτάτην· τῆς δὲ γῆς ἠμελήκασι διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς θαλάττης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ διὰ μακροῦ φέρει τὸν καρπὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ δεῖ λαβεῖν ἐργασαμένους, ἡ δὲ αὐτόθεν μηδὲν πονήσασιν.* Byzantium, as is well known, was a great centre for the tunny-fishery (Strabo, p. 320). The soil of Chios was rocky, and though its wine was good, its inhabitants must have been forced to live to a large extent by commerce, like those of Aegina (see note on 1258 a 34) and other States in a more or less similar position (see note on 1326 b 26). The passage before us shows that, whatever may have been the case in earlier times (see Isocr. De Pace, § 48, Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 326 sq., and above on 1327 b 11), in Aristotle's time many Athenian citizens served as oarsmen in the fleet. Τὸ *ἐμπορικόν*, however, must also have been a numerous class at the Peiraeus.

21. *χρηματιστικόν*, explained by *ἐμπορικόν* in 24. Aristotle appears to be speaking of seafaring men on board merchant-ships; it is not quite clear whether he includes *ἔμποροι* among them. If he does, he brings *ἔμποροι* here under the head of *τὸ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν*, not under that of *τὸ ἀγοραῖον*, as in 1291 a 4 sqq. For the contrast of *πολεμικόν* and *χρηματιστικόν*, cp. 1. 9. 1258 a 10 sqq.

25. *τὸ χερνητικόν*, here apparently = *τὸ θητικόν*, though in 3. 4. 1277 a 38 sqq. *οἱ χερνῆτες* include *ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης*.

τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον οὐσίαν, less than the *γεωργοί*, who are grouped in c. 6. 1292 b 25 sq. with persons possessing *μετρίαν οὐσίαν*.

26. *τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*, 'that which is not citizen by both parents': see vol. i. p. 248, note 1, and cp. c. 6. 1292 b 39, where *ἐλεύθεροι* seems to answer to *πολίτης* in c. 4. 1292 a 3. Cp. also Diog. Laert. 6. 4, *ὀνειδιζόμενός ποτε (Ἀντισθένης) ὡς οὐκ εἴη ἐκ δύο ἐλευθέρων, "οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ δύο," ἔφη, "παλαιστικῶν, ἀλλὰ παλαιστικός εἰμι."* At Athens, democratic though it was, the class of

'half-breeds' was looked down upon, all the more so probably because the Athenians claimed to be *αὐτόχθονες*: cp. Eurip. Ion, 529 Bothe (589 Dindorf),

> *εἶναί φασι τὰς αὐτόχθονας*
> *κλεινὰς Ἀθήνας οὐκ ἐπείσακτον γένος,*
> *ἵν' ἐσπεσοῦμαι δύο νόσῳ κεκτημένος,*
> *πατρός τ' ἐπάκτου καὐτὸς ὢν νοθαγενής.*

They were regarded as *ξένοι* (3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq.) and were often of partly servile origin (1278 a 33). Not every kind of democracy admitted them to citizenship (ibid. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6–11), and even the democracies which made them citizens did so mostly when they were short of genuine citizens, and withdrew the boon when they ceased to be so (1278 a 29 sqq.). According to Isocrates they were the bane of the States to which they belonged (Panath. § 165, *τοῖς τε μὴ δυναμένοις ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ζῆν καὶ τοῖς χεῖρον γεγονόσιν ὧν οἱ νόμοι προστάττουσιν, οἵπερ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λυμαίνονται τὰς πόλεις*: cp. Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 1532, *μαχέσθωσαν οὖν, φησί, Κλεοφῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τούτῳ ὁμοιοί εἰσι ξένοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσιν αὐτῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ κινείτωσαν πολέμους· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν πατρὶς αὕτη*). We learn from *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 13 that the class of citizens whose extraction was not pure was one of the classes which supported Peisistratus before he made himself tyrant. Many demagogues belonged to this class (Gilbert, Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens, p. 75 sqq.). It was to a corresponding class at Rome that Scipio Africanus the younger referred in the stern words which he addressed to the Roman mob, 'Taceant quibus Italia noverca est' (Val. Max. 6. 2. 3).

28. With *τῶν γνωρίμων* some such words as *εἴδη ποιοῦσιν* must apparently be supplied (Vict. 'notorum autem species constituunt divitiae,' etc.). For the fact cp. c. 3. 1289 b 33 sqq. and c. 8. 1293 b 37 sq., and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 39, *ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται.*

29. *καὶ τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν.* *Τούτοις* is neuter, though it refers to masc. and fem. substantives: see note on 1291 a 16. *Κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν* is 'fere idem quod *κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συστοιχίαν*' (Bon. Ind. 192 b 34), and *συστοιχία* = 'series notionum quae eodem genere continentur' (Bon. Ind. s. v.). Cp. Metaph. Δ. 10. 1018 a 35, *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον.*

30. *δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle now goes on to fulfil the

promise he makes in 15 sq. (cp. c. 1. 1289 a 10 sq. and c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq.) to show that there are more kinds than one of democracy and oligarchy. As to the various kinds of democracy see Essay on Constitutions. Aristotle deals with democracy before oligarchy because it is less bad than oligarchy, and the better constitutions deserve to be noticed first (c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq.). *Μὲν οὖν* is taken up by *μὲν οὖν*, 38, but to *μέν* after *πρώτη* there is nothing to answer. For the absence of the article with *δημοκρατία* cp. 3. 8. 1279 b 20, where see note. For *ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον*, 'that which is so called most in accordance with equality,' cp. Meteor. 4. 3. 381 a 9, *ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ἔψησιν λεγομένη πέψις τοῦτ' ἐστίν*. Aristotle regards this kind of democracy as placing rich and poor on a level more than any other, but his view is open to question. It placed rich and poor nominally on a level, but, as it did not provide pay, the holders of office would be unremunerated, and members of the assembly and dicasts would be so too. Hence it would be difficult for poor men to play an active part in the State, and Greek democrats would deny that this form of democracy really placed rich and poor on a level. The constitution of Rhodes as described by Cicero in De Rep. 3. 35. 48, in which pay was provided, seems to make a nearer approach to this ideal. It may, indeed, be questioned whether the kind of democracy described in the passage before us falls within the definition of democracy given in 3. 8. 1279 b 18, where democracy is said to exist when the poor are supreme, not when neither rich nor poor are supreme. It should be noticed that in the kind of democracy which ranks as first in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book—a kind which appears to answer to the first two of the chapter before us—property-qualifications for office may or may not exist; they may be entirely absent (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 31 sq.), as indeed they may be in the *πάτριος δημοκρατία* (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq.), but they may also exist, and indeed may reach a high amount in the case of the most important offices (1318 b 30 sq.), and in that case these would be quite beyond the reach of the poor.

32. τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους. *Ὑπάρχειν* is the reading of Γ M^{a} $P^{2\,3\,6}$ etc. Vat. Pal. Bekk., while $P^{1\,4}$ Ar. Sus. have *ὑπερέχειν*, but in 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 6 sqq., a passage apparently based on that before us, we have *ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξ ἴσου κατ' ἀριθμόν*. Hence Vict., followed by Schn.,

Coray, Stahr, Bonitz (Ind. 789 b 2 sqq.), and Welldon, would read ἄρχειν in place of ὑπάρχειν. It is not easy to account for the addition in the MSS. of the prefix ὑπ-, but I am inclined on the whole to think that Vict. is right, unless indeed ἄρχοντας or some such word should be added before ὑπάρχειν.

34. εἴπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., '[and the law is right,] for if,' etc. Γάρ introduces a justification of the interpretation of political equality adopted by the law of this democracy. Freedom will be enjoyed by the citizens under a democracy of this kind, because office will be open alike to all (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2 sqq.), and equality, because they will all share alike. That freedom and equality were commonly thought to go with democracy, we see from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq.: cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 19, Isocr. Areop. § 60, Plato, Rep. 562, and Plut. Themist. c. 27, where Artabanus says to Themistocles, ὑμᾶς μὲν οὖν ἐλευθερίαν μάλιστα θαυμάζειν καὶ ἰσότητα λόγος. But in 3. 6. 1279 a 21 Aristotle says that all the παρεκβάσεις are δεσποτικαί.

37. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here the test of the existence of a democracy is found in τὸ κύριον εἶναι τὸ δόξαν τοῖς πλείοσιν, notwithstanding what has been said in c. 4. 1290 a 30 sqq. See note on that passage.

39. ἄλλο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and another, the characteristic of which is that the offices are held on a property-qualification, this property-qualification being, however, small.' Δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. is added to make it clear that admissibility to office is not confined in this kind of democracy to those who at the moment of its institution happen to possess the small prescribed property-qualification, but falls of right to any one who may acquire the property-qualification from time to time, and is not retained by any one who loses it. Cp. c. 5. 1292 a 41. Μετέχειν, sc. τῶν ἀρχῶν. In τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, 39, we have the plural ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, and this occurs more frequently in such phrases than the singular ἀπὸ τιμήματος, but the latter occurs in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 7 sqq., 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 28, and elsewhere.

1292 a. **1.** For the absence of δέ after ἕτερον cp. 4, c. 16. 1300 b 20, 31, Rhet. 2. 23. 1397 a 20, ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων, and 3. 15. 1416 a 6, 13, 20, 21, 24.

2. ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι, i. e. κατὰ τὸ γένος: cp. c. 6. 1292 b 35 sq., where see note. Compare also Diog. Laert. 1. 55, καὶ ὁ ἀργὸς ὑπεύθυνος ἔστω παντὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ γράφεσθαι. To the mind of a Greek there would be a great difference between a democracy which excluded from office persons of illegitimate birth or wholly or in part of alien or slave

extraction, and a democracy which did not. Aristotle distinguishes in 3. 5. 1278 a 17 sq., 26 sqq., between democracies which admitted artisans and day-labourers to citizenship and democracies which went further and made half-aliens and *νόθοι* citizens. So Aeschines traces disastrous results to a contamination of the Athenian citizen-body (De Fals. Leg. c. 173, *παρεμπεσόντων δ' εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐλευθέρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοῖς τρόποις οὐ μετρίων κ.τ.λ.*). Compare the cry sometimes heard in France, 'À bas les Juifs! Vive la France Française!' Some States of the American Union are easier than others in admitting aliens to citizenship (Bryce, American Commonwealth, Part 3, c. 62: vol. ii. p. 440 sq.), and this no doubt affects the working of the State-constitution.

3. ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης. This answers to *ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι* in c. 6. 1292 b 39. Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 27, *ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἔν τισι δημοκρατίαις πολίτης ἐστίν.*

4. ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κ.τ.λ. *Ταὐτά* seems to mean 'the same as in the last-mentioned kind of democracy.' For *κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον* (where *τὸ πλῆθος* = *ὁ δῆμος*, cp. 11 and 26–28), compare c. 14. 1298 b 13, *συμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τε τῇ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ νῦν* (*λέγω δὲ τοιαύτην ἐν ᾗ κύριος ὁ δῆμος καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐστίν*) *κ.τ.λ.* An Attic law quoted in Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 87 and Andoc. De Myst. c. 87 contains a provision, *ψήφισμα μηδὲν μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου νόμου κυριώτερον εἶναι.* In the kind of democracy to which Aristotle here refers the assembly sets itself above the law, and passes decrees which are not in accordance with it. The majority of the Athenian assembly claims a right to do this in Xen. Hell. 1. 7. 12, *τὸν δὲ Καλλίξενον προσεκαλέσαντο παράνομα φάσκοντες γεγραφέναι Εὐρυπτόλεμός τε ὁ Πεισιάνακτος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἔνιοι ταῦτα ἐπῄνουν, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται*: cp. [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 88, *ὁ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων κυριώτατος ὢν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἁπάντων καὶ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, οὕτω καλὸν καὶ σεμνὸν ἡγήσατ' εἶναι δῶρον τὸ Ἀθηναῖον γενέσθαι, ὥστε νόμους ἔθετο αὑτῷ καθ' οὓς ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἐάν τινα βούλωνται, πολίτην*, and see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 310, on these two passages. Aeschines appears to imply in c. Timarch. c. 177 sqq. that decrees were often passed by the Athenian assembly which were in contravention of law. This may well have been the case, notwithstanding what Demosthenes says of Midias in c. Mid. c. 150, *πατρίδος τετευχὼς ἣ νόμοις τῶν ἁπασῶν πόλεων μάλιστα οἰκεῖσθαι δοκεῖ.*

That Aristotle objects to rule uncontrolled by law, except in the case of the absolute king, we have seen already (see note on 1272 b 7 and cp. also 3. 16. 1287 a 28 sqq.). His statement that when the decrees of the assembly come to be supreme and not the law, this is due to the demagogues, appears to be inconsistent with the statement which he makes immediately after, that demagogues do not arise except in the kind of democracy in which the law is already not supreme. Elsewhere he does not seem to hold that demagogues do not exist in democracies according to law, for he implies in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 29 sqq. that Peisistratus was a demagogue, yet he cannot think that in those early times a democracy existed at Athens in which decrees, not laws, were supreme: see also 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq., where it is implied that demagogy is practised even in the *πατρία δημοκρατία*. In c. 6. 1292 b 41 sqq. the rise of the ultimate kind of democracy is traced to a different cause; it is ascribed not to the flattery of the assembly by demagogues, but to profounder causes—to an increase of the States in populousness and in revenue and to the provision of pay. It is implied in 36 sq. that the difference between a law and a decree of the assembly is that a law is universal in its terms, whereas a decree is drawn to meet the shifting circumstances of the moment (cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 14. 1137 b 27 sqq.) and is not universal. Yet we find an instance of a decree of an universal character in Plut. Aristid. c. 22, *γράφει* (*ὁ Ἀριστείδης*) *ψήφισμα κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἱρεῖσθαι*. We might infer from what Aristotle says here that it was the assembly only that shook off the restraints of law in the ultimate democracy, but it would seem from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25–36 that the individual citizens also did so. Did the dicasteries in an ultimate democracy observe the laws? Aristotle appears to be silent as to this in the Politics.

7. **τοὺς δημαγωγούς.** The word *δημαγωγός*, which appears to be modelled on *παιδαγωγός*, is occasionally used in a neutral sense of influential *ῥήτορες* in general (e.g. in Thuc. 4. 21. 3, Isocr. De Antid. § 234, and [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 4), and in 2. 12. 1274 a 14 we hear of *δημαγωγοὶ φαῦλοι* and in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 26 of *δημαγωγοὶ πονηροί*, so that we conclude that Aristotle regarded some demagogues as good, but he commonly uses the word in an unfavourable sense of those among them who habitually flattered the demos. Here the *δημαγωγός* is tacitly contrasted with *οἱ βέλτιστοι*

τῶν πολιτῶν, 'the upper class of citizens.' The word is for obvious reasons seldom used by the Attic Orators (with the exception of Isocrates), and, if one may judge by the silence of Ast's Lexicon Platonicum, never by Plato.

ἐν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Supply πόλεσι (with Welldon). Cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 28, ἕως μὲν οὖν Περικλῆς προειστήκει τοῦ δήμου βελτίω τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ἦν, τελευτήσαντος δὲ Περικλέους πολὺ χείρω. πρῶτον γὰρ τότε προστάτην ἔλαβεν ὁ δῆμος οὐκ εὐδοκιμοῦντα παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις ἀεὶ διετέλουν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς δημαγωγοῦντες: Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 681 (quoted by Sandys): and Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 14 sq. (see note).

9. οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν, 'the upper class of citizens': cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 34 (where οἱ βέλτιστοι = οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ γνώριμοι): Isocr. Hel. § 33 (τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν πολιτῶν): Diod. 11. 86. 5 (οἱ χαριέστατοι τῶν πολιτῶν): Plut. Phocion, c. 34 (οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν): Thuc. 8. 47 (τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων): Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 6 (οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν Μαντινέων), and Grote's remarks on this passage in Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76 (vol. 10. 50, note). It was no doubt a name which this class of the citizens had given themselves (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 22). But the phrase is sometimes used in a more purely ethical sense, e.g. in Isocr. De Pace, § 119, and perhaps in Panath. § 148. In c. 8. 1293 b 41 we have τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, and in Xen. Hell. 1. 4. 13 κράτιστος τῶν πολιτῶν, used in this ethical sense.

εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ = εἰσὶν οἱ μίγιστοι (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22).

11. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται κ.τ.λ., 'for there' (i.e. where the laws are not supreme) 'the demos becomes a monarch.' The picture of a tyrant Demos surrounded by flatterers comes to Aristotle from the Equites of Aristophanes: cp. Eq. 1111 Didot,

ὦ Δῆμε, καλὴν γ' ἔχεις
ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἄν-
θρωποι δεδίασί σ' ὥσ-
περ ἄνδρα τύραννον.
Ἀλλ' εὐπαράγωγος εἶ,
θωπευόμενός τε χαί-
ρεις κ.τ.λ.

and 1330,

δείξατε τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡμῖν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆσδε μόναρχον.

Compare 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 38 sqq., 2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq., and 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31 sqq. It is when a democracy or an oligarchy (c. 6. 1293 a 17 sqq.) comes to be like a monarchy that law ceases to be supreme and men become supreme in place of it.

18. Ὅμηρος, in Il. 2. 203 sqq., where Odysseus addressing men of the people says,

> *οὐ μέν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοί.*
> *οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω,*
> *εἷς βασιλεύς, ᾧ ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω.*

Aristotle sees that there may be two kinds of **πολυκοιρανίη**, one in which the ruler is one, though made up of many individuals, and another in which there are more rulers than one. As to the evils of the latter kind, see Thuc. 6. 72. 3, Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 18, and Isocr. Nicocl. § 24 sq.

15. ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος κ.τ.λ., 'be that as it may, the kind of demos we have mentioned,' etc., as in 23, though in 17 the same words must mean (as in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 11) 'a democracy of the kind we have mentioned.' By **ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος** is meant a demos which is not ruled by law. For the thought cp. Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 426 Nauck (506, ed. 2),

> *πάντων τύραννος ἡ τύχη ἐστὶ τῶν θεῶν,*
> *τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ὀνόματα ταῦτα πρόσκειται μάτην·*
> *μόνη διοικεῖν οὖν ἅπαντα βούλεται,*

or, if we adopt Nauck's reading in his second edition,

> *μόνη διοικεῖ γοῦν ἅπαντ' ἃ βούλεται.*

17. ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι. Cp. 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 38 sqq.: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 234 sqq.: Aristoph. Eq. 1116 Didot: Demosth. Phil. 3. 4.

καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1292 b 7 sqq., 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 5 sq., 37 sq., and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq. Had this been said of the ultimate democracy by any one before? Aristotle, however, does not probably mean to say that this kind of democracy is as bad as tyranny, for tyranny combines in itself the evils of the extreme forms of oligarchy and democracy (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3 sqq., 1311 a 8 sqq.: see also above on 1289 a 39).

19. δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιόνων. Cp. c. 10. 1295 a 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. In the first, or most moderate, form of democracy the **ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ γνώριμοι** are not ruled by men worse than themselves (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 35 sqq.).

20. τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, the technical term for the 'ukases' of tyrants: cp. Plato, Laws 722 E, *τυραννικὸν ἐπίταγμα*, and 859 A: Stob. Floril. 99. 34, *ὦ φιλοσοφία, τυραννικά σου τὰ ἐπιτάγματα*, and Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 185, where, however, it is implied that oligarchies

issue *ἐπιτάγματα* as well as tyrants: also (with Vict.) Demosth. Ol. 2. 30, *εἰ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ὥσπερ ἐκ τυραννίδος ὑμῶν ἐπιτάττειν ἀποδώσετε. Προστάγματα δεσποτῶν* occurs in Plut. Pelop. c. 34.

καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. Cp. 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 40 and Aristot. Fragm. 421. 1548 a 24, *τῶν δημαγωγῶν τὰ πλήθη κολακευόντων, ὡς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν πολιτείαις* (referred to in Bon. Ind. 174 a 38). *Καί* before *ἀνάλογον* means 'or,' as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8, *δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων*. See also note on 1294 a 35.

23. τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. For the omission of *παρά*, see notes on 1274 b 12 and 1295 a 29.

25. πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δῆμον, everything, even matters regulated by law. For *ἀνάγοντες* cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 32 sqq. and 2. 8. 1267 b 40. For the fact cp. c. 15. 1300 a 3 sq. and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 29 sqq.

28. ἔτι δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες κ.τ.λ., 'and further those who bring charges against the magistrates [also add to the supremacy of the people, for they] say,' etc. Not a few held that the many were the fittest judges of disputed questions when the arguments of the contending parties had been placed before them (3. 11: 3. 16. 1287 b 23 sqq.: so Athenagoras in Thuc. 6. 39. 1).

29. δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν, 'receives the invitation' to decide the question at issue. *Δέχεσθαι τὴν πρόκλησιν* is a phrase of frequent occurrence (Thuc. 3. 64. 5: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 39 *init.*: Plut. Pyrrh. c. 12 *init.*, Sulla, c. 22 *sub fin.*), and in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 41 we have *τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον πρόκλησιν*. Thus there is little doubt that *πρόκλησιν* is the true reading here, and not *πρόσκλησιν*, though the latter reading has the support of Vat. Pal. as well as Π^1.

ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί, as well as the law. Even the Boulê (c. 15. 1299 b 38 sqq.: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.).

31. ὁ φάσκων. Plato is probably referred to: cp. Rep. 557 C sqq., Laws 712 E, and Plut. Dion, c. 53, *ἐπενόει δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν, ὡς οὐ πολιτείαν ἀλλὰ παντοπώλιον οὖσαν πολιτειῶν κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα κ.τ.λ.*

οὐ πολιτείαν. For the position of the negative see Waitz on Categ. 6. 4 b 22 and Bon. Ind. 539 a 5 sqq.

32. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. Cp. 2. 10. 1272 b 9 sqq. If it is objected that the absolute kingship, in which laws do not rule, is nevertheless a form of constitution,

Aristotle's reply would probably be that the absolute king is himself a law.

δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the law ought to rule over everything, and the magistrates and the citizen-body to decide [only] in reference to particulars.' For the suppression of 'only' see note on 1282 a 36. Aristotle probably remembers the saying of Pindar quoted in Hdt. 3. 38 (cp. Plut. Demetr. c. 42), *ὀρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι.* The magistrates and the citizen-body should decide about particulars, because the magistrates will deal with some things best and the citizen-body with others (3. 11. 1281 b 21–38: 3. 15. 1286 a 26 sqq.: 3. 16. 1287 b 15 sqq.). For the gen. *τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα*, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Gerth, § 417. 4. Anm. 10 c (p. 363), where Plato, Rep. 576 D, *ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἡ ἄλλως κρίνεις*; is referred to (see Stallbaum's note), and cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 36, *αἱ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενόν εἰσι τῶν κοινῶν* (see note on 1322 b 37). For *πολιτεία* in the sense of 'universitas civium' see Bon. Ind. s. v. and Liddell and Scott.

35. *ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται.* Cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 41, where we read of Athens, *ἁπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν πεποίηκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις, ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμός ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν*, and Cic. De Rep. 1. 27. 43, Athenienses quibusdam temporibus sublato Areopago nihil nisi populi scitis ac decretis agebant. Contrast the language of Demosthenes about Athens in c. Timocr. c. 152, *ἡ γὰρ πόλις ἡμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, νόμοις καὶ ψηφίσμασι διοικεῖται.*

36. *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου*, and in constitutions the universal rules, because law rules in them and law is an embodiment of the universal.

C. 5. **39.** As to the various kinds of oligarchy see Essay on Constitutions.

40. *μὴ μετέχειν*, sc. *τῶν ἀρχῶν*, or, which is the same thing, *τῆς πολιτείας.*

πλείους ὄντας. But suppose the poor are not more numerous but fewer than the privileged class, does not an oligarchy exist even then? The answer given in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 19 sq. is 'No,' but in 3. 8. 1280 a 1 sqq. 'Yes.' In the polity the class which shares in the advantages of the constitution is more numerous than that which does not (c. 13. 1297 b 4 sqq.). Even in an oligarchy the privileged class ought to be *stronger* than those excluded (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 26 sqq.).

41. *ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας.* That this was the rule in the first form of oligarchy is confirmed by 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 25 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26–28). The words before us are added because even where the property-qualification was not high, admission to the privileged class might be made subject to additional conditions, such as the abandonment of trade or selection by the authorities (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26 sqq.).

1. *ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί.* Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 1292 b. 21 sqq.

καὶ αἱρῶνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας. *Αὐτοί* is usually explained to mean 'the office-holders,' but in c. 6. 1293 a 23, where the kind of oligarchy referred to in the passage before us is further described, *αὐτοί* means *οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες*, or in other words 'the class which has access to office, the members of the *πολίτευμα*,' and that is probably what it means here. *Τοὺς ἐλλείποντας* is explained in c. 6. 1293 a 24 by *τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας*. I can hardly think, therefore, that the explanation of Bonitz (Ind. 238 b 10), 'eos magistratus qui desunt,' is correct.

2. *ἂν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* *Ἐκ πάντων τούτων*, 'from all those who possess this property-qualification.' For *τούτων* thus used cp. *ταῦτα*, 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 24, and see note on 1252 a 33. Aristotle regards this mode of electing as comparatively aristocratic, and the mode in which the choice is made from a designated section of those who possess the property-qualification as oligarchical, because, when some elect out of all, the arrangement is aristocratic (c. 15. 1300 b 4 sq.), and when some elect out of some, oligarchical (1300 b 1 sq.).

5. *εἰσίῃ*, sc. *εἰς τὰς ἀρχάς* (so Stahr and Welldon), or possibly *εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα*, not, I think, *εἰς τὴν βουλήν* (as Bonitz suggests, Ind. 224 b 15, where c. 14. 1298 b 2 sqq. is compared).

6. *τε* is displaced; it should follow *ὑπάρχῃ*, not *τό*.

7. *καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.* This echoes the corresponding remark about the extreme democracy in c. 4. 1292 a 17.

For *ἀντίστροφος ὥσπερ*, cp. De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 3, *ὅτι ἀνάλογον ὡς τοῖς ἄρρεσιν ἡ γονὴ οὕτω τοῖς θήλεσι τὰ καταμήνια, φανερόν.* Aristotle probably has before him here Thuc. 3. 62. 4, where the Thebans say, *ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν· ὅπερ δέ ἐστι νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα.* See also c. 6. 1293 a 31 and 2. 10. 1272 b 7–11.

9. καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'and further they call,' etc. For καὶ ... δή see note on 1253 a 18. Vict. 'quare addit, vocare consuerunt hunc dominatum paucorum dynastiam, quia par similisque est huiuscemodi principatui: dynastas vero appellare mos erat regulos.' Zeus is called a δυνάστης in Soph. Antig. 609. For the term δυναστεία see (with C. F. Hermann) Thuc. 3. 62. 4 (quoted above) and 4. 78. 3: Andoc. De Reditu, c. 27: Plato, Rep. 544 D: Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 46: Isocr. Paneg. § 105.

11. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν κ.τ.λ. This remark is added to convey a caution: compare the similar caution introduced by δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν in 3. 1. 1275 a 34 sqq. We must not suppose that the list of democracies and oligarchies just given exhausts the subject. It is not the case that the only democratically ruled States are those in which the constitution as embodied in the laws is democratic, and the only oligarchically ruled States those in which it is oligarchical. There are virtual as well as actual democracies and oligarchies. A State may be democratically ruled, though its constitution is oligarchical, if its customs and training are democratic, and a State may be oligarchically ruled, though its constitution is democratic, if its customs and training are oligarchical. When the constitution is not in harmony with the prevailing customs and training, the reason usually is that a revolution has occurred which has affected the customs and training of the State, but has not yet affected its constitution. Under circumstances of this kind the law is often the last thing to be changed. Plato had already spoken to much the same effect (Rep. 424 D: see vol. i. p. 78, note 1). It is interesting to observe that revolutions of a democratic or oligarchical nature were attended with changes of customs and training. A democratic revolution would bring with it an alteration in the bearing of the poor to the rich and of the rich to the poor, and an oligarchical revolution an alteration of an opposite kind. Mr. Bryce (American Commonwealth, end of c. 76) refers to England as a country 'where, though the constitution has become democratic, the habits of the nation are still aristocratic': this is the reverse change to that described by Aristotle. For συμβαίνειν followed by ὥστε see note on 1261 a 34. For the distinction between οἱ νόμοι and τὸ ἔθος καὶ ἡ ἀγωγή, cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 103, ἐὰν μὴ ὄντων τῶν νόμων κατὰ ἔθη καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα χρηστῶς πολιτεύωνται, for ἐπιτηδεύματα = ἀγωγή, as we see from Diod. 11. 87. 5, καὶ καθόλου πολλοὶ τὰ φαῦλα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀντὶ τῆς παλαιᾶς καὶ σπουδαίας ἀγωγῆς

ἠλλάττοντο. Some light is thrown on the meaning of *ἀγωγή* by Diod. 9. 1. 4, *ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς Σόλων τὴν ὅλην ἀγωγὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐχούσης Ἰωνικήν, καὶ διὰ τὴν τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ῥᾳστώνην ἐκτεθηλυμμένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μετέθηκε τῇ συνηθείᾳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ ζῆλον τῶν ἀρρενωπῶν πράξεων.*

14. The subject of **πολιτεύεσθαι** is probably *τὴν πολιτείαν*, 12, as the subject of *ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι*, 16, is *τὴν πολιτείαν*, 15 (cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 1): compare Plato, Laws 701 E, *τούτων ἕνεκα δὴ πολιτείας τήν τε δεσποτικωτάτην προελόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερικωτάτην ἐπισκοποῦμεν νυνί, ποτέρα τούτων ὀρθῶς πολιτεύεται*, and see note on 1293 b 8.

18. **οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν**, sc. *ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν*, or *vice versa*, 'for they' (i. e. the citizens of the State which undergoes a change of constitution) 'do not [in this case] change at once from the one constitution to the other' (cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D). Bonitz (Ind. s. v. *μεταβαίνειν*) supplies *αἱ πολιτεῖαι*, but it seems better to supply the same subject with *μεταβαίνουσιν* and with *ἀγαπῶσι*.

19. **παρ' ἀλλήλων**, i. e. the oligarchical party from the democratic or *vice versa*.

23. **ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων**, i. e. probably from the account which C. 6. has been given in c. 4. 1291 b 17 sqq. of the different *εἴδη* or *μέρη τοῦ δήμου*. The reference may, however, possibly be to c. 3. 1289 b 32 sq. and 1290 a 3–5. For in one form of democracy (the ultimate form) all these kinds of demos both share (*μετέχουσι*) in the constitution and take an active part in its working (*κοινωνοῦσι*), whereas in two at any rate of the three other forms not all of them even share in it, access to a share in it being accorded in the one to those only who acquire a certain property-qualification, and in the other to those whose extraction is unimpeachable, while in all three those who share in the constitution (owing to the absence of revenues and consequently of pay) have not the leisure to take an active part in its working.

25. **τὸ γεωργικὸν καὶ τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν**. The *γεωργοί* are a part only of *τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν*, for the *νομεῖς* also belong to this category (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 9 sqq.) and probably other classes. The *γεωργοί* of Aristotle are evidently peasant-proprietors, and the *νομεῖς* also may have been owners of land as well as of the herds and flocks they tended (see notes on 1318 b 9 and 1319 a 19, and for cases of the existence of democracies of this kind see note on 1318 b 10). We read of *μετρία οὐσία* here and in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sq., and the class which is here said to have *μετρία οὐσία* appears to be the same as that which is said in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11 sq. to

have *μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν*: we read, again, of *οὐσία μέση καὶ ἱκανή*, a larger amount apparently, in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 40, of *μικρὰ οὐσία* in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 and *οὐσία βραχεῖα* in 2. 7. 1267 a 9 sq., and of *μακρὰ οὐσία* and *μακραὶ οὐσίαι* in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 16 and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11.

28. *τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες*, 'setting the law over men's doings as a ruler': cp. Plut. Solon, c. 21, *ἐπέστησε δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐξόδοις τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἑορταῖς νόμον ἀπείργοντα τὸ ἄτακτον καὶ ἀκόλαστον*, and c. 6. 1293 a 20, *ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτούς*.

ἐκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11, *διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχολοι (ὁ γεωργικὸς δῆμος), ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν*. It was when meetings of the assembly came to be frequent that it was led to draw all authority to itself (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 3 sq.) and to set itself above the law.

29. *τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν κ.τ.λ.* So that not only does the class in possession of power rule in accordance with law, but the admission of those outside it to its ranks is also regulated by law, and indeed by a law which does not leave it free to admit or exclude whomsoever it pleases: contrast the law referred to in 1293 a 23 sqq. *Μετέχειν*, sc. *τῆς πολιτείας* (cp. 39), or in other words *τῶν ἀρχῶν*, though the *γεωργοί* and *οἱ κεκτημένοι μετρίαν οὐσίαν* would enjoy only a nominal access to office, as they would not be rich enough to hold office without pay (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 13 sqq.), and pay is not forthcoming in this kind of democracy. It is not clear whether in democracies of this type purity of extraction is made a condition of sharing in the constitution, as well as the possession of a certain property-qualification, but this may be Aristotle's meaning.

30. *ὅλως μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 'for that it should not be open on any terms to all to share in the constitution is characteristic of an oligarchy [and inappropriate to a democracy], but that it should be open to all to do so is characteristic of a democracy; hence it is open [in this form of democracy] to all who have acquired the property-qualification to share in the constitution, but it is impossible [for the ruling class in it] to take leisure in the absence of revenues, [and consequently to hold office].' As to the text of this passage see critical note on 1292 b 30–33. *Ὅλως* qualifies *μὴ ἐξεῖναι*: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8, *ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτῆσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπό τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν*. For the repetition of *μέν*

cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 23–26 and Plato, Rep. 421 A, *εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν φύλακας ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιοῦμεν ἥκιστα κακούργους τῆς πόλεως κ.τ.λ.* For *δὲ δή* cp. 1293 a 21 and c. 11. 1295 a 34. '*Δὲ δή* secundum usum vulgarem Aristoteles ita adhibet, ut *δή* "manifesto fere" (sed lenior vis est particulae *δή*) significans oppositionem urgueat, id quod maxime post *εἰ* fit' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 46). For *τὸ μὲν ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν*, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2, *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικόν*, and 3. 11. 1281 b 28 sq. By *πρόσοδοι* are meant special revenues providing a surplus which can be distributed as pay or otherwise (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29 sqq.). These revenues might be derived from dependent allies or from an emporium (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 29 sq.) or from a monopoly of some special product such as the silphium at Cyrene ([Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 a 5 sqq.). See note on 1320 a 17. '

33. **τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἓν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας**, 'this then is one kind of democracy by reason of these causes': i. e. it is marked off from other kinds by the fact that, while it opens office to all who can acquire a moderate property-qualification, and therefore is a democracy, office in it falls to those who are enabled by adequate means to take leisure. For *διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας* cp. 1293 a 10 sqq. and c. 10. 1295 a 23, *τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.*

35. **διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν.** I follow Spengel, Sus., and Bonitz (Ind. 18 b 52) in reading *διαίρεσιν* in place of *αἵρεσιν*, which is the reading of Γ Π Bekk. Sus. translates *διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν*, 'durch die zunächst angrenzende Unterscheidung' ('by reason of the distinction which stands next in order'). *Διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην αἵρεσιν* is rendered by Sepulveda 'per proximam rationem mandandi magistratus,' and so Vict., Lamb., and others. I should prefer the rendering 'by reason of the choice [of a ruling class] which stands next in order,' if *αἵρεσιν* were retained, but it seems better to read *διαίρεσιν.*

καὶ πᾶσιν . . . τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, 'to all those also who are not open to objection on the score of extraction,' as well as to those who possess a certain property-qualification. For *τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος*, see above on 1292 a 2, and cp. Libanius' Life of Demosthenes (prefixed to Bekker's Demosthenes, p. 5), *Δημοσθένει τοίνυν τῷ ῥήτορι πατὴρ ἦν Δημοσθένης, ἀνεπίληπτος τῷ γένει δοκῶν*: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 169, *οἶμαι τοίνυν ἅπαντας ἂν ὑμᾶς ὁμολογῆσαι τάδε δεῖν ὑπάρξαι τῷ δημοτικῷ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐλεύθερον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ πρὸς μητρός, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸ γένος ἀτυχίαν δυσμενὴς ᾖ*

τοῖς νόμοις οἱ σώζουσι τὴν δημοκρατίαν: Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13. l. 22, οἱ τῷ γένει μὴ καθαροί.

39. ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι answers to ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης in c. 4. 1292 a 3. It would seem from c. 4. 1291 b 26, τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, that even those who were the offspring of only one citizen parent would be accounted ἐλεύθεροι.

40. ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. Because, as there is no revenue to furnish the ruling class with pay, they cannot meet in the popular assembly often enough to usurp the place of the law (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 3 sq.).

1293 a. 1. ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. Cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 29, τὴν νεωτάτην δημοκρατίαν. Aristotle's language in 3. 4. 1277 b 1, διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον, suggests that he regarded the ultimate democracy as not having been introduced very recently.

διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Does τὰς πόλεις here mean 'cities' or 'States'? Ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι in the preceding sentence means 'in the States'; it is probably, therefore, better to take τὰς πόλεις to mean 'States,' but when States are said to have grown larger, or in other words more populous (for, notwithstanding 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 24 sq., μείζων seems here to mean 'more populous'), the increase referred to in their population is no doubt an increase in the population, and especially the citizen-population, of the central city and its seaport, if it has one, not an increase in the rural population. Hence the meaning of the passage is much the same, whether we translate τὰς πόλεις 'cities' or 'States.' That an increase in the size and populousness of a State was favourable to democracy, and in particular to extreme democracy, we see from 3. 15. 1286 b 20 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sq.: cp. Isocr. Areop. § 62, τῶν τοίνυν ἄλλων πόλεων ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις καὶ μεγίσταις . . . εὑρήσομεν τὰς δημοκρατίας μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας συμφερούσας. Athens is described by Critias in Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 24 as 'the most populous of Greek States.' This increase in population would lead to an increase of revenue, because a large part of the revenue of Greek States was derived from imposts which would become more productive as the population of the State increased, such as customs, market-dues (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 29 sq.), fees and fines in the lawcourts, and the like, to say nothing of the probability that the State, as it became more populous, would acquire dependent allies and would receive tribute from them. Compare Xen. Anab. 7. 1. 27 and Demosth. Phil. 3.

40. An ultimate democracy might, however, exist where there were no *πρόσοδοι* (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sqq.). For *προσόδων εὐπορίας* cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 2. 1422 a 13, *προσόδων εὐπορία* (with Bonitz), and for the plural *εὐπορίας* Demosth. De Pace, c. 8, *τοῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἐνθάδε τὰς εὐπορίας ἄγουσιν*, and Diod. 12. 30. 1, *διὰ τὰς προειρημένας εὐημερίας*.

3. μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους, 'all share in the constitution on account of the superiority' (in number, not in quality) 'of the multitude': cp. c. 12. 1296 b 24, *ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου*, and 1296 b 34.

4. κοινωνοῦσι δὲ καὶ πολιτεύονται. Cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 15, *ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίος)*. For *κοινωνοῦσι* cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 2. **Πολιτεύεσθαι** is a wider term than *ἄρχειν*: it includes sharing in any kind of political activity, for instance habitual attendance at the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries. Pay enabled the poor to attend frequent meetings of the assembly (Plato, Rep. 565 A: Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 1 sqq.).

6. τὸ τοιοῦτον πλῆθος, 'the kind of multitude we have described,' i. e. one composed of poor men receiving pay.

8. τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq. Aristotle does not say that the rich often did not belong to the Boulê, but this seems to be a natural inference from these passages. It is hardly likely that at Athens, if the lot fell on them and they declined to serve, they were forced to do so. They do not appear to have been liable to any fine for refusing to serve on the dicasteries (c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.), and they were probably not liable to a fine if they declined to serve on the Boulê. As to the absence of the rich from the dicasteries at Athens see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 289.

10. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1295 a 23 sq., and for *διὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀνάγκας* (with Bon. Ind. 43 b 42) De Caelo, 1. 8. 277 a 11, *τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις καὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀνάγκαις*: cp. also Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 560 Kühn, *ὑπὸ τουτέων τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐ πολύγονόν ἐστιν τὸ γένος τὸ Σκυθικόν*, and De Morbis, 4. vol. ii. p. 348 Kühn, *κατ' ἀνάγκην τοιήνδε*, and Iamblich. Protrept. 96. 1 (quoted by Blass, De Antiphonte Sophista Iamblichi auctore, Fragm. E, p. 15), *διὰ ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς ἀνάγκας τόν τε νόμον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐμβασιλεύειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*. In Plato, Rep. 489 D, *τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας*

τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διέλθωμεν, the word *ἀνάγκη* is explained as = 'causa' by Ast, Lex. Platon. s. v.

12. **τὰ δὲ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας**, sc. *τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν*.

15. **καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι κ.τ.λ.** For *τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος* cp. c. 13. 1297 b 9. We see from what follows that the mere numerousness of the dominant class does not by itself suffice to secure the supremacy of the law, if the dominant class possesses leisure, being either so rich as to be able to live without paying close attention to its property or so poor as to be supported by State-pay. The class which is supreme in an ultimate democracy is very numerous, and yet it becomes collectively a monarch, because it possesses leisure, being supported by State-pay.

17. We expect *ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλεῖον κ.τ.λ.* to be answered by *τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν*, but the clause is in fact answered by *ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν* without *τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον*. This is probably due to the interposition of *καὶ μήτε . . . πόλεως* between *ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλεῖον ἀπέχωσι τῆς μοναρχίας* and *ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν*. It rarely happens that *τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον* is omitted after *ὅσῳ* with a comparative. Kühner (Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 582. ii. 2. Anm. 1), however, gives an instance of this from Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 14, *καὶ χάριν σοι εἴσομαι ὅσῳ ἂν πλεονάκις εἰσίῃς ὡς ἐμέ*, and another will be found in Demosth. Prooem. 51. p. 1457, *ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλεονάκις ἐξετάζῃ τις αὐτά, ἀνάγκη τοὺς τούτων αἰτίους εὐδοκιμεῖν*.

20. Vict., Eaton, and Sus. take **αὐτοῖς** to be in the dative after **ἄρχειν** (Vict. 'statuere ut lex ipsis imperet'), but the Index Aristotelicus gives no instance of *ἄρχειν* governing the dative, and perhaps we should rather translate 'for them' (Welldon, 'in their case'). The position of the word makes it unlikely that it is to be taken with *ἀνάγκη*.

22. **πλείω δέ**, sc. *οὐσίαν ἔχωσι*.

24. For **τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας**, cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 171. 60 (vol. i. p. 270), *τοὺς καταχωριζομένους εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα*.

26. **τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον**, 'they enact the law in terms of that kind,' i. e. to the effect that the members of the *πολίτευμα* shall have the power to elect those who are to be admitted into it from the outside. In the third form of oligarchy the law provides that when a member of the *πολίτευμα* dies, his son shall succeed him, so that in this form no one is admitted from outside (28 sqq.). For

τίθενται τοιοῦτον, cp. De Part. An. 4. 5. 680 b 27, *διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δ' αἰτίαν καὶ ἡ κοιλία τοιαύτη ἔσχισται.*

ἐπιτείνωσι, 'strain matters further in the direction of excess.' For *ἐπιτείνειν*, 'non addito obiecto,' Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) refers to 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 26, 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30, and Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 23.

28. For **δι' αὑτῶν ἔχειν** cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 12, and Aristid. Leuctr. 1. p. 421, *λέγειν γὰρ ἔφη πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ πλεονεκτημάτων, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν θάλατταν δι' αὑτῶν ἕξουσιν.*

29. **τῶν τελευτώντων**, 'those who from time to time die': cp. 2. 8. 1268 a 8, and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 20, *τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις*, and 1322 b 21: also Plut. Lycurg. c. 26 *init.* See note on 1324 b 18.

31. **ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν** repeats Thuc. 3. 62. 4, quoted above on 1292 b 7. *Ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία*, i. e. a *δυναστεία τῶν πολὺ ὑπερτεινόντων ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις.*

33. **ἀντίστροφον τῷ τελευταίῳ τῆς δημοκρατίας.** Cp. c. 14. 1298 a 31 sqq.

35. **Ἔτι δ' εἰσὶ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and further there are,' etc. Besides that there are more kinds of democracy and oligarchy than one, there are other constitutions besides democracy and oligarchy. Aristotle has now dealt with the question which stands first in the programme contained in c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq., the question how many varieties of democracy and oligarchy there are, and we expect that he will pass on to the next, *τίς πολιτεία κοινοτάτη καὶ τίς αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν*, but this he does not do; he does not deal with this question till c. 11, and cc. 7–10 are occupied with investigations respecting constitutions which have not hitherto been sufficiently studied. Aristocracy has been studied, so far as it is coincident with the best constitution, but the 'so-called aristocracy' (which, it would seem from 1293 a 38 sq., was the only form of aristocracy commonly included in enumerations of constitutions) has not been studied, nor have polity and tyranny. These forms are therefore dealt with in cc. 7–10, before Aristotle passes on to the question *τίς πολιτεία κοινοτάτη καὶ τίς αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν.* Aristotle has, in fact, already promised in c. 2. 1289 a 35 sqq. to treat of polity and tyranny as well as of democracy and oligarchy, so that we are prepared for the investigations contained in cc. 7–10 with the exception of those relating to the so-called aristocracy. In 35 his words are *παρὰ δημοκρατίαν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν*, but in strictness he should have said *παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ μοναρχίαν* C. 7.

(cp. c. 8. 1294 a 26). When he says that all included aristocracy in their list of constitutions, his statement is not literally correct (see vol. i. p. 211, note 1). The view, however, that there were four constitutions, monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, was no doubt a common one; we trace it in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 22 sq., in Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 29 sq., and in the title of the Πολιτεῖαι ascribed to Aristotle, Πολιτεῖαι πόλεων δυοῖν δεούσαιν ρξ̄ . . . δημοκρατικαί, ὀλιγαρχικαί, ἀριστοκρατικαί, τυραννικαί (where however τυραννίς takes the place of monarchy, and kingship is omitted), Aristot. Fragm. 1465 b (143).

36. ὧν τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν λέγουσί τε πάντες καὶ εἴρηται κ.τ.λ. For the structure of the sentence cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 27, ὅσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἑστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμήν.

38. τέταρτον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην ἀριστοκρατίαν, 'and in the fourth place the so-called aristocracy.' Aristotle appears to imply that no one had yet included in their list the true aristocracy, that in which the good citizen is also a good man. Even the aristocracy sketched in Plato's Republic would count among its citizens many who could not be called good men in the sense which Aristotle attaches to the term.

39. πέμπτη δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. The existence of the 'polity' specially so called was generally recognized (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν, cp. c. 8. 1293 b 34 sqq.), but those who sought to enumerate the different kinds of constitutions had omitted it from their lists. As to Plato, indeed, all that Aristotle says is that he had not included the polity in the list of constitutions given in the Republic, so that Aristotle's words do not absolutely exclude the supposition that he regarded it as included in the list given in the Politicus (302 C sqq.). In Laws 712 C Plato enumerates only three constitutions, democracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy, in addition to tyranny and kingship (=monarchy). The expression ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις refers either to the Republic of Plato as a whole (for other instances of the use of it in this sense see Henkel, Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Staat, p. 10, who refers to Themist. Or. 2. 32 c, Πολιτεῖαί τε αἱ κλειναὶ καὶ οἱ θεσπέσιοι Νόμοι, etc.) or (as Bonitz, Ind. 598 a 42, and Sus.², Note 1231, think) to the Eighth and Ninth Books of it only (see note on 1342 a 32). Though Aristotle says here that the Polity 'did not occur frequently,' we gather from c. 13. 1297 b 24 sq. that what were called democracies in early times were really polities, and of early democracies there can have been no lack; besides, as Prof. Francotte points out (Les Formes Mixtes de Gouvernement

d'après Aristote, p. 17, note 1), the polity appears to have existed at one time or another at Malis (c. 13. 1297 b 14 sqq.), at Tarentum (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 3 sqq.), at Syracuse (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.), and at Oreus (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 18 sqq.).

1. ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'true, it is right to call by the 1293 b.
name of aristocracy,' etc. Aristotle feels it necessary to justify his use of the name in 38 sq. in reference to the 'so-called aristocracy.' As to the reference in περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις see vol. ii. p. xxv. Sus.[3a] (p. 367) takes the reference to be to the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books, and it is very possible that 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sqq. (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.) is referred to, but this is not certain, and as a similar account of the best constitution is already in substance given in the Third Book (cc. 4–5, c. 7. 1279 a 34 sqq., c. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq., and c. 18. 1288 a 37 sqq.), the reference may be to the Third Book. It is not certain that the Fourth and Fifth Books were in existence when the words before us were written (see note on 1289 a 30 and vol. ii. p. xxv sq.).

3. τὴν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for to only one constitution is it right to apply the name of aristocracy, to the constitution the citizens of which are men best in respect of virtue absolutely and not merely good with reference to certain given conditions, for in this constitution alone the same man is an absolutely good man and good citizen, whereas in all others good citizens are good men only relatively to their own constitution' (i. e. with reference to certain given conditions, not absolutely). Ἀρίστων κατ' ἀρετήν, 'best in respect of virtue,' and not merely in respect of other things such as practical ability or serviceableness to the constitution under which they live (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10, κρείττων κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων). For the account here given of aristocracy cp. 4. (7). 9. 1328 b 37, ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, and 3. 5. 1278 b 1 sqq., and as to the variation of virtue and justice with the constitution, 3. 4. 1276 b 30 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq. For πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν, cp. Probl. 10. 52. 896 b 22, where τὸ πρὸς χρείαν τινὰ καλόν is contrasted with τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καλόν.

8. τὰς ὀλιγαρχουμένας, sc. πολιτείας (see note on 1292 b 14).

The words καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι, which follow διαφοράς in Γ Π, are placed by Thurot and Sus. after πολιτείαν, probably rightly. Jackson and Welldon would omit them.

10. ὅπου γε κ.τ.λ., 'seeing that in them,' etc.: cp. Plato, Rep.

343 A, ὅτι τοί σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὃς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πράβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις. Ὅπου γε often='quando-quidem,' and Liddell and Scott, s.v. ὅπου, give the words that meaning here, but in ὅπου γε as used here ὅπου seems to retain its ordinary meaning of 'where.' Magistrates are elected πλουτίνδην in oligarchies (2. 11. 1273 a 21 sqq.), and Aristotle appears to imply here that they are not elected even partially ἀριστίνδην in polities (see vol. i. p. 219, note 2). How far does this agree with what we are told in 3. 17. 1288 a 14 sq., that elections to office in polities take place κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς? Perhaps to distribute office among the well-to-do in accordance with ἀξία is not to elect ἀριστίνδην. It should be noticed that in 2. 11. 1273 a 23 sqq. a constitution in which magistracies are filled ἀριστίνδην καὶ πλουτίνδην is distinguished from an aristocracy on the ground that in an aristocracy election to office is κατ' ἀρετήν. Aristotle's conception of aristocracy in the Sixth Book appears to be less strict than in the Second.

11. αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία. For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.

12. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added to explain and justify ἀριστίνδην and ἀριστοκρατική. When, in the absence of a public care for virtue on the part of the State, men reputed to be good (ἐπιεικεῖς) are elected to office, the community may fairly be said to elect ἀριστίνδην and its constitution may be called aristocratic. Cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 35, οἱ γὰρ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις ἐν τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἄρχουσιν· ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους φαίνεσθαι ἀρίστους· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα εἴληφε τοῦτο, and Plato, Laws 854 B, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν λεγομένων ἀνδρῶν ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν ξυνουσίας. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 554 C, ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβολαίοις . . . ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι: also Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 25, (Ἐφιάλτης) δοκῶν ἀδωροδόκητος εἶναι καὶ δίκαιος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, and the line of Cratinus quoted on 1291 b 5. Πόλεσι must be supplied with ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς: this is a word which is frequently omitted by Aristotle (see notes on 1266 b 1 and 1288 b 38). For the use of ὅμως here cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 5 sqq. (quoted in note on 1258 b 10).

14. ὅπου οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not explain why a constitution which recognizes virtue and wealth only is not an aristocracy. Looking to 10, we expect him to regard a constitution of this kind as an aristocracy. Such a constitution would seem at any rate to be superior to constitutions which do not recognize virtue at all, yet these are allowed the name of aristocracies in 20 sq.

19. τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν. Cp. c. 8. 1294 a 24, τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην, and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 3, τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὔσης, and 28, τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην.

20. καὶ τρίτον κ.τ.λ., 'and in the third place whatever [mixed] constitutions incline towards oligarchy more than the polity does,' for πολιτείαι should probably be supplied with ὅσαι, and not ἀριστοκρατία (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15, where πολιτείας, not ἀριστοκρατίας, must be supplied). Aristotle here departs from the account which he frequently gives of aristocracy as a constitution in which virtue is recognized in the award of office either alone or in combination with other things, and concedes the name to constitutions in which this is not the case. Hence Sus. brackets as interpolated καὶ τρίτον ... μᾶλλον, but the same view reappears in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10–16, and Sus. is compelled to bracket this passage together with its context, a course in which it is difficult to follow him. It seems more probable that both passages are genuine, and that Aristotle is guilty of an inconsistency, into which he is led, partly by his reluctance to depart too far from the ordinary classification (cp. De Part. An. 1. 3. 643 b 10 sqq.) and from the ordinary use of language, partly by the difficulty of bringing these constitutions under any other of the six forms of constitution recognized by him, and partly by the kinship which (following Plato in Polit. 301 A and other inquirers) he always conceives to exist between aristocracy and oligarchy (3. 7. 1279 b 5: 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 22 sqq.). See Prof. H. Sidgwick in the *Classical Review*, 6. 144.

23. ἐτάξαμεν δ' οὕτως, sc. τὴν ὀνομαζομένην πολιτείαν. Οὕτως, i. e. C. 8. among the παρεκβάσεις, and not before them, where we expect to find polity dealt with looking to the announcements in c. 2. 1289 a 35 sqq. and 3. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq.

24. ταύτην, i.e. the polity. See note on 1306 b 26.

25. In τὸ μὲν ἀληθές we have an instance of *μέν solitarium* (see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34).

πᾶσαι, i. e. both polity and the aristocracies just described.

26. ἔπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων, 'and consequently are counted with the deviation-forms': cp. c. 3. 1290 a 16 sqq., where aristocracy is said to be often held to be a form of oligarchy and polity of democracy.

εἰσί τ' αὐτῶν αὗται παρεκβάσεις, 'and these deviation-forms are deviation-forms of them' (i. e. of the aristocracies just described and of polity). This implies that oligarchy is a deviation-form of

the so-called aristocracy and not of the true aristocracy, but we are not told this elsewhere. Tyranny at any rate is a deviation-form of the true kingship (c. 2. 1289 a 40).

27. ***ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχήν***, i.e. in 3. 7, where however oligarchy is not said to be a deviation-form of the so-called aristocracy, but of aristocracy generally.

τελευταῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Contrast Hist. An. 5. 1. 539 a 7, ***νῦν δὲ περὶ τούτου*** (i.e. ***ἀνθρώπου***) ***τελευταῖον λεκτέον διὰ τὸ πλείστην ἔχειν πραγματείαν*** (comparing with this passage c. 10. 1295 a 1 sqq.). That tyranny is the worst of the deviation-forms we have been told in c. 2. 1289 a 39 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3 sqq.).

30. ***τέτακται***, sc. ***ταῦτα***. Cp. ***ἐτάξαμεν***, 23.

31. ***νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας κ.τ.λ.*** For the use of ***δεικνύναι*** without an object, Bonitz (Ind. 167 b 26 sqq.) compares Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 25 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 b 7. For ***ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς*** cp. c. 10. 1295 a 9 and 1. 4. 1254 a 13, ***τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον***, and Isocr. Panath. § 134, ***αἱ μὲν οὖν φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις τῶν πολιτειῶν οὕτως ἔχουσιν***. Aristotle describes how polity differs from the so-called aristocracy in the remainder of c. 8, and how it comes into being and how it should be constituted in c. 9.

34. ***εἰώθασι δὲ καλεῖν κ.τ.λ.*** Aristotle has just said that the polity is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, and now he goes on—'but people are wont to give the name of polity to those mixtures of oligarchy and democracy only which incline to democracy and to call those which incline to oligarchy aristocracies.' Twice before in this Book (c. 3. 1290 a 22 sqq. and c. 4. 1290 a 30 sqq.) Aristotle has corrected customary views, and now he corrects this one. He grudges the name of aristocracy to a mere mixture of oligarchy and democracy inclining to oligarchy, and gradually feels his way in 1293 b 34–1294 a 25 to the conclusion that, next to the true aristocracy, the constitution which has *most* right to the name of aristocracy is that in which there is a mixture of all the three things which claim to be recognized in constitutions—free birth, wealth, and virtue. This conclusion is quite in harmony with the tendency of what is said in 3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq. and 2. 6. 1266 a 4 sq. (It would seem from Aristotle's use of the word 'most' that while he ranks the claims of the form in which all the three attributes are recognized above those of the form in which only two—virtue and free birth—are recognized,

and also above those of the mixed constitutions which incline to oligarchy rather than to democracy, he does not deny the name of aristocracy to either of these forms.) Thus he is led to draw a different distinction between the so-called aristocracy and the polity from that which was commonly drawn. He first describes in 1293 b 34–42 the way in which mixtures of oligarchy and democracy inclining to oligarchy had come to be thought specially to deserve the name of aristocracies, and then in 1293 b 42 sqq. he appeals in correction of this view to the commonly received opinion that aristocracy and *εὐνομία* go together, and argues that if this is the case and *εὐνομία* involves obedience to well-constituted laws, and well-constituted laws are either the best attainable or the best absolutely, then aristocracy implies obedience either to the best attainable laws or to the laws which are absolutely the best, neither of which tests is satisfied by laws inclining towards oligarchy. A further proof of the same conclusion is derived from another commonly held opinion that aristocracy especially implies the award of office for virtue, whereas in oligarchy office is awarded for wealth.

37. *παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν.* It is taken for granted that these attributes are closely connected with aristocracy. That *παιδεία* is so, we see from c. 15. 1299 b 24, *ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων (αἱ ἀρχαί εἰσιν)*, and that *εὐγένεια* is so may be inferred from the fact that virtue is an element in it (1294 a 20 sqq.). For the connexion of *παιδεία* and *εὐγένεια* with wealth cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.

38. *ἔτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν* κ.τ.λ. Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5, *ἐν γὰρ τοῖς βελτίστοις ἔνι ἀκολασία τε ὀλιγίστη καὶ ἀδικία, ἀκρίβεια δὲ πλείστη εἰς τὰ χρηστά· ἐν δὲ τῷ δήμῳ ἀμαθία τε πλείστη καὶ ἀταξία καὶ πονηρία· ἥ τε γὰρ πενία αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἄγει ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἡ ἀπαιδευσία καὶ ἡ ἀμαθία δι' ἔνδειαν χρημάτων ἐνίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων.* That this view is not regarded by Aristotle as correct we see from 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq. A wealthy man is not saved by his wealth from temptations to commit injustice.

39. *ὅθεν καὶ καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καὶ γνωρίμους τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν.* Cp. Plato, Rep. 569 A, *τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει*, and Cic. De Rep. 1. 34. 51: perhaps also Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 313, *πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ.* Aristotle appears to hold that the belief in the virtue of the rich won them the name not only of *καλοὶ κἀγαθοί*, but also of *γνώριμοι*, so that

he must understand γνώριμοι to mean 'widely known for their virtue': cp. 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 27 sq.

41. τὴν ὑπεροχήν. Cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 20 sqq.

καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶναί φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν μᾶλλον. Bonitz (Ind. 503 b 7 sq.), followed by Sus.², Ind. s.v., takes ὀλιγαρχία here in the sense of τὸ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολίτευμα, κύριον, and groups this passage with 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, but I do not feel sure that they are right: cp. c. 7. 1293 b 3 sqq., 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πλήθη πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστᾶσι κ.τ.λ., and 2. 6. 1265 b 26–29.

42. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Μή is placed by Γ Π before εὐνομεῖσθαι, but I follow Thurot and Sus. in transferring it to after τήν and before ἀριστοκρατουμένην. If Γ Π were right in placing μή before εὐνομεῖσθαι, we should expect the second clause to run ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν εὐνομουμένην, but Γ Π have ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομουμένην, which seems to show that the first clause should run τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατουμένην πόλιν ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην. The change in the position of μή has this further advantage, that the words ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην, which are not easily explained if we retain the reading of Γ Π, no longer present any difficulty. The view that εὐνομία is found where the best men rule, is implied in Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 154, ὅτ' εὐνομεῖτο μᾶλλον ἡ πόλις καὶ βελτίοσι προστάταις ἐχρῆτο, and in Isocr. Panath. § 132 sq., and indeed in Theogn. 43–52 and Pindar, Pyth. 10. 71 sq. Bergk: cp. also Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 5 sq. and Plato, Rep. 605 B.

1294 a. 3. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εὐνομία κ.τ.λ. This had been already in substance said by Xenophon in Oecon. 9. 14 and by Ephorus in Fragm. 47 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 246), εὐνομεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἅπαντα φυλαττομένους τὰ τῶν συκοφαντῶν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τοῖς ἁπλῶς κειμένοις: cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 6 and Demosth. c. Mid. c. 57. But the remarks of Aeschines on Athenian ways in c. Timarch. cc. 177–179 are especially present to Aristotle's memory.

4. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν κ.τ.λ. In Diog. Laert. 3. 103 Plato is said to have distinguished three senses of εὐνομία—εὐνομία διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· ἓν μὲν ἐὰν ὦσιν οἱ νόμοι σπουδαῖοι, εὐνομίαν φαμὲν εἶναι· ἕτερον δὲ ἐὰν τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις ἐμμένωσιν οἱ πολῖται, καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν εὐνομίαν εἶναι· τρίτον δὲ ἐὰν μὴ ὄντων τῶν νόμων κατὰ ἔθη καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα χρηστῶς πολιτεύωνται, καὶ τοῦτο εὐνομίαν προσαγορεύομεν. Compare with this

the definition of *εὐνομία* which we find in the Definitions ascribed to Plato, 413 E, *εὐνομία πειθαρχία νόμων σπουδαίων*. How far either of these accounts of *εὐνομία* is correctly attributed to Plato is extremely doubtful. Aristotle appears to find true *εὐνομία* in obedience to good laws.

7. *τοῦτο δὲ ἐνδέχεται διχῶς* κ.τ.λ., 'and this' (i.e. obedience to well-constituted law) 'is possible [only] in two ways, for [it is possible to obey] either the best laws attainable in the given case or those which are absolutely the best.' For the omission of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36.

9. *δοκεῖ δὲ* κ.τ.λ., 'aristocracy again is thought especially to consist in the distribution of the offices according to virtue,' and not according to wealth, which would be the rule of distribution if it bordered on oligarchy. See note on 1309 a 2.

11. *τὸ δ' ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν*, sc. *κύριον εἶναι*, 'but the principle that whatever the majority decide is supreme [is not characteristic of any particular constitution, for it] is recognized in all.' Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 31 sq., 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq., and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 4 sqq., where it appears that the supremacy of the decisions of the majority was commonly conceived to be a mark of democracy.

12. *καὶ γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. For the repetition of *ἐν* see notes on 1325 b 10 and 1305 b 4.

15. For *τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται*, 'the form which is called polity exists,' cp. Xen. Oecon. 4. 6, *ἔνθα δὴ ὁ σύλλογος καλεῖται*, which Holden translates, 'where the so-called muster of forces is,' and see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Phaedo 107 C, *τοῦ χρόνου τούτου ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν*.

17. For the absence of *καί* before *πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας* see explanatory note on 1277 b 10 and critical note on 1260 a 26.

σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See above on 1293 b 39. For the absence of *τήν* before *τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν* (which Coray, Bekk.², and Sus. add without necessity), cp. Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 470 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 325 and 5. ccxc),

μήποθ' (*μήθ'* MSS.) *ὁ πονηρὸς κατεχέτω χρηστοῦ τόπον.*

19. *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ., 'but since there are three things which lay claim to an equal participation in the constitution, free birth, wealth, and virtue—I say three, for the fourth, that which is called nobility, [is not a distinct thing, for it] is a concomitant of the two latter.' For *ἀμφισβητοῦντα* cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 16 sqq., where, as

Bonitz points out (Ind. 40 a 28 sqq.), *ἀντιποιεῖσθαι* is used as synonymous with *ἀμφισβητεῖν* (1283 a 11, 38), and for *τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας*, c. 11. 1296 a 30, *τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας*, and 3. 9. 1280 a 18, *τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα*.

21. *ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν* κ.τ.λ. In 3. 13. 1283 a 37, *εὐγένεια γάρ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ γένους*, we hear nothing of wealth (cp. Plato, Rep. 618 B, *τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ γένεσι καὶ προγόνων ἀρεταῖς*, and Aristot. Fragm. 83. 1490 a 18 sqq.), but in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 3 those persons *οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος* are said to be thought *εὐγενεῖς*. The common Greek view probably was that *εὐγένεια* implied nothing more than descent from several generations of *wealthy* ancestors: cp. Plato, Theaet. 174 E, *τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι*, and a fragment from the Aeolus of Euripides (Fragm. 22), in which one of the characters, no doubt wishing to depreciate noble birth, says of it, *ἐν χρήμασιν τόδ' ἐστί*, and adds,

ᾧ δ' ἂν ἐν δόμοις
χρόνον συνοικῇ πλεῖστον (sc. *τὰ χρήματα*), *οὗτος εὐγενής*.

Cp. also Julian, Or. 2. p. 81 B, *φασὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων εὐγενεῖς*. The Greeks would, it would seem, refuse the epithet *εὐγενής* to a newly-made Peer of the Realm, unless the family to which he belonged had been distinguished for wealth for generations past.

C. 9. **30.** *Τίνα δὲ τρόπον* κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 22 sqq. and see notes on 1288 b 29 and 1293 b 31 and vol. i. p. 294, note 1.

34. *τὴν τούτων διαίρεσιν*, i.e. *τὴν τούτων διαφοράν* (Bon. Ind. 180 b 40, where Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 3 is referred to, *ἀλλ' ἆρα οὐ μόνον δεῖ τὰ συμβληταὶ μὴ ὁμώνυμα εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ ἔχειν διαφοράν, μήτε ὃ μήτ' ἐν ᾧ; λέγω δὲ οἷον χρῶμα ἔχει διαίρεσιν*). Sus.[3] (Ind. s. v. *διαίρεσις*), however, explains *διαίρεσιν* here as synonymous with *διορισμόν*. *Τούτων*, i.e. *τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας*.

ἐκ τούτων is rendered by Vict. in his translation 'post haec' (so Stahr, 'alsdann,' and apparently Sus. and Welldon), but in his commentary 'ex ipsis,' and Lamb. and Giph. render the words 'ex his' (i. e. of democracy and oligarchy). I incline to render *ἐκ τούτων* in the latter way, taking it with *συνθετέον*: cp. Plato, Soph. 252 B, *ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες*, and Cratyl. 427 C, *ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη αὐτοῖς τούτοις συντιθέναι ἀπομιμούμενος*. The words *ἀφ' ἑκατέρας ὥσπερ σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας* will then be added to explain the exact method by which the polity is to be compounded of democracy and oligarchy.

35. *σύμβολον*, 'pars' (Bon. Ind. s. v.), where we find a reference among other passages to De Gen. An. 1. 18. 722 b 10, *φησὶ γὰρ (Ἐμπεδοκλῆς) ἐν τῷ ἄρρενι καὶ τῷ θήλει οἷον σύμβολον ἐνεῖναι, ὅλον δ' ἀπ' οὐδετέρου ἀπιέναι, 'ἀλλὰ διέσπασται μελέων φύσις, ἡ μὲν ἐν ἀνδρός'* (cp. De Gen. An. 4. 1. 764 b 3 sqq.).

εἰσὶ δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως, 'and there are three determining principles of this combination or mixture.' For *καί* = 'or,' see note on 1292 a 20 and cp. De An. 1. 4. 407 b 30, *καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι.* *Μίξεως* is probably added because the polity had been described as a *μίξις* in 1293 b 34 and 1294 a 16, 23. *Ὅρος* is explained by Bonitz (Ind. 529 b 53) in the passage before us and in 1294 b 15 as 'id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur.' Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33, *δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς ποιητέον εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον.*

37. *ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις . . .* **40.** *ζημίαν.* This is repeated in c. 13. 1297 a 21–24 and 35–38, and in c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. It appears from the passage before us that there were oligarchies in which dicasteries existed composed of both rich and poor, though the poor would not be likely often to act on them, no pay being provided, and the rich would be sure to act, as they would incur a penalty if they did not. The oligarchies in which this system existed would not be oligarchies of an extreme type, for in extreme oligarchies the poor would be excluded from the dicasteries altogether. So again paid dicasteries would not exist in all forms of democracy, but only in those which approached the ultimate form.

41. *κοινὸν δὲ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 13. 1297 a 38 sqq. We gather from the passage before us that in a polity there may be poor dicasts receiving pay, yet in c. 13. 1297 b 1 sqq. we read of the polity, *δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἐχόντων μόνον*, and in what follows *οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες* are tacitly distinguished from *οἱ πένητες* (see note on 1289 b 31). We must suppose that there might be a proportion of poor men even in the hoplite class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12). See vol. i. p. 503, note 1. This is confirmed by 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 12, *καὶ τὸ τῷ πλήθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν, διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦνται τῶν ὅπλων*, which implies that the *πλῆθος* has heavy arms to be taken away.

1. *πολιτικόν*, 'characteristic of a polity.' 1294 b.

εἷς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In the first of the three modes of mixing democracy and oligarchy here described the entire arrangement

characteristic of democracy is adopted in conjunction with the entire arrangement characteristic of oligarchy, in the second an institution (a property-qualification for the assembly) is borrowed from both, not however in the form in which it exists in democracies and oligarchies, but in a midway form, and in the third a part of the arrangement characteristic of democracy is adopted in conjunction with a part of the arrangement characteristic of oligarchy. Thus in framing a polity the lawgiver might balance a democratic institution with an oligarchical one, or he might steer a midway course between democracy and oligarchy, or he might ally a part of a democratic institution with a part of an oligarchical one. A polity would evidently differ much according as one or other of these methods was predominantly employed in its construction.

3. οἷον ἐκκλησιάζειν κ.τ.λ. Supply *τάττουσιν*. It would seem from this passage that even in democracies a small property-qualification for membership of the assembly might exist (see vol. i. p. 508, note 3). We also gather that an assembly often existed in oligarchies, though membership of it would be confined to those possessed of a high property-qualification (cp. Plato, Polit. 298 C, *ξυλλέξαι δὲ ἐκκλησίαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἢ ξύμπαντα τὸν δῆμον ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους μόνον*). This would not be the case in the first, or most moderate, form of oligarchy, for in that form a high property-qualification would hardly be required for membership of the assembly, and in not a few oligarchies there would be no assembly whatever (3. 1. 1275 b 7).

4. κοινὸν δέ γε κ.τ.λ. Thus in a polity there would be a moderate property-qualification for membership of the assembly, but none for office (1294 b 12 sq.).

5. τὸ μέσον ἑκατέρου τιμήματος τούτων. For *ἑκατέρου τιμήματος τούτων* see note on 1283 b 4.

6. τρίτον, 'in the third place.' *Τρίτος* would have been more regular, but for a similarly imperfect correspondence cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 23, where *τρίτον δ' ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων* should have been *τρίτου δ' ἀδυναμίας τῶν πραγμάτων*.

ταγμάτοιν takes up *τάττουσιν*, 3. The Index Aristotelicus translates *τάγμα* here by 'lex, institutum,' and gives no other instance of the occurrence of the word in the genuine writings of Aristotle. *Τάγμα* occurs in a different sense in Oecon. 2. 1349 a 24.

τὰ μέν, sc. *λαμβάνειν*, obtained from 2 (cp. *λαβεῖν*, 11).

7. λέγω δ' οἷον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is here only stating the popular impression (δοκεῖ). As a matter of fact, even extreme democracies did not always, or perhaps generally, claim that all magistracies should be filled by lot (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.), and magistracies would seem to have been sometimes filled by lot in oligarchies, though of course not ἐκ πάντων but ἐκ τινῶν (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 1 sqq.: cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 8 sq.). So again the filling of magistracies by election, and not by lot, is not peculiar to oligarchy; the magistracies are filled by election on the ground of virtue in an aristocracy (2. 11. 1273 a 25 sqq.); what is characteristic of oligarchy is rather to elect to magistracies on the ground of wealth (ibid.). But indeed they seem to have been filled in some oligarchies not by election, but by hereditary succession (c. 5. 1292 b 4 sqq.). In 3. 5. 1278 a 23 it is implied to be characteristic of oligarchy not simply to require a property-qualification for office, but to require a high property-qualification. Indeed, in the more moderate forms of democracy a property-qualification for office often existed (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 39: see note on 1305 a 28), sometimes varying with the importance of the office (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30 sq.); still it is true that the tendency of democracy was to do away with property-qualifications for office (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 22 sq.). Cp. Diod. 18. 18. 4, τὴν δὲ πολιτείαν μετέστησεν ἐκ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ προσέταξεν ἀπὸ τιμήματος εἶναι τὸ πολίτευμα.

10. ἀριστοκρατικὸν τοίνυν καὶ πολιτικὸν κ.τ.λ. For the association here of aristocracy and polity cp. 2. 11. 1273 a 4, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν εὐθύνουσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. The reference to aristocracy here shows that the mode of combining democratic and oligarchical elements in the case of a so-called aristocracy is similar to that which obtains in the case of a polity. Aristotle, in fact, considers himself to have been dealing in c. 9 with so-called aristocracies as well as with polities (1294 b 40 sq.). Though according to the passage before us it is appropriate to a so-called aristocracy that no property-qualification for office should exist, we learn from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq. that it is appropriate to the same constitution (ἀριστοκρατικόν) that the γνώριμοι should hold the offices. This would be all the more likely to be the case because it is ἀριστοκρατικόν that offices should be unpaid (2. 11. 1273 a 17). It may be noted that the conception of ἀριστοκρατία in a fragment of the 'Constitutions' ascribed to Aristotle (Aristot. Fragm. 560. 1570 b 4), προέστησαν γὰρ αὐτῆς (i. e. τῆς τῶν ἱπποβοτῶν

πολιτείας) ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ἄνδρες ἀριστοκρατικῶς ἄρχοντες, and in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 25. 4, πολιτείαν δὲ κατεστήσαντο ἀριστοκρατικήν· χίλιοι γὰρ πάντα διοικοῦσιν αἱρετοὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, which may also be derived from the 'Constitutions,' stands in marked contrast to that in the passage before us, for in these passages we read of aristocracies in which office was elective, subject to a property-qualification. For another instance of a discrepancy between the Politics and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. see note on 1306 b 29.

12. ἐκ μὲν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ αἱρετὰς ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς. As to the way in which offices were filled in a polity see note on 1288 a 12.

15. ὅρος, 'the determining mark,' or 'criterion': see note on 1294 a 35.

ἐνδέχηται, 'it is possible.'

18. ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 7. 1234 b 5, ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γάρ ἐστί πως τὰ ἄκρα, and De An. 2. 11. 424 a 6, τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων.

ὅπερ συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. Ὅπερ seems to refer to 15, ὅταν ἐνδέχηται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 712 D sqq., and also Isocr. Areop. § 61, οἶδα γὰρ . . . Λακεδαιμονίους διὰ τοῦτο κάλλιστα πολιτευομένους, ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατούμενοι τυγχάνουσιν· ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱρέσει καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἴδοιμεν ἂν παρ' αὐτοῖς τὰς ἰσότητας καὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας μᾶλλον ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰσχυούσας, while another mood of Isocrates' mind is represented in Nicocl. § 24, ἔτι δὲ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, τοὺς ἄριστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων πολιτευομένους, (ἅπαντες ἴσμεν) οἵκοι μὲν ὀλιγαρχουμένους, παρὰ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον βασιλευομένους.

21. τὴν τάξιν = τὴν πολιτείαν, as in c. 1. 1289 a 1, c. 3. 1290 a 12, and c. 11. 1296 a 40 (Sus.[3] Ind. s. v.).

πρῶτον is taken up by ὁμοίως δέ, 24.

τροφήν, 'bringing-up,' whereas in 26 sq. τροφή means 'food.' In an oligarchy the bringing-up of the sons of the rich, or at any rate those of them who were in office, was luxurious (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22 sqq.) and very unlike that of the sons of the poor.

23. For τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον see note on 1281 a 21.

24. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and [things are ordered] similarly.' We are not probably intended to carry on τρέφονται and παιδεύονται.

26. οὐδὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλούσιος καὶ ὁ πένης. Cp. Thuc. 1. 6. 4 and Plato, Laws 696 A.

οὕτω τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις, 'and [just as no difference is made between the rich and the poor in other ways,] so also is the food in the syssitia the same for all.' Οὕτω carries on the comparison just as if καθάπερ had preceded. Sus. translates 'so sehr ist die Kost für Alle dieselbe in den gemeinsamen Mahlzeiten'—'so much is the food the same for all in the common meals'—but I doubt whether this is the meaning of οὕτω, and Welldon translates the word 'so too.' For the fact cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 10. Τροφή and ἐσθής are mentioned together in 3. 16. 1287 a 14 sq.

27. καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα κ.τ.λ. Spengel would insert ἔχουσιν, but we are by this time familiar with Aristotle's tendency in the Politics to omit words. See vol. ii. p. li, note 4. For τις καὶ τῶν πενήτων ὁστισοῦν cp. Plato, Rep. 350 A, εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὁστισοῦν πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἱρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅσα κ.τ.λ. The dress of the rich in ancient Greece would ordinarily differ from that of the poor in fineness of material and in dye, to say nothing of ornamental accessories. It is interesting to gather from the passage before us that a too great contrast between the rearing and education, and also the food and dress, of rich and poor was regarded as undemocratic (cp. Demosth. Ol. 3. c. 25 sq.: yet that a difference did exist between the dress of the rich and the demos at Athens is implied in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 10). Was the change from an ornate costume to μετρία ἐσθής which Thucydides (1. 6. 3) describes at Athens connected with the rise of democracy there? At Venice the Nobili and the Cittadini wore the same plain black clothes, partly because the poorer Nobili were thus saved expense, and partly because in concourses the small number of the ruling class became less conspicuous (Roscher, Politik, p. 159).

29. ἔτι τῷ δύο κ.τ.λ. Supply δημοκρατίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν.

τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς seems to imply that the senatorship and the ephorship were greater offices than the kingship in the Lacedaemonian State. Yet the kings are said to be μεγάλων κύριοι in 2. 11. 1272 b 41 (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 35). As to the way in which the ephors were appointed see note on 1270 b 28.

31. οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν, sc. εἶναι λέγουσιν.

32. πάσας, sc. τὰς ἀρχάς, which must be supplied from 29. As to the non-employment of the lot in appointments to offices in oligarchies see note on 7.

33. ὀλίγους εἶναι κυρίους θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς. The reference is to

the Lacedaemonian senate (Xen. Rep. Lac. 10. 2: Plut. Lycurg. c. 26). In democracies the infliction of these penalties fell to the popular assembly (c. 14. 1298 a 5–10) or to popular dicasteries. But did it not fall to a few in aristocracies as well as in oligarchies?

34. δεῖ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ., 'and in the polity that is mixed well both of the mixed elements' (democracy and oligarchy) 'should seem to be present and neither of the two.' The mixture must be so subtle and complete that the mixed elements are felt to be both present in it and not present, just as one might say of a glass of wine and water both that wine and water are each present in it and that neither is present but only a mixture of wine and water.

36. καὶ σώζεσθαι δι' αὑτῆς καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν, sc. τὴν πολιτείαν. Cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 21 sq.

καὶ δι' αὑτῆς κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 21 sq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14 sqq.

37. As to [ἔξωθεν] see critical note.

38. Kaissling (Ueber den Gebrauch der Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 7) notes the use here of the substantival infinitive with ἄν.

40. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζομένας ἀριστοκρατίας. Hardly any reference has been made in c. 9 to the so-called aristocracies, but the use of the word ἀριστοκρατικόν in 1294 b 10 probably indicates that Aristotle has had them in view in this chapter as well as polities (see note on 10).

C. 10. 1295 a. 1. Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle sometimes treats of a subject last when it requires especially full treatment (Hist. An. 5. 1. 539 a 7, νῦν δὲ περὶ τούτου τελευταῖον λεκτέον διὰ τὸ πλείστην ἔχειν πραγματείαν), so now he explains that he does not treat of tyranny last for this reason.

2. ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος. Bonitz (Ind. 455 b 2) compares Meteor. 1. 1. 338 a 25, λοιπὸν δ' ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης ἔτι θεωρητέον, ὃ κ.τ.λ. Tyranny was often contrasted with πολιτείας, as in Demosth. Olynth. 1. 5, and indeed by Aristotle himself in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the Politics.

4. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις κ.τ.λ., i. e. in 3. 14–17.

7. πόθεν, 'from what source': cp. Plato, Rep. 375 C, πόθεν ἅμα πρᾶον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἦθος εὑρήσομεν; and Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10, καθίστανται βασιλεὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν. The answer given has been, from men of surpassing virtue, not from men of surpassing stature, as was the practice in Ethiopia (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 4 sq.).

τυραννίδος δ' εἴδη κ.τ.λ. In these two kinds of tyranny rule is exercised over willing subjects (16), and yet they are here classed as tyrannies. This does not agree with 3. 14. 1285 a 27, οἱ δὲ (τύραννοι) ἀκόντων ἄρχουσιν. Aristotle, in fact, here includes among tyrannies any forms of monarchy in which the monarch rules δεσποτικῶς κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην (16 sq.). In 3. 14. 1285 a 16 sqq. he classes these two kinds of tyranny among kingships; still even there he seems to feel that they are rather μοναρχίαι than βασιλεῖαι (see note on 1285 a 16).

8. μέν is taken up by δέ in τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, 17.

ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, in 3. 14. 1285 a 16–b 3. The two kinds of tyranny there described are the form of hereditary kingship with despotic authority which existed among some barbarian races and the aesymneteship of the early Greeks. As to the electiveness of these barbarian kingships see note on 1285 b 2. They seem to have been hereditary as well as elective, though we hear nothing of their hereditariness here (see note on 1313 a 10). How they combined the two characteristics we are not told.

9. διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, 'because their nature in a way overlaps in relation to kingship also [as well as mutually].' As to ἐπαλλάττειν, which is here followed by πρός, see note on 1255 a 13. For τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν cp. c. 8. 1293 b 32, ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς.

11. ἔν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τισὶν κ.τ.λ. The fact that these monarchs were elective is dwelt on because it shows that their monarchy was in accordance with law: cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 92, οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπὰν αἱρεθῶσι, κατὰ νόμον ἄρχουσιν. Αὐτοκράτορας is explained by κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν γνώμην, 17. Niebuhr (quoted by Eaton) thinks that Aristotle here refers to the Roman Dictatorship, and certainly we are reminded of the passage before us in Appian, Bell. Civ. 1. 99, Ῥωμαίοις δὲ . . . χειροτονοῦσι τὸν Σύλλαν ἐς ὅσον θέλοι τύραννον αὐτοκράτορα· τύραννος μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν δικτατόρων ἀρχὴ καὶ πάλαι, ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ὁριζομένη, τότε δὲ πρῶτον ἐς ἀόριστον ἐλθοῦσα τυραννὶς ἐγίγνετο ἀτελής, but Aristotle may have in his mind among other barbarian kings those of the Ethiopians, who are spoken of as elected in Diod. 3. 9. 4. See note on 1313 a 10.

13. τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, i. e. by election.

15. ἦσαν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 2 sq. Διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον, sc. εἶναι.

18. ἥπερ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς. So we hear of a μάλιστα λεγομένη βασιλεία in 5, and of a μάλιστα εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία in

c. 14. 1298 b 13 sq. and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 26. Cp. also 1. 9. 1256 b 40, *ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικήν.*

19. *τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἥτις* κ.τ.λ. Possibly a reminiscence of Hdt. 3. 80, *πῶς δ' ἂν εἴη χρῆμα κατηρτημένον μουναρχίη τῇ ἔξεστι ἀνευθύνῳ ποιέειν τὰ βούλεται;* For the definition here given of *ἡ μάλιστα τυραννίς*, cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 41 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37, *μοναρχία δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τοὔνομα ἐν ᾗ εἷς ἁπάντων κύριός ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δ' ἀόριστος τυραννίς.*

C. 11. **25.** *Τίς δ' ἀρίστη πολιτεία* κ.τ.λ. Welldon places a note of interrogation after *μετασχεῖν*, 31, and he may be right, but perhaps it is more likely that the sentence is incomplete and that *σκεπτέον* or some such word would have been added but for the interposition of the clause *καὶ γὰρ . . . λεκτέον* (31–34⁹), which distracts the writer's attention. I do not think (with Conring and Sus.) that any word or words have fallen out of the text after *μετασχεῖν*, 31, for the same thing occurs elsewhere in the Politics, e. g. in 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq.

26. *μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν* κ.τ.λ. For the dative *συγκρίνουσι* compare the dative in Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 31, *ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι.* For *ἀρετὴν τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας* see note on 1330 b 38.

27. *μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle appears here to speak not of *παιδεία* in general, but of a specially exalted kind of it; in Lucian, Somn. c. 1, however, we read of *παιδεία* in general, *τοῖς πλείστοις οὖν ἔδοξε παιδεία μὲν καὶ πόνου πολλοῦ καὶ χρόνου μακροῦ καὶ δαπάνης οὐ μικρᾶς καὶ τύχης δεῖσθαι λαμπρᾶς.*

28. *τυχηρᾶς* qualifies *χορηγίας*, but not, I think, *φύσεως*, as Sus. apparently holds that it does (Sus.[3] Ind. s. v. *φύσις*). *Τύχη* is something apart from *φύσις* (cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27 sqq. and 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 41). For the contrast of *φύσις* and *χορηγία* cp. Polyb. 6. 2. 13.

29. *βίον τε τὸν τοῖς πλείστοις κοινωνῆσαι δυνατόν.* Supply *πρός.* See note on 1274 b 12, and cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 23. For *βίον τὸν τοῖς πλείστοις κοινωνῆσαι δυνατόν* cp. Xen. Anab. 4. 1. 24, *αὐτὸς δ' ἔφη ἡγήσεσθαι δυνατὴν καὶ ὑποζυγίοις πορεύεσθαι ὁδόν.*

31. *καὶ γὰρ ἃς* κ.τ.λ. The sense is—for the so-called aristocracies described by us just now, which might seem to be in a special degree the constitution of which we are in quest, are partly beyond the reach of most States, so that they do not really concern us now, and partly border on the polity, so that they are not more the constitution of which we are in quest than the polity is, and we must speak of them and of it as one constitution.

Aristotle adds this remark to show that the question which he has just asked has not as yet been answered, and that it still needs to be dealt with.

32. τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρω πίπτουσι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων. This is implied as to the Lacedaemonian constitution in c. 1. 1288 b 40 sqq. For ἐξωτέρω πίπτειν see Bon. Ind. 594 b 59 sqq.

34. ἀμφοῖν, these aristocracies and the polity.

ἡ δὲ δὴ κρίσις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle shows in 34–1295 b 1 that the μέσος βίος and the μέση πολιτεία are the best. He thus prepares the way for the conclusion which he is occupied in establishing in 1295 b 1–35, that ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία is the best, a distinct conclusion, be it observed, from that which he had previously arrived at, that the μέση πολιτεία is the best, for we can conceive a μέση πολιτεία which is not διὰ τῶν μέσων. However, Aristotle identifies ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία with ἡ μέση πολιτεία in 1296 a 7. He proves that ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία is the best in the following way:—A mean state in respect of the gifts of fortune is best. For those who are thus circumstanced (1) obey reason most readily, and therefore are less likely to commit unjust acts, (2) they are most capable, as citizens should be, of both ruling and being ruled, and also most alike and equal, and for both these reasons are best suited for membership of a πόλις, for a πόλις thrives best when it consists of men alike and equal, among whom the friendship and community of feeling essential to a πόλις are most likely to be found; besides, those who are moderately well-to-do are most secure, for they are least given to plot against others and are least plotted against themselves. Hence the constitution which places supreme power in the hands of the moderately well-to-do class is the best (1295 b 34 sqq.). It is also the best because it is least subject to civil discord (1296 a 7 sqq.). A further indication that it is the best may be found in the fact that the best lawgivers have belonged to this class (1296 a 18 sqq.). It is only because in many States the moderately well-to-do class is small, and for other reasons which Aristotle gives in 1296 a 22–b 2, that ἡ μέση πολιτεία, or in other words ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία, has so seldom existed.

περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων, i. e. which is the best constitution and the best life for most States and most men (25 sq.).

35. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων, 'based on the same elementary principles': cp. Top. 6. 5. 143 a 13, σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ γένη στοιχείων, and Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16, τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον

στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κ.τ.λ.: also Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 16, ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν.

36. ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς. Probably a reference to Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 9–21, as well as to Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 14 sqq. and similar passages.

τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, 'that which is unimpededly lived in accordance with virtue.' Ἀνεμπόδιστον agrees with βίον understood, not with ἀρετήν, as Vet. Int. supposes that it does, translating 'eam quae secundum virtutem non impeditam.'

37. μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 8. 1108 b 11, τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μία δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος. As Sus.[3] points out (Note 1288), Aristotle would have spoken more exactly if he had said that *moral* virtue is a mean state. Τήν is added before ἀρετήν because κατ' ἀρετήν has preceded: see note on 1286 b 17.

τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον. Cp. Plato, Rep. 619 A. Τὸν μέσον βίον = τὸν κατὰ μεσότητα βίον.

38. τῆς ἑκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος, 'ea mediocritate quae potest singulis contingere' (Sepulv.). This is added because the same mean state is not within the reach of every one (see Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 32 sqq.). The mean state of a great wrestler like Milo in respect of food is not attainable by a novice. For the explanatory genitive τῆς ἑκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος, added in interpretation of τὸν μέσον βίον, compare the somewhat similar genitive in Plato, Laws 776 C, ἡ Ἡρακλεωτῶν δουλεία τῆς τῶν Μαριανδυνῶν καταδουλώσεως ('servitium, sive servi, Heracleotarum, qui extiterunt ex subiectione Mariandynorum,' Stallbaum), and see Stallbaum's note on Phaedo 97 A, ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι.

39. τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους ὅρους κ.τ.λ., 'and these same criteria must necessarily be the criteria of the goodness or badness of a State also and a constitution,' i. e. States and constitutions will be good or bad according as they are or are not in a mean condition, just as the life of an individual will be good or bad according as it is or is not in a mean condition. Καί before πόλεως probably means 'also,' not 'both,' though it is followed by another καί: see note on 1342 a 4.

40. ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως, i. e. for what holds of a State is likely to hold of a constitution, for a constitution is a form of the life of a State. See vol. i. p. 210, note 1.

1. *ἐν ἁπάσαις* κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1289 b 29 sqq., where the *μέσοι* are 1295 b
the midway class between the *εὔποροι* and the *ἄποροι*, just as they are in 1296 a 10–13 and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 28 sqq., whereas in the passage before us they are the midway class between the *εὔποροι σφόδρα* and the *ἄποροι σφόδρα*. In 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 1 sq. they are the midway class between *οἱ πλούσιοι* and *ὁ δῆμος* (cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 40 sqq., where *οἱ πλούσιοι* and *οἱ πένητες* are the extremes between which they stand), and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 12 sqq. the midway class between *οἱ γνώριμοι* and *ὁ δῆμος*. In Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 18 sqq. they are opposed to *οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις*. We hear nothing of the *μέσοι* in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 30 sq. It would seem from 1296 a 10 sqq. that, notwithstanding what is said in the passage before us, the *μέσοι* hardly existed in small Greek States. Aristotle no doubt has before him Eurip. Suppl. 225 Bothe (238 Dindorf),

τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οἱ μὲν ὄλβιοι
ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλειόνων τ' ἐρῶσ' ἀεί·
οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες βίου,
δεινοί, νέμοντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλεῖον μέρος,
εἰς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρ' ἀφιᾶσιν κακά,
γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι·
τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ 'ν μέσῳ σώζει πόλεις,
κόσμον φυλάσσουσ' ὄντιν' ἂν τάξῃ πόλις.

3. *ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτριον ἄριστον καὶ τὸ μέσον*. Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 14 sq. As Camerarius points out (Interp. p. 163), the saying *Μέτρον ἄριστον* was ascribed to Cleobulus of Lindus (Diog. Laert. 1. 93), and Theognis had said (335),

μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· πάντων μέσ' ἄριστα.

For *τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ μέσον*, cp. De Part. An. 2. 7. 652 b 17 sq. and Plut. De Profect. in Virt. c. 13 *sub fin.*, *εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστασθαι καὶ μέτριον*.

4. *φανερὸν ὅτι* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq. Under *εὐτυχήματα* Aristotle evidently includes both bodily and external goods; both are the gifts of fortune (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27 sq.). He has before him here and in what follows Plato, Laws 679 B sq. and 728 D, *μηνύειν δή μοι φαίνεται . . .* 729 A, *ὡς τὸ πολύ*. Compare also Eurip. Fragm. 80 Nauck (79, ed. 2),

βροτοῖς τὰ μείζω τῶν μέσων τίκτει νόσους·
θεῶν δὲ θνητοὺς κόσμον οὐ πρέπει φέρειν,

and the fragment of Rhianus referred to in vol. ii. p. 419 (Stob. Floril. 4. 34).

5. ῥᾴστη γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν, 'for it is most ready to obey reason': cp. [Plato,] Menex. 249 C, τοῖς τε γὰρ τελευτήσασι καὶ τοῖς ζῶσιν οὕτως ἂν προσφιλέστατοι εἶητε καὶ ῥᾷστοι θεραπεύειν τε καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι, and Plut. Anton. c. 6, οὐ γὰρ οὕτως εὐχερὴς ἦν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιος ὑπ' ὀργῆς ἐκπεσεῖν τῶν λογισμῶν Γάϊος Καῖσαρ, ὥστε κ.τ.λ. We hardly expect to find Aristotle asserting so close a connexion between a moderate amount of property and a readiness to be swayed by reason after what he has said in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sqq. and 1267 a 41 sqq.

6. ὑπερίσχυρον. Cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 17. 470 R.

9. γίγνονται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 16. 1390 b 32, τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἃ ἕπεται ἤδη, ἀπιστολῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ἅπασιν· ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἅπαντα τἀγαθὰ οὕτω διάκεινται, and Plato, Laws 742 E.

10. τῶν δ' ἀδικημάτων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1390 a 18, καὶ τἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν (οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες) εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν.

12. ἔτι δ' ἧκισθ' οὗτοι φυλαρχοῦσι καὶ βουλαρχοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα βλαβερὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν. Οὗτοι evidently refers to the μέσοι, who have not, however, been mentioned since 3. It may be doubted, therefore, whether the words ἔτι δὲ . . . πόλεσιν stand in their right place; they would be more in place after πόλεως, 28, or εἶναι, 34. As to their probable meaning see vol. i. p. 499, note 1, and compare Xen. Oecon. 2. 5 sq. (already referred to in vol. i. p. 580). Cp. also Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 17 sqq. If the words are in their right place, they adduce a further proof that the μέσοι are more under the guidance of reason than the very rich, derived from their abstinence from extravagant expenditure on liturgies. Giph. (p. 467) would expunge ἔτι δὲ . . . βουλαρχοῦσιν as an interpolation and retain in the text only ταῦτα . . . πόλεσιν, and Sus. adopts a similar course, bracketing ἔτι δὲ . . . βουλαρχοῦσιν and reading ταῦτα δή in place of ταῦτα δ'. It is of course possible that the words ἔτι δὲ . . . βουλαρχοῦσιν, and indeed the whole clause ἔτι δὲ . . . πόλεσιν, are nothing more than a remark added by Aristotle or some one else in the margin which has crept into the text, but I incline on the whole to a more favourable view of them, though, as has been said, I doubt whether they are in their right place.

13. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now turns to the political, as distinguished from the moral, defects of those who have too much or too little of the goods of fortune. He has before him Plato, Laws 728 D–729 A: cp. also Laws 791 D, λέγω δὴ τό γε παρ' ἡμῖν

δόγμα, ὡς ἡ μὲν τρυφὴ δύσκολα καὶ ἀκράχολα καὶ σφόδρα ἀπὸ σμικρῶν κινούμενα τὰ τῶν νέων ἤθη ἀπεργάζεται, τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐναντίον ἥ τε σφοδρὰ καὶ ἀγρία δουλωσις ταπεινοὺς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους καὶ μισανθρώπους ποιοῦσα ἀνεπιτηδείους ξυνοίκους ἀποτελεῖ. We are told, however, in Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sq. that an abundance of the goods of fortune is thought to engender greatness of soul (*μεγαλοψυχία*). In Pol. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 19 sq. much the same unfavourable account is given of *οἱ ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις* generally, not merely of those who are extremely rich.

16. *καὶ τοῦτ' εὐθὺς κ.τ.λ. Εὐθὺς οἴκοθεν*, 'from their parents' house at the outset': cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2. 3. 7, *Κύρῳ ὡς ἔτι οἴκοθεν συνήθης καὶ ἀρεστὸς ἀνήρ.* For the fact here mentioned, cp. Carneades ap. Plut. De Adul. et Amic. c. 16, *Καρνεάδης δὲ ἔλεγε, ὅτι πλουσίων καὶ βασιλέων παῖδες ἱππεύειν μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εὖ καὶ καλῶς μανθάνουσι· κολακεύει γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς ὁ διδάσκαλος ἐπαινῶν, καὶ ὁ προσπαλαίων ὑποκατακλινόμενος.* Plato had said much the same thing in Laws 695 B, *παραλαβόντες δ' οὖν οἱ παῖδες τελευτήσαντος Κύρου τρυφῆς μεστοὶ καὶ ἀνεπιπληξίας, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἕτερον ἄτερος ἀπέκτεινε τῷ ἴσῳ ἀγαπακτῶν κ.τ.λ.*, and 695 E, *τὸ δ' αἴτιον οὐ τύχης, ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, ἀλλ' ὁ κακὸς βίος, ὃν οἱ τῶν διαφερόντως πλουσίων καὶ τυράννων παῖδες τὰ πολλὰ ζῶσιν.* Cp. also Laws 791 D, quoted above on 13. 'A boy has the best chance of being well brought up in a household where there is solid comfort combined with thrift and simplicity' (Trevelyan, Life of Lord Macaulay, 1. 37).

21. *γίνεται οὖν κ.τ.λ.* That a *πόλις* in which one section of the citizens consists of masters and the other of slaves is no true *πόλις* is a view inherited by Aristotle from the Menexenus (238 E sq.), and from Plato, Laws 756 E sq. (quoted in vol. i. p. 499, note 2) and 712 E, and Rep. 417 A–B. He probably also remembers Laws 679 B, *ᾧ δ' ἄν ποτε ξυνοικίᾳ μήτε πλοῦτος ξυνοικῇ μήτε πενία, σχεδὸν ἐν ταύτῃ γενναιότατα ἤθη γίγνοιτ' ἄν· οὔτε γὰρ ὕβρις οὔτ' ἀδικία, ζῆλοί τε αὖ καὶ φθόνοι οὐκ ἐγγίγνονται.* That the *πόλις* is an association of *ἐλεύθεροι* we are told in 3. 6. 1279 a 21.

23. *κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς. Πολιτικῆς* goes only with *κοινωνίας*, not with *φιλίας*. For *κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς* without the article cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 38.

24. *ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλικόν*, 'for association is a thing connected with [and springing from] friendliness': cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 38, *τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία*, and Plato, Gorg. 507 E, *ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη.* In Laws 697 C

τὸ φίλον is conjoined with τὸ κοινόν, and in 695 D φιλία with κοινωνία: cp. also Laws 837 B.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁδοῦ βούλονται κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. Is Aristotle thinking of Aeschines and Demosthenes on their second embassy to Pella? Cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 97, οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ (i. e. Δημοσθένει) συσσιτεῖν, ὅτ' ἐξήειμεν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑστέραν πρεσβείαν, ἤθελεν, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς, ὅπου δυνατὸν ἦν, εἰς ταὐτὸν πανδοκεῖον καταλύειν. More probably he has in view the general inclination of foes to give each other a wide berth (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 225: Aristoph. Plut. 837). We read of the old families and their antagonists at Lausanne in 1817 in Mr. S. Lane-Poole's Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (1. 274), 'The spirit of democracy showed itself even on the high-road, and whenever cart met carriage, the latter in most instances had to knock under.'

25. βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα. Βούλεται, i. e. 'aims at being,' not 'tends to be,' for Aristotle does not mean to assert that the πόλις tends, as time goes on, to become an union of men alike and equal. Aristotle is here speaking of the citizens of the πόλις, not, as in 3. 4. 1277 a 5, ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις, of all its components. Compare Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 30, κατ' ἰσότητα δὴ βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία, and Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων. Political rule itself is a rule over men free and equal (1. 7. 1255 b 20). It is not of course enough that the citizens should be alike; poor men are alike and slaves are alike, yet a πόλις composed of poor men or of slaves would not be a πόλις (3. 12. 1283 a 18 sq.). Machiavelli (Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book 1. c. 55) goes so far as to say that 'whosoever shall attempt to found a Republic where there are many gentlemen will never effect his purpose except he can first root them all out.' He explains that he means by 'gentlemen' 'such as live in idleness and abundance on the income of their estates without needing to trouble themselves to till the soil or to undertake any other kind of labour, in order to live.' He holds that if three Republics, Florence, Siena, and Lucca, had subsisted a long time in the not large country of Tuscany, it was because there were but very few gentlemen there and no Lords with castles and subjects of their own, whereas Lombardy and the Kingdom of Naples abounded with these two sorts of men, and were consequently marked out for monarchy.

27. ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ., 'so that this State' (i. e. a State com-

posed of moderately well-to-do citizens) 'will necessarily be best constituted in respect of those elements of which we say that the State is by nature composed.' The elements referred to are the very rich, the very poor, and the moderately well-to-do (1295 b 1 sqq.). A saying is attributed to Thales in [Plut.] Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 11 that the best democracy is that in which the citizens are neither very rich nor very poor. For *ταύτην τὴν πόλιν* = *τὴν ἐκ τῶν μέσων συνεστῶσαν πόλιν*, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 6, *ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας* (= *τὰς τῶν ἄριστα δοκούντων πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων*). For the ellipse in *ἐξ ὧν* see note on 1253 b 3.

28. *καὶ σώζονται δ' ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν* κ.τ.λ., i. e. not only save the State, but also save their own lives and fortunes. Euripides had said, *τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ 'ν μέσῳ σώζει πόλεις* (see note on 1295 b 1): cp. also Plato, Rep. 417 A, *καὶ οὕτω μὲν σώζοιντό τ' ἂν καὶ σώζοιεν τὴν πόλιν*. For the fact cp. Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 462 Nauck (547, ed. 2), esp.

ἡ δὲ μεσότης ἐν πᾶσιν ἀσφαλεστέρα,

and Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 35.

31. *τῆς τούτων*. Aristotle expects us to supply *οὐσίας*: compare the omission of *πολιτειῶν* in 1296 a 5. For similar omissions see vol. ii. p. li, note 4.

καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. Compare the passage from the Supplices of Euripides quoted above on 1295 b 1, Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 28–31, and Corn. Nepos, Chabrias, c. 3, neque animo aequo pauperes alienam opulentium intueantur fortunam.

33. *διὰ τοῦτο* κ.τ.λ. For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.

Φωκυλίδης, fragm. 12 Bergk. Cp. Pindar, Pyth. 11. 52 sq. Bergk.

34. *δῆλον ἄρα* κ.τ.λ., 'it is clear then that the constitution also in which the moderately well-to-do are supreme is best,' as well as *ἡ μέση κτῆσις τῶν εὐτυχημάτων* (1295 b 4 sq.), or perhaps as well as the *πολλά* of 34. *Ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική* here means 'the constitution,' as in 2. 1. 1260 b 27 (cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 29). In 1. 1. 1252 a 7 it seems to mean 'the *πόλις*.' For *ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων*, cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 6 sq.

36. *καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας* κ.τ.λ. 'The condition of economical and political well-being in any highly civilized nation is a harmony of large, moderate, and small incomes. Things are best when the moderate incomes predominate—when, as Rousseau says, "no citizen is so rich that he can buy up the rest and none so poor

that he must needs sell himself"' (Roscher, Politik, p. 473). Mr. A. J. Balfour remarked of Ireland in the House of Commons (*Times*, March 11, 1890), that one reason why its land-system was imperfect was that 'there was an absence of a class intermediate between the occupying farmer and the landlord which might hold the balance between the two.' Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 38 sqq.

ἐν αἷς δή. 'Δή vim relativi urguet, "welcher eben," "welcher gerade"' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 43).

39. τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολάς, i.e. extreme democracy and unmixed oligarchy.

40. τοὺς πολιτευομένους, 'cives optimo iure' (Bon. Ind. 613 b 27), 'the active citizens' (Welldon). See note on 1328 a 17.

1296 a. **1. ὡς ὅπου κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 36 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32 sqq.

ἡ δῆμος ἔσχατος ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἄκρατος. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 35 sq. and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21.

2. ἡ τυραννὶς δι' ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπερβολάς, 'or, as a result of both these extremes' (extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy), 'a tyranny.'

3. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. **Τῆς νεανικωτάτης** probably qualifies both **δημοκρατίας** and **ὀλιγαρχίας**: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3, **ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας.** The reason why extreme democracies and extreme oligarchies were apt to change into tyrannies may be gathered from 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 20 sqq.; both these constitutions placed great power in the hands of individuals, the one of them in the hands of demagogues and the other in those of the leading oligarchs. Tyranny often arose out of oligarchy (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.), and according to a saying of Dionysius the younger (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. Iun. 4. 176 D), the elder Dionysius became tyrant **μισουμένης δημοκρατίας.** The narrow oligarchy of the Bacchiadae at Corinth ended in a tyranny, but the less narrow oligarchy which was set up on the fall of the tyranny had not been replaced by a tyranny, though it is true that Timophanes had attempted to overthrow it (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 23 sq.).

5. τῶν μέσων, sc. **πολιτειῶν,** which is suppressed because easily supplied. The term **ἡ μέση πολιτεία** is used of a constitution midway between oligarchy and democracy in **Ἀθ. Πολ.** c. 13. l. 18.

τῶν σύνεγγυς, i.e. the moderate forms of oligarchy (cp. 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21, **τὴν μὲν εὔκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ**) and also of democracy. Thus

the cities of Achaia, being under moderate democracies, were mostly free from tyranny (Paus. 7. 7. 1: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 105).

τὴν δ' αἰτίαν κ.τ.λ. The reference perhaps is especially to 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 20 sqq. (see above on 3).

7. *ἡ μέση*, sc. *πολιτεία*. It is implied that in the *μέση πολιτεία* the midway class will be large: cp. 23 sqq., where *ἐν ταύταις* apparently means *ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πολιτείαις*, and c. 13. 1297 b 26, *δι' ὀλιγανθρωπίαν γὰρ οὐκ εἶχον* (*αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι*) *πολὺ τὸ μέσον*.

8. *ὅπου γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30, *τὸ μέσον αὔξειν· τοῦτο γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις*. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 744 D, *δεῖ γὰρ ἐν πόλει που, φαμέν, τῇ τοῦ μεγίστου νοσήματος οὐ μεθεξούσῃ, ὃ διάστασιν ἢ στάσιν ὀρθότερον ἂν εἴη κεκλῆσθαι, μήτε πενίαν τὴν χαλεπὴν ἐνεῖναι παρά τισι τῶν πολιτῶν μήτ' αὖ πλοῦτον, ὡς ἀμφοτέρων τικτόντων ταῦτα ἀμφότερα*. This passage lends support to the reading of the MSS. here, *στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις*, and makes it unlikely that Schneider and Sus. are right in reading *συστάσεις* in place of *στάσεις*, a change suggested by the rendering of Vet. Int., 'conturbationes et dissensiones politiarum,' where however 'conturbationes' may stand for *στάσεις*, for *στάσις* is not always rendered 'seditio' by Vet. Int. Compare also Menecles of Barca, Fragm. 1 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 4. 449), *οἱ πολῖται ἐν τῇ Θήρᾳ ἐστασίασαν καὶ διέστησαν ἀλλήλων*, and Gellius' version of Solon's law as to neutrality in a sedition (Gell. 2. 12, si ob discordiam dissensionemque seditio atque discessio populi in duas partes (*στάσις καὶ διάστασις*) fiet, etc.); also Plato, Rep. 560 A, *στάσις καὶ ἀντίστασις*, and Plut. Solon, c. 12, *τῆς στάσεως ἀκμὴν λαβούσης μάλιστα καὶ τοῦ δήμου διαστάντος*. In a *διάστασις* the citizens were divided into two camps, and a division into two camps was probably often the precursor of actual fighting (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 19).

9. *αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις*, 'large States' probably, not 'large cities,' as in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sq. The tendency of small States to *στάσις* may be illustrated by the examples of Cynaetha (Polyb. 4. 17), Epidamnus (Thuc. 1. 24), and Delphi (Pol. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 37 sqq.). Aristotle's remark that *τὸ μέσον* was a numerous class in large Greek States throws an interesting light on the distribution of property in them. If we could trust the statement of the tribune Marcius Philippus in B.C. 104 that there were not two thousand men in Rome who possessed property (Cic. De Offic. 2. 21. 73), which is in all probability an exaggerated one, the state of things at Rome must have been at that time very different.

10. ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς κ.τ.λ. If οἱ μέσοι were so few in number in small Greek States, the polity can hardly have been suitable to them. Yet were not most Greek States small? If so, can the polity have been suitable to most Greek States? Aristotle says himself in 1296 a 23 sqq. that the midway class was often a small one in Greek States. The difficulty just pointed out does not seem, however, to have occurred to him.

11. μηδὲν μέσον, 'nothing midway between the very rich and the very poor.'

13. καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστεραι τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν κ.τ.λ. A different reason is given for this in 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 8 sqq.: cp. also 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15 sqq.

16. ἐπεί introduces a proof that the greater durability of democracy as compared with oligarchy is due to the μέσοι, the proof being furnished by the fact that when the supremacy of the poor in a democracy is not due to the aid of the μέσοι but to their own superiority in number, democracies do not last long. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 12–19. The fact mentioned by Aristotle is interesting. The Athenian democracy, which lasted long, must have had the support of the μέσοι. Mommsen (History of Rome, Book 4, c. 6: Eng. Trans., ed. 1, vol. iii. p. 212) says of the demagogues Saturninus and Glaucia, 'While Gaius Gracchus, clearly perceiving that no government could be overthrown by means of the proletariate alone, had especially sought to gain over to his side the propertied classes, these continuators of his work began by producing a reconciliation between the aristocracy and the *bourgeoisie*.' For κακοπραγία γίνεται cp. Plato, Laws 701 E, ἐγένετο εὐπραγία.

18. σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. An indication of what? Probably of the fact that the constitution which gives supreme power to the midway class is the best.

19. Σόλων τε γὰρ ἦν τούτων (δηλοῖ δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως). For δηλοῖ = δῆλόν ἐστι, see Liddell and Scott and Bon. Ind. 174 a 14 sqq. That Solon belonged to the moderately well-to-do class is testified also by Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 5 and Plut. Solon, cc. 1 and 14. No evidence of the fact is to be found in Solon, Fragm. 15, which seems only to show that he was not wealthy, nor do the quotations from his poems in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 5 prove the point, as the writer seems to think that they do. Aristotle probably did not regard Cleisthenes as one of the best lawgivers. He must have been a wealthy man.

20. οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεύς. This is added in correction of those who

had said that Lycurgus was king. Ephorus had done so (Fragm. 64, ap. Strab. p. 482, *τέως μὲν οὖν ἐβασίλευεν ὁ Λυκοῦργος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, γενομένου δὲ παιδὸς ἐπετρόπευεν ἐκεῖνον*: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 3). Other authorities went further; according to them Lycurgus was for many years king at Lacedaemon (Plut. Solon, c. 16). Wide domains were attached to the Lacedaemonian kingship (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 44. 2), and if Lycurgus had been king, he would have been a rich man and not one of the *μέσοι*. Cp. Hom. Odyss. 1. 392,

οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακὸν βασιλευέμεν αἶψά τέ οἱ δῶ
ἀφνειὸν πέλεται, καὶ τιμήεστερος αὐτός.

The view that Lycurgus was not a king recurs in the speech of Cleomenes III in Plut. Cleom. c. 10, *τὸν Λυκοῦργον, ὃς οὔτε βασιλεὺς ὢν οὔτε ἄρχων, ἰδιώτης δὲ βασιλεύειν ἐπιχειρῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις προῆλθεν εἰς ἀγοράν* κ.τ.λ.

21. Χαρώνδας. Charondas, though praised here, is apparently referred to in c. 13. 1297a 23 sqq. as the author of an *ἀριστοκρατία* embodying one at any rate of the *σοφίσματα* to which Aristotle objects (see note on 1274a 22).

22. *φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων* κ.τ.λ. Three reasons for the comparative rarity of *ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία* are given in what follows:— (1) the class of *μέσοι* is often small, (2) the constitution is the outcome of a victory of the rich or the poor, (3) those who have had the hegemony in Greece have seldom favoured this constitution. In 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 39 sqq. a different reason is given for the tendency of constitutions to assume the form of oligarchy or democracy.

23. *ἐν ταύταις*, i. e. *ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πολιτείαις* (cp. 14 sqq.).

27. *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις* κ.τ.λ. Compare Plato, Laws 715 A, and as to Argos Thuc. 5. 82. 2, Plut. Alcib. c. 15, and Paus. 2. 20. 2. As to Tegea see Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6–10.

30. *τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας*, 'the superior share in the advantages of the constitution': cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 28, *τοῖς ἧττον κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας*, and 6 (4). 8. 1294a 19, *τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας*.

32. *ἔτι δὲ* κ.τ.λ. The cause now mentioned for the general prevalence in Greece of democracy and oligarchy does not account for the prevalence of these two constitutions throughout the Greek world, for though the constitutional development of the States of Greece Proper, Western Asia Minor, the Northern Aegean, and

the Propontis, etc. was considerably influenced by the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, this can hardly be said of the constitutional development of the Greek States of Italy and Sicily, in which Athens did not interfere till a comparatively late date, or of Cyrene and Massalia, where neither the Lacedaemonians nor the Athenians appear to have interfered at all.

τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 'those who held in the past the hegemony of Greece.' Aristotle refers to the Athenians and Lacedaemonians (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 22 sqq.). For the phrase cp. Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 133, οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ποτὲ ἀξιοῦντες ἡγεμόνες εἶναι (said of the Lacedaemonians): Demosth. Fragm. 17, τῶν ἡγησαμένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος (said of the Thebans): and Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. 6. 9, οἵ τε τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγούμενοι καὶ ἐπ' ἀνδρίᾳ διαβόητοι Σπαρτιᾶται. Cp. also for γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 5, τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γινομένους.

38. ὀλιγάκις καὶ παρ' ὀλίγους. Aristotle often uses expressions like this: cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23, ὀλιγάκις ἢ ὀλίγας, and see Vahlen on Poet. 14. 1454 a 1, who refers to Poet. 24. 1460 a 9, De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 b 28 sq. and 3. 5. 756 a 16 sq., Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1151 b 30, and other passages. See also Bon. Ind. s. v. ὀλιγάκις, and Plato, Rep. 491 B.

εἷς γὰρ ἀνὴρ κ.τ.λ., 'for one man only of those formerly in a position of supreme authority was persuaded to allot this constitution [to those with whom he had to do].' For the use of ἐπί in τῶν πρότερον ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων, cp. ἐπ' εὐπραξίᾳ in Soph. O. C. 1554,

> εὐδαίμονες γένοισθε, κἀπ' εὐπραξίᾳ
> μέμνησθέ μου θανόντος εὐτυχεῖς ἀεί.

It is doubtful whether we should supply τῆς Ἑλλάδος with ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ, though we have had τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος in 32; Bonitz (Ind. s. v. ἡγεμονία) and Sus.[2] (i. 597) do not appear to supply τῆς Ἑλλάδος, but to take statesmen at the head of their respective States to be referred to. Statesmen at the head of the greater Greek States would, however, be in a position to exercise an influence over the affairs of Greece. It is to be noticed that while the reference is to peoples in 32, statesmen are now referred to. I take the allusion to be to Theramenes: see vol. i. p. 470. A constitution which Thucydides describes both as ὀλιγαρχία and as ἀριστοκρατία was introduced at Thasos and in other States dependent on Athens in the time of the Four Hundred (Thuc. 8. 64). Aristotle

may well have thought that Epaminondas and Pelopidas missed a splendid opportunity of introducing the polity when the victory of Leuctra made Thebes the leading power in Greece, and that Arcadia, for instance, might have prospered better if Epaminondas had advised those who reorganized it to give it a less democratic constitution than they actually did. Why *συνεπείσθη* and not *ἐπείσθη*? *Συμπείθειν* seems hardly to differ in meaning from *πείθειν* in De Caelo, 2. 1. 284 a 2, *διόπερ καλῶς ἔχει συμπείθειν ἑαυτὸν τοὺς ἀρχαίους καὶ μάλιστα πατρίους ἡμῶν ἀληθεῖς εἶναι λόγους*, and the word is said by Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 254. 3 to be often used in the same sense as *πείθειν* by Theopompus. *Συνεπείσθη* may mean no more here, or it may mean, as Richards suggests, 'was persuaded to agree in doing so and so.' For *ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν*, where I can hardly think (with Welldon) that *ἀποδοῦναι* means 'to restore' (Sus. translates the word 'ins Leben zu rufen,' 'to call into being'), cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 5, *οὐ πρότερον ἀπέδωκε τῷ πλήθει τοὺς νόμους* (*ὁ Λυκοῦργος*). In *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 11, *τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἀποδώσειν*, the word perhaps means 'to restore.'

40. *ἤδη δὲ κ.τ.λ.* *Καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν*, 'among those in the individual cities also,' as well as among rulers of the leading States of Greece: cp. Xen. Anab. 6. 6. 12, *εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις· τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι.* Aristotle evidently holds that the bad spirit to which he refers had had its origin in the policy of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian statesmen and had spread from it to the dependent States ruled by them. Macaulay perhaps remembers the passage before us when he writes of the Englishry and Irishry of Ireland in 1688–9 (History of England, c. 12), 'It was now impossible to establish in Ireland a just and beneficent government. . . . The opportunity had passed away; compromise had become impossible; the two infuriated castes were alike convinced that it was necessary to oppress or to be oppressed, and that there could be no safety but in victory, vengeance, and dominion.' *Μηδὲ βούλεσθαι τὸ ἴσον*, 'not even to wish for that which is equal and fair,' much less to endeavour to realize it. For *τὸ ἴσον* cp. 29, *οὐ καθιστᾶσι κοινὴν πολιτείαν οὐδ' ἴσην.*

2. *ἀρίστη*, sc. *ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι* (c. 11. 1295 a 25: c. 13. 1296 b. 1297 b 33).

5. *καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐχομένην.* Cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 15, *καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριοῦσιν*: Metaph. Z. 2. 1028 b 24,

καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 173 a 16 sqq. In 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 16 we have καὶ οὕτω δή, which is less common.

7. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. So in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21 sq. we are told that the first form of oligarchy is that which makes a near approach to the polity.

9. πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, 'in relation to a presupposition' (in contradistinction to ἁπλῶς), i. e. in relation to the presupposition of a given case in which what is in the abstract most choiceworthy is not most advantageous. For πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν see Bon. Ind. 797 a 52 sqq.

λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. It does not follow that what is in the abstract most choiceworthy will be advantageous in a given case. Punishment, which is in the abstract by no means choiceworthy, will be advantageous in the case of a criminal (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10 sqq.). Cp. also Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 37, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς. Thus, though the first form of oligarchy, which makes a near approach to the polity, is in the abstract the most choiceworthy form, in a given case an extreme form of oligarchy may be advantageous (cp. c. 12. 1296 b 33 sq.).

C. 12. 13. Τίς δὲ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 1. 1288 b 24 sqq. and c. 2. 1289 b 17 sqq. Compare also Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 30, χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαίειν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἁρμόττουσιν.

14. λεκτέον, i. e. ὑποθετέον: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 16, λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης, and 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 18. 'In a logical sense λαμβάνειν is used synonymously with αἰτεῖσθαι, ὑποθέσθαι, and in contrast to δεικνύναι' (Bon. Ind. 422 b 11). That the principle here insisted on was inherited by Aristotle from Theramenes we have seen in vol. i. p. 491. Aristotle draws attention to it here because it has a bearing on the question what constitution is advantageous in a given case. To answer this question we must begin by ascertaining what is the strongest element in the given State, and what constitution will enlist its support.

17. ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. For the omission of the article before ποσοῦ cp. 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 1, πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικάς. 'New England abolished caste; in Virginia they still talk of "quality folk"' (Lowell, Among my Books, p. 239).

18. ἐλευθερία, which is said in c. 8. 1294 a 11 to be the ὅρος of

democracy, is here distinguished from ἡ τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχή. The πλῆθος, in fact, may include others than οἱ ἐλεύθεροι (3. 15. 1286 a 36). For the grouping together of πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν cp. c. 4. 1291 b 28 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 39.

20. For ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις, see note on 1339 b 38. For the reversal of the order of the words in τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως . . . ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν see note on 1277 a 31, and cp. 26, ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου.

23. ὑπερέχειν, sc. τοῦτο τὸ μέρος.

25. τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, i. e. so as to overbalance its defect in quality.

26. Though Aristotle uses the word πέφυκεν here, he does not probably intend to imply that democracy or oligarchy exist by nature under any circumstances (cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 39 sq.).

29. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθαρνούντων, τὴν τελευταίαν. This hardly agrees with c. 6. 1293 a 1 sqq. No doubt the ultimate democracy will exist only in States in which artisans and day-labourers are very numerous, but it will not exist even in them unless the revenue is large enough to make an ample provision of pay possible.

31. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων κ.τ.λ. We see from 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq. that other things have to be taken into account in deciding what kind of oligarchy is suitable to a given State besides that mentioned here—for instance, the character of the territory. In 2. 12. 1274 a 18 we have ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων, but in the passage before us the article is omitted after καί because the two classes are treated as nearly akin. Compare with 31 sq. Περὶ μακροβιότητος 5. 466 a 33, μακροβιώτερα γὰρ τὰ λειπόμενα τῷ πλήθει τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ἐὰν πλείονι λόγῳ ὑπερέχῃ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ λείπεται κατὰ τὸ ποσόν.

34. κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους, 'according to the degree of superiority' (i. e. in quality) 'possessed by the oligarchical population.' Πλῆθος must here be used of the class referred to without much reference to its numbers: cp. 31, τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων (sc. πλῆθος). The phrase recurs in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 11, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ποίῳ πλήθει.

34. δεῖ δ' ἀεὶ . . . **38.** τούτους, and **1297 a 6.** ὅσῳ . . . **b 1.** μόνον Sus., following Buecheler, would transfer to before 1294 b 14, τοῦ, and **1297 b 1.** δεῖ . . . **28.** ἄρχεσθαι, to after ὅλως, 1294 b 40. But

Welldon retains the traditional order of these passages, and, I think, rightly. I do not see any reason why Aristotle should not in 1296 b 34–38 advise the framers of oligarchies and democracies to frame their constitutions so as to satisfy the *μέσοι*, and though the counsel as to the construction of durable polities and aristocracies which is given in 1297 a 6–b 28 might have been given in c. 9, where Buecheler and Sus. would place it, it should not escape attention that *μονιμωτέρα*, 1297 a 7, evidently takes up *μόνιμον*, 1296 b 40, and that it can hardly be right to tear asunder the two sentences in which these words occur, as Buecheler and Sus. would do. It should also be noticed that the closing remark in 1297 b 26–28 as to *τὸ μέσον* comes better after, than before, what we have been told in c. 11 as to the importance of *οἱ μέσοι*. Aristotle's object in 1297 a 6–b 28 is to add two cautions to what he has already said in c. 9 as to the proper way of constructing polities and aristocracies, the one against falling into the error into which framers of these constitutions frequently fell, and trying to deceive the demos in addition to giving an unfair share of power to the well-to-do, and the other against fixing the property-qualification without reference to the circumstances of the particular case, and omitting to take care that those admitted to political rights shall be more numerous than those excluded from them. The latter caution is in complete harmony with, and was probably suggested by, what is said at the outset of the discussion in c. 12. 1296 b 14 sqq.

35. *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ* goes with *προσλαμβάνειν*, and we should translate 'should make the moderately well-to-do sharers in the advantages of the constitution in addition to the class specially favoured by him.' Bonitz (Ind. s.v. *προσλαμβάνειν*) compares with the passage before us 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 7, *τῷ προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστους καὶ ποιεῖν πολίτας μὴ μόνον τοὺς γνησίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόθους κ.τ.λ.*

36. *στοχάζεσθαι τῶν μέσων.* Cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 22, *στοχαζόμενον τοῦ πλήθους*, and Polyb. 6. 15. 9.

37. *ἐάν τε δημοκρατικοὺς κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 11. 1296 a 13 sqq.

38. *ὅπου δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'but where the mass of the moderately well-to-do outweighs either both the extreme classes taken together or even one of them only, there it is possible for a durable polity to exist.' See vol. i. p. 501, note. *Ὑπερτείνει* probably means 'outweighs' (cp. 32, *ὑπερτείνει τῷ ποιῷ*), not 'exceeds in number,' though in small Greek States the very rich may often have been

more numerous than the moderately well-to-do (c. 11. 1296 a 10 sqq.).

40. For **οὐδὲν φοβερὸν μή** cp. (with Bon. Ind. 828 a 30) Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 b 23, *καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μή ποτε στῇ*: cp. also Xen. Hiero, 1. 12, *φοβερὸν γὰρ μὴ ἅμα στερηθῶσι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀδύνατοι γένωνται τιμωρήσασθαι τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας.*

2. **οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄτεροι βουλήσονται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἑτέροις κ.τ.λ.** 1297 a. The sense is—for, if the rich are to combine with the poor against the *μέσοι*, either the one class must submit to be ruled by the other, and neither of the two classes will agree to that, or they must fall back on a *κοινὴ πολιτεία* which will give both classes a share of power, and if they seek to find a *πολιτεία* more *κοινή* than this, they will seek in vain.

3. **οὐδεμίαν εὑρήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης.** Vict. and Lamb. supply *κοινοτέραν* before *ταύτης*, while Sus.[2] ('so werden sie keine andere als diese finden') and Welldon ('they will not discover any other than this') make *ταύτης* in the gen. after *ἄλλην*. For *ἄλλος* with the gen. cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 15 sq. and see Bon. Ind. s. v. I incline myself, however, to supply *κοινοτέραν*.

4. **ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν κ.τ.λ.** *Τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι* is a sign of freedom (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2 sq.), and a constitution in which it found a place would be especially *κοινή*.

6. **διαιτητὴς δ' ὁ μέσος.** Cp. De An. 2. 11. 424 a 6, *τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων.* Aristotle's conception of the *μέσοι* ruling as arbitrators between rich and poor was perhaps suggested to him by the fact that Greek States occasionally had recourse to an *ἄρχων μεσίδιος* when the *ἀπιστία πρὸς ἀλλήλους* mentioned in 4 sq. existed (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 26 sqq., where the phrase recurs).

ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον ἡ πολιτεία μιχθῇ, τοσούτῳ μονιμωτέρα. Cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 5 sqq.

7. **καὶ τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας,** 'even of those who wish to construct aristocratic constitutions,' not merely of those who wish to construct oligarchies. I incline to think that *τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας* means here 'aristocratic constitutions,' not 'aristocratic polities,' though in c. 14. 1298 b 10 we have *πολιτείας ἀριστοκρατικῆς* used in the sense of an 'aristocratic polity.' That many aristocracies were not unlike oligarchies we know from c. 7. 1293 b 20 sq. and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15 sqq.

9. **ἐν τῷ παρακρούεσθαι τὸν δῆμον.** How odious laws were

which deceived the demos, we see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 79.

10. ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. By ψευδῶς ἀγαθά Aristotle means apparent privileges which come to nothing and disappoint those to whom they are given. He perhaps remembers Theogn. 607,

ἀρχῇ ἔπι ψεύδους μικρὴ χάρις· ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν
αἰσχρὸν δὴ κέρδος καὶ κακόν, ἀμφότερον,
γίνεται· οὐδέ τι καλόν, ὅτῳ ψεῦδος προσομαρτῇ
ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἐξέλθῃ πρῶτον ἀπὸ στόματος

(a saying which is apparently referred to in Soph. Fragm. 749, 750 Nauck; cp. also Plato, Rep. 490 C, ἡγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οἶμαι, φαῖμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι). Eurip. Fragm. 1022 Nauck (1035, ed. 2) should also be compared,

δύστηνος ὅστις τὰ καλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ λέγων
οὐ τοῖσδε χρῆται τοῖς καλοῖς ἀληθέσιν,

and Fragm. 266 Nauck (264, ed. 2),

τὰ γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς πρασσόμεν' ὀρθῶς
τοῖς πράσσουσιν κακὸν ἦλθεν,

and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. cclxx (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 292),

κρεῖττον δ' ἁλίσθαι ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθὲς κακόν.

Some familiar proverb or verse probably lies at the root of all these passages.

11. αἱ γὰρ πλεονεξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τοῦ δήμου, 'for the undue gains of the rich' (i. e. the superiority of political advantage which the ingenious constitutional contrivances referred to secure to the rich) 'are more fatal to the constitution than those of the demos.' Πλεονεξία here = τὸ πλέον ἔχειν, not τὸ βούλεσθαι πλέον ἔχειν (Bon. Ind. s. v.). The reason why the undue gains of the rich are more fatal to the constitution than those of the poor probably is that these gains fall to a minority, and to a minority specially keen for political predominance (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 17, κρεῖττόν τε γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἴσον ἔχοντες) and specially ready to abuse it (1307 a 19 sq.).

C. 13. 14. Ἔστι δ' ὅσα κ.τ.λ. Ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις probably means 'in polities,' i. e. in polities strictly so called: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 40 sqq., where a warning is addressed to 'well-mixed constitutions' not to trust to the artifices described in the chapter before us; hence it is likely that framers of aristocracies and polities often committed the error of trusting to them. We know that Plato did so

in the Laws (see vol. i. p. 502, note 2), and the constitution sketched in the Laws is said by Aristotle to be meant for a polity (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.). Plato may have been misled by the example of Charondas (1297 a 23). The plan followed in the aristocracies and polities which Aristotle here criticizes was to give the demos an apparent, but illusory, share in the popular assembly, in office, in the dicasteries, and in the possession of arms and the practice of gymnastic exercises. Similar devices are occasionally practised in modern times. Thus in the South African Republic the Uitlander or alien after a period of two years' residence and naturalization acquires only a vote in the election of the second Raad, a worthless franchise, for the Acts of this body must be presented to the President of the Republic for consideration, and can only become law if he decides to submit them for the approval of the first Raad, and its approval is obtained (*Times*, Jan. 1, 1896). It should be noticed that the advice which Aristotle himself gives to oligarchies to associate the demos with the privileged class in the deliberative, but to give it only a nugatory or consultative voice (c. 14. 1298 b 32 sqq.) comes perilously near that which he censures here. It would seem from what Aristotle says in the passage before us that even in polities the rich had to be forced by penalties to attend in the assembly and dicasteries, and to possess heavy arms and practise gymnastic exercises, so that it is not surprising that in extreme democracies they commonly absented themselves from the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries (c. 6. 1293 a 8 sq.).

17. περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 9 sqq. Aristotle does not object to the imposition of a fine on all, whether rich or poor, for non-attendance at the assembly, but to the imposition of a fine exclusively on the well-to-do, or of a much larger fine on them than was imposed on the poor, unless indeed the imposition of a fine on the rich is balanced by the provision of pay for the poor (1297 a 38 sqq.: cp. c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.). A fine was imposed at Athens on those who did not attend the assembly (Pollux, 8. 104, where habitual absentees are perhaps meant by τοὺς μὴ ἐκκλησιάζοντας), but no doubt on rich and poor alike, though of course a fine would not be easily leviable from the very poor. If the fine thus levied was of equal amount for both rich and poor, it would obviously fall more lightly on the rich than on the poor, and therefore would be more effective in securing the attendance of the poor

than of the rich, whether this was intended by those who instituted it or not. The comitia centuriata at Rome were so organized that the centuries of the rich outnumbered those of the poor (Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 350).

19. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ. A device of a somewhat similar kind finds a place in the constitution of the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropaedeia, for under this constitution office was confined to the 'complete citizens,' and no one could become a complete citizen without having in youth attended the public schools, which only those could do whose fathers could afford to maintain them in idleness. Thus while Xenophon can say that none of the 120,000 Persians were excluded from office by law, it was practically possible only for the sons of well-to-do parents to hold office (Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 15).

20. τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι τίμημα, 'those who possess rateable property,' cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 17, *τίμημα φέροντας*, and *'Αθ. Πολ.* c. 39, l. 24, *ἐν τοῖς τὰ τιμήματα παρεχομένοις.*

μὴ ἐξεῖναι ἐξόμνυσθαι. It is implied that in the constitutions to which Aristotle refers men were glad to avoid holding office; hence no pay can have been attached to the offices, or at any rate no pay large enough to be tempting. The tenure of office without pay is described in 2. 11. 1273 a 17 as characteristic of aristocracy, and some of the constitutions to which Aristotle here refers were aristocracies (cp. 8); whether offices were unremunerated in polities also, we do not learn.

21. καὶ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1298 b 16 sqq. In the constitutions referred to here there seem to have been dicasteries of which the poor were nominally at any rate members, but in the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian aristocracies the magistrates constituted the judicial authority of the State (3. 1. 1275 b 8 sqq.).

23. ἐν τοῖς Χαρώνδου νόμοις. Charondas legislated for Catana and the other Chalcidian cities of Italy and Sicily (2. 12. 1274 a 23 sqq.), but his laws seem to have been in use also at Thurii, if we may trust Diod. 12. 11 sqq., at Mazaca in Cappadocia (Strabo, p. 539), and apparently at Cos (Herondas, 2. 48: see Crusius, Untersuchungen, p. 34 sqq.), and very possibly in other cities of which we do not hear.

24. ἀπογραψαμένοις, 'after having their names entered in a register.' There was a list of members of the assembly at Athens (*πίναξ ἐκκλησιαστικός*), in which men entered their names on attain-

ing the proper age (Demosth. Or. 44. in Leoch. c. 35: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 199, 289: Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 112 sq.), and such lists must have existed in most Greek States which had assemblies, for otherwise it would be impossible to exclude persons not entitled to serve, especially where pay was forthcoming for attendance, but the peculiarity of the arrangement described in the text is that registration was optional, and that poor men were discouraged from registering by the imposition of heavy penalties on those who after registering failed to attend (*τούτοις*, 27). This device differs from the rest in not affecting the poor exclusively. Not a few rich persons might be glad to avoid all risk of incurring these heavy penalties, and might consequently abstain from entering their names on the register. As to the use of the word *ἀπογράφεσθαι* see Mr. W. Wyse in *Class. Rev.* 12. 392.

29. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. Some oligarchies deprived the many of their heavy arms (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 12 sq.), and the constitutions referred to here did in a stealthy way much the same thing as those oligarchies did openly. We are told in 2. 5. 1264 a 20 sqq. that the Cretan States forbade their slaves to practise gymnastic exercises and to possess heavy arms, and the two things go together in the passage before us also.

34. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχικὰ τὰ σοφίσματα τῆς νομοθεσίας. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 8, *ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη.*

35. ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις κ.τ.λ. This was the case at Athens, where pay was provided for attendance at the assembly and dicasteries, but no special fine was imposed on the rich for non-attendance. Pay would be provided in democracies for holders of office also, but Aristotle does not dwell on that, because in many democracies the real authority rested to a large extent with the assembly and the dicasteries. We do not hear, so far as I am aware, that poor men were ever in democracies enabled by pay to possess heavy arms and practise gymnastic exercises.

40. τοῖς μὲν μισθὸν πορίζειν τοῖς δὲ ζημίαν. Πορίζειν does not suit with *ζημίαν*, and we expect *τοῖς δὲ τάττειν ζημίαν* (cp. 38), but see notes on 1257 a 21 and 1287 b 26, and cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq., where *τάττειν* is used both with *μισθόν* and with *ζημίαν*. Aristotle evidently sees that simply extending the fine to the poor would not suffice, inasmuch as many of them would be too poor to pay it, and indeed could not afford to attend without remuneration.

41. κοινωνοῖεν, sc. τοῦ ἐκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν.

1297 b. 1. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but the constitution [of the polity] should indeed be composed of' (or in other words 'should give political rights to') 'the possessors of heavy arms and none others, [so that it will be necessary to name a property-qualification for membership of it;] still it is not possible to define the amount of this property-qualification absolutely' (in contradistinction to 'relatively to the particular State') 'and to say that it should be this or that, but we must consider what is the highest amount falling within the reach of the particular State that will allow those who share in the constitution to outnumber those who do not, and we must fix this amount.' Sus. and Welldon translate τὴν πολιτείαν here 'the polity,' but if we translate it thus, we can hardly avoid translating ἡ πολιτεία in 12 sq. and 14 sq. in the same way. In 14 sq., however, at any rate ἡ πολιτεία cannot be thus translated, and neither Sus. nor Welldon thus translate it there. I incline, therefore, to translate τὴν πολιτείαν here 'the constitution [of the polity],' and to translate ἡ πολιτεία in 12 sq. and 14 sq. 'the constitution.' Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 12 sq.) translates τὴν πολιτείαν in the passage before us and ἡ πολιτεία in 12 sq. 'universitas civium,' but I prefer the rendering 'the constitution' (see note on 1293 b 41). That the polity will confine political rights to the possessors of heavy arms is taken for granted; this has been already said in 2. 6. 1265 b 28 sq. and 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq. If the property-qualification were fixed so high as to make those excluded from political rights more numerous than those admitted to them, the constitution would not be a polity but an oligarchy (c. 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.). The property-qualification which entitles to political rights in the polity will vary in different States; it will be high where a high qualification will bring an adequate number within the constitution, it will be lower where that will not be so. When it is said that the constitution must be 'composed of' the possessors of heavy arms (for ἐκ here designates the material of which the constitution is made, cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 28 sq. and 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq., and see notes on 1290 b 8 and 1319 a 24), the meaning probably is that membership of the assembly and dicasteries and the right of electing magistrates should be confined to this class. For though καὶ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν, 6, might seem to indicate that the phrase implies access to office strictly so called, a distinction is drawn in 14 sqq. between membership of the πολιτεία and eligibility to office. It is evident, in fact, from 2. 8.

1268 a 27 sqq. and 3. 11. 1281 b 28 sq. that, though the expression *μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας* often means *μετέχειν τῶν τιμῶν* (e.g. in c. 5. 1292 a 41 and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 26)—in one passage, indeed (2. 8. 1268 a 21 sqq.), it means *μετέχειν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν*—it does not always do so, and sometimes implies nothing more than membership of the assembly and dicasteries and the right of electing magistrates. Under *οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες* Aristotle probably includes only *οἱ ὁπλιτεύοντες*, not *οἱ ὡπλιτευκότες* (cp. 12 sqq. and 2. 8. 1267 b 32 sq., where *τὸ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχον* is coupled with *τὸ προπολεμοῦν*). *Οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες* are tacitly distinguished in what follows from *οἱ πένητες*: see as to this above on 1289 b 31 and 1294 a 41. For *ὁρισαμένους* Busse (De Praesidiis Aristotelis Politica Emendandi, p. 22) compares Poet. c. 7. 1451 a 9, *ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος, ἀεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὡς δὲ ἁπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κ.τ.λ.* Δεῖν must be supplied with *ὑπάρχειν* (Schneider) and *δεῖ* with *τάττειν*. As to the suppression of *δεῖ* see notes on 1335 b 5 and 1328 a 8.

6. **ἐθέλουσι γὰρ οἱ πένητες κ.τ.λ.**, 'for [this course will not cause any difficulty with the poor, for] they are willing,' etc. We learn, however, from 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 14 sqq. that something besides abstinence from outrage or spoliation on the part of the rulers is necessary if the poor are to remain quiet; office must not be a source of large gains. Who are meant by *οἱ πένητες*, we see from Aristoph. Plut. 552 Didot,

> *πτωχοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίος, ὃν σὺ λέγεις, ζῆν ἐστιν μηδὲν ἔχοντα·*
> *τοῦ δὲ πένητος ζῆν φειδόμενον καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχοντα,*
> *περιγίγνεσθαι δ' αὐτῷ μηδέν, μὴ μέντοι μηδ' ἐπιλείπειν.*

The passage before us shows that they possessed some property: in 1. 2. 1252 b 12 it is implied that the *πένης* owned an ox for ploughing, but of course this would be true only of small cultivating landowners, not of urban *πένητες*. In Plato, Rep. 552 A the terms *πένης* and *ἄπορος* are conjoined. As to the *ἄποροι* see note on 1279 b 19.

9. **χαρίεντας.** See note on 1267 a 1.

10. **καὶ εἰώθασι δέ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle has just noticed a difficulty in connexion with his proposal which may be removed by wise conduct on the part of the ruling class, and now he notices another of which the same thing may be said. He perhaps remembers how the Council of the Areopagus had induced the poorer citizens of

Athens to take their place in the triremes and to fight at Salamis by giving each man eight drachmae (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 23). Compare the experience of the oligarchical leaders at Mytilene (Thuc. 3. 27. 2). To be willing to fight on condition of receiving food and without any pay was evidence of an easily contented disposition: cp. Plato, Rep. 420 A, *ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐπισίτιοι καὶ οὐδὲ μισθὸν πρὸς τοῖς σιτίοις λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι (ἐπίκουροι)*, and Eubul. Δαίδαλος, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 216),

ἐθέλει δ' ἄνευ
μισθοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς καταμένειν ἐπισίτιος.

Cp. also Plut. Aristid. c. 10, *ὀργίζεσθαι δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτι τὴν πενίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν νῦν παροῦσαν Ἀθηναίοις μόνον ὁρῶσι, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς φιλοτιμίας ἀμνημονοῦσιν ἐπὶ σιτίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀγωνίζεσθαι παρακαλοῦντες.* It would seem from the passage before us that the poor were commonly expected to help in fighting for the State even in a polity—whether as hoplites or as light-armed troops (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 13 sq.), we are not told.

12. *ἔστι δ' ἡ πολιτεία παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὁπλιτευόντων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡπλιτευκότων.* Ἡ πολιτεία, 'the constitution.' Aristotle would approve this arrangement because it adds to the number of those admitted to political rights (and so to the strength of the polity) without altering the class to which they belong. Plato (Laws 753 B: vol. i. p. 446) had given the right of nominating the three hundred citizens from whom the thirty-seven Nomophylakes are afterwards chosen by the whole city to those citizens, *ὁπόσοι περ ἂν ὅπλα ἱππικὰ ἢ πεζικὰ τιθῶνται καὶ πολέμου κεκοινωνήκωσιν ἐν ταῖς σφετέραις αὐτῶν τῆς ἡλικίας δυνάμεσι*, a constituency not very unlike that described in the text.

15. *ἐκ τούτων*, i.e. *ἐκ τῶν ὁπλιτευόντων καὶ τῶν ὡπλιτευκότων.* Membership of the assembly and the dicasteries was conferred on both these classes. So in the constitution of the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropaedeia office was confined to those citizens who, being between the ages of twenty-six and fifty-one, bore heavy arms and served on foreign expeditions, while the citizens above fifty-one years of age elected the holders of the magistracies and acted as judges (Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 13 sq.).

16. *καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.* This is added in justification of the recommendation in 1297 b 1 that the polity should confine political rights to the possessors of heavy arms. The earliest constitution gave political rights to those who fought for the State,

and Aristotle is probably inclined to presume that the earliest constitution will have been framed on a correct principle; thus he holds that the oldest kind of democracy is the best (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6 sqq.). We do not hear what was the nature of the military force under the kings, but the knights were supreme in the oligarchies which arose after the fall of kingship. It is clear from c. 3. 1289 b 36 sqq. that the strength of every State did not lie in cavalry, and therefore that these oligarchies of knights did not exist everywhere, but they are said in that passage to have existed, among other places, at Chalcis and Eretria, at Magnesia ad Maeandrum, and at many cities in Asia. They probably existed wherever there was a spacious open (Hdt. 5. 63) plain near the city, in which cavalry could act with effect (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.). See notes on 1289 b 39 and 1321 a 8.

18. τὴν γὰρ ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ὁ πόλεμος εἶχεν. Cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 31 sq., De Part. An. 2. 7. 653 b 13, *τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς τροφῆς περιττώματα περὶ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς σκέψιν καὶ θεωρίαν οἰκείους ἔχει τοὺς λόγους*, and Diod. 14. 72. 4, *καταταχούμενοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ὀξύτητος τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν ἑαυτῶν σπουδὴν εἶχον ἄπρακτον.*

19. ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ συντάξεως κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eurip. Herc. Fur. 185 Bothe (190 Dindorf),

> *ἀνὴρ ὁπλίτης δοῦλός ἐστι τῶν ὅπλων,*
> *καὶ τοῖσι συνταχθεῖσιν οὖσι μὴ 'γαθοῖς*
> *αὐτὸς τέθνηκε δειλίᾳ τῇ τῶν πέλας,*

and Plut. T. Flamin. c. 8, *ζῴῳ γὰρ ἡ φάλαγξ ἔοικεν ἁμάχῳ τὴν ἰσχύν, ἕως ἂν ἐστι σῶμα καὶ τηρεῖ τὸν συνασπισμὸν ἐν τάξει μιᾷ, διαλυθείσης δὲ καὶ τὴν καθ' ἕνα ῥώμην ἀπόλλυσι τῶν μαχομένων ἕκαστος διά τε τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὁπλίσεως καὶ ὅτι παντὸς ὅλου τοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων μέρεσι μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὑτὸν ἰσχύει.*

20. αἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐμπειρίαι καὶ τάξεις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις οὐχ ὑπῆρχον, 'and the crafts and tactical rules connected with the above-mentioned matters' (i.e. the ordering of hoplites) 'did not exist among the ancients.' Aristotle speaks of *ἐμπειρίαι*, not *τέχναι*, because the crafts based on mere practice to which he refers hardly deserved the name of arts; arts have to do with *τὸ καθόλου*, not so *ἐμπειρία* (Metaph. A. 1. 981 a 15 sq.). Cp. Pol. 3. 11. 1282 a 1, *τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας*, and Plato, Phaedr. 260 E, *οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἄτεχνος τριβή*, Gorg. 462 B sq., 465 A, and Laws 938 A, *εἴτ' οὖν τέχνη εἴτε ἀτεχνός ἐστί τις ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή.* For *τάξεις* ('taktischen Regeln,' Stahr), cp. Plato, Laws 688 A, *τὰς τάξεις τῶν*

νόμων: 721 A, ταῖς τάξεσι ('praescriptionibus suis,' Stallbaum): 823 C, τάξεις καὶ ζημίας ἐπιτιθέντα. For ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, cp. c. 10. 1295 a 12, ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν.

22. αὐξανομένων τῶν πόλεων, 'the States increasing in size': see notes on 1293 a 1, where it has been explained that this increase would especially consist in an increase of the central city, and on 1310 b 17.

24. διόπερ, 'hence,' i.e. the constitutions which then arose were called democracies (though they would now be called polities), because the possessors of political rights under them were more numerous than before and might well seem to be a demos when compared with the handful of men who ruled in the oligarchies which preceded them. It was perhaps in part because Aristotle saw that the earliest democracies were polities that he came to regard democracy as a perverted development of polity.

25. αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι. Bonitz (Ind. 613 b 12), Susemihl, and others take these words to mean 'the ancient polities,' but I incline rather to render them, with other interpreters, 'the ancient constitutions.' The words αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι seem to take up ἡ πρώτη πολιτεία ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, where πολιτεία means 'constitution,' not 'polity.' Prof. Francotte (Les Formes Mixtes de Gouvernement d'après Aristote, p. 41, note 2) is not altogether satisfied with Susemihl's rendering, though he follows it.

26. δι' ὀλιγανθρωπίαν γὰρ οὐκ εἶχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον (sc. αἱ πόλεις). Cp. c. 11. 1296 a 9 sqq.

27. ὀλίγοι τε ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν. Ὀλίγοι must be supplied with κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν in the sense of 'insignificant,' which of course is not its natural sense, but Aristotle often makes one word do, where the use of a second would have improved the sentence (see notes on 1257 a 21 and 1297 a 40). I do not think that any adjective, such as φαῦλοι, has dropped out before or after κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν. What is the suppressed nominative to ὑπέμενον? I incline to think οἱ δημοτικοί, or in other words the class which rose to supreme power in the democracies, better called polities, which succeeded the kingships and oligarchies, i.e. οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες. For the displacement of τε, which should follow τό, see note on 1325 a 19.

28. διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἰτίαν αἱ πολιτεῖαι πλείους. This question has been dealt with in c. 3. 1289 b 27–c. 4. 1291 b 13.

29. καὶ διὰ τί παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἕτεραι. Τὰς λεγομένας appears to include monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, one kind only of

democracy and oligarchy being recognized: cp. c. 8. 1294 a 25, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἕτερα πολιτείας εἴδη παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν. This question has been dealt with in c. 4. 1291 b 15—c. 8. 1294 a 25.

31. τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. For the genitive see note on 1253 b 27. Monarchy has two forms, kingship and tyranny; oligarchy has four (c. 5), aristocracy several (cc. 7–8); we are not distinctly told that there are more forms than one of polity, though we hear incidentally of aristocratical polities (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 10: cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 41 sq.).

ἔτι δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει, 'and further what the differences between them are, and owing to what cause it happens [that they are what they are].' Cp. c. 6. 1293 a 10 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 8.

32. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τίς ἀρίστη κ.τ.λ. Dealt with in c. 11.

33. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποία κ.τ.λ., 'and of the other constitutions which constitution' (literally, 'which of the constitutions') 'is suitable to whom.' Dealt with in c. 12. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10 sqq.

35. Πάλιν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This inquiry is referred to as past in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 31 sqq., but we are not prepared for it in the programme given in c. 2. 1289 b 12–26, except so far as it relates to democracy and oligarchy (see vol. i. p. 493). Its aim is to show how the deliberative magisterial and judicial elements should be organized under each constitution and each variety of constitution so as to harmonize with the constitution of which they form a part (cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 31 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 12 sqq.). Aristotle seeks to enable the statesman to avoid in framing each constitution adopting an organization of any one of these elements inappropriate to the tendency and spirit of the constitution, his special aim being, it would seem from c. 16. 1300 b 36 sqq., to prevent civil troubles and constitutional innovation. It should be noticed that Aristotle here proceeds to study constitutions in their parts, the most searching way of studying them (see note on 1252 a 17, τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον), and also that τὸ προσολεμοῦν, notwithstanding what is said as to its importance in c. 4. 1291 a 6 sqq., is not one of the μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν mentioned here. Aristotle appears to regard it as a μέρος τῆς πόλεως, and an important one, but not a μέρος τῆς πολιτείας. It is, in fact, concerned, not with ruling or judging, but with fighting. C. 14.

36. αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν ἐφεξῆς.

37. μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν. Cp. c. 15. 1299 a 4, τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας, and see vol. i. p. 514, note. Compare also Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 79, τρία γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκεν, ὁ ἄρχων, ὁ δικαστής, ὁ ἰδιώτης. The expression αἱ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι seems to be used here in a sense exclusive of kingship and tyranny, of which we hear hardly anything in cc. 14–16.

38. ἑκάστῃ τὸ συμφέρον, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 38, καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἑκάστην.

ὧν ἐχόντων καλῶς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 48, ὡς παρ' ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν ἢ καλῶς ἢ κακῶς τὸ σύμπαν ἔξον, οὕτω σπουδάζετε περὶ αὐτῶν. That the parts, on the other hand, cannot be in a good state if the whole is not so, is a remark ascribed to the Thracian Zamolxis in Plato, Charm. 156 E, where he is made to say of the Greek physicians, that they knew not how to cure most diseases, ὅτι τὸ ὅλον ἀγνοοῖεν, οὗ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὗ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδύνατον εἴη τὸ μέρος εὖ ἔχειν.

39. καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἕκαστον τούτων. We have been told in 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq. that constitutions differ because they give supreme power to different supreme authorities, but now we are told that they also differ because they organize the deliberative, magisterial, and judicial elements in a different way.

41. ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Zeller has already remarked (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 749: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 283) that the three 'elements of all constitutions' named by Aristotle—the deliberative, the magistracies, and the judiciary—do not coincide with the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities of modern theorists. Aristotle's deliberative is indeed charged with legislative functions, but it is also charged with executive functions (for questions of peace, war, and alliance come before it) and with judicial functions (for it has power to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation). For the union of legislative and judicial authority in the hands of the deliberative no defence can be offered; it was not well that the deliberative authority should have power to punish with death, exile, or confiscation. But when the Greek State gave the authority which had to do with legislation a voice in questions of war, peace, and alliance, it anticipated the practice of modern States. Prof. H. Sidgwick (Elements of Politics, ed. 1, p. 439) recommends that 'the consent of the legislature should be required, as a general rule, for making war,

or ceding or annexing territory, or making treaties that pledge the State to any such measures or that otherwise affect materially the financial liabilities or resources of the State.' The three elements named by Aristotle were probably marked off from each other in most Greek constitutions, but they were not in all. In many forms of oligarchy, for instance, and in some of aristocracy (3. 1. 1275 b 8 sqq.) judicial authority rested with the magistrates, and in some extreme forms of oligarchy one or more magistracies—often perhaps a gerusia—constituted the deliberative (1298 a 8 sq.). The deliberative in Greek States was not so called because it had a monopoly of deliberation, for the magistrates also deliberated (c. 15. 1299 a 25 sqq.), but because certain specially important subjects of deliberation were made over to it, just as in a modern joint-stock company the consideration of some specially important matters is often reserved for meetings of the shareholders. (Compare Tac. Germ. c. 11, de minoribus rebus principes consultant, de maioribus omnes, ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium est apud principes pertractentur.) What these subjects were, we learn from 1298 a 3 sqq. It should be noticed that the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation and that of reviewing the conduct of magistrates in office (c. 16. 1300 b 19) were often possessed also by dicasteries, so that the deliberative had not exclusive competence on these subjects. We see from the chapter before us that some of the powers enumerated in 1298 a 3 sqq. were given to the magistrates even in some forms of democracy, for there were democracies in which the functions of the assembly were confined to the enactment of laws and of provisions connected with the constitution, while in others they did not include the review of the magistrates' conduct in office and the infliction of the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation. In the 'ultimate' form of democracy, on the other hand, not only did the competence of the assembly include the whole range of the subjects mentioned in 1298 a 3 sqq., but the functions of the magistracies (with the exception no doubt of those of the stratêgi when employed on expeditions) extended only to making preliminary inquiries, the right of effectual decision on all important matters being reserved for the assembly, which thus tended to become the supreme administrative authority of the State (cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 27, *ὁ δῆμος . . . τὰ μὲν ἐκὼν τὰ δὲ ἄκων προηρεῖτο τὴν πολιτείαν διοικεῖν αὐτός*). That the demos at Rome possessed most of the powers ascribed to the

deliberative by Aristotle, we see from Polyb. 6. 14, *τιμῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τιμωρίας ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ μόνος ὁ δῆμος κύριος . . . κρίνει μὲν οὖν ὁ δῆμος καὶ διαφόρου πολλάκις, ὅταν ἀξιόχρεων ᾖ τὸ τίμημα τῆς ἀδικίας, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς τὰς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐσχηκότας ἀρχάς, θανάτου δὲ κρίνει μόνος . . . καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁ δῆμος δίδωσι τοῖς ἀξίοις . . . ἔχει δὲ τὴν κυρίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν νόμων δοκιμασίας, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης οὗτος βουλεύεται καὶ πολέμου. καὶ μὴν περὶ συμμαχίας καὶ διαλύσεως καὶ συνθηκῶν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ βεβαιῶν ἕκαστα τούτων καὶ κύρια ποιῶν ἢ τοὐναντίον.* Aristotle omits to mention some of the powers possessed by the deliberative—for instance, its power of conferring citizenship and its powers in reference to taxation, such as the power to impose an eisphora or a new tax. Nor does he say anything of the power sometimes possessed by it of suspending or displacing any magistrate whom it held to discharge his duties ill (as to the exercise of this power by the deliberative at Athens, see Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 223 sq.).

1298 a. **2. ἃς δεῖ**, sc. *εἶναι*. For *ἃς*, not *τίνας*, though *τίνων* follows, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 562. 4, who refers to Isocr. Ad Demon. § 5, *διόπερ ἡμεῖς . . . μέλλομέν σοι συμβουλεύειν ὧν χρὴ τοὺς νεωτέρους ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ τίνων ἔργων ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ποίοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν καὶ πῶς τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον οἰκονομεῖν.* Cp. also Plato, Laws 728 D, *τὰς δ' αὖ τιμὰς δεῖ σκοπεῖν, καὶ τούτων τίνες ἀληθεῖς καὶ ὅσαι κίβδηλοι.*

ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν. Cp. c. 15. 1299 a 10 sqq.

3. τὴν αἵρεσιν must here include appointment by lot as well as by election.

5. καὶ περὶ νόμων. That it often fell to the whole body of citizens to enact, or at any rate to confirm, laws, we see from Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42, *πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἃ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή.* A common course was for the assembly to appoint *νομογράφοι* to draft laws and submit them to it for confirmation: see as to Teos Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 126. 45 sqq. (referred to by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 313. 2), where the assembly of Teos is advised by Antigonus to appoint *νομογράφοι* for this purpose, and compare *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 29 sqq., where the Athenian assembly appoints *συγγραφεῖς* to draw up a new constitution, which is afterwards submitted to it for confirmation (cc. 30 *init.*, 32 *init.*). Laws, however, were occasionally enacted by the deliberative without recourse being had to *νομογράφοι* or *συγγραφεῖς*;

see Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 470 (quoted by Gilbert ibid.), *[ἀγ]αθῆι τύχηι, [οἰκ]ονομοῦντος Δημητρίου, μηνὸς Θαργηλιῶνος δευτέραι, Ἀλέξων Δάμωνος εἶπεν· νόμον εἶναι Γαμβρειώταις κ.τ.λ.* As to the mode in which laws were enacted at Athens, see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 300 sqq., and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 290 sqq., and on the broad subject of direct legislation by the people Bryce, American Commonwealth, c. 39. There is this to be said in favour of direct legislation by the people in a Greek City-State, that the people were not precluded by their numbers from meeting together for discussion, as the people of a modern State are.

καὶ περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς καὶ δημεύσεως. That questions of this kind came not only before the dicasteries in Greek States, but also before the deliberative is proved by the inscriptions collected by Gilbert in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 314. 1—Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 551 (about B. C. 357), *ἔδοξεν τῶι δήμωι· Φίλωνα καὶ Στρατοκλέα φεύγειν Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ τὴγ γῆν τὴν Ἀμφιπολιτέων ἀειφυγίην καὶ αὐτο[ὺ]ς καὶ το[ὺ]ς παῖδας, καὶ ἤμ πο[υ] ἁλίσκωνται, πάσχειν αὐτο[ὺ]ς ὡς πολεμίο[υ]ς καὶ νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι, τὰ δὲ χρήματα αὐτῶν δημόσια εἶναι*: Dittenberger, Syll. No. 77 (from Iasus), *ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι, μηνὸς Ἀπατουριῶνος, ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου Παταίκο τοῦ Σκύλακο[ς· τ]ῶν ἀν[δρ]ῶν τῶν ἐπιβουλευσάντων Μαυσώλλωι καὶ τῆι Ἰασέων πόληι τὰ κτήματα δημεῦσαι . . . καὶ φεύγειν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκγόνους [ἐς] τὸν ἀίδιον χρόνον.* Gilbert also quotes Cic. De Rep. 3. 35. 48, where we read of the Rhodians, et in theatro et in curia res capitalis et reliquas omnis iudicabant idem. As to Athens see Hdt. 6. 136, Xen. Hell. 1. 7. 9 sq., and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 306.

6. καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεως καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. Cp. 3. 11. 1282 a 26 sqq.

8. οἷον ἀρχῇ τινὶ μιᾷ ἢ πλείοσιν, ἢ ἑτέραις ἑτέρας, 'as for instance all may be assigned to some one magistracy or to more magistracies than one, or some may be assigned to certain magistracies and others to others.' Aristotle here has oligarchies mainly in view, and it appears from what he says that in an oligarchy a single magistracy —possibly even a single magistrate—might be invested with all these great powers, the right, that is to say, to punish with death, exile, or confiscation, the right to appoint the magistrates and to review their conduct in office, the right to make laws, and the supreme control over the foreign policy of the State. When a single magistrate possessed all these powers, it must have been easy for him to convert

his position into a tyranny (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22 sqq.). There were well-governed oligarchies where a single magistracy possessed these high prerogatives; the oligarchy of Massalia would seem to have been a case in point, for the great council of the Six Hundred τιμοῦχοι must probably have possessed them (cp. Cic. De Rep. 1. 27. 43, ac modo si Massilienses, nostri clientes, per delectos et principes cives summa iustitia reguntur, inest tamen in ea condicione populi similitudo quaedam servitutis). Oligarchy would assume a still more extreme form, where the magistracy which was invested with these prerogatives was less numerous than at Massalia. On the other hand, it would be less extreme where they were given to more magistracies than one, acting, we must suppose, together, and less extreme still, when some of these powers were given to some magistracies and others to others, for then the one group of magistracies would be a check on the other.

9. ἢ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πᾶσι τινὰς δὲ τισίν. This would be the case in an aristocracy or a polity.

τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντας καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων δημοτικόν. Supply βουλεύεσθαι before δημοτικόν. Cp. Cic. De Rep. 1. 32. 48, si vero ius suum populi teneant, negant quicquam esse praestantius, liberius, beatius, quippe qui domini sint legum, iudiciorum, belli, pacis, foederum, capitis uniuscuiusque, pecuniae.

10. τὴν τοιαύτην ἰσότητα, i. e. the equality implied in all deliberating about everything. This is arithmetical, in contradistinction to proportional, equality, τὸ πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sqq.). Cp. Plato, Laws 757 A, δυοῖν γὰρ ἰσοτήτοιν οὐσαιν κ.τ.λ.

11. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ τρόποι τοῦ πάντας πλείους. All may be said to share in deliberative authority, (1) if all do so successively (i. e. by relays) on almost all subjects, and the subjects on which all deliberate collectively are very few, so that the powers of the collective gathering of all the citizens are small, and deliberative work falls for the most part either to relays of citizens, the magistrates taking no part in it, or to a council of magistrates to which all the citizens are admitted by relays; (2) if all deliberate collectively on a considerable number of subjects, and magistrates elected or taken by lot from all deliberate on the rest; (3) if all deliberate collectively on a considerable number of subjects, and magistrates deliberate on the rest taken by lot (from all?) in all cases in which the nature of the office does not make it essential

that its holders shall be skilled persons, and consequently that it shall be filled by election (from all?); (4) if all deliberate collectively about all subjects and the magistrates merely make preliminary inquiries. But if *τὸ πάντας βουλεύεσθαι καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων* is democratic (1298 a 9 sq.), are the second and third modes really democratic?

12. *εἷς μὲν τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντας ἁθρόους*, sc. *βουλεύεσθαι*. It was possible to give deliberative authority to sections of the whole citizen-body in rotation, or to a council composed of boards of magistrates on which every citizen served by turns, and by thus admitting all the citizens in relays to a share in deliberation, to reduce to a minimum the work of the collective assembly of all the citizens. Of the Telecles mentioned in the text nothing is known but what we learn here. Sus.[2] (Note 1321) regards him as a constitutional theorist, and groups him with Hippodamus and Phaleas. Certainly the phrase *ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Τηλεκλέους ἐστὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου* reminds us of *ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος* in 2. 1. 1261 a 5. A parallel to his constitution is offered to some extent by the arrangements in connexion with the Five Thousand at Athens, at any rate as represented by the envoys of the Four Hundred to the armament at Samos (Thuc. 8. 86. 3, *τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν*). So again, in the democracy of Mantineia and others the right to elect the magistrates belonged not to the assembly, but to *τινὲς αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων* (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.). We must not mix up Telecles' organization of the deliberative with the first kind of democracy described in c. 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and c. 6. 1292 b 22 sqq., for in this kind of democracy the deliberative seems to have consisted of all the citizens, not of a part of them only (c. 6. 1292 b 27 sqq.). We are not told of what nature the sections were to which deliberative authority was successively entrusted under the constitution of Telecles. Were they tribes or subdivisions of the tribe, or were they independent of the tribe? It is evident that if some sections lived nearer to the city than others, it would be easier for them to act when their turn of deliberative authority came than for those further off. Nor are we told for what length of time each section was to continue to act as a deliberative. The successive sections appear to have been given the power of appointing the magistrates (by election or by lot or in both ways?) and that of inflicting the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, and the concession to them of these great powers would be attended with many dangers.

We do not learn whether popular dicasteries were to exist in the State of Telecles or not. Obviously he had no choice but to withhold from the sections the right of legislation, or at any rate of legislation in relation to the constitution, and to reserve it for a collective gathering of the citizens, for otherwise each section would have been able during its term of power freely to modify, and even to abolish, the constitution; the sections, in fact, would have been, especially if no popular dicasteries existed, the absolute masters of the State. The scheme of Telecles, however, possessed this merit, that the deliberative would not be as large as if it consisted of the whole citizen-body, and that it would not be likely to claim or to acquire that supremacy over the law which the popular assembly tended to acquire in the ultimate form of democracy (cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32 sqq.). Demagogues would not have the same power in a deliberative of this kind as they had in gatherings of the whole citizen-body. True, even under this constitution the whole citizen-body would occasionally meet in a collective assembly, but as it would meet only for the enactment of laws and to deal with questions as to the constitution and to receive the directions of the magistrates, it would meet but seldom, and consequently the assembly would acquire but little cohesion or power.

13. καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις δὲ πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ. These constitutions (we are not told whether they were ideal or actual) were more democratic than that of Telecles, for while his gave every citizen by turns a place in the deliberative assembly, they gave every citizen by turns a share of office (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 23 sqq.); this was exactly what Solon, who distrusted the fitness of the many for office, had sought to avoid (3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq.). In the opinion of the Greeks democracy was most fully realized when a rotation of office was established, so that every citizen held office in turn: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq., and Eurip. Suppl. 392 Bothe (406 Dindorf),

δῆμος δ' ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει
ἐναυσίαισιν, οὐχὶ τῷ πλούτῳ δίδους
τὸ πλεῖστον, ἀλλὰ χὠ πένης ἔχων ἴσον.

'The effect of the rule forbidding more than one reappointment to the Boulê at Athens was to give every Athenian citizen at some period of his life a seat in that body' (Sandys on Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 62). So we read in Cic. De Rep. 3. 35. 48 as to Rhodes, omnes erant idem tum de plebe tum senatores, vicissitudinesque habebant, quibus mensibus populari munere fungerentur, quibus senatorio:

utrobique autem conventicium accipiebant. Democracy, in fact, meant to the Greeks equality, and the arrangement most consonant with equality was a rotation of office; even appointment to office by lot fell short in this respect of rotation. The system described in the passage before us had this merit, that under it the participation of all the citizens in the government was effected at a far smaller cost than in those democracies in which a paid and frequently meeting assembly existed. It was open, however, to the objection that there was no security that the decisions of the portion of the citizen-body which happened to be in office at any given time would be satisfactory to the citizens generally.

14. αἱ συναρχίαι συνιοῦσαι. This is an early instance of the occurrence of the word *συναρχία*. For another see Aen. Poliorc. c. 4. 11. The word is often met with in inscriptions after the death of Alexander and also in Polybius (4. 4. 2: 38. 11. 4 sq.). Συναρχία here means 'the boards of magistrates,' as in Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., Nos. 132, 234. The principal boards of magistrates were frequently formed into a combined board—a great administrative improvement, for the magistracies were thus grouped together in a kind of Cabinet and were better able to consult and to act in concert—and we sometimes find this combined board discharging the functions of a pre-considering body in relation to the Boulê and Assembly (see Gilbert on *συναρχία* in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 322. 1, and Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, pp. 249, 323). In the constitutions referred to in the passage before us, however, the *συναρχίαι* appear to have been invested with far more considerable powers; they were not a mere pre-considering body entitled to draw up resolutions to be sanctioned or the reverse by the Boulê and Assembly, but were the deliberative authority of the State, competent to deal finally with questions of war and peace and alliance, to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, and to review the conduct of the magistrates on the expiration of their term of office, the only matters withdrawn from their jurisdiction being the making of laws and of enactments relating to the constitution. We are, in fact, surprised to find any form of Greek democracy trusting these great powers to a board composed of magistrates; we must remember, however, that all citizens in turn became members of this board. It should be noted that *συναρχίαι* appear to have existed at Miletus, the city of Telecles, in later days at any rate than his: see Meineke,

Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 625, where Μιλασίοις καὶ ταῖς συναρχίαις καὶ τοῖς γερόντοις is quoted from a grammarian.

16. τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐλαχίστων. Households are probably referred to.

17. διέλθῃ, sc. τὸ ἄρχειν. See note on 1300 a 26.

συνιέναι δὲ μόνον κ.τ.λ., sc. πάντας, i. e. the whole body of citizens, for Hildenbrand (Gesch. und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, 1. 468) seems to me to be right in translating 'während Generalversammlungen der Bürgerschaft nur dann zusammentreten, wenn es gilt Gesetze zu geben,' etc. (so too Welldon). In a democracy like that of Telecles it was necessary to reserve legislative authority for a collective gathering of the citizens for the reason mentioned above on 12; besides it was well to have the consent of all the citizens to laws and constitutional enactments, and also to have means of acquainting them with directions given by the magistrates.

18. τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 1298 b 31, τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν, and 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 4, τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. Here the distinction between νόμοι and πολιτεία is maintained, which is not always the case (see above on 1289 a 15).

19. ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ. In this form the magistracies are not filled in turn by all the citizens, but those who hold them are selected by election or lot out of all the citizens, so that a turn of office does not necessarily come to every citizen, and consequently the powers of the collective assembly of all the citizens are more extensive. The magistracies being less accessible to all, the collective assembly naturally acquires greater importance. As to this form and the next see note on 1298 a 11. In it the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation apparently falls to the magistrates, though we might have expected it to be given to popular dicasteries.

22. τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς βουλεύεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 33, τὰ δ' ἄλλα, ἐπειδὰν ἐκεῖσε ἔλθωμεν, βουλευσόμεθα. Τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις τεταγμένας probably stands in opposition to αἱ συναρχίαι συνιοῦσαι, 14.

24. ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ. In this form only those offices are filled by election which an advanced democracy will allow to be so filled—the offices referred to are explained to be those which demand experience and skill in the holder (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 21: [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3)—and all the rest are filled by lot (a system specially dear to democracy, 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.), and here

again the powers of the collective assembly are extensive. They do not, however, include the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, which seems to fall, as in the last form, to magistrates, nor is the making of laws expressly mentioned among them, though the omission of any reference to this latter subject is probably accidental. In the explanation given above of *ὅσας ἐνδέχεται* I follow Sepulveda and Victorius. The former (p. 136 b) explains these words thus—'ratio reipublicae popularis poscit ut magistratus non suffragio mandentur sed sortibus, permittit tamen ut suffragio mandentur qui debent a doctis aut peritis administrari necessitatis causa.' Welldon's translation is similar—'who are appointed by suffrage so far as is possible [in this advanced form of democracy].' *Ἐξ ἁπάντων* is not added with *αἱρεταὶ οὖσαι*, as in 23 sq., but this is probably what is intended, for otherwise the *τρόπος* under consideration would not be democratic.

30. *τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς περὶ μηδενὸς κρίνειν ἀλλὰ μόνον προανακρίνειν.* Cp. c. 4. 1292 a 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 28 sqq., and for *ἀνακρίνειν* *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 56. l. 29 sq. That this had come to be true of the Boulê at Athens, we see from *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 45 (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38–1300 a 4) and c. 55. l. 10 sqq.; that it had also come to be true of the archons, we see from *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 3. l. 31 sqq. (where see Sandys' note) and c. 48. l. 26 sqq. As to the euthyni, see c. 48. l. 23 sqq. That the powers of the stratêgi when employed on expeditions cannot have been narrowed in this way, we have seen above on 1297 b 41.

32. *ἣν ἀνάλογόν φαμεν* κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 4. 1292 a 17 sqq. and c. 6. 1293 a 32 sqq.

35. *ὅταν μὲν γὰρ* κ.τ.λ., 'for when eligibility to the deliberative body is conferred by a comparatively moderate property-qualification, and a comparatively large number of persons is eligible because of its moderateness, and the members of the deliberative do not make changes in things which the law forbids to be changed but conform to the law, and it is open to any one acquiring the property-qualification to be elected to the deliberative, the constitution is indeed an oligarchy, but it is an oligarchy bordering on polity by reason of its moderateness of spirit.' Sepulveda, who translates *μετέχειν*, 39, 'aditus ad rempublicam,' supplies *τῆς πολιτείας* with *μετέχειν* and is followed by Vict. and Lamb.: Sus. also translates 'der Zutritt zu allen Aemtern offen steht.' But it seems more natural to supply *τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι* (cp. 40, *ὅταν δὲ μὴ*

πάντες τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι μετέχωσιν). It would appear from the passage before us that in the most moderate form of oligarchy the deliberative was not composed of the whole number of those who were privileged under the constitution, but was an elective body chosen from them (and by them?). Yet we gather from c. 9. 1294 b 3 sqq. that there were oligarchies in which an assembly existed, and we know that this was so at Corinth (Plut. Dion, c. 53). Aristotle's list of the forms assumed by the deliberative in oligarchies is silent as to those oligarchies in which deliberative authority was confined to the magistrates, but the demos had a consultative voice (1298 b 33 sq.). Nor does it quite tally with his list of oligarchies.

38. ἀκολουθῶσι, sc. τῷ νόμῳ: see note on 1339 a 19.

39. ὀλιγαρχία μὲν πολιτικὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 10, καὶ ἔνθα μὲν πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλιγαρχία.

ἡ τοιαύτη, sc. πολιτεία.

40. ὅταν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but when not all [those who acquire the property-qualification] have access to the deliberative, but only selected persons, but they rule in accordance with law, as before also, this is oligarchical.' Αἱρετοί seems to be used here in much the same sense as ἀφωρισμένοι in c. 15. 1300 a 16 sqq. We are not told who the electors were in this form. Under the rule of the Thirty at Athens the magistracies (including the Boulê) were confined, if the text is correct, to πρόκριτοι ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, i.e. out of the knights ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 35. l. 3 sqq.). Office was sometimes confined in oligarchies to the members of certain clubs (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 31 sq.).

1298 b. 5. τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36.

ὅταν δὲ τινῶν τινές κ.τ.λ. Supply κύριοι ὧσιν from what precedes. Πάντες περὶ πάντων is the democratic arrangement, τινὲς περὶ πάντων the oligarchical, τινὲς περὶ τινῶν the arrangement appropriate to an aristocracy or polity, being intermediate between the other two. In the aristocracy which Aristotle imagines questions of peace and war and the review of the conduct of magistrates in office and probably their election would fall within the competence of 'all' acting collectively, while legislation and the conclusion and dissolution of alliances and the infliction of the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation would be reserved for the cognizance of 'some.' It is not surprising to find legislation reserved for 'some' in an aristocracy, for in 2. 8. 1269 a 24 sqq. Aristotle in effect suggests that not any one and every one should have to do with the alteration of laws, but only select persons. There would also

be an obvious advantage in reserving for the consideration of a few questions relating to alliance and the infliction of the grave punishments referred to, though the reservation to a few of the power to inflict these punishments was in the case of the Lacedaemonian State commonly criticized as oligarchical (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 33 sq.). When, on the other hand, we are told in 7 that the magistrates of an aristocracy may be appointed either by election or by lot (i. e. apparently by lot pure and simple, not by lot *ἐκ προκρίτων*, as to which see note on 8), the statement conflicts with 2. 11. 1273 a 17, *τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον* (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 4 sq.), and Brandis, followed by Sus., is probably, therefore, right in bracketing *ἢ κληρωτοί*. Another reason for bracketing *ἢ κληρωτοί* is that, if we do not, it becomes difficult to distinguish the organization of the deliberative in aristocracy from its organization in those forms of democracy in which some of the subjects dealt with by the deliberative are reserved for the cognizance of magistrates elected or taken by lot out of all (1298 a 19 sqq.), unless indeed we add *ἐκ τινῶν* in 7 before *αἱρετοὶ ἢ κληρωτοί*. Vict., followed by Giph. (p. 497), reads *ἡ πολιτεία* in 8 in place of *ἡ πολιτεία*, and Giph. (ibid.) explains, 'et aristocratiae quidem (proprium), ubi magistratus non sortito verum suffragiis mandentur, reipublicae vero, ubi sortito sint facti,' but Camerarius, Bekk., and Sus. are probably right in reading *ἡ πολιτεία*. It should be noted that even where the magistrates are appointed by election, if they are not elected for virtue, the constitution does not really deserve the name of an aristocracy (c. 7. 1293 b 7 sqq.: c. 8. 1294 a 9 sq., 19 sqq.).

6. For *ὑπέρ* in the sense of *περί*, see Bon. Ind. s.v. and Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 47, who remarks that it is used in this sense oftener in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Rhetoric, and the Topics than elsewhere in Aristotle's writings.

8. *ἂν δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Two questions arise as to the organization of the deliberative which is here said to be suitable to an aristocratic polity or a polity—1. Are we to carry on from 5 sq. *οἷον πολέμου μὲν καὶ ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες*, so that the modes of organization described in 8 sqq. apply only to those subjects which are not reserved for the cognizance of all? This question should probably be answered in the affirmative. 2. Are the *αἱρετοί* and *κληρωτοί*, or the mixed body of *αἱρετοί* and *κληρωτοί* referred to in 8 sqq., magistrates, or are they simply a deliberative council? The answer is doubtful, but as Aristotle does not repeat the

word ἄρχοντες, perhaps the chances are in favour of the latter hypothesis. The plans appropriate to polity proper are probably that by which some subjects are assigned to persons appointed by election and others to persons appointed by lot, and that by which some members of a deliberative council are appointed by election and others by lot (compare the advice which Aristotle gives to extreme democracies in 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11–16), while the appointment of deliberators by lot ἐκ προκρίτων savours rather of an aristocratic polity. Thus, when Athens was under a democracy mingled with aristocracy (Isocr. Panath. §§ 130–1), it appointed its magistrates in this way (Panath. § 145, καθίστασαν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοὺς προκριθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν φυλετῶν καὶ δημοτῶν: cp. Areop. § 22, οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς κληροῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τοὺς ἱκανωτάτους ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἔργων προκρίνοντες, and Aθ. Πολ. c. 8. l. 1 sqq.: c. 22. l. 20 sqq.: c. 30. l. 11 sq.: c. 31. l. 2 sqq.). Appointments to priesthoods were sometimes made in this way (Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 46). When it is implied in 2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq. that the appointment of magistrates by lot is inconsistent with aristocracy, Aristotle probably refers to their appointment by lot ἐκ πάντων, not ἐκ προκρίτων. In 2. 6. 1266 a 8 we are told that the appointment of magistrates by lot out of elected persons is common to oligarchy and democracy; it would seem, therefore, that both oligarchy and democracy used this mode of appointing magistrates.

9. In ἡ κοινῇ αἱρετοὶ καὶ κληρωτοί the reference seems to be to a mixed body or bodies composed of elective members and members appointed by lot, acting as the deliberative in relation to all the subjects which are not reserved for the cognizance of all.

11. διῄρηται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For πρός cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 37, δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διῃρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν. In 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 5 sqq. we have οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς . . . διῄρηνται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτως, cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 27, τὰ δὲ κύρια διῄρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας.

13. συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Further advice as to the assembly in the ultimate democracy is given in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sqq., but here Aristotle places in the forefront of his recommendations the adoption of measures to induce the γνώριμοι to attend its meetings. As to these recommendations see vol. i. p. 513. They are quite in harmony with the views expressed in 3. 11. 1281 b 34 sqq. (see note on 1281 b 35) and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq., but they can have had but little chance of being adopted in an ultimate democracy.

συμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τε τῇ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ νῦν κ.τ.λ. Bekk.[2] omits *τε*, and Schneider, though he leaves it in his text, calls it superfluous (2. 265), but Sus.[2] may be right in regarding it as corresponding, though in an anacoluthic way, to *δέ* in *ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις*, 26. Aristotle would probably have continued *καὶ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις*, if the intervening recommendations to the ultimate democracy had not run to a considerable length. For *τῇ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ νῦν*, cp. c. 10. 1295 a 5, 18, and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25, *ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαις δημοκρατικαῖς*, which suggests whether we should not read *δημοκρατικῇ* in place of the second *δημοκρατίᾳ* (or *δημοκρατία ἡ* Π^1) in the passage before us. The expression *ἡ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία* is applied in 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 5, not to an ultimate democracy, as in the passage before us and in 1310 a 25 sqq., but to one in which rich and poor stand on a level, neither being alone supreme.

14. λέγω δὲ τοιαύτην κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 4. 1292 a 5.

16. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. Cp. c. 9. 1294 a 37 sqq.

18. οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ μισθὸν τοῖς ἀπόροις. Cp. c. 13. 1297 a 36 sqq.

19. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖν. For *τοῦτο δέ* see Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 422, who says of *τοῦτο δέ* in Plato, Tim. 59 D, 'redintegrat orationis structuram post parenthesin quae dicitur.' Richards, however, would read *δή* in place of *δέ* in the passage before us.

20. βουλεύσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ. See note on 1281 b 35. So lawsuits will be tried all the better if rich and poor sit together on dicasteries (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq.). Cp. also 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq. Contrast the provision in Plato's Laws 764 A by which attendance at the assembly is made compulsory only on members of the first and second property-classes, not on members of the third and fourth, though the composition of the Boulê in the Laws (756 B sqq.) suggests that Plato no less than Aristotle sought to bring rich and poor to deliberate together, for while the Athenian Boulê was composed of representatives not of the property-classes but of the tribes, Plato in the Laws by a remarkable innovation makes his Boulê consist of representatives of the property-classes, and thus secures that both rich and poor shall find a place upon it. Aristotle's desire that the assembly and dicasteries in an ultimate democracy should be composed of both rich and poor deserves

notice, because this is not the way in which our own deliberative assemblies and juries are constituted, but we must not lose sight of the fact that he recommends this only in the case of an ultimate democracy. He would undoubtedly prefer assemblies and dicasteries in which the moderately well-to-do predominate.

21. συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Compare with this suggestion 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 13 sqq. Ἐκ τῶν μορίων, which I have taken in vol. i. p. 513 to refer to tribes and other sections of the State, probably rather refers to the sections just named, the γνώριμοι and δῆμος (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq.). We gather from what follows that Aristotle regards this suggestion as suitable only to the case in which there is no great disparity between the numbers of the γνώριμοι and δῆμος. He comes here near to suggesting a representative assembly, though one of a doubtfully workable kind, for would a representative chamber prove workable in which half the members were returned by the γνώριμοι and half by the δῆμος? It is true that Zurich was ruled for many years by a Council of twenty-six, half of the members of which were taken from the upper class (Konstafel) and half from the trades or arts (Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz, 1. 456–8: Short History of Switzerland, Eng. Trans., p. 70).

23. συμφέρει δὲ κἂν κ.τ.λ. Κἄν, 'if also': cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 1, ἔτι δὲ κἂν ὦσιν ἵππεῖς κ.τ.λ. When the numbers of the δῆμος greatly exceed those of the γνώριμοι, evil results follow; the constitution becomes disorderly and the γνώριμοι insubordinate (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 11 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq.: 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 31 sq.).

24. For οἱ δημοτικοί, 'the men of the people,' cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 22: 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 36: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14.

τῶν πολιτικῶν here seems = τῶν γνωρίμων, 25. For the contrast drawn between οἱ δημοτικοί and οἱ πολιτικοί compare that between οἱ ἐργαστικοί and οἱ πολιτικοί in Polyb. 10. 16. 1, and that between τὸ βάναυσον and τὸ ἀστεῖον in Plut. Camill. c. 38.

26. τοὺς πλείους, 'those who are in excess of this number.' Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 63, καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πλείω λέγειν;

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ. Just as the ultimate democracy is advised to induce the γνώριμοι to take part in the work of the deliberative, so oligarchies are advised to allow the voice of the δῆμος to be heard in the deliberative, not however without taking certain precautions. As to these precautions see vol. i. p. 513 sq.

27. ἢ προσαιρεῖσθαί τινας ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους. Supply συμφέρει.

Sus. is probably right in suggesting that προσαιρεῖσθαι should be read in place of προαιρεῖσθαι: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 5. 5–6. So we are told in Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 17 that Theramenes said ὅτι εἰ μή τις κοινωνοὺς ἱκανοὺς λήψοιτο τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀδύνατον ἔσοιτο τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν διαμένειν. At Solothurn in Switzerland in the fourteenth century the Council of Twelve chosen from the nobles added to itself two representatives of the eleven arts (Zünfte) selected by itself (Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz, 2. 367).

ἢ κατασκευάσαντας κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 15. 1299 b 30 sqq., where probuli are said to be an oligarchical magistracy, 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 16 sq., and 1323 a 6 sqq., the last-named passage so far disagreeing with that before us that it connects νομοφύλακες with aristocracy, not with oligarchy. Compare (with Arnold) Thuc. 8. 1. 3, where the Athenians after the disaster at Syracuse decide to appoint ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων, ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ, προβουλεύσουσι. It is possible that in the long-lived oligarchy of Corinth, in which probuli found a place side by side with a Boulê (see note on 1299 b 36), and, it would seem from Plut. Dion, c. 53, a popular assembly, the powers of the popular assembly were restricted in the manner described in the text. Even where probuli were not elderly men, they would be few in number in comparison with a Boulê, and therefore the institution would be oligarchical (c. 15. 1299 b 34 sqq.). A sole πρόβουλος occurs in an inscription which probably belongs to Leucas (Oberhummer, Akarnanien, pp. 272, 274). As to probuli see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 315, and as to nomophylakes, ibid. 2. 337 sq., though no instances are there given of nomophylakes acting in a probouleutic capacity. We read in Pollux, 8. 94 of nomophylakes at Athens, who τοῖς προέδροις ἐν ἐκκλησίαις συγκαθίζουσιν, ἵνα διακωλύοντες ἐπιχειροτονεῖν, ὅσα μὴ συμφέρει. The existence of probuli in a State appears to imply the existence in it of a larger deliberative body, for the function of the probuli was to consider beforehand matters to be brought before such a body. Thus probuli will hardly have existed in the more extreme forms of oligarchy, for in them this larger body will not have found a place.

31. τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν. Cp. 1298 a 18.

32. ἔτι ἢ ταὐτὰ ψηφίζεσθαι τὸν δῆμον ἢ μηδὲν ἐναντίον τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις. A stronger measure than the restriction of the deliberations of the popular assembly to proposals introduced by probuli or nomophylakes, for the latter measure would leave the assembly free to deal with these proposals as it pleased, whereas the former would

tie its hands. For this measure cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 10 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 9 sqq. In some States only the *χρηστοί* were allowed to speak in the assembly ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 6).

33. *ἢ τῆς συμβουλῆς* κ.τ.λ. A stronger measure still. For the implied contrast between a consultative and an effective voice in deliberation, cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 65, *ἐν ᾧ φαίνεται γεγραφὼς τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν συμβουλεύειν τὸν βουλόμενον, τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ τοὺς προέδρους ἐπιψηφίζειν τὰς γνώμας, λόγον δὲ μὴ προτιθέναι.*

34. *καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον δὲ* κ.τ.λ. This recommendation of course applies only to cases in which the assembly has something more than the mere right to give advice. It would seem that in polities the few (by which is probably meant the magistrates) often possessed a final and decisive voice in rejecting a measure, while affirmative resolutions arrived at by them were not valid until confirmed by the assembly. Aristotle advises oligarchies to adopt the opposite plan—to give the assembly a final voice only in rejecting, and to require that affirmative decisions should be referred back for confirmation by the magistrates. (So I understand the passage: compare Vict., who explains, 'iubet igitur ipsos contrarium facere eius quod servatur in statibus liberis et qui reguntur a multitudine, id est, permittere multitudini ut improbet repudietque quae sibi non placent, nec tamen valeat sententiam ullam confirmare ac ratam facere, quia necesse est quod illi probatum sit referri ad principes.' Stahr and Welldon, on the other hand, take *ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας* to refer not to affirmative decisions of the assembly, but to bills rejected by it. Whichever view we adopt, however, as to the meaning of these words, there is no difference of opinion as to the invalidity attaching to affirmative decisions of the assembly.) The restriction suggested by Aristotle would place a check on rash affirmative resolutions of the assembly—resolutions, for instance, in favour of a declaration of war—by making them invalid if the magistrates withheld their approval. Compare the rule at Rome as stated by Cicero, De Rep. 2. 32. 56, quodque erat ad obtinendam potentiam nobilium vel maximum, vehementer id retinebatur, populi comitia ne essent rata, nisi ea patrum adprobavisset auctoritas, and by Livy, 1. 17. 9, decreverunt enim ut cum populus regem iussisset, id sic ratum esset, si patres auctores fierent, and 6. 42. 10. Compare also the addition to the Rhetrae of Lycurgus made by the kings Polydorus and Theopompus, *αἰ δὲ σκολιὰν ὁ δᾶμος ἕλοιτο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενέας καὶ ἀρχαγέτας ἀποστατῆρας ἦμεν, τοῦτ' ἔστι μὴ κυροῦν, ἀλλ'*

ὅλως ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαλύειν τὸν δῆμον (Plut. Lycurg. c. 6), and see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 49. 3. 'I am so far anti-democratic,' says H. Crabb Robinson in a letter dated Sept. 13, 1831 (Diary and Reminiscences, 2. 509), 'that I would allow the people to do very little; but I would enable them to *hinder* a great deal.' Yet it would hardly have been to the advantage of Rome if the Roman comitia had persisted in their refusal to declare war against Philip V of Macedon in B.C. 200 (see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Book 3, c. 8: Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 233).

35. ἀποψηφιζόμενον. For the use of ἀποψηφίζεσθαι in the sense of 'reject,' cp. Plato, Laws 800 D, τοῦτον δὴ τὸν νόμον ἆρ' οὐκ ἀποψηφιζόμεθα; Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 174, and Deinarch. c. Aristog. c. 9.

36. For the use of καταψηφιζόμενον in the sense of 'voting affirmatively,' or perhaps simply in that of 'decernere,' see Bon. Ind. s.v., where Poet. 25. 1461 b 2 is referred to, and Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles' Poetik, 4. 423.

38. ἀνεστραμμένως. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 7, where however Fritzsche reads ἀντεστραμμένως, as indeed Bekker (with one or two inferior MSS.) does here.

1. καὶ τοῦ κυρίου δὴ τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. c. 1. 1289 a 17, 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 31 sq., and 3. 11. 1282 a 25 sqq. In 2. 6. 1264 b 33 sq. τὸ βουλευόμενον is said to be κύριον τῆς πόλεως, not τῆς πολιτείας. 1299 a.

3. Ἐχομένη δὲ τούτων κ.τ.λ. The list of questions as to magistracies given in c. 14. 1298 a 1 sqq. omits, as Sus.[2] points out (Note 1343), the third question mentioned here, the question as to the period for which they are held and the permissibility of a repeated tenure, and this question is not dealt with either in the chapter before us or in 8 (6). 8, though something may be learnt on the subject from 34 sqq. and more from 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq. If we look back to c. 14. 1297 b 37 sqq., we shall see that the main object which Aristotle has in view is to discover what organization of the magistracies is appropriate to each constitution, and it is to this problem that he chiefly addresses himself in the chapter before us, but he finds it requisite to inquire first, what are and what are not magistracies (1299 a 14–30), and what magistracies are absolutely necessary to a State and what are desirable if the constitution is to be a good one (a question as to which we learn but little from 1299 a 31–b 13, and more from 8 (6). 8), and to deal with one or two other preliminary inquiries (1299 b 14–20), C. 15.

before he strikes into his destined path and asks how far the same magistracies will exist in different constitutions (1299 b 20–1300 a 8), and how the mode of appointing to them will differ in each (1300 a 9 sqq.). See as to the contents of the chapter before us and its relation to 8 (6). 8, vol. i. p. 514 sqq.

4. ἔχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Πόσαι τε ἀρχαί κ.τ.λ. is added to explain in reference to what points the many differences spoken of arise. Compare the very similar sentence in 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5, ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, as to which see note. For τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας cp. c. 14. 1297 b 37. In the Lacedaemonian State the magistracies would seem to have been much fewer and less specialized than at Athens. Judging from 8 (6). 8, one would say that Aristotle desires to steer a midway course between the two States in this matter. It would be easy to add to the list of questions as to magistracies and their tenure which Aristotle gives here. Questions might be raised as to whether magistracies should be salaried, whether they should be subject to review and by whom, whether more than one should be allowed to be held by the same person at the same time, whether the chief magistracies of a State should be combined to form a single great board, and whether boards are better than single magistrates, and if so, of how many members they should be composed, etc.

6. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Democracies liked to make magistracies, or as many of them as possible, tenable for only a short time (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq.), six months (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.) or less. In early democracies, however, we hear of magistracies tenable for long periods (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sq.). The prytaneis at Athens held office for thirty-five or thirty-six days (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 43), and their epistatês for one day and night only (c. 44). Still there were magistrates at Athens (for instance, the ταμίας στρατιωτικῶν, and οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικόν, and ὁ τῶν κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητής: see Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 43) who held office for four years; Aristotle, indeed, can hardly mean to say that some States made *all* their magistracies of brief tenure. Democracies were especially opposed to offices tenable for life (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 41 sqq.). In oligarchies, on the other hand, offices were often held for life (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 16 sqq.), or at any rate for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.). In the Lacedaemonian ἀριστοκρατία the kings and senators held their offices for life.

9. πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτούς, sc. ἄρχειν. For πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτοὺς

Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Top. 5. 2. 130 a 29 and 6. 3. 141 a 21. Democracies tended to set limits to a repeated tenure of all offices except those relating to war and a few others (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23 sq., where see note: see also Sandys' note on *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 62. l. 18). At Thurii a course was adopted unusual even in democracies, and restrictions of this kind were extended to offices relating to war, the office of stratêgus not being tenable a second time by the same person, except after an interval of five years (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 7).

10. *τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν*, cp. 1300 a 9 sq., 32, b 7 sq., and Plato, Laws 768 D, *αἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς καταστάσεις.*

11. *δεῖ γίνεσθαι*, sc. *τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν*: cp. 1300 b 7, *πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις.*

12. *πῶς*, i. e. by election, or by lot, or by a combination of the two.

14. *ποῖαι*, sc. *ἀρχαί.*

ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1275 a 26, and compare Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 13–19, a passage which is probably present to Aristotle's mind here, *λέξουσι δὲ . . . καὶ ἕτερόν τινα λόγον . . . ὡς ἄρα ὅσα τις αἱρετὸς ὢν πράττει κατὰ ψήφισμα, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀρχὴ ἀλλ' ἐπιμελειά τις καὶ διακονία* (cp. *τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν*, 20)· *ἀρχὰς δὲ φήσουσιν ἐκείνας εἶναι ἃς οἱ θεσμοθέται ἀποκληροῦσιν ἐν τῷ Θησείῳ, κἀκείνας ἃς ὁ δῆμος εἰώθε χειροτονεῖν ἐν ἀρχαιρεσίαις, στρατηγοὺς καὶ ἱππάρχους καὶ τὰς μετὰ τούτων ἀρχάς, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα πραγματείας προστεταγμένας κατὰ ψήφισμα.* To this plea Aeschines opposes the language of the law, which declares *ἀρχὰς ἁπάσας εἶναι ἃς ὁ δῆμος χειροτονεῖ, "καὶ τοὺς ἐπιστάτας" φησὶ "τῶν δημοσίων ἔργων" (ἔστι δὲ ὁ Δημοσθένης τειχοποιός, ἐπιστάτης τοῦ μεγίστου τῶν ἔργων)* κ.τ.λ., where we are reminded of 15, *πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται.* (If cc. 13–19 of Aeschin. c. Ctes. are here present to Aristotle's mind, the passage before us cannot have been written before B.C. 330, for Aeschines' speech was delivered in that year.) Aristotle seems here by implication to deny the name of magistracy to any post which is not filled either by election or by lot, and consequently to the position of member of the assembly, if not to that of dicast. He speaks more decidedly here than in 3. 1. 1275 a 26 sqq. He adds that not all posts which were filled by election or lot were to be accounted magistracies; priests were not magistrates (cp. Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1461), though some of them were elected (Paus. 7. 20. 1) and others appointed by lot (Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 46), nor were chorêgi, though some of them were elected (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 56. l. 7 sqq.), nor heralds (of the mode of whose appointment in

most States little seems to be definitely known, though they were a hereditary profession at Sparta, Hdt. 6. 60), nor ambassadors, who were elected (19). Aristotle may have been led to mark off πολιτικαὶ ἀρχαί from such posts as those of priests and heralds by a recollection of what Plato had said of priests and heralds in Polit. 290.

16. διόπερ πάντας οὔτε τοὺς αἱρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρωτοὺς ἄρχοντας θετέον. The inference appears to be—as so many functionaries are required for the purposes of the political association, it is not likely that they will all be magistrates, and therefore we must not treat as magistrates all those functionaries who are appointed by election or by lot. For the absence of οὐ before πάντας, which some would add, see critical note.

18. τοῦτο, the office of priest. Aristotle does not explain why he denies the name of ἄρχοντες to priests, chorêgi, heralds, and envoys.

19. ἔτι δὲ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες. We should probably supply 'are not magistrates.' It would, however, also be possible to supply 'are elected.'

αἱροῦνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί. See critical note. Compare [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 31, νόμος δὲ ἦν Χαλκιδεῦσι μὴ ἄρξαι μηδὲ πρεσβεῦσαι νεώτερον ἐτῶν πεντήκοντα, and Harpocr. εὔθυναι (Aristot. Fragm. 405. 1545 b 43), οἱ πρεσβεύσαντες ἢ ἄρξαντες ἢ διοικήσαντές τι τῶν δημοσίων, passages which imply that the post of envoy was not an office. 'In Attic inscriptions the plural of πρεσβευτής is till B.C. 250 πρέσβεις, afterwards πρεσβευταί' (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. Att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 112). The plural πρεσβευταί, however, occurs in our text of Thucydides (8. 77 and 86), and πρεσβευτάς in Andoc. 3. 41 and Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 12.

20. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν. Τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν takes up πολλῶν ἐπιστατῶν, 15. Aristotle appears to regard only πολιτικαὶ ἐπιμέλειαι as ἀρχαί in the truest sense. Πολιτικαὶ ἐπιμέλειαι are explained to be offices in which an ἐπιμέλεια is exercised over the whole or a part of the citizens (πολῖται, hence πολιτικαί) with a view to a given action. It is implied apparently that no such ἐπιμέλεια is exercised in the case of οἰκονομικαί or ὑπηρετικαὶ ἐπιμέλειαι. Aristotle does not explain how treasurers or auditors or registrars of contracts, whom he no doubt regards as entrusted with πολιτικαὶ ἐπιμέλειαι, can be said to exercise an ἐπιμέλεια of the kind to which he refers.

πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν. Supply ἐπιμέλειαι.

21. For πρός τινα πρᾶξιν cp. 1299 b 18, πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, and Polyb. 10. 16. 2.

στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων, sc. ἐπιμελούμενος. We expect στρατηγία, but cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 3, μέγισται δὲ καὶ πρῶται τῶν ἀρχῶν ἦσαν βασ[ιλεὺς καὶ πολ]έμαρχος καὶ �ἀρ[χων], c. 7. l. 9 sqq., and c. 31. l. 16: also Pol. 3. 1. 1275 a 23–26, and the passage quoted above on 14 from Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 13–19, κἀκείνας κ.τ.λ.

22. ἢ κατὰ μέρος, 'or sectionally.' It is implied that women and children are citizens, which is of course not strictly the case.

23. οἰκονομικαί, 'economic': i. e. these magistracies have to deal with matters similar to those with which the head of a household has to deal, for instance the distribution of food (cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 21 sqq.).

πολλάκις γὰρ αἱροῦνται σιτομέτρας. 'Corn-measurers' would be elected when corn was distributed among the citizens, and this would occur in times of scarcity or when a present of corn was made to the State: thus we read in Diod. 13. 58. 4 οἱ γὰρ Ἀκραγαντῖνοι σιτομετρήσαντες αὐτοῖς δημοσίᾳ διέδωκαν κατὰ τὰς οἰκίας: see also an inscription from Iasus in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 8. 100, and Plut. Cato Censor, c. 8 *init.* In Pollux 7. 18 σιτομέτραι are included under the head of αἱ ἐπὶ ταῖς τροφαῖς τέχναι. They must not be confounded with the Prometrêtae, as to whom see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 48, 239. Public 'measurings-out' of wheat no doubt took place at Athens during the four years of scarcity B.C. 330–326 (see vol. i. p. 135, note 2, and Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 268 sq.), and it is possible that the passage before us was written during or after the scarcity which these distributions of food were intended to alleviate. Cp. Demosth. Or. 34. in Phorm. c. 37, ἐν τοιούτῳ καιρῷ ἐν ᾧ ὑμῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἄστει οἰκοῦντες διεμετροῦντο τὰ ἄλφιτα ἐν τῷ φδείῳ, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἐν τῷ νεωρίῳ ἐλάμβανον κατ' ὀβολὸν τοὺς ἄρτους καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μακρᾶς στοᾶς, τὰ ἄλφιτα καθ' ἡμίεκτον μετρούμενοι καὶ καταπατούμενοι. Sus.[2] (Note 1348) identifies the σιτομέτραι with the σιτοφύλακες, but not, I think, rightly, nor do I agree with Liddell and Scott that 'inspectors of corn-measures' are referred to in the passage before us.

24. αἱ δ' ὑπηρετικαὶ κ.τ.λ. Plato had already marked off magistrates from ὑπηρέται in Polit. 290 B, ὅπερ εἴπες νῦν, ὑπηρέτας, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας. As to the employment of public slaves as clerks and the like, see Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 341, note 3. Ὑπηρέται were a despised race (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 249: Diod. 14. 66. 6).

25. μάλιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14, where see note. Aristotle has before him Plato, Polit. 260 C sqq., where τὸ ἐπιτάττειν, or rather ἡ αὐτεπιτακτική, is ascribed to ὁ ἄρχων, and probably also Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 11, ὁπότε γάρ τις ὁμολογήσειε τοῦ μὲν ἄρχοντος εἶναι τὸ προστάττειν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. (cp. Poet. 19. 1456 b 17, τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησί (sc. Πρωταγόρας), ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν). In ὅσαις ἀποδέδοται βουλεύσασθαί τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρῖναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι Aristotle adds περὶ τινῶν because a magistracy has a definite, not an indefinite, sphere of competence. He does not confine the name of ἀρχή to posts of which ὅσαις κ.τ.λ. can be said, but he thinks that these deserve it best. He would hardly include among the posts which best deserve the name of ἀρχαί the ἐπιμέλειαι which he describes as οἰκονομικαί and ὑπηρετικαί, or indeed the magistracies of ultimate democracies, for they possessed only the power to make preliminary inquiries (c. 14. 1298 a 30 sqq.). But he does not distinctly say to what posts he would give the name of ἀρχή and to what he would not. The question was made all the more perplexing by the fact that in the ordinary use of the Greek language a distinction was drawn between ἀρχαί and such posts as that of envoy. Giphanius remarks (p. 504), 'Bodinus in methodo historica, pagina 195, ita definit: Magistratus, inquit, est is qui imperii publici partem habet—publici inquam, ut ab imperio herili, patrio, aut alio domestico distinguatur: ubi multis quoque verbis hunc locum et definitionem Aristotelis reprehendit.' The criticism referred to by Giph. will be found in Bodinus, Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem, p. 154, ed. 1595. Vict. quotes Cic. De Leg. 3. 1. 2, videtis igitur magistratus hanc esse vim, ut praesit praescribatque recta et utilia et coniuncta cum legibus. But is a magistrate not a magistrate if the things which he orders to be done are not 'recta et utilia,' etc.?

28. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. This remark is added to break off the discussion (for similar breakings-off see note on 1274 a 30 and see 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 18 sqq.); what Aristotle says in 30 explains why he has given a certain amount of consideration to the question. 'Hoc dicit, quoniam (ut alio in loco adnotavimus et saepe ipse admonet) in doctrina civili, licet pleraque omnia ad actionem pertineant, ut in ceteris doctrinis practicis sive activis, tamen quaedam cognitionis duntaxat gratia traduntur' (Sepulveda, p. 140 b): cp. 3. 8. 1279 b 11 sqq.

ταῦτα, the determination of the question who is a magistrate and who is not.

πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις, 'in relation to practice' (in contrast to πρὸς τὰς διανοήσεις).

29. οὐ γάρ πω κ.τ.λ., 'for no decision has yet been given, the discussion having been merely about the name.' The fact is mentioned to show that the question is not one of practical importance. It would have already been decided one way or the other, if it had been. For κρίσις γέγονεν cp. c. 16. 1300 b 34, δεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν.

30. ἔχει δέ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν, 'but it offers an opportunity to a certain extent for speculative inquiry': cp. Hist. An. 5. 1. 539 a 7, νῦν δὲ περὶ τούτου τελευταίου λεκτέον διὰ τὸ πλείστην ἔχειν πραγματείαν, and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 12, ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικήν. Ἄλλος is pleonastic, as often elsewhere (see note on 1309 b 30).

31. ποῖαι δ' ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. For the answer to this question see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29 sqq. (cp. 1300 a 4 sqq.).

33. πρὸς ἅπασάν τε δὴ πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ., 'with a view to every constitution, and especially with a view to small States.' For δή following ἅπας, cp. Soph. Aj. 992. For καὶ δὴ καί, cp. Poet. 24. 1460 a 5: Meteor. 2. 3. 357 b 26: Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 2. l. 2 sqq.: and Plato, Laws 758 E. Aristotle occasionally studies the circumstances of small States, e.g. in c. 11. 1296 a 10 sqq., 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq., and 2. 11. 1273 b 12 sqq. Most Greek States were small, and it is probable that many of his pupils, like himself, came from small States, for the attractions of philosophy were greater where those of a political career were less (Plato, Rep. 496 B).

34. ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ ταῖς μεγάλαις κ.τ.λ., 'for in the large States [there will be as many offices as there are duties to be discharged, for in them] it is possible and right for one office to be set apart for the discharge of one duty.' Aristotle has already said of Carthage what he says here (2. 11. 1273 b 8 sqq.). The course which he here recommends had not always been followed at Athens, though it was a large State: thus we read of the Commissioners of the Theoric Fund (οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν κεχειροτονημένοι) in the days of the ascendency of Eubulus, ἦρχον μὲν πρὶν ἢ τὸν Ἡγήμονος νόμον γενέσθαι τὴν τοῦ ἀντιγραφέως ἀρχήν, ἦρχον δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀποδεκτῶν καὶ νεωρίων ἀρχήν, καὶ σκευοθήκην φκοδόμουν, ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ὁδοποιοὶ καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν ὅλην διοίκησιν εἶχον τῆς πόλεως (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 25).

37. ὥστε τὰς μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'so that in the case of some offices men intermit the tenure of them for a long time, while others they hold

only once.' Cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 24 sqq. So in the constitution adopted at Erythrae after its reduction by Athens towards the middle of the fifth century B.C. no one was to be a member of the Boulê a second time till four years had elapsed (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 23). At Athens the position of epistatês of the prytaneis could only be held once by the same individual (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 44). So in the days of the Four Hundred at Athens, according to Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 31. l. 16 sqq., it was ordained that except in the case of the Boulê and the office of stratêgus, no one should hold the same magistracy twice. Aristotle does not notice, or at any rate point out, that the frequent tenure of important posts by novices which regulations of this kind involve would not be favourable to efficiency.

38. καὶ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., 'and every task is better attended to, when the attention of the person discharging it is directed to doing one thing and not many.' Compare 1. 2. 1252 b 3 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 b 14 sq. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Rep. 370 C, *ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾷον, ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ*, and 374 A sqq., and (as Vict. points out) Laws 846 D sqq. He probably also has before him Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 21, *ἐκεῖνο δοκῶν καταμεμαθηκέναι ὅτι οὗτοι κράτιστοι ἕκαστα γίγνονται οἳ ἂν ἀφέμενοι τοῦ πολλοῖς προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἐπὶ ἓν ἔργον τράπωνται*, and 8. 2. 5–6, where the increased specialization of labour in large States as compared with small is dwelt upon, and the increased excellence of work resulting from this is described. 'Formae *μονοπραγματεῖν* et *πολυπραγματεῖν* unicum ex hoc loco exemplum posuit Stephanus' (Schn.).

1299 b. **1.** συνάγειν εἰς ὀλίγους. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 6. 14, *πᾶσαι δὲ συγκεφαλαιοῦνται πολιτικαὶ πράξεις εἰς ὀλίγους ἐπιστάτας*, and Pol. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 37, *ὅταν ἔνιοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἕλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.*

2. ὀλιγανθρωπίαν, 'paucity of citizens,' as is clear from 1299 a 37, *διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας.*

5. καὶ νόμων, i.e. laws regulating the tenure and administration of magistracies.

πλὴν αἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'but large States often require the same magistracies, whereas it is only at long intervals that small States do so.' In large States, for example, magistrates for the repair of the walls will often need to be appointed, not so in small States. Cp. c. 16. 1300 b 29, *συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσιν.* It appears from the Gortyna Code that the *ὀρπανοδικασταί* of Gortyna 'n'avaient qu' une existence inter-

mittente,' for the words of the Code are *αἳ κα μὴ ἴωντι ὀρπανοδικασταί* (col. 12. 22 sq.: see Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, première série, pp. 390, 476).

7. διόπερ οὐδὲν κωλύει κ.τ.λ. In small States several magistracies may be held by the same person at one time, for they will not clash, because some of them for long periods of time together will give their holders but little to do.

9. πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν, 'to suit the paucity of citizens.' Cp. 3. 13. 1284a 1, *πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην.*

10. ὀβελισκολύχνια. See notes on 1252b 1 and 2. We read of similar contrivances in Athen. Deipn. 700 d, *Ἕρμιππος δ' ὁ κωμῳδιοποιὸς ἐν τοῖς Ἰάμβοις τὸ στρατιωτικὸν λυχνεῖον σύνθετον οὕτως* (i. e. λυχνεῖον) *ὀνομάζει* (Hermipp. Fragm. 8 Bergk), and 700 e, *ξυλολυχνούχου δὲ μέμνηται Ἄλεξις· καὶ τάχα τούτῳ ὅμοιόν ἐστι τὸ παρὰ Θεοπόμπῳ ὀβελισκολύχνιον* (see Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 517).

πόσας, sc. *ἀρχάς,* which does not come to the surface, as it were, till 13. See notes on 1281a 26 and 1336a 21.

14. ἁρμόττει δὲ κ.τ.λ. This question needs to be considered because it has a bearing on the question raised in 1299a 31 sqq., what offices are necessary. A similar question would be whether it is better to give the stratêgi, as at Athens, command both by land and by sea, or, as in the Lacedaemonian State, to give the command by land to one magistracy and the command by sea to another.

16. εὐκοσμίας. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321b 14, 20, and Plato, Laws 764 B. At one time in the history of Athens the Council of the Areopagus was charged with the maintenance of *εὐκοσμία* throughout the State: cp. Isocr. Areop. § 37, *τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν ἐπέστησαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς εὐκοσμίας,* and *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 3, *ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴ τὴν μὲν τάξιν εἶχε τοῦ διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους, διῴκει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολάζουσα καὶ ζημ[ιο]ῦσα πάντας τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας κυρίως.* This width of jurisdiction had its drawbacks, especially as the Council not only tried and sentenced culprits, but also carried the sentence into effect (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* ibid. and c. 8. l. 19 sqq.: cp. Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322a 16 sqq.), and we may probably infer from 8 (6). 8. 1321b 12 sqq. that Aristotle prefers, at any rate in the case of large States, the arrangement by which the task of caring for *εὐκοσμία* is entrusted to more magistracies than one. There is obviously something to be said on the other side. In modern States we are accustomed to look to one supreme police-authority in each city. We note that Aristotle entrusts the receipt

and paying out of the revenue to one magistracy with jurisdiction everywhere (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 31 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sq.).

17. ἄλλον δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τόπον, i. e. astynomi in the city and agronomi in the country (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 18 sqq., 27 sqq.). The proedri ἐπεμελοῦντο τῆς εὐκοσμίας in the assembly (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 44. l. 10).

18. καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. The latter method seems to have been followed in some cases in Persia according to Xen. Oecon. 4. 9, καὶ εἰσὶ δ' αὐτῷ οἱ ἄρχοντες διατεταγμένοι ἐφ' ἑκάτερον οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχουσι τῶν κατοικούντων τε καὶ τῶν ἐργατῶν . . . οἱ δ' ἄρχουσι τῶν ὡπλισμένων φρουρῶν. We are ourselves familiar with Guardians charged with the care of the poor and Commissioners charged with the care of lunatics.

19. λέγω δ' οἷον ἵνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας. Supply πότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ.

21. καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος, 'the magistracies also,' as well as the constitution. Τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος probably means no more than αἱ ἀρχαί. See as to expressions of this kind Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 382, and cp. Plato, Laws 797 A, τὸ τῶν παιδιῶν γένος, and Tim. 76 C, τὸ τῶν τριχῶν γένος.

24. ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων. Cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 33, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐν ᾗ οἱ κατὰ παιδείαν (διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς).

27. καὶ κατ' αὐτάς, i. e. κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας (cp. 21, καθ' ἑκάστην), as well as κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, κατὰ τὰ πράγματα, and κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

29. ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Great magistracies were seldom found in democracies (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq., 29 sq., 41 sqq.), except in early times (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 20 sqq.).

30. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἴδιαί τινές εἰσιν. To the magistracies mentioned here as peculiar to special constitutions a gerusia may be added, for a gerusia can hardly have existed in democracies.

31. ἡ τῶν προβούλων. See note on 1298 b 27.

αὕτη γὰρ οὐ δημοκρατική. Nor was the office of probulus suitable to an aristocracy either: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 8 sq.

32. βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικόν. The name Boulê seems, however, sometimes to be applied to Councils not of a democratic character: see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 131. 1: 2. 190: 2. 315. 3. The γερουσία in the Cretan States, which was composed of persons who had held the office of cosmus, an office tenable only by the members of certain gentes, was called a Boulê (2. 10. 1272 a 7 sq., 33 sqq.), though there was nothing democratic about it. It is implied in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 6–9, where the word βουλεύουσι is used, that a Boulê might exist in an oligarchy.

33. ὅπως ἀσχολῶν ἔσται, 'in order that it may be able to attend to its business.'

34. τοῦτο δ', ἐὰν ὀλίγοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχικόν. Cp. Plut. Camill. c. 1, *τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἄνδρας, ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο, τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐφιστάναι παρεμυθεῖτο τοὺς βαρυνομένους τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.*

36. ἀλλ' ὅπου κ.τ.λ., 'but where both these magistracies exist, [the arrangement is still oligarchical, for] the probuli are established as a check upon the bouleutae.' We can trace the existence of probuli in addition to a Boulê at Corinth (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 90, who refers to Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 60 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 394), at Corcyra (Gilbert, 2. 234 sq.), at Eretria (Gilbert, 2. 67), and indeed at Athens after the Syracusan disaster (Thuc. 8. 1. 3). Since the foregoing note was written, I have noticed that my remark as to the coexistence of probuli and a Boulê at Corinth has been anticipated by Professor Wilisch (Beiträge zur inneren Geschichte des alten Korinth, p. 17) and by Mr. Lutz (*Class. Rev.* 10. 419).

38. καταλύεται δὲ . . . **1300 a 4.** κρίνουσιν. The connexion with what precedes is, 'but though the Boulê is a democratic institution, even its authority is destroyed in extreme democracies.' The substance of this passage is repeated in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30–35. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 29, *ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί*, and Cic. pro L. Flacco, c. 7. 16, Graecorum autem totae respublicae sedentis contionis temeritate administrantur. As to Athens, cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 41. l. 24 sqq., c. 45, c. 49. ll. 20–24, and see Sandys' note on c. 43. l. 30, where ways are pointed out in which a departure occurred from 'the principle laid down by Solon, *μηδὲν ἐᾶν ἀπροβούλευτον εἰς ἐκκλησίαν εἰσφέρεσθαι* (Plut. Solon, c. 19).' It should be noticed that Aristotle here connects the decline of the power of the Boulê with the introduction of liberal pay for the assembly (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 31, *ὅπου μὴ μισθοῦ εὐπορία πᾶσιν*). This throws light on the date at which he would place the decline of the Boulê at Athens.

4. παιδονόμος δὲ κ.τ.λ. This remark is partly repeated in 8 (6). 1300 a. 8. 1323 a 3 sqq.

5. καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle refers to the *γυμνασίαρχος* among others, as appears from 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 37 sqq.: see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 337. 3, where Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 246. 30 sqq. is quoted, *γυμνασίαρχός τε αἱρεθεὶς τῆς τε εὐταξίας τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν νέων προενοήθη, τῆς τε ἄλλης εὐσχημοσύνης τῆς κατὰ τὸ γυμνάσιον ἀντελάβετο καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως.*

6. πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sq.

7. τρυφῶσι γὰρ αἱ τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D, 556 B.

8. περὶ μὲν τούτων. In the next line we have περί with the acc. See for other instances of this Bon. Ind. 579 b 20 sqq., where 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 30 sq. is among the passages referred to. Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 28 sq.

10. For ἐξ ἀρχῆς see Bon. Ind. 111 a 56 sqq.

εἰσὶ δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν τρισὶν ὅροις, 'and the varieties [in the mode of appointing magistrates] are dependent on three determining factors' (see note on 1294 a 35). For εἶναι ἐν, see note on 1330 b 8. Compare also c. 16. 1300 b 14 sq. and Plato, Protag. 354 E, ἔστιτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις ('in hac re totius disputationis nostrae cardo versatur,' Stallbaum).

14. ἑκάστου δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων διαφοραὶ τρεῖς εἰσίν. I take the nine διαφοραί to be as follows:—All appoint, or some, or all to some offices and some to others; the appointment is made out of all, or out of some, or to some offices out of all and to others out of some; the appointment is made by election or by lot, or to some offices by election and to others by lot.

17. γένει, as the Cosmi in Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 33 sq.).

ἀρετῇ, as in the election to the Lacedaemonian Gerusia (2. 9. 1270 b 23 sqq.).

ὥσπερ ἐν Μεγάροις κ.τ.λ. Plato appears to have cases of this kind before him in Laws 715 A, ἀρχῶν περιμαχήτων γενομένων, οἱ νικήσαντες τά τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφετέρισαν σφόδρα, ὥστε ἀρχῆς μηδ' ὁτιοῦν μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ἡττηθεῖσι, μήτε αὐτοῖς μήτε ἐκγόνοις, παραφυλάττοντες δὲ ἀλλήλους ζῶσιν, ὅπως μή ποτέ τις εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀφικόμενος ἐπαναστῇ μεμνημένος τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονότων κακῶν. It is not certain when the change from democracy to oligarchy at Megara referred to in the text took place. A change of this nature probably took place there in the time of the poet Theognis, whose date however is a contested point (see Christ, Gesch. d. gr. Litt. p. 113 sq., and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 394. 2). Plutarch may have the democracy of those days in view when he describes in Quaest. Gr. c. 18 the oppressive way in which the rich were at one time treated at Megara, and in c. 59 the disorderly spirit which prevailed there and the sacrilegious outrage of which some Megarians were guilty; he does not, however, mention that it was overthrown and that an oligarchy took its place. It is to the overthrow of this

democracy that Welcker (Theogn. p. xii), Sus.[2] (Notes 1365, 1513, and 1556), and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 70. 1) take Aristotle to refer in the passage before us and in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 30 sq. and 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 34 sqq. Busolt, on the other hand (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 395. 6), takes Aristotle to refer to this revolution in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 34 sqq., but thinks that the reference in the passage before us and in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 30 sq. is to the events of B. C. 424, described in Thuc. 4. 66–74, when a democracy was succeeded at Megara by an extreme oligarchy (Thuc. 4. 74). He does not give the reasons which lead him to take this view. Others, among whom are Schlosser (Aristoteles' Politik, 2. 169, note) and E. Meyer (Gesch. d. Alterth. 2. 633), take all the three passages to refer to the revolution of B. C. 424. Sus.[2] (Note 1365) objects that the account of Aristotle does not suit the description of the events given by Thucydides, and it is true that while Aristotle evidently refers to an overthrow of democracy which was the result of a victory over the demos won by oligarchs returning from exile, Thucydides says nothing of any such victory and represents the fall of the democracy to have been due to the intervention of Brasidas and his army aided by a Boeotian force. Still the oligarchical exiles at Pegae, who, as Thucydides tells us (4. 74), were enabled by the fall of the democracy to return to Megara, *may* have won a victory over the demos which Thucydides omits to record, and certainly his description of the oligarchy set up in B. C. 424 as 'extremely oligarchical' (4. 74) quite agrees with what Aristotle says in the passage before us. A third view is that of Congreve, who in his notes on 1302 b 30 and 1304 b 34 connects the overthrow of democracy at Megara mentioned in the three passages of the Politics with the withdrawal of Megara from the Athenian alliance after the battle of Coroneia in B.C. 447 (Thuc. 1. 113 sq.). An oligarchy in which power was confined to returned exiles would probably be especially oppressive, for exiles could hardly fail to return embittered by exile. Philip of Macedon set up an oligarchy of this type at Thebes after Chaeroneia (Justin, 9. 4, pulsos deinde per iniuriam in patriam restituit: ex horum numero trecentos exules iudices rectoresque civitati dedit).

19. πάλιν ταῦτα συνδυαζόμενα, 'again there is the case of these things being combined.' For the asyndeton in πάλιν cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 10.

22. τούτων δ' ἑκάστης ἔσονται τῆς διαφορᾶς τρόποι τέτταρες, 'and

of each variety of these there will be four modes.' Τούτων, i. e. τῶν τριῶν ὅρων (10 sqq.). Take, for instance, the first ὅρος—'who is it that appoint?' One variety under this head is that all appoint. There will be four modes of this variety.

All may appoint from all by election,
" " " lot,
All may appoint from some by election,
" " " " lot.

The same holds good of the second variety under this head, that in which some appoint.

Some may appoint from all by election,
" " " lot,
Some may appoint from some by election,
" " " " lot.

So again as to the third variety, in which partly all, partly some, appoint.

Partly all, partly some may appoint from all by election,
" " " " " lot,
Partly all, partly some may appoint from some by election,
" " " " " lot.

Thus there will be twelve modes of each ὅρος, if we confine our attention to one only of the three possible συνδυασμοί, i. e. the συνδυασμός 'partly all, partly some,' and neglect the two others, which are 'partly from all, partly from some' and 'partly by election, partly by lot.' This is explained in 30 sq. If we took account of all three συνδυασμοί, there would be more than twelve modes. See Spengel, Aristotelische Studien, 3. 53, whose explanation I follow. But what is exactly meant by all or some appointing by lot? If an appointment is made by lot, how can it be said that all appoint or some appoint?

23. ἢ γὰρ πάντες ... **1300 b 5.** ἀριστοκρατικόν. As to the text of this passage see critical notes.

24–26. The first of these two modes of appointing from all is open to the objection that, as the magistrates would be taken by election or lot or both from each of the tribes, demes, and phratries composing the State in succession, all the magistrates of the State might at a given moment belong to one and the same tribe.

25. φρατρίας. The way in which phratries are referred to here

suggests that they were a subdivision of the deme. As to the relation of the phratry to the deme at Athens see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 428 sq.

26. διελθῇ. Sus. apparently takes the nom. to *διελθῇ* to be 'die Ernennung aus Allen' ('the nomination out of all'), and probably this is so. In c. 14. 1298 a 17, on the other hand (cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 4. l. 16), *τὸ ἄρχειν* has to be supplied with *διελθῇ*.

ἀεὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων, i. e. on each occasion out of all; not merely out of all, if we take several occasions together.

31. χωρὶς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν. See above on 22.

τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικαί κ.τ.λ. It has been objected to the text as it stands that not two, but only one mode of appointing is mentioned in what follows (*τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων*), or else three (*τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ ἀμφοῖν*): hence Sus. would read *τρεῖς* instead of *δύο*, and H. Rabe would insert *καὶ τὸ πάντας ἐκ τινῶν* after *πάντων*, 32. I incline to think that no change should be made in the text. It has been explained in 24–26 that the one democratic mode of appointing (*τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων*) assumes two forms, *τὸ πάντας ἐξ ἁπάντων ἀνὰ μέρος* and *τὸ πάντας ἀεὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων*. *Μέν* is answered by *δέ*, 34. I take Aristotle's meaning to be that if all appoint out of all taken in successive sections, so that the appointment is made out of all, though not out of all simultaneously, the arrangement is democratic, but that if all appoint by successive sections, one section appointing first and then the next and so on till all have had their turn of appointing, and the appointment is made out of all—the MS. text adds (probably erroneously), 'or out of some'—by lot or election or both, or to some offices out of all and to others out of some by lot or election or both, the arrangement is suitable to a polity. In other words, it is essential to democracy that the appointment should be made by all simultaneously, but not that the selection should be made from all simultaneously. It should, however, be pointed out that in one or two passages of the Politics Aristotle seems to take a different view. Thus in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23–27 a scheme under which persons elected from all the citizens by alternation (*τινὲς αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων*) elect the magistrates is treated as democratic. Perhaps, however, in this scheme the electors were elected by all simultaneously, and this is regarded by Aristotle as equivalent to the election of the magistrates being made by all simultaneously. Another passage which deserves attention is that in which the

constitution of Telecles is described (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 11 sqq.). This constitution is regarded by Aristotle as a democratic constitution. Were not, however, successive sections of the citizens invested under it with the right of appointing the magistrates? We are not explicitly told that they were, but, if this was the case, it is not easy to reconcile the teaching of 1298 a 11 sqq. with that of the passage before us.

1300 b. 1. **τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν** κ.τ.λ. See note on 1292 b 2.

3. As to **μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως** see note on 1300 b 37.

4. **τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἁπάντων** κ.τ.λ. See note on 1292 b 2.

7. **τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει** κ.τ.λ. **Τίνα**, sc. **τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς**. We gather from this remark that offices of importance ought not to be filled in the same way as minor ones. Perhaps they should be filled by election (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.) and exclusively or predominantly from the class favoured by the constitution (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 30 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 516 sq.

8. **ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῶν ἀρχῶν**; [**καὶ**] **τίνες εἰσίν**, 'as soon as the prerogatives of the various magistracies shall have become manifest, what they are.' As to [*καί*] see critical note.

9. **τὴν κυρίαν τῶν πρασόδων**, sc. **ἀρχήν**, the magistracy of the apodectae or tamiae (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 31 sqq.).

10. **τὴν κυρίαν τῆς φυλακῆς**, the magistracy of the stratêgi (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33 sqq.).

11. **τῆς τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν συμβολαίων κυρίας**, the magistracy of the agoranomi (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12 sqq.: Plato, Rep. 425 C sq.). We see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 112 how humble the position of an **ἀγορανόμος** or **ἀστυνόμος** or **δικαστὴς κατὰ δήμους** was at Athens compared with that of an envoy. Cp. also Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 31, where it is implied that **ἀστυνομικά** and **ἀγορανομικὰ νόμιμα** are of little importance.

C. 16. 14. **κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν**, 'in accordance with the same plan': cp. Plato, Gorg. 454 C, **ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς**.

ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ κ.τ.λ., 'now there is a difference between dicasteries, dependent on three determining factors': cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 3, **διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν**. In c. 15. 1300 a 10 we have **εἰσὶ δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν τρισὶν ὅροις**, where the article is added before **διαφοραί**. See note on 1300 a 10. There were other differences between dicasteries besides those noticed here. For instance, the members of some were paid, of others

not; the richer members of some were fined for non-attendance, of others not; the members of some were numerous, of others not, and so forth. Aristotle takes no notice of these differences, and confines his attention to the three points mentioned by him, which he probably regards as more closely connected with the *κατάστασις τῶν δικαστηρίων* than the others.

18. *πρῶτον οὖν διαιρείσθω πόσα εἴδη δικαστηρίων.* Aristotle takes it for granted that a separate kind of dicastery will exist for each of the more important departments of judicial jurisdiction. Hippodamus had classified lawsuits (2. 8. 1267 b 37 sqq.) as concerned with three subjects only, *ὕβρις*, *βλάβη*, *θάνατος*: he would seem, therefore, to omit offences against the State and against religion unless they can be brought under one or other of these three heads (see note on 1267 b 37). Aristotle, on the other hand, gives much prominence to offences against the State (no doubt for the reason mentioned in 36 sqq.), but omits from his classification many suits which Hippodamus includes in his; we hear nothing from him about suits connected with *ὕβρις* or *βλάβη*, except where there is a contract (*συνάλλαγμα*), nor indeed of any criminal trials except those for homicide or offences against the State; none connected with offences against the gods. Which of his dicasteries, again, would try questions of inheritance? Plato had already distinguished, as Aristotle does here, between the way in which dicasteries dealing with offences against the State and dicasteries dealing with offences against private persons should be constituted (Laws 767 sq.: 957 A). We see which were the most important dicasteries of those enumerated here from 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 25, *τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων.* The most important dicasteries were probably also those on which the largest number of dicasts sat (see *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 53. l. 15 sqq. and Sandys' note, and Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 31. 12 sqq.). We hear at Athens of dicasteries of 200, 400, 500, 1,000, 1,500, 2,000, and 2,500 members (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 393).

19. *ἓν μὲν εὐθυντικόν.* As to this kind of dicastery see *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 48 *sub fin.* It has this peculiarity, that the persons brought before it were exclusively magistrates. Dicasteries of this kind seem to have found a place both in democracies and in oligarchies (Plato, Polit. 298 E sq.). Aristotle might have added as another

kind of dicastery those which dealt with the *δοκιμασίαι* of magistrates (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 55. l. 6 sqq.).

20. *ἄλλο δὲ εἴ τίς τι τῶν κοινῶν ἀδικεῖ*, 'and another dealing with any one who commits an offence against any public interest': cp. Rhet. 1. 13. 1373 b 20, *διὸ καὶ τἀδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα δηχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὡρισμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ὡρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν* (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 9 a 58), Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 35, *τοὺς ἀδικοῦντάς τι τῶν κοινῶν*, and Plato, Laws 767 B, *τὸ δ' ὁπόταν τὸ δημόσιον ὑπό τινος τῶν πολιτῶν ἠγῆταί τις ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ βουληθῇ τῷ κοινῷ βοηθεῖν*. Under the head of *ἀδικήματα πρὸς τὸ κοινόν* would fall not only the avoidance of military service, but theft of public property (Laws 941 C–D: Xen. De Vect. 4. 20 sq.), the non-payment of debts to the State, and a host of other offences. See Demosth. in Lept. cc. 100, 135, and c. Timocr. c. 172 sq.

ἕτερον ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει. For the ellipse of *περὶ ταῦτα* before *ὅσα* see note on 1253 b 3. Cp. also Demosth. Or. 41. in Spud. c. 7, *τὸν νόμον, ὃς οὐκ ἐᾷ διαρρήδην, ὅσα τις ἀκετίμησεν, εἶναι δίκας οὔτ' αὐτοῖς οὔτε τοῖς κληρονόμοις*. For *εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει* cp. Plato, Rep. 449 D. Acts alleged to be unconstitutional and attempts to change the constitution by force would fall within the province of this kind of dicastery.

21. *τέταρτον κ.τ.λ.*, 'a fourth both for magistrates and for private persons dealing with contentions arising about impositions of penalties.' How important it was that a court of this kind should exist, we see from 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 13 sqq. This court, unlike the one which will next be mentioned as dealing only with differences between private persons, had to do with questions affecting both private persons and magistrates. Plato perhaps refers to this kind of dicastery among others in Laws 957 A, *τὰ δὲ δημόσια καὶ κοινὰ* (sc. *δικαστήρια*) *καὶ ὅσοις ἀρχὰς δεῖ χρωμένας τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν διοικεῖν. Ζημίωσις* appears to be a rare word. Greek officials, unlike officials in general among ourselves, had the power of imposing money-fines (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 13 sqq.: as to Athens see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 215. 3). Plato, indeed (Laws 847 A), empowers the *ἀστυνόμοι* of his State in a particular case to punish the offender, if a citizen, *ὀνείδεσί τε καὶ ἀτιμίαις*, i.e. with penalties other than money-fines.

22. *πέμπτον κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Polyb. 6. 17. 7, *τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐκ ταύτης ἀπονέμονται κριταὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν συναλ-*

λαγματων, ὅσα μέγεθος ἔχει τῶν ἐγκλημάτων. In ἰδίων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος a limitation of ἰδίων seems to be introduced by καί: see as to this use of καί Bon. Ind. 357 b 8 sqq., and cp. Plato, Laws 766 C, οἱ προσήκοντες καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντες πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων.

24. φονικοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶδη κ.τ.λ. This is based on Athenian custom. For similar enumerations of courts dealing with homicide see Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 57. l. 14 sqq., Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 65–77, and Helladius, ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 279 (p. 535 a 22 sqq. Bekker). In the passage before us and in Helladius only four kinds of court are enumerated, whereas Demosthenes and the Ἀθ. Πολ. mention five, the additional court being that which tries cases of homicide in which death is caused by the impact of stone, wood, iron, or the like, the thrower being unknown.

27. ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. Cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 16, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν, Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 b 27 sq., and Rhet. 3. 17. 1417 b 25 sq.

τέταρτον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and a fourth kind of court concerned with acts of homicide charged against persons who have left the country for homicide upon their return.' The first act of homicide would be accidental, the second wilful: cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 77, ἔτι τοίνυν πέμπτον δικαστήριον ἄλλο θεάσασθε οἷον ὑπερβέβηκε, τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ . . . κελεύει δίκας ὑπέχειν ὁ νόμος, ἐάν τις ἐπ' ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ πεφευγώς, μήπω τῶν ἐκβαλόντων αὐτὸν ἠδεσμένων, αἰτίαν ἔχῃ ἑτέρου φόνου ἑκουσίου.

29. καί, 'for instance.' See note on 1255 a 36.

συμβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'For the first time during the last twenty years the Isle of Man has been the scene of a trial for murder' (*Times*, Nov. 15, 1892). Ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ, cp. Plato, Tim. 36 E, πρὸς τὸν ξύμπαντα χρόνον, and Phaedo, 107 C, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός: Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 117. 15, συμμαχησῶ τοῖς Ἱεραπυτνίοις τὸν πάντα χρόνον: Pindar, Pyth. 1. 46, ὁ πᾶς χρόνος. Π^1 have ἐν τῷ παρόντι χρόνῳ, which seems less suitable.

31. τοῦ δὲ ξενικοῦ ἓν μὲν ξένοις πρὸς ξένους, ἄλλο ξένοις πρὸς ἀστούς, 'and of the dicastery for alien suits one kind for aliens in litigation with aliens, and another for aliens in litigation with citizens.' Ξένοις πρὸς ἀστούς might refer only to suits brought by aliens against citizens, and not to litigation between aliens and citizens generally. But Susemihl, Welldon, and other interpreters are probably right in giving the words the wider meaning. At

Athens according to Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 254, 'the πολέμαρχος had jurisdiction in most private suits in which the defendant was a foreigner.' The kind of dicastery which dealt with litigation between aliens and citizens would obviously be regarded as more important than that which dealt with litigation between aliens; it would also be that in which infractions of justice were most likely to occur (Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 22), and infractions of justice which might possibly result in war. We read of ξενοδίκαι at Oeantheia and Chaleion in Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 31.

32. ἔτι δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Supply δικαστήριόν ἐστι. The Forty had jurisdiction at Athens in suits where the matter in dispute did not exceed the value of ten drachmae (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 53. l. 5).

33. μικρῷ πλείονος. Here the amount of money which is involved in the contract is expressed in the genitive: see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 418. 6 c (ed. Gerth, § 418. 7).

34. οὐκ ἐμπίπτει δὲ εἰς δικαστῶν πλῆθος. Bonitz (Ind. s. v. ἐμπίπτειν) compares such expressions as ἐμπίπτουσι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι καὶ εἰς ἄλλας λύσεις (Soph. El. 30. 181 b 19). Cp. also Plut. Solon, c. 18, τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα τῶν διαφόρων ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς.

35. περὶ μὲν τούτων, sc. τῶν δικαστηρίων. Δικαστηρίων must also be supplied with τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ξενικῶν and with τῶν πολιτικῶν. The term τὰ πολιτικὰ δικαστήρια seems to include the first five kinds of dicastery. We read of οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἀγῶνες in Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 18 (Bon. Ind. 614 a 57): cp. also Lys. Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 8. That injustice in the review of magistrates' conduct in office had a special tendency to produce στάσις we see from Plato, Laws 945 D sq.

37. περὶ ὧν μὴ γινομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ κινήσεις. At the end of this sentence should possibly be added μὴ γινομένων δ' ὁμοίως from 1300 b 3. See critical note on 1300 b 38. For the thought cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20 sqq.

38. ἀνάγκη δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not consider the possible alternative of all the citizens sitting as a dicastery. He would probably regard a dicastery of this kind as too numerous. He takes it for granted that a dicastery will comprise only a part of the citizens, whether selected by election or by lot or by both.

39. περὶ πάντων τῶν διῃρημένων, 'respecting all the subjects which have been distinguished' (cp. 1300 b 18, διαιρείσθω). Looking to 35–38, we expect Aristotle to confine his attention to the matters with which political dicasteries have to do, but περὶ πάντων τῶν διῃρη-

μένων seems to imply, as Prof. Jowett remarks, that he does not do so.

41. περὶ ἐνίων τῶν αὐτῶν. This has been interpreted in different ways. Vict. 'de quibusdam certisque': Sepulv. 'de quibusdam eiusdem generis controversiis': Welldon, 'or some of them must invariably come before certain judges appointed partly by lot and partly by suffrage.' Of these interpretations I prefer those of Vict. and Welldon, but another is possible, and I incline to adopt it, 'about some things, the same [for both classes of dicasts].' If my view is correct, Aristotle adds τῶν αὐτῶν wishing to make it clear that the two classes of dicasts, those elected and those appointed by lot, have similar competence and deal with the same, and not with different, causes. Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 35, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἂν ταὐτῷ ὑπερέχῃ πολύ, οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ πλούσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ῥητορικὸς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ., where ταὐτῷ, which has been doubted (A^c has ταῦτα), receives some support from the passage before us.

2. οἱ κατὰ μέρος, 'the sectional modes,' i. e. the modes in which 1301 a.
some, not all, judge.

3. Is καὶ οἱ δικάζοντες 'the dicasts also' as well as those appointed to magistracies, who have been dealt with in c. 15. 1300 a 27 sqq.? Spengel brackets καί and Sus. is inclined to transfer it to before ἐκ τινῶν, 2, but perhaps without absolute necessity.

4. τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δὲ αἱρέσει, 'partly by lot and partly by election.' The dicasteries dealing with the more important matters would probably be elective.

ἢ ἔνια δικαστήρια περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ κληρωτῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν, 'or some dicasteries composed of persons appointed by lot and by election, the subjects dealt with being the same for both classes of dicasts.'

5. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. It seems likely that one or more words have dropped out in this sentence. Vict. and Sus. insert οἱ αὐτοί εἰσι after οἱ τρόποι, while Schneider and Coray add ἴσοι, which Coray places after τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Possibly ἀντίστροφοι may be the missing word, and should be added after οἱ τρόποι. Ἀντίστροφοι would easily drop out after τρόποι from the similarity of the ending. The translation will then be, 'these modes then, as they were previously said to do, correspond to those already mentioned.'

7. τὰ αὐτά. Δικαστήρια should probably be supplied, as with τὰ μέν and τὰ δέ.

10. ἀμφοῖν. I take Aristotle's meaning to be that dicasts might

be appointed from all or from some or from both all and some, either by election or by lot or by both methods.

11. τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, sc. δικαστήρια. It seems from this that there was nothing undemocratic in an elected dicastery or in a dicastery appointed partly by election and partly by lot, if only the dicasts were elected out of all. This is remarkable, as even in the Solonian democracy, a very moderate form, the dicasts were appointed by lot (2. 12. 1274 a 5). Aristotle probably preferred in a democracy dicasteries appointed from all wholly or in part by election to dicasteries wholly appointed from all by lot, but would Greek democrats agree with him in regarding such dicasteries as democratic? And would they be content even with dicasteries appointed by lot from all, if these dicasteries were not both numerous and paid? Dicasteries appointed wholly or in part by election would hardly be suitable to any but moderate democracies. And what does Aristotle mean by dicasts appointed by election? Does he mean dicasts thus appointed for a given term—say a year or some longer or shorter term—or for a given trial? There would be obvious objections to appointing dicasts by election for a given trial, though the three hundred dicasts who tried the ἀναγεῖς for the murder of the followers of Cylon were appointed for the trial and by some sort of selection, not by lot (Plut. Solon, c. 12). Imagine if the English judge and jury who tried the leaders in the Transvaal raid had been appointed for the given trial by election!

12. τὰ δὲ δεύτερα ὀλιγαρχικά, ὅσα ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων. So that if the dicasts were selected ἐκ τινῶν by lot or partly by election and partly by lot, the plan would be oligarchical. Aristotle does not tell us whether the plan would be oligarchical, if they were elected ἐκ τινῶν by all, but probably it would not. It is to be presumed that by ἐκ τινῶν Aristotle means 'from the rich' or 'from the well-born,' for there would be nothing oligarchical in a selection from 'the good.'

13. τὰ δὲ τρίτα κ.τ.λ., 'and the third sort of dicasteries is suitable to an aristocracy or a polity, all those which are partly taken from all and partly from a limited class.' So Sus. probably rightly: Stahr, however, translates τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ 'for some matters' and 'for others' ('für einige Sachen' and 'für andere'). Dicasteries composed both of members appointed out of all and of members appointed out of a limited class (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, 8) are not distinctly named, though Aristotle probably intends to class these also as suitable to

aristocracies and polities. He may well, indeed, have preferred dicasteries of this kind to any others, if we may judge by what he says in c. 14. 1298 b 20 sq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq., where he holds that in an extreme democracy rich and poor should deliberate and judge together. But of the three other plans—that by which some suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from a limited class and others by dicasts taken from all, that by which all suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from all, and that by which all suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from a limited class—he will have preferred the first. Here again it is remarkable that Aristotle does not explain what sort of limited class he means by τινές. Would he regard it as an aristocratic arrangement if some suits were tried by dicasts taken from all and others by dicasts taken from the rich?

BOOK VII (V).

Preliminary Remarks.

A few remarks may here be added to what has already been said in vol. i. p. 521 sqq. as to the teaching of this Book.

If we study the eleven causes of στάσις and constitutional change enumerated in c. 2. 1302 a 34 sqq. (see vol. i. p. 523 sqq.), we shall see that they may be grouped under three main heads. Στάσις and constitutional change may arise either from a certain emotional state of the minds of the citizens or some of them, or from social causes, such as the increase of a class in size out of proportion to the rest or the unlikeness of one part of the citizen-body to the other, or from negligence on the part of the authorities of the State and similar causes. It is obvious that a great difference exists between the second group of causes and the two others. Negligence in government can be avoided, and it is possible also to avoid arousing feelings of envy, or contempt, or indignation at oppression or fears of future oppression, but it is far less easy to prevent a class increasing in size or credit, or an individual or individuals acquiring a pre-eminence in power, or to secure the existence of a midway class capable of holding the balance between rich and poor, or to soften distinctions of race or geographical contrasts. If the increase of a class in relative magnitude is often due to accidental causes, as we are told that it is in c. 3. 1303 a 3 sqq., how is it possible to prevent it in these cases? When the numbers of the upper class at Tarentum were greatly reduced in consequence

of the defeat of the Tarentines by the Iapygians, what amount of good conduct or vigilance on the part of the magistrates would have saved the polity from becoming a democracy?

Aristotle's analysis of the causes of στάσις and constitutional change reveals, in fact, the existence of causes with which it is extremely difficult for the statesman to deal, however great his skill and watchfulness. Aristotle himself seems, indeed, to be hardly conscious of this. He hardly realizes how difficult it is to prevent στάσις and constitutional change when they are brought about by changes in the size or credit of classes, or other social changes not easily guided or controlled. He may possibly have underrated the difficulty of doing this, for we find him in 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30 advising statesmen under certain circumstances to 'try to increase the midway class' without betraying much consciousness of the difficulty of the task.

Another consequence of his recognition of the share of social causes in bringing about στάσις and constitutional change seems also to be imperfectly realized by him. Does not the fact suggest a resort to means of preserving constitutions of which he would hardly approve? If the increase of the rich in numbers or wealth is often fatal to democracies (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 10 sqq.: 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 12 sqq.), will not democracies be wise if they thin the numbers of the rich and impoverish them? This view was commonly held by Greek democrats (see vol. i. p. 538 sqq. and Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 8 sqq.), but Aristotle advises democracies to adopt an opposite policy and to spare the resources of the rich (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 14 sqq.). Is he not rather inconsequent in this? He would probably reply that, however dangerous to democracies an overgreat increase in the numbers or wealth of the rich may be, the danger of driving the rich to combine against the democracy by oppressive measures is still greater (7 (5). 5. 1304 b 20 sqq.).

When at the close of c. 4 Aristotle passes on from studying the causes of constitutional change in constitutions taken as a whole to study in cc. 5–7 its causes in each constitution taken separately, some causes are pointed out of which we hear nothing in the first four chapters. We now learn that changes of constitution may result in democracies from oppression practised on the rich not by magistrates, but by demagogues (c. 5. 1304 b 20 sqq.), or from the ambition of demagogues who are also generals, in oligarchies from the rivalry of great officials in courting the favour of those who

elect to offices, from an overgreat narrowness of the constitution, from feuds within the ruling class, or from the ruin of individual oligarchs by spendthrift and dissolute habits of life, and in aristocracies from strong contrasts of wealth and poverty within the citizen-body. These are causes of constitutional change of which we have not heard before.

It has already been pointed out in vol. i. p. 527 that the theory of constitutional change set forth in this Book is not quite the theory which we expect from Aristotle. We do not hear as much in it as we expect of the effect of ethical changes in the citizens in bringing about changes of constitution. We know that the constitution represents the mode of life preferred by the State (vol. i. p. 209 sqq.) and reflects its conception of justice, and its view as to the things which produce happiness (vol. i. p. 220 sq.), or in other words is an indication of the moral level of the community, and we are, in fact, told in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14 sqq. that each constitution is preserved by the ἦθος appropriate to it, so that we infer that a change in the ἦθος of the citizens will often produce a change in the constitution, but this cause of change remains unnoticed in this Book till we are told in c. 9. 1310 a 12 sqq. how important it is that the citizens should receive an education conducive to the preservation of the constitution. We infer, again, from such passages as 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 28 sqq. that the rise or increase of new classes in a State, such as those of artisans, day-labourers, or seafaring men, will result in constitutional change, but this source of constitutional change is nowhere dwelt on in this Book. Other causes of constitutional change which we expect to find noticed in it, but do not, are pernicious and erroneous teaching, or teaching likely to overthrow or undermine the existing constitution, disasters to the State (see note on 1304 a 33), disease and famine (Plato, Laws 709 A), great differences of opinion among the citizens, the mistakes of statesmen, the presence of ἄτιμοι within the city ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 12 sq.), or of exiles in neighbouring cities. Something is said in c. 11. 1314 b 1 sqq. of the dangers attaching to heavy taxation in tyrannies, but we hear little or nothing of it as a source of στάσις and constitutional change in constitutions generally, except incidentally in c. 5. 1305 a 5, c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq., and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20 sqq. Aristotle does not notice how often the foreign relations of a State helped to determine its constitution. One reason why Corinth, for instance, was oligarchically governed

no doubt was that its dreaded neighbour, Argos, was democratically governed, and one reason why a democracy existed at Argos was that its enemy, the Lacedaemonian State, was in the opposite camp. States were apt to give supreme power to the class which was least likely to betray them to the foe they feared. Instances of this might easily be multiplied. Some occasions of *στάσις* and constitutional change which Aristotle notices elsewhere escape mention in this Book. We gather, for instance, from 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. that changes in the relative importance of different arms of the military force of the State bring with them changes of constitution, but we hear nothing of this in the Book before us. So again we gather from the Second Book that *στάσις* is caused by the continued rule of the same men (2. 5. 1264 b 8 sqq.), and by the coexistence of two similar and rival great magistracies (2. 9. 1271 a 39 sqq.). In Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 9–16 bad men are said to be in a state of *στάσις* among themselves because of their moral badness. Of these sources of *στάσις* we hear nothing in this Book.

As to the causes to which the fall of monarchies is traced in it, we note that while we hear of their being overthrown owing to misgovernment, and especially owing to *ὕβρις* in its various forms (c. 10. 1311 a 27 sqq.), owing to fear, and owing to contempt (1311 a 25 sqq.), and we gather that they sometimes fell in consequence of disunion within the ruling family (1312 b 9 sqq., 40 sq.) or of making a single individual overgreat (c. 11. 1315 a 8 sqq.), or not taking sufficient care to have the strongest class in the State on their side (1315 a 31 sqq.), we do not hear that they were affected, as constitutions strictly so called were, by what we have termed the social causes of constitutional change, such causes, for instance, as the disproportionate increase of a class in size or the like.

From the counsels given in cc. 8 and 9 we learn that constitutions are especially preserved (1) by vigilance. The constitution must be carefully guarded; in well-balanced constitutions small infractions of law must not be tolerated, and in oligarchies resting on a property-qualification and polities the property-qualification must be altered, if any changes should occur from time to time in its value; the first beginnings of rivalries and feuds among the notables must be detected and checked; both in oligarchy and in democracy the private life of the citizens must be watched and spendthrift habits controlled. Under no constitution should a single individual be made overgreat or be suddenly dispossessed of his greatness.

(2) Both the class favoured by the constitution and the class not so favoured should be fairly treated. In aristocracies and oligarchies the members of the former class should be placed as far as possible on a level, and their access to office facilitated by making official terms short. In all constitutions special care should be taken of the class not favoured by the constitution. It must not be wronged or oppressed. Its more ambitious members must not suffer in their honour nor the many in their pecuniary interests, and those who are fit for rule must be brought within the constitution. If this class is excluded from office, as was often the case in oligarchies, it should be reconciled to its exclusion by laws and regulations securing that office shall not be a source of gain, but oligarchies are advised in 1309 a 20 sqq. to reserve minor but lucrative offices for it, and both oligarchies and democracies are advised (1309 a 27 sqq.) to award it honorary distinctions to make up for its non-admission to the more important offices. Too often, it would seem, the class favoured by the constitution claimed a monopoly both of power and of honour and profit: Aristotle advises, on the contrary, that it should be content with a monopoly, or something like it, of the more important offices, and allow a full share of honour and profit to the less fortunate class. But he evidently holds that neither vigilance nor fair and kindly treatment both of the class favoured by the constitution and of the class not so favoured would suffice without attention to a third point (3). The constitution, if a deviation-form, must be moderate and must have the strongest element in the State on its side, and the ruling class must be prepared by an appropriate education to rule in such a way as to secure that the constitution will last. Vigilance, fair treatment of all within the State, a moderate and strongly supported constitution, and a ruling class fitted by education to rule—these are the things which make constitutions durable.

Aristotle's counsels are wise, but yet we feel that he has pointed out causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change with which they do not enable us to deal. How is it possible to counteract the social causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change, such causes, for instance, as the disproportionate increase of a class, especially in those cases in which it is due to defeat in war or other circumstances of an accidental kind?

The question of the causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change had been studied to some extent by others before Plato and Aristotle

took it up. Some light is thrown on it now and then by Herodotus (e. g. in 3. 80–82), by Thucydides (e. g. in 3. 82 sqq. and 8. 89. 3), and by Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 480: see note on 1302 a 34). The date of Phaleas is not known, but he had evidently considered it. No one, however, appears to have dealt with it at all fully till Plato dealt with it in the Republic and Laws and Aristotle in the Politics.

Throughout the Politics Aristotle often illustrates and confirms general statements made by him by adducing historical examples in support of them, but in none of its Books does he make a larger use of this method than in that before us. U. Köhler (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 491) has anticipated me in raising the interesting question what class of Greek writers first made use of this method, and in pointing out that it is already used by Aeneas in his Commentarius Poliorceticus thirty years or more before the Politics was written. He may well be right in thinking that Aeneas will not have been the first to use it. I am sometimes inclined to suspect that the references in medical writers to cases occurring in their practice (see e. g. Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6) suggested the employment of a similar method in other fields of inquiry.

The historical examples adduced in this Book are drawn pretty evenly from most parts of the Hellenic world, most freely perhaps from the less remote parts of the coast of Asia Minor and the islands lying off it. In Greece Proper they are largely furnished by the history of the chief cities, Athens, Megara, Corinth, Argos, Lacedaemon, Heraea, Elis, Thebes, Larissa, Pharsalus; no reference is made to the cities of Achaia, to Messene after its restoration, or to Megalopolis, to the Acarnanians or Aetolians, to Corcyra (which is surprising, considering how full an account Thucydides had given of its troubles), or to Crete. Not many illustrations are drawn from the history of the Sicilian cities, with the exception of Syracuse, nor from that of the Aegean islands other than those lying near the mainland of Asia or Europe; none from the history of the cities of the more distant part of the Euxine. We might have expected that Aristotle would make more use than he appears to do of the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. Whether he made a larger use of the history of Ephorus, we cannot say. It is not easy to trace the source from which he obtained his illustrations. Some of the facts he mentions may have become known to him personally (see notes on 1304 a 4 and 1311 a 36), and he may have learnt others from his numerous pupils.

19. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ὧν προειλόμεθα σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων. For the needless repetition of περί in περὶ πάντων cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 9, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν, and 2. 12. 1273 b 29 sq. (compare also 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 40 sqq.). In Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς 2. 464 b 18, where Bekker reads ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν ἐνυπνίων μαντικῆς εἴρηται, Biehl (who reads μαντείας in place of μαντικῆς) adds περὶ πάσης after εἴρηται with EMY, probably rightly. Cp. Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς 21. 480 b 21 sq. C. 1. 1301 a.

20. ἐκ τίνων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων. This question, stated in a slightly different form in c. 2. 1302 a 16, ἐπεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τίνων αἵ τε στάσεις γίγνονται καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 5 sqq., 17 sqq., and c. 7. 1307 b 24 sq.), is dealt with in cc. 2–4. It has been already noticed in vol. i. p. 521 that this summary does not prepare us for the distinction between πολιτεῖαι and μοναρχία which is a conspicuous feature of the Book. See also note on 1289 b 24.

21. τίνες ἑκάστης πολιτείας φθοραί. This question is dealt with in cc. 5–7.

22. ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται. This is a question on which light is occasionally thrown in cc. 5–7 and elsewhere in the Book. We gather, for instance, from c. 5 that democracies are apt to change into oligarchies and tyrannies: see also c. 7. 1307 a 20–27.

ἔτι δὲ σωτηρίαι τίνες καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης εἰσίν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων ἂν μάλιστα σώζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστη. Giphanius (p. 525) brackets ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων—ἑκάστη, and Spengel and Sus. regard these words as an alternative recension of ἔτι δὲ σωτηρίαι—εἰσίν. It is possible that they are so; it is also possible that they are a gloss which has crept from the margin into the text; I incline to think, however, that they are neither, but, on the contrary, are in place where they stand: cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 23, πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, and 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 34, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον. Both these passages distinguish between the σωτηρίαι, or modes of preserving constitutions, and the αἰτίαι σωτηρίας, the means by which they are preserved. Thus in 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 34 sqq. and 1314 a 29 sqq. two broad modes of preserving tyrannies are described, distinct from the means which each mode employs for the purpose. So again in 8 (6). 5. 1319 b

37 sqq. the σωτηρίαι are mentioned side by side with τὰ σώζοντα. We often trace in the Politics a distinction between the τρόπος and the δι' οὗ, e. g. in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες κ.τ.λ.: 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται: 3. 18. 1288 a 39, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν.

25—1302 a 15. The contents of this part of c. 1 may be thus summarized. The origin of στάσις is to be found in the fact that men seek what is equal and that many constitutions do not give what is equal, inasmuch as they treat as equals men who are not really equal, or as unequals men who are not really unequal. Hence στάσις arises, which sometimes seeks to substitute one constitution for another, and sometimes does not. What it always seeks to do is to obtain that which is equal. But the equal is of two kinds—the arithmetically equal and the equal according to desert. Hence two main constitutions come into existence, democracy and oligarchy, the one based on the one sort of equality and the other on the other. Democracy is safer than oligarchy, but they both rest on one sort of equality only, and both are consequently unsafe. Constitutions should combine both sorts of equality. Here Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Laws 757 A–E.

Aristotle has promised in 1301 a 20 sq. to inquire into the causes of changes of constitution (ἐκ τίνων μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων), but we find him inquiring in the passage before us how στάσις originates, and hence he is led in c. 2. 1302 a 16 sqq. to enlarge the subject of his inquiry, and to ask what are the causes of στάσις as well as of changes of constitution. Now στάσις does not always aim at a change of constitution (1301 b 6–26), nor are changes of constitution always preceded or accompanied by στάσις (c. 3. 1303 a 13 sqq.), so that Aristotle's addition of an inquiry into the cause of στάσις to an inquiry into the causes of constitutional change somewhat complicates his investigation. Still it enables him to insist that the constitution should realize that which is equal and should realize it in both its forms, and this he is no doubt glad to have an opportunity of doing. It should be noticed, however, that constitutional change may occur not only without being preceded or accompanied by στάσις, but also without the existence in anybody's mind of a sense of injustice. In oligarchies based on a property-qualification and polities, for instance, it may occur through accident, if owing to any cause there should be a rise or a fall in the value of property (c. 6. 1306 b 6 sqq.: c. 8. 1308 a 35 sqq.).

25. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν κ.τ.λ., 'and we must first assume the starting-point that the reason why many different constitutions have come into being is that,' etc. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 14, ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων πρῶτον λαβεῖν περὶ σπέρματος τί ἐστιν. For ὑπολαβεῖν ('sumere ac statuere aliquid pro vero,' Bon. Ind. 799 b 26), cp. Anal. Post. 1. 16. 79 b 26 sqq., where ἁπλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν is opposed to διὰ συλλογισμοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ὑπόληψιν. The first step taken is the assumption of the starting-point that the existence of numerous constitutions is due to an error as to what is just and proportionally equal, but what is the next? Perhaps to point out (1301 a 37 sqq.) that στάσις arises when constitutions are found by certain classes (the rich and the freeborn) not to give them the position which they think their due.

26. πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον. Spengel, Bekk.², and Sus. read εἶναι in place of καί (cp. 1301 b 35 sq.), but Bonitz (Ind. 512 a 33) brackets καί, coupling the passage before us with 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 3, ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτριον ἄριστον. I doubt whether any change is called for in the text: καί is probably here, as often elsewhere, explanatory ('the just in the sense of that which is proportionally equal': see note on 1318 a 33). For ὁμολογεῖν with an acc. (meaning 'to agree about') cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 18, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, and Plato, Rep. 597 E, τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν. For τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 32, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἴδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας κ.τ.λ., 7. 3. 1238 b 19 sqq., and 7. 10. 1242 b 12 sqq. In a just award of advantages to persons proportionally, not arithmetically, equal the advantages which fall to each are proportionally, not arithmetically, equal, i. e. they are proportioned to the comparative ἀξία of the persons (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a 16 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 24 sqq.). Hence in 1301 b 29 sqq. and c. 7. 1307 a 26 we have τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον in the same sense as τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον here. But τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον is τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον (1301 b 35 sq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 9. 1158 b 30, ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρώτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως): therefore τὸ δίκαιον is identified in the passage before us with τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον.

28. ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, in 3. 9. 1280 a 7 sqq. and 3. 12. 1282 b 14 sqq.

31. ὀλιγαρχία δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 12. 1316 b 1 sqq.

34. πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσι μετέχειν, and so demand a democracy.

πάντων τῶν ἴσων. Cp. Diod. 15. 29. 6, προσελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις πᾶσιν: Plut. Alex. c. 13, τοῖς καταφυγοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἁπάντων μετενδίδοσαν τῶν φιλανθρώπων: Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 321, καὶ γᾶς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησιν καὶ τἆλλα τίμια καὶ φιλάνθρωπα πάντα ὅσα κ.τ.λ. Various changes in the text have been proposed (see Sus.[2 a]), but, as it seems to me, without necessity.

35. πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, and so demand an oligarchy.

τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον, 'for [they seek the unequal and] the more is unequal.'

36. πᾶσαι, i. e. both democracy and oligarchy. See note on 1280 a 9.

ἡμαρτημέναι δ' ἁπλῶς εἰσίν, 'but from an absolute point of view they are erroneous.' They are κατὰ τὶ ὀρθαί, but ἡμαρτημέναι ἁπλῶς. Compare (with Lutoslawski, Erhaltung und Untergang der Staatsverfassungen, p. 91) Plato, Rep. 543 D, ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας ἔλεγες, εἰ αὕτη ὀρθή. Cp. also 3. 6. 1279 a 19 sq. and 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 9.

37. διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν. Does this mean 'because democracy and oligarchy are ἡμαρτημέναι ἁπλῶς, based on erroneous views of what is just,' or 'because the supporters of democracy and oligarchy take erroneous views of what is just'? I incline to the former interpretation. Cp. Plato, Laws 757 A, διὰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα (the giving of too much power to the few and of an equal share to the good and the bad) στάσεων αἱ πολιτεῖαι πληροῦνται.

39. στασιάζουσιν. What is the exact meaning of στάσις and στασιάζειν? Τὸ στασιάζειν occurs when a number of the citizens of a State form themselves into a faction for the attainment of some political end by legal and illegal means. A party is assumed to pursue its end by legal means only, whereas a στάσις is prepared to carry its point by illegal means, if necessary. Στάσις may have as its aim either an entire change of constitution or something short of that (1301 b 6–26). The existence of στάσις implies the absence of ὁμόνοια (Plato, Rep. 352 A); it implies hostility between those who ought to be friendly to each other (Rep. 470 B), but τὸ στασιάζειν is distinguished from τὸ ἐπιτίθεσθαι in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 25, and στάσις from μάχαι in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 27 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 3.

1303 b 1 sq.) and Plato, Rep. 560 A, and from *πόλεμος* in Polit. 271 E etc., though in Laws 629 D *στάσις* is said to be *πάντων πολέμων χαλεπώτατος*.

After *στασιάζουσιν* I propose to insert c. 3. 1303 b 3, *στασιάζουσι δὲ—7, ὄντες*: see critical note on 1301 a 39 and explanatory notes on 1303 b 3–5.

πάντων δὲ δικαιότατα κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 24 sqq.

2. *οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἴσων αὐτούς*. Cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 9, *ἀξιούμενοι* 1301 b.
τῶν ἴσων, and Plut. Pelop. c. 25, *τῶν ἴσων οὐκ ἠξιοῦτο*, and for the fact Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 34 sqq.

3. *εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle uses the word *δοκοῦσιν* here, but in 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 21 sq. (where see note) he adopts this view as his own. In the passage before us he hints that true *εὐγένεια* is something different (cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 39 sqq. and the fragment of Menander quoted in the note on 1255 a 34, where true nobility is identified with virtue). Whatever claim to rule wealth and virtue may confer on their possessors, mere descent from the wealthy and virtuous confers none.

4. *ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν αὗται καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεών εἰσιν, ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν*, 'these then are the sources, speaking broadly, and the springs of civil discord, from which civil discord takes its rise.' *Μὲν οὖν* may possibly be taken up by *ἐπεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν*, c. 2. 1302 a 16, but it is not certain whether (owing to the length of the disquisition which follows) it is taken up by anything. *Αὗται*, i. e. a sense on the part of a person or persons that they have not the position under the constitution which they regard as their due. Thurot would place *ὡς εἰπεῖν* before *πηγαί* and Sus. after it, because, while *ἀρχαί* 'est une expression ordinaire, qui n'a pas besoin d'être adoucie et excusée,' *πηγαί* 'est une expression figurée,' but *ὡς εἰπεῖν* is often used where no 'expression figurée' has gone before, to restrict and qualify an absolute statement (e. g. in 3. 11. 1282 a 5, 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 28 sq., and 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 4 sq.): see Bon. Ind. 872 a 34 sqq. and Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 631, who says '*ὡς εἰπεῖν* proprie est modeste loquentis et rem infinita ratione vel universe significantis.' So here Aristotle uses it to express the fact that it is only in a broad way that inequality under the constitution can be said to be the source of *στάσις*, for a more detailed investigation (c. 2. 1302 a 16 sqq.) reveals to him that a sense of unequal treatment under the constitution is not the only source of *στάσις* and constitutional change. The phrase *πηγαὶ τῶν*

στάσεων comes to Aristotle from Plato, Laws 690 D, νῦν γὰρ δὴ στάσεων πηγήν τινα ἀνευρήκαμεν ἡμεῖς.

6. διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται διχῶς, 'hence the changes also [as well as the στάσεις that lead to them] come into being in two ways' (i.e. they arise either from στάσις which seeks a complete change of constitution or from στάσις which does not). As the aim in στάσις is broadly the removal of inequality, and inequality may be removed with or without a change of constitution, the changes which result may be either changes in the constitution or changes stopping short of that. The long parenthetical passage, 1301 b 6–26, breaks the continuity of the argument and looks at first sight like a marginal note which has found its way into the text, but this it can hardly be, for it is with reference to the case of Lysander mentioned in 19 sqq. that the inequality of a perpetual kingship, where all are equal, is dwelt upon in 27 sq.

ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, sc. στασιάζουσιν.

10. ταύτας ἐξ ἐκείνων, i.e. oligarchy and democracy in place of polity and aristocracy.

ὁτὲ δ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ. Of this kind of change (i.e. change which does not seek the substitution of one constitution for another), three kinds are mentioned; its promoters may seek either (1) to leave the constitution as it is, but to take the place of the existing holders of supreme power, or (2) to make the constitution more moderate or more pronounced, or (3) to alter a part of it. Those whose aims fall under the second or third head, no less than those who do not desire any change in the constitution, are marked off from those who seek to replace the existing constitution by another, for they seek only to modify it. I cannot follow Susemihl, therefore, in transposing 10, ὁτὲ δὲ . . . 13, μοναρχίαν, to after πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ, 26. Aristotle makes no mention here of a fourth type of revolution, of which we read in 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 17 sqq. The leaders in this sought the total overthrow of the existing constitution and its replacement by another, but they did not, when successful, proceed at once to overthrow it, resting content for a time with acquiring supreme power for themselves and modifying the customs and training of the State.

13. ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν. Cp. c. 12. 1316 a 29, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὥσπερ ἡ Σικυώνος ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος εἰς τὴν Κλεισθένους.

ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, sc. στασιάζουσιν.

14. οἷον ἡ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὖσαν κ.τ.λ. *Μεταβάλλουσιν* should probably be supplied.

15. ἡ δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον δημοκρατεῖσθαι, like Cleisthenes at Athens (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 21 sq.).

16. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν, sc. *στασιάζουσιν*.

17. ἔτι κ.τ.λ. Here again we must supply *στασιάζουσιν*.

18. μέρος τι τῆς πολιτείας. See note on 1297 b 37 and vol. i. p. 514, note.

ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι, as for instance at Epidamnus a Boulê. Kingship is here treated as an *ἀρχή*, as in c. 10. 1313 a 5, 8.

19. ἢ ἀνελεῖν. So, in addition to Lysander and Pausanias, Empedocles at Agrigentum *τὸ τῶν χιλίων ἄθροισμα κατέλυσε συνεστὸς ἐπὶ ἔτη τρία* (Diog. Laert. 8. 66). See also Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 10 (quoted on 1306 a 12) as to Ephialtes at Athens and Phormion at Elis. As to Lysander see note on 1271 a 21. In strictness his plan seems to have been to open the kingship to the best of the Spartans irrespectively of descent, but this change was equivalent to putting an end to the kingship of the Heracleidae (cp. Diod. 14. 13, *διόπερ ἐπὶ τούτοις πεφρονηματισμένος διενοεῖτο καταλῦσαι τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν βασιλείαν καὶ κοινὴν ἐκ πάντων Σπαρτιατῶν ποιῆσαι τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν βασιλέων*), and perhaps Aristotle here means no more than this by his phrase *καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν*, as to which cp. Xen. Ages. 1. 4. As to the question to what Pausanias Aristotle here refers, see notes on 1333 b 34 and 1307 a 3. Pausanias *ὁ βασιλεύς* is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 32 sqq. to have tried to make himself master of his own State, and we know that Pausanias the victor of Plataea did so (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 2 sqq.). Is it likely that two men of the name of Pausanias plotted at Sparta at different times with the same end in view?

21. καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Changes of a part of a constitution would mostly occur where the partisans of the existing constitution were strong and offered a vigorous resistance to proposals of change. In a State torn by faction like Epidamnus this would be likely to be the case.

22. ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρχων βουλὴν ἐποίησαν. For *ἐποίησαν* cp. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 8, *τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας*, and see note on 1274 b 7. This was of course a change in a democratic direction, for a Boulê was a democratic institution (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 32). The context implies that the *φύλαρχοι* were an element of inequality in the State, and that their exalted position

gave rise to a feeling in the minds of the citizens generally that they were unjustly dealt with. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 236) conceives them to have been the heads of the three Dorian tribes and to have acted as a council to the single magistrate who managed the affairs of the State (1301 b 25). This is possible, but we know too little about Epidamnus to be sure of it. That the three Dorian tribes existed at Epidamnus is likely enough, for we find traces of one of them at all events in the mother-State, Corcyra (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 236. 2). But it is not certain that they existed there, nor that, if they did, they were the only tribes, for at Calymna we find the three Dorian tribes co-existing with others (Gilbert, 2. 213). As we know neither how many tribes there were at Epidamnus nor whether each tribe had one or more φύλαρχοι at its head, we cannot tell how many in number the φύλαρχοι were, but they were no doubt less numerous than the Boulê which took their place. As to Epidamnus see notes on 1290 b 9 and 1304 a 13.

28. εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν κ.τ.λ., 'but it is still obligatory on the magistrates [alone] among the members of the privileged class to proceed to the Heliaea when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the vote, [which is an oligarchical arrangement].' Göttling was apparently the first to interpret this passage aright. He says (p. 391), 'sic intelligendus est locus aristotelicus: ex omnibus iis qui ad rempublicam accedere possunt non nisi magistratibus imperatur interesse comitiis cum creatur aliquis magistratus; ceteris civibus interesse licet quidem, at non imperatum est.' Susemihl and Welldon take the passage substantially in the same way. Stahr, on the other hand, in his translation of 1860, takes τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι not as a partitive genitive after τὰς ἀρχάς, but as in the genitive after τὴν ἡλιαίαν ('the Heliaea of the members of the privileged class'), and this is a possible view, though I prefer the other. To enforce the attendance of the magistrates exclusively at elections by the Heliaea was 'an oligarchical measure, because when one set of men were forced to be present and the rest were not, the probability was that those only would be present whose attendance was enforced, and that they would thus acquire a decisive voice in the election. The magistrates would, in fact, be almost placed in a position to name their successors in office. Plato in a similar spirit arranges in Laws 755 C and 756 A that the nomophylakes shall propose the generals and hipparchs to the assembly, though he allows any one to propose alternative names.

Some Greek States enforced the attendance of the rich exclusively at meetings of the assembly (6 (4). 13. 1297 a 17 sqq.); Epidamnus enforced the attendance of the magistrates exclusively at elections by the Heliaea. Compare Baunack, Die delphischen Inschriften, No. 2561. D 25 (in Collitz, Sammlung der gr. Dialekt-Inschriften), *α[ἰ δ' ἀ]λίαν ποιόντων ἄρχω[ν ἀ]πείη, ἀποτεισάτω ὀδελόν*, where the assembly of the members of the Delphic phratry of the Labyadae is referred to. Aristotle mentions the continued existence of this oligarchical feature of the constitution of Epidamnus, and of the other to which he refers in 25 sq., in order to show that democratic innovation there was confined to one point and that the constitution *μετέβαλε κατὰ μόριον*. The *ἡλιαία* (i.e. the assembly) at Epidamnus was probably called there *ἁλιαία* or *ἁλία* (see Liddell and Scott on these words), but Aristotle uses the Attic form. For *εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν βαδίζειν* cp. Plut. Dion, c. 53, *καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς συνέδριον παρακαλούμενος οὐκ ἐβούλετο βαδίζειν*.

25. *ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ εἷς ἦν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ*. That the single supreme magistrate was an oligarchical feature, we see from 3. 10. 1281 a 32 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22 sq., though it is implied in 3. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. that making one man *κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως*, as at Epidamnus and Opus, was not an arrangement peculiar to oligarchies. The use of the word *διοίκησις* suggests that this great officer did not add military functions to his civil ones (see note on 1287 a 6). In c. 4. 1304 a 16 it is implied that a plurality of magistrates existed at Epidamnus, at any rate at one time. A difficulty arises in connexion with *ἦν*, 26, for this magistracy is referred to in 3. 16. 1287 a 7 as actually existent, but too much need not be made of this discrepancy, for the office may have ceased to exist when the passage before us was written. Π^1 omit *ἦν*, but little weight attaches to these MSS. when they omit small words.

26. *πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον ἡ στάσις· οὐ μὴν (εἰ) τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον (ἀίδιος γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐν ἴσοις)*. I add *εἰ* before *τοῖς ἀνίσοις*, and translate, 'for everywhere' (i.e. both where those who stir civil discord seek to overthrow the constitution and where they stop short of this) 'civil discord arises on account of inequality, not however if unequals receive in proportion to the inequality subsisting between them (for a perpetual kingship [such as that which Lysander sought to abolish] is unequal [only] if it exists among equals).' In other words, inequality of advantage

does not give rise to civil discord if those to whom it falls deserve the superiority of advantage which they enjoy. Compare 3. 9. 1280 a 12, καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ γάρ ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσι ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις, 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 3, οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. Aristotle has in his memory in the passage before us Plato, Laws 757 A, τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου· διὰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα στάσεων αἱ πολιτεῖαι πληροῦνται. Schneider (following Sepulveda, who has 'cum non' in his translation for οὐ μήν, and Ramus, who has 'nisi') reads οὔ μή in place of οὐ μήν, and is followed by Coray and Sus., but οὐ μήν can be retained if we add εἰ before τοῖς ἀνίσοις. Welldon retains the reading of the MSS. and takes ἀνάλογον with τοῖς ἀνίσοις, translating 'not that inequality [in this sense] exists among people who are only proportionately unequal,' but I cannot follow him in this. The thought that inequality is the source of στάσις is derived from Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 14, φωνή τις αὐτοῦ περιφερομένη πρότερον εἰπόντος ὡς τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ: compare the proverb ἰσότης φιλότης in Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 8 and elsewhere, and Plato, Rep. 547 A, Laws 757 A).

29. ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἴσον. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Laws 757 A sqq., and Isocr. Areop. § 21 sq. See Stallbaum on Laws 757 B.

30. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον. Cp. Plato, Laws 757 B, τὴν μέτρῳ ἴσην καὶ σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ (ἰσότητα).

31. κατ' ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ. That which is equal according to desert is the proportionally equal, because in any just distribution between *A* and *B* the share of *A* will be to the share of *B* as the desert of *A* is to the desert of *B*. See note on 1301 a 26.

32. οἷον ὑπερέχει κ.τ.λ. This is added not to prove that the equal according to desert is the proportionally equal, for that it does not do, but to illustrate by an example the difference between the proportionally equal and the arithmetically equal. The excess of four over two is proportionally equal to the excess of two over one, but not arithmetically equal to it, for what is arithmetically equal to the excess of two over one is the excess of three over two, not that of four over two. The proportion in which two stands to four is the same as that in which one stands to two, for two is the half of four and one is the half of two.

35. ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and though men agree that the absolutely just is that which is in accordance with desert, they differ' etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25, *τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν.* Yet in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 we read *καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν* (cp. 1318 a 3 sqq.). See note on 1288 a 22. For the contrast of *ὁμολογεῖν* and *διαφέρεσθαι* cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 16 sq.

36. *καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον*, in 1301 a 26 sqq.

39. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα κ.τ.λ., 'hence two constitutions especially come into being, democracy and oligarchy, for [only constitutions championed by a large number of supporters are likely to come into being, and] while high birth and virtue are found in few, the attributes on which democracy and oligarchy are based are found in a larger number.' These attributes are wealth and poverty. Contrast the reasons given for the prevalence of democracy and oligarchy in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 22 sqq. For *καὶ μάλιστα* cp. Plato, Phaedo 61 D and Laws 773 C, quoted by Riddell in his Digest of Platonic Idioms, § 133 (Plato, Apol. p. 169 sq.).

40. *εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐν ὀλίγοις.* Cp. Theogn. 149 sq.

2. *εὔποροι δὲ πολλαχοῦ.* We expect *εὔποροι δὲ καὶ ἄποροι πολλαχοῦ*, 1302 a. but Aristotle does not add *καὶ ἄποροι*, because the fact is obvious.

τὸ δὲ ἁπλῶς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 757 E, *οὕτω δὴ χρηστέον ἀναγκαίως μὲν τοῖν ἰσοτήτοιν ἀμφοῖν, ὡς δ' ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐπ' ὀλιγίστοις τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, τῇ τῆς τύχης δεομένῃ.* We need not perhaps supply *τὴν πολιτείαν* with *τετάχθαι*: cp. c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq. It follows that, if *στάσις* is to be avoided, the constitution must not only secure the citizens 'that which is equal,' but must combine the two kinds of equality. It has hitherto been implied that democracy no less than oligarchy rests on a misconception of *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον* (cp. 1301 a 25 sqq., b 35 sqq.), but now Aristotle implies that it rests on arithmetical equality, not on equality according to desert. Perhaps he regards its contention that those who are equal in one thing are wholly equal as tantamount to a demand for arithmetical equality.

4. *οὐδεμία γὰρ μόνιμος ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν*, 'for of constitutions of the sort we have mentioned' (i. e. constitutions based on one of the two kinds of equality) 'none is durable.' For the use

of ἐκ here, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 414. 5 b, Anm. 4 (ed. Gerth, § 414. 5 b, Anm. 5). Compare also its use in 3. 3. 1276 a 16, *τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος (πράξεις)*, where, as in the passage before us, the simple genitive would have sufficed.

5. **τούτου δ' αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.** Cp. c. 4. 1303 b 28 sqq., and (with Camerarius, Interp. p. 177 sq.) Soph. Fragm. 747,

ἔργου δὲ παντὸς ἥν τις ἄρχηται καλῶς,
καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκὸς ἐσθ' οὕτως ἔχειν

(lines which are perhaps in Isocrates' memory in De Pace §§ 101, 105: cp., with Vict., Cic. Epist. ad Att. 10. 18. 2, ut male posuimus initia, sic cetera sequentur): also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 1152 Bothe (1261 Dindorf),

ὅταν δὲ κρηπὶς μὴ καταβληθῇ γένους
ὀρθῶς, ἀνάγκη δυστυχεῖν τοὺς ἐκγόνους,

and Demosth. Olynth. 2. 10. Camerarius adds Eurip. Fragm. 32,

κακῆς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γίνεται τέλος κακόν,

and a line of Gregory of Nazianzus,

ἀρχῆς καλῆς κάλλιστον εἶναι καὶ τέλος.

In *τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένον* (cp. Isocr. De Pace § 101, *τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων*) the basing of the constitution exclusively on one kind of equality is referred to.

8. **ὅμως δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'but nevertheless,' i. e. though both democracy and oligarchy are unsafe, as resting on one kind of equality only. It appears from c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq. that oligarchy is exposed to a third sort of *στάσις* besides the two mentioned here, when the privileged class does not include all the rich—to *στάσις* arising between the privileged and the excluded rich. The fact mentioned in 12 sqq. that *στάσις* did not arise to any considerable extent within the demos is remarkable, for the interests of the peasants must often in ancient Greece, as in modern times, have been by no means the same as those of the artisans and labourers of the city (cp. Aristoph. Eccl. 431 sqq.). At Athens the trireme-oarsmen gained by war (see note on 1291 b 18) and the peasant-proprietors by peace. Did not *στάσις* arise within the demos when one part of it was of pure extraction and the other alien or semi-alien, or when the demos was composed of persons differing in race? **Στάσις** will also have arisen in democracies between rival demagogues and their followers. The fact that democracy is safer than oligarchy is differently accounted for in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 13 sqq.

11. καὶ ἔτι, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 21 (Bon. Ind. s. v. ἔτι).

12. τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, 'the oligarchs,' as in c. 6. 1305 a 39 sq.

13. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Yet we are told in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq. that the most moderate form of oligarchy is *σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ*. Are we to infer from the passage before us that the constitution in which the midway class is supreme is based on both kinds of equality?

14. ἐγγυτέρω. For *ἐγγυτέρω εἶναι* cp. Plato, Apol. Socr. 30 A, *μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὲ γένει*, and Rep. 330 E, *ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ*.

15. τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν, 'of the constitutions of the kind we have mentioned.' What constitutions are referred to? Sepulveda (p. 145 b) takes Aristotle to refer to the 'depravatae respublicae, seu quae ab optimo statu reipublicae deflexerunt,' Sus.[2] (Note 1508 b) interprets the phrase in the same way, and it is not easy to see what else it can mean, though we might have expected it to bear the same meaning as in 5. Cp. Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 23 sqq.

17. περὶ τὰς πολιτείας may go either with *αἱ μεταβολαί* (cp. c. 7. 1307 b 24 sq.) or with *γίγνονται* (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 17 sq.). Sus. and Welldon perhaps rightly take the words with *αἱ μεταβολαί*. C. 2.

καθόλου πρῶτον, 'first generally' in constitutions as a whole (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 5 sqq., 17 sq., and c. 7. 1307 b 2 sq.), afterwards in each constitution taken separately.

18. τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν. Cp. 34 sq., and see for the phrase Bon. Ind. 112 a 49 sqq.

εἰσὶ δὴ κ.τ.λ. We gather from what follows that it is not enough to cause *στάσις* and constitutional change that there should be a sense of injustice in men's minds and advantages to be won; there must also be occasions calling that sense of injustice into activity (1302 a 34 sqq.). Special stress is laid on these occasions in Aristotle's theory of constitutional change, as we have it in the Book before us, and if we study cc. 8 and 9, the chapters in which the means of preserving constitutions are described, we shall see that Aristotle's counsels are mainly directed to preventing the rise of these occasions of evil. He perhaps rates rather too highly the share of these 'occasions' in causing constitutional change.

19. ἃς διοριστέον καθ' αὑτὰς τύπῳ πρῶτον, 'which we must mark out each by itself first of all in outline.'

20. δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 523, note 1, where it has been already shown that a similar classification is employed in

the Rhetoric (1. 10. 1368 b 27): compare also Eth. Nic. 7. 4. 1146 b 15 sqq.

21. τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεων. Τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν, because there are such things as ταραχαί between members of the same family or between States (Thuc. 5. 25, καὶ εὐθὺς ἄλλη ταραχὴ καθίστατο τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα). The ταραχαί here referred to are between citizens of the same State. For the conjunction of ταραχαί and στάσεις, cp. Isocr. Philip. § 107, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν πόλεσι στάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς καὶ σφαγὰς ἐμποιοῦντες ἐκτῶντο τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην, and Diod. 15. 40. 1, μετὰ γὰρ τὴν συγχωρηθεῖσαν τοῖς δήμοις αὐτονομίαν αἱ πόλεις ἐνέπιπτον εἰς ταραχὰς μεγάλας καὶ στάσεις. Ταραχή implies strife, but not necessarily actual fighting; it is coupled with ἔρις in Demosth. De Cor. c. 18, ἀλλά τις ἦν ἄκριτος καὶ παρὰ τούτοις καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἔρις καὶ ταραχή. It is a more general word than στάσις: thus in Hdt. 4. 162 the recourse of Arcesilaus of Cyrene to στάσις is an incident of the πολλὴ ταραχὴ περὶ τῶν τιμέων.

24. περὶ ἧς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες, in c. 1. 1301 a 33 sqq. and 1301 b 35 sqq.

28. τούτων, i. e. equality and inequality.

29. ἐλάττους, 'smaller,' opposed to μείζους: cp. Alex. Κυβερνήτης, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 434),

> ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βίων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἡ τύχη
> ἡμῶν μεγάλοις προσένειμε τοὺς δ' ἐλάττοσιν.

31. περὶ ὧν δὲ στασιάζουσιν κ.τ.λ., in other words τὰ τέλη (c. 10. 1311 a 28). Thucydides had said much the same thing (3. 82. 16, πάντων δ' αἰτίων ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, which is perhaps present to Aristotle's memory in Pol. 2. 9. 1271 a 16 sqq.: cp. Thuc. 1. 76. 2, οὔτως οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα, καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν ὑπὸ τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελείας). Plato also implies in Rep. 464 D sq. that one of the causes of στάσις is χρημάτων κτῆσις. Phaleas had held (2. 7. 1266 a 38 sqq.) that στάσις arises exclusively in connexion with property, and especially, it would seem, landed property, for he meddled with nothing else (2. 7. 1267 b 9 sqq.), and hence had gain or the avoidance of loss as its object and had nothing to do with honour (2. 7. 1266 b 38 sqq.).

32. καὶ γὰρ ἀτιμίαν φεύγοντες κ.τ.λ. So at Epidamnus (c. 4. 1304 a 13 sqq.) and at Heracleia and Thebes (c. 6. 1306 a

36 sqq.). 'C. etiam Caesar dicebat se civile bellum movisse ut ignominiam a se depelleret, quod quasi concedit M. Cicero, cum Q. Ligarium defenderet' (c. 6. 18), 'refellit autem ac falsum esse docet in epistola quadam ad Atticum' (7. 11. 1) 'his verbis, Atque omnia se facere ait dignitatis causa, qui ne umbram quidem τοῦ καλοῦ vidit unquam' (Vict., who slightly alters the passage).

33. ἢ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν φίλων. Cp. c. 11. 1315 a 27 sq. The preposition is not repeated before τῶν φίλων: cp. c. 10. 1311 a 29, b 25 sq., and 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 31.

34. αἱ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 392 b 11 sqq.) appears to supply τῆς πολιτείας with τῶν κινήσεων, and he may well be right, for though Stahr and Sus. translate 'Bewegungen' ('movements'), and Polybius uses κίνησις in this sense (3. 4. 12: 3. 5. 1), I do not notice that Aristotle does so elsewhere. Vict. explains τῶν κινήσεων 'motuum animi,' but this can hardly be the meaning of the word here. It is implied in 22 sqq. that a sense of injustice is broadly the cause of the mental state which prompts to revolution, but now we study the causes of revolution more in detail, and the detailed study of them discloses that a sense of injustice is not always present in the minds of those who aim at constitutional change. For men may be stirred to aim at constitutional change by witnessing the *deserved* enjoyment by others of a superior degree of profit or honour, or, in other words, under circumstances which leave no room for a sense of injustice in their minds. Nor do the circumstances under which constitutional change is said to occur in c. 3. 1303 a 13–25 seem to be connected with a sense of injustice. With the account here given of the causes of στάσις and constitutional change compare the view of Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 480, Fragm. 64 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 249: cp. Cic. Pro Rosc. Amerin. 27. 75), who holds that διχοστασία arises διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ τρυφήν, which cause φθόνος ὕβρις and μῖσος, so that the best means the lawgiver has of preventing διχοστασία is to compel the citizens to lead a temperate and frugal life. The Cynic Crates seems to have taken a similar view (Plut. De tuenda sanitate praecepta, c. 7: see Wyttenbach's note on 125 E), but Aristotle agrees with Ephorus only in part; he holds, indeed, that φθόνος and ὕβρις are potent causes of στάσις, but he does not think that the prevention of luxurious living will do much to prevent it, nor would he say that φθόνος ὕβρις and μῖσος are its only causes: it may arise, for instance, when none of these things are present, but only

ὑπεροχή or αὔξησις παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. It should be noticed that of the seven causes enumerated by Aristotle the first four affect those who are depressed in the political scale and the three others those who are exalted. Revolution as often proceeds from those who 'wax fat' as from those who are in the opposite case. The order in which the causes are enumerated here (ὕβρις, φόβος, ὑπεροχή, καταφρόνησις κ.τ.λ.) agrees with the order in which the causes of attacks on monarchies are enumerated in c. 10. 1311 a 31–1312 a 39 (ὕβρις, φόβος, καταφρόνησις, φιλοτιμία). The list of causes of στάσις and constitutional change here given seems incomplete. Other causes besides the seven or eleven here mentioned appear to disclose themselves when Aristotle proceeds in cc. 5–7 to deal with each constitution separately. The overthrow of oligarchies, for instance, by the demagogy of some of the oligarchs (c. 6. 1305 b 22 sqq.) or by spendthrift and ruined oligarchs (c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq.) cannot easily be brought under any of the eleven heads.

37. ἔστι δ' ὡς πλείους, i. e. if we count in the four additional causes mentioned in 1302 b 3 sqq. 'Nam septem sunt quae magis per se iram et seditionem movent, alia vero, ut negligentia . . ., magis ex accidenti' (Sepulveda).

ὧν δύο μέν κ.τ.λ. Μέν is here displaced, as occasionally elsewhere (see notes on 1259 b 15 and 1268 b 12); it qualifies ταὐτά. Supply ταὐτά with ὡσαύτως: see note on 1257 b 35.

38. διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 38 sqq. and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30 sq.

40. πρότερον, in 31 sqq.

1302 b. **2.** ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν, sc. παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

3. ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον κ.τ.λ. Here again we must supply παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Hence it would seem that the four causes now named by Aristotle *may* produce στάσις, though we learn in 1303 a 13 sqq. that they do not always do so. I do not agree with Vict., therefore, when he explains ἄλλον τρόπον 'alio pacto, id est sine dissensionibus et armis' (he is followed in this by Giph., p. 539): Aristotle's meaning seems rather to be that we have now to do with causes of a more remote kind and acting less directly, due to the action or default of the authorities of the State (see Sepulveda, quoted above on 1302 a 37).

5. δι' ἀνομοιότητα. This cause is dealt with in 1303 a 25 sqq. Compare Oecon. 1. 4. 1344 a 18, αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν ἠθῶν ἥκιστα φιλικόν. Democritus had long before said that his atoms were in

a state of *στάσις* because of their unlikeness (Aristot. Fragm. 202. 1514 b 18, *στασιάζειν δὲ καὶ φέρεσθαι ἐν τῷ κενῷ διά τε τὴν ἀνομοιότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς εἰρημένας διαφοράς*), and Plato (Rep. 547 A), speaking of *ἀνομοιότης καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος*, says, *ἃ γενόμενα, οὗ ἂν ἐγγένηται, ἀεὶ τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν.*

6. πῶς αἴτια, sc. *στάσεως*, cp. 11. C. 3.

ὑβριζόντων τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq. The subject of *στασιάζουσι* is 'the citizens.' Aristotle probably has before him Theogn. 43–52. *Ὕβρις* and *πλεονεξία* are often mentioned in conjunction (c. 7. 1307 a 20: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 94: Polyb. 1. 81. 10). *Ἀδικία* is said to be the offspring of *ὕβρις* in Plato, Laws 691 C (cp. 713 C, *ὕβρεώς τε καὶ ἀδικίας*, and 775 D). It was by the *ὕβρις* and *πλεονεξία* of the leading men of Agrigentum that Empedocles was roused to action (Plut. Adv. Colot. c. 32, *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τοὺς τε πρώτους τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρίζοντας καὶ διαφορουῦντας τὰ κοινὰ ἐξελέγξας κ.τ.λ.*: Diog. Laert. 8. 64). Cp. also Solon, Fragm. 4. 37,

εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιὰς ὑπερήφανά τ' ἔργα
πραΰνει,

and *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 5 *sub fin.*, *καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐλεγείας δεδοικέναι φησὶν* (*ὁ Σόλων*)

τήν τε φ[ιλαργυρ]ίαν τήν θ' ὑπερηφανίαν,

ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἔχθρας ἐνεστώ[σ]ης. As to *τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς*, see note on 1303 b 22.

9. ἡ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν. Depredations by magistrates on public property were probably more frequent than on private—we hear of them at Apollonia on the Euxine in c. 6. 1306 a 7, and Aristotle makes special provision against them in c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq.—but depredations by magistrates in oligarchies on the property of the many seem to be referred to in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 19 sq.

11. καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλους ὁρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν. Aristotle remembers the case of Lysander (see c. 7. 1306 b 31 sqq.). Compare also the conspiracy of wealthy Athenians just before the battle of Plataea (Plut. Aristid. c. 13, *ἄνδρες ἐξ οἴκων ἐπιφανῶν καὶ χρημάτων μεγάλων πένητες ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου γεγονότες καὶ πᾶσαν ἅμα τῷ πλούτῳ τὴν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύναμιν αὐτῶν καὶ δόξαν οἰχομένην ὁρῶντες, ἑτέρων τιμωμένων καὶ ἀρχόντων, . . . συνωμόσαντο καταλύσειν τὸν δῆμον*).

12. ταῦτα δὲ κ.τ.λ. *Ταῦτα*, 'this honouring and dishonouring.' There is perhaps here a reminiscence of Hippias of Elis, Fragm. 13

(Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 62), *Ἱππίας λέγει δύο εἶναι φθόνους, τὸν μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν τις τοῖς κακοῖς φθονῇ τιμωμένοις, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον, ὅταν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.* For *κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν*, not *καθ' ἀξίαν*, cp. 8 (6). 6. 1321 a 2 sq.

15. **δι' ὑπεροχὴν δέ κ.τ.λ.**, sc. *στασιάζουσιν*. We read of the *ὑπεροχή* of Themistocles at Athens in Diod. 11. 54. 5 (cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 205, *ἐκεῖνοι Θεμιστοκλέα λαβόντες μεῖζον αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦντα φρονεῖν ἐξήλασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ μηδισμὸν κατέγνωσαν*); we read also of Theron before he became tyrant of Agrigentum in Diod. 10. 27. 3, *ὅτι Θήρων ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος φιλανθρωπίᾳ πολὺ προεῖχεν οὐ μόνον τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τῶν Σικελιωτῶν.* Compare Eurip. Phoeniss. 650 Bothe (703 Dindorf),

ἥκουσα μεῖζον αὐτὸν ἢ Θήβας φρονεῖν,
κήδει τ' Ἀδράστου καὶ στρατῷ πεποιθότα,

Justin, 21. 4. 1, opes suas, quibus vires reipublicae superabat, and Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 236, *οὐ μέμνησθ' ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐπέθετο πρότερον δήμου καταλύσει, πρὶν ἂν μεῖζον τῶν δικαστηρίων ἰσχύσῃ*; *Μείζων ἡ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος*, 'great out of proportion to the State and to the power of its supreme authority.' It appears, however, from c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq. that not only overpowerful men but also men of ruined fortunes sought to make themselves tyrants.

17. **μοναρχία ἢ δυναστεία.** The former, if this superiority of power is possessed by one man; the latter, if by more than one. Cp. c. 6. 1306 a 22 sqq. and Plato, Gorg. 492 B, *ἀρχήν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν.* For *μοναρχία*, which is here apparently=*τυραννίς*, cp. c. 10. 1313 a 4.

18. **διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ κ.τ.λ.** See note on 1284 a 17. The ostracism seems to have been not unknown to the laws even of the oligarchy of Berne. 'If the influence of a citizen had increased so much, owing to benefits conferred by him on the people, that in the opinion of the Council or a majority of the Council it threatened to be injurious to the State, he was to absent himself from the city for five years and to pay a fine of ten pounds. An ostracism, in fact, in *optima forma*' (Geiser, Gesch. der bernischen Verfassung von 1191–1471, p. 31).

19. **καίτοι βέλτιον κ.τ.λ.** Compare the saying of Pittacus quoted in the note on 1308 a 33. For *τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες* (not *οἱ τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες*) see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 462. 1.

21. **οἵ τε ἠδικηκότες, δεδιότες μὴ δῶσι δίκην.** Cp. Cic. pro Sest. 46. 99, etenim in tanto civium numero magna multitudo est eorum qui

aut propter metum poenae peccatorum suorum conscii novos motus conversionesque reipublicae quaerant, aut etc. To this category belong the five wealthy men brought to trial at Corcyra (Thuc. 3. 70. 5 sqq.), Hanno at Carthage in his alleged second attempt to make himself tyrant (Justin, 21. 4. 6), and the friends of Catiline at Rome (Sallust, De Coniur. Catil. c. 14, referred to by Giph.). Hence too the support given to the designs of Peisistratus by persons who claimed to be citizens of Athens without being of pure Athenian extraction ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 13. l. 22 sqq.), and, if we could trust 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 25. l. 11 sqq., the intrigue of Themistocles against the Council of the Areopagus.

22. καὶ οἱ μέλλοντες δδικεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ. For an instance of this at Argos see Diod. 15. 58. 1. We see from c. 5. 1305 a 5 sqq. that a period during which the rich were plied with calumnious accusations often preceded that in which actual wrong was done to them, and no doubt they frequently took up arms during the period in which there was only a menace of future wrong. 'Eadem causa et Caesarem concitavit et impulit, metuentem ne dimisso exercitu privatus, Romam et domum reversus, a potentissimis inimicis opprimeretur' (Giph.). But Caesar had more genuine reasons than this for the course which he took.

23. ἐν Ῥόδῳ. Cp. 32 sq. and c. 5. 1304 b 27 sqq. The three passages probably refer to the same combination of the notables against the demos, though it would seem from 1304 b 27 sqq. that the notables were driven to combine not by the dread of wrong, but by actual experience of wrong, the action of the demagogues being such as to expose them to the lawsuits briefly referred to in the passage before us, and it would also seem from 1302 b 32 sq. that they were encouraged to combine by a feeling of contempt for the disorderliness of the democracy. Susemihl is probably right in taking the revolution of B.C. 390 to be referred to, though Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 427), followed by Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 175), believes Aristotle to refer to the substitution of an oligarchy for a democracy in B.C. 357 (Demosth. De Rhod. Libert. cc. 14, 19), when Rhodes revolted from Athens at the commencement of the Social War. We find, in fact, that Diodorus in describing the revolution of B.C. 390 uses the same expression as Aristotle does in 33, where he speaks of ἡ ἐπανάστασις (Diod. 14. 97, οἱ λακωνίζοντες τῶν Ῥοδίων ἐπαναστάντες τῷ δήμῳ τοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων φρονοῦντας ἐξέβαλον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως). It is true that, as Susemihl points out (Sus.[2],

Note 1511), Xenophon (Hell. 4. 8. 20–24) represents this revolution as effected not by the Laconizing party at Rhodes, as does Diodorus, but by an intervention of the Spartan Teleutias at the head of a fleet after the failure and exile of the Rhodians who were opposed to the democracy; this, however, only shows that Aristotle's version of the transaction agrees with that of the authority followed by Diodorus, and not with that of Xenophon.

25. καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ ἐπιτίθενται. The two words are conjoined in 2. 7. 1267 a 41 also. Τὸ *στασιάζειν* does not necessarily involve τὸ *ἐπιτίθεσθαι* (see note on 1301 a 39).

26. ἔν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ μὴ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας. We might infer from 6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq., where we are told that even in the first and most moderate form of oligarchy the poor, though more numerous than the rich, do not share in the offices, that in all forms of oligarchy those who do not share in the constitution are more numerous than those who do, but it is implied in 3. 8. 1280 a 1 sqq. that there were oligarchies in which this was not the case.

28. καταφρονήσαντες, as in c. 7. 1307 b 9 (cp. c. 11. 1314 b 32, *θαυμάσωσιν*). We have *καταφρονοῦντες* in c. 10. 1312 a 10, 15 sq., and *καταφρονῶν* in 1312 a 12.

τῆς ἀταξίας. Some light is thrown on what is meant by this word by Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 59, *οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαρεῖς δι' ἀταξίαν τῆς πολιτείας ἠμέλησαν τοῦ ἀδικήματος.*

29. οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη. The wording of this passage is ambiguous, and we cannot be sure that we are right in inferring from it that the democracy the existence of which at Thebes after the battle of Oenophyta it clearly implies dated from that battle, and did not exist before it, for Aristotle may only mean that the maladministration of the democracy began then, but it is likely enough that this was the case. Nor do we learn from the passage when the democracy was overthrown, but its fall probably did not occur till after the Athenian defeat at Coroneia (Thuc. 1. 113). The course of events in Boeotia after the battle of Oenophyta is disputed and obscure. Busolt's view on the subject, whether it is correct or not, may be gathered from Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 320. 3. He places the battle of Oenophyta in B.C. 457 (ed. 2, 3. 1. 258. 1) and that of Coroneia in B.C. 447 (ibid. p. 422. 1).

30. καὶ ἡ Μεγαρέων δι' ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἡττηθέντων. Supply

δημοκρατία διεφθάρη. Cp. Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 59, "*πόθεν ἐν Μεγάροις γένος ἁμαξοκυλιστῶν;*" *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκολάστου δημοκρατίας, ἣ καὶ τὴν παλιντοκίαν ἐποίησε καὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν, ἐπορεύετο θεωρία Πελοποννησίων εἰς Δελφοὺς διὰ τῆς Μεγαρικῆς.* This *θεωρία* was maltreated by certain Megarians, and then the narrative proceeds, *οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαρεῖς δι' ἀταξίαν τῆς πολιτείας ἠμέλησαν τοῦ ἀδικήματος κ.τ.λ.* It seems likely that *ἡττηθέντων* in the passage before us refers to the victory won by the returning oligarchical exiles over the commons of Megara (see note on 1300 a 17), but this is not absolutely certain. As Richards points out, *ἡττηθέντων* may refer, as in 1303 a 4, to a victory won over the Megarians by a foreign foe.

31. καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως. It is not certain what should be supplied after *ἐν Συρακούσαις* and after *ὁ δῆμος*, but I incline to think that we should supply in the former place 'the democracy aroused contempt by disorderliness' and in the latter 'aroused contempt in a similar way.' I take *ὁ δῆμος* here to mean 'the commons,' not 'the democracy'; it was against the commons that the insurrection of the notables was directed (see Diod. 14. 97, quoted above on 23). Some supply *ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη* after *ἐν Συρακούσαις* and *διεφθάρη* after *ὁ δῆμος*, but I cannot think that this is right, for the democracy was overthrown at Syracuse *by*, and not *before*, the advent of Gelon as tyrant, and at Rhodes *by*, and not *before*, the insurrection against it. As to Syracuse, see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 126, and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 785. The demos of Syracuse had recently put an end to the oligarchy of the Gamori and expelled them from the city with the help of the serfs who tilled the soil of the State. Both demos and serfs were probably to a large extent of Sicel origin, and it is likely enough that a demos of this kind, intoxicated by its triumph, would be disorderly and undisciplined. As to Rhodes see above on 23.

34. ὥσπερ γὰρ σῶμα κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 122 b 17) compares De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 27, *τῇ μὲν γὰρ κρατοῦν* (sc. *τὸ πεττόμενον*) *τῇ δὲ οὐ κρατοῦν ποιεῖ πολύμορφον τὸ συνιστάμενον, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν πολυφαγίαν· διὰ πλῆθος γὰρ τροφῆς οὐ δυναμένης τῆς φύσεως κρατεῖν, ὥστ' ἀνάλογον αὔξειν καὶ διαμένειν ὁμοίαν τὴν μορφήν, ἀλλοῖα γίνεται τὰ μέρη, καὶ σχεδὸν ἐνίοθ' οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἐοικέναι τῷ πρότερον. παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ νόσημα τὸ καλούμενον σατυριᾶν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διὰ ῥεύματος ἢ πνεύματος ἀπέπτου πλῆθος, εἰς μόρια τοῦ προσώπου παρεμπεσόντος, [τοῦ ζῴου] καὶ σατύρου φαίνεται τὸ πρόσωπον,*

and De Gen. et Corr. 1. 5. 321 b 28 sqq. Compare also Dio Chrys. Or. 17. 470 R. In the passage before us we must supply τὸ σῶμα before αὐξάνεσθαι (35), with φθείρεται (36), and with μεταβάλλοι (38) and αὐξάνοιτο (39). We gather from what Aristotle says that a whole consisting of parts, for instance a body or a State, must grow in such a way as to preserve a certain proportion or symmetry between its parts, otherwise it will be destroyed and may even change into a wholly different entity. I am not aware that Aristotle anywhere formulates this doctrine as clearly as he does here, but we trace some approach to it in Phys. 1. 5. 188 b 12 sqq., where he tells us that τὸ ἡρμοσμένον φθείρεται εἰς ἀνάρμοστίαν, and in Fragm. 41. 1482 a 6 (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 744 a 45), τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀναρμοστία τοῦ σώματος, ἀναρμοστία δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἶσχος. An overgreat increase of a part, indeed, is fatal to the identity not only of the whole of which it is a part, but also of the part itself (c. 9. 1309 b 27 sqq.).

38. ἐνίοτε δὲ κ.τ.λ. This would happen if, for instance, the human foot not only grew to be out of proportion to the body in size, but also underwent a disproportionate qualitative increase, e. g. in hardness, so that flesh and muscle stiffened into horn, and the foot became a hoof. Changes not unlike this were thought to occur in certain diseases, such as satyriasis (see above on 34), leontiasis, and elephantiasis, which were held to cause the human form to approach that of the satyr, the lion, or the elephant. See a paper by F. E. Hoggan, M.D., on the Leper Terra-Cotta of Athens in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 13. 101, where 'the leonine aspect characteristic of leprosy' is mentioned.

40. οὕτω καὶ πόλις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not directly tell us anywhere how he proposes to prevent the disproportionate increase of a part of the State, but we can see from passages like c. 8. 1309 a 20–26 and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29–b 16 how he would combat an increase of the poor. The measures suggested in c. 8. 1309 a 20–26 would also serve to some extent to prevent a disproportionate increase in the numbers of the rich.

1303 a. 1. οἷον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ πολιτείαις. That a too great excess of poor is fatal to democracies, we have seen in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq. But why are democracies and polities mentioned alone? That the numbers of the poor may increase in oligarchies, we see, if we needed to be told it, from c. 12. 1316 b 10 sqq. But Aristotle would probably say that in

oligarchies the poor are not a part of the State (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.), and that in them an increase of the poor would not be an increase of a part of the State. As to the use in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the term 'parts of the State' see vol. i. p. 567. The change to which Aristotle refers may have occurred in recent times among ourselves, for I read in the *Times*, April 7, 1899, that 'what is certain is that the wage-earning class [in Great Britain] has greatly added to its numbers—probably out of all proportion to the increase in other classes of the community—during the past thirty years.'

3. **συμβαίνει δ' ἐνίοτε τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τύχας**, 'and this' (i.e. a change of constitution arising from the disproportionate increase of a part of the State) 'happens occasionally by reason of accidents also,' as well as in consequence of insensible or unnoticed growth. The **τύχαι** referred to would not escape notice: cp. c. 6. 1306 b 14 sqq. The Athenian Stranger in Laws 708 E is tempted to say **ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτουσαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν.**

οἷον ἐν Τάραντι κ.τ.λ. **Ἡττηθέντων**, sc. **τῶν Ταραντίνων** (cp. 8, **ἀτυχούντων πεζῇ**, sc. **τῶν Ἀθηναίων**). As to the meaning of **τῶν Μηδικῶν** see note on 1341 a 28. This great defeat is placed by Diod. 11. 52 in B.C. 473: see also Hdt. 7. 170 and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 805 sq. 'Ut contigit post Sembachiam cladem, qua Helvetiorum qui montes accolunt nobilitas paene tota occubuit; ceteri ferre liberum exilium quam plebis direptionibus et contumeliis patere maluerunt' (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 235).

6. **καὶ ἐν Ἄργει** κ.τ.λ., 'and at Argos, those [who perished] on the seventh day of the month having been put to death by Cleomenes the Laconian, they were compelled to receive into the citizen-body some of the serfs.' That **οἱ ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ** most probably means 'those who perished on the seventh day of the month' appears from Plut. De Mulierum Virtutibus, c. 4, where we read as to the victory of Cleomenes, **τὴν δὲ μάχην οἱ μὲν ἑβδόμῃ λέγουσιν ἱσταμένου μηνός, οἱ δὲ νουμηνίᾳ γενέσθαι** κ.τ.λ. The first and seventh days of the month were sacred at Athens to Apollo (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 44. 5), and probably at other places also, and there was evidently a tradition at Argos that the battle occurred on a day sacred to Apollo, though some thought that it occurred on the first and others (with whom Aristotle agrees) on the seventh. For **ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ** cp. Lucian, Pseudolog. c. 16, **ὁ δὲ ἑβδόμῃ** (sc. **τινὰ εἶπεν**), **ὅτι, ὥσπερ οἱ**

παῖδες ἐν ταῖς ἑβδόμαις, κἀκεῖνος ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἔπαιζε καὶ διεγέλα καὶ παιδιὰν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν σπουδὴν τοῦ δήμου. The first and seventh days of the month were days on which Apollo was specially honoured at Sparta (Hdt. 6. 57), and the victory was no doubt attributed to aid rendered by Apollo, which would evoke all the more gratitude in the minds of the Spartans because Apollo was also one of the chief gods of Argos (Paus. 2. 19. 3: 2. 24. 1). Apollo was believed to have been born on the seventh of the month (Preller, Gr. Mythologie, 1. 187) and was therefore called ἑβδομαγενής (Plut. Sympos. 8. 1. 2), and it was remembered of Plato and Carneades that they were born, like Apollo, on the seventh (Plut. ibid.). See as to the seventh day of the month Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 410 (59 h). Vict. remarks, 'est autem obscurum quid hic valeat illud auctoris τῶν ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ: a diversis sane interpretibus longe aliter acceptum est, cum quidam ipsorum putarint tempus ostendere, et ipsum infaustum, alii vero locum. Ego facile crederem ordinem quendam certum in ea republica significare.' Welldon accordingly translates 'the members of the seventh order.' It is conceivable that φυλῇ or some such word should be supplied, and not ἡμέρᾳ, for we read ἐν τόνῳ ἑβδόμῳ in an inscription of Tenos, a city divided into τόνοι (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 207. 2), but on the whole I prefer to supply ἡμέρᾳ, at any rate till we are in possession of some fresh data on the subject. Cleomenes is distinguished as ὁ Λάκων because there were other well known persons of the name, for instance the nomarch of the Arabian nome of Egypt under Alexander. Τῶν περιοίκων τινάς, 'some of the serfs,' for this is the sense in which the word περίοικοι seems always to be used by Aristotle. Herodotus speaks of them as δοῦλοι (6. 83, Ἄργος δὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐχηρώθη οὕτω, ὥστε οἱ δοῦλοι αὐτέων ἔσχον πάντα τὰ πρήγματα, ἄρχοντές τε καὶ διέποντες ἐς ὃ ἐπήβησαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολομένων παῖδες). It would seem that the serfs admitted to citizenship became the masters of the State. Plutarch, indeed (De Mul. Virt. c. 4), claims that the persons admitted to citizenship were not slaves, but Perioeci, using the word apparently in the sense in which we use it of the Lacedaemonian Perioeci, and it is of Perioeci of this kind that Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 75. 2) and Sus.[2] (Note 1518) understand Aristotle to speak, but the word does not appear to be used in this sense by Aristotle.

8. καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις κ.τ.λ., 'and at Athens owing to reverses by land the upper class came to be less numerous than before, because

during the Laconian War service in the army fell on citizens 'taken from the service-list [and not on mercenaries].' In Aristotle's day the citizens were apt to leave service in the hoplite force to mercenaries (Demosth. Olynth. 3. 30). Κατάλογοι were kept at Athens of citizens who served in the cavalry ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 49. l. 8 sqq. with Sandys' note), of citizens liable to serve as hoplites (including only the three higher property-classes, and not the Thetes, Thuc. 6. 43), and apparently also of trireme-oarsmen (Demosth. Or. 50. in Polycl. cc. 6, 16). It is to the two former lists, and especially to the second of them, that Aristotle here refers. This list included all Athenian citizens from eighteen to sixty years of age belonging to the three higher property-classes, except presumably those who rendered cavalry service (see Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 315). A similar catalogue of *οἱ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ* seems to have been kept at Syracuse (Plut. Nic. c. 14): as to the cities of Boeotia see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 58 sq. The phrase *ἐκ καταλόγου στρατεύεσθαι* occurs in Xen. Mem. 3. 4. 1, and we read in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 26, *τῆς γὰρ στρατείας γιγνομένης ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις ἐκ καταλόγου.* In the last-named passage a diminution in the number of *οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων* is said to have occurred in the time of Cimon owing to *τὸ στρατεύεσθαι ἐκ καταλόγου*, whereas in the passage before us Aristotle speaks of the *γνώριμοι* becoming fewer from the same cause during the Peloponnesian War. Isocrates in De Pace, § 86 sqq. traces losses extending over the whole period of the first Athenian Empire ending in the disappearance of many ancient families at Athens (§ 88: cp. Diod. 13. 97. 1). That the rich became fewer at Athens towards the close of the Peloponnesian War is evident from the fact that the task of equipping a trireme was then for the first time allowed to be divided between two trierarchs (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 370). The Chorêgia for tragedy and comedy was also then allowed to be divided between two citizens (Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 404: Gilbert, ibid. p. 359). Aristotle does not say that a change of constitution resulted at Athens, but he may have thought that the constitution became more democratic in consequence of these losses.

10. *ὑπὸ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον.* For *ὑπό* Eucken (Praepositionen, p. 74) compares c. 7. 1306 b 38. For *τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον* in the sense of the Peloponnesian War, cp. c. 4. 1304 b 14, *τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.* Cp. also Diod. 15. 25. 1, *ἐπὶ δὲ*

τούτων ὁ κληθεὶς Βοιωτικὸς πόλεμος ἐνέστη Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς Βοιωτοὺς διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας. In Paus. 8. 48. 4 ὁ Λακωνικὸς πόλεμος is used of an early war between Tegea and the Lacedaemonians in the days of King Charillus or Charilaus.

11. τοῦτο, i. e. a change of constitution arising from the disproportionate increase of a part of the State, as in 3.

πλειόνων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This explains why not a few democrats thought that the best means of preserving a democracy was to oppress and plunder the rich ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 4, 14). That when the rich increased in wealth without increasing in numbers a δυναστεία often resulted is what we should expect from 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.

13. δυναστείας. After this word Sus. would insert 1304 a 17, μεταβάλλουσι δὲ ... b 5, πρὸς πολλαύς, but this change of order involves the insertion of a passage dealing with the ἐξ ὧν αἱ μεταβολαί, which is the subject treated in 1303 b 17–1304 b 5, in the midst of a passage dealing with the δι' ἃ αἱ μεταβολαί, the subject treated in 1302 a 37–1303 b 17, for ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκιμῆσαι, 1304 a 18, takes up the ἐκ of 1303 b 18, 21, 37, 1304 a 4, 10, 14. Besides, the passage 1304 a 17–b 5 must not be severed from what immediately precedes it in 1303 b 17–1304 a 17, for it stands in contrast to this, a transition being made from revolutions occasioned by insult to revolutions occasioned by a rise in reputation and greatness (see note on 1304 a 17).

μεταβάλλουσι δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄνευ στάσεως κ.τ.λ., 'and constitutions change even without civil discord,' etc. See note on 1302 b 3. Another way in which constitutions changed without civil discord was through a change in the value of the property-qualification (c. 6. 1306 b 6 sqq.: c. 8. 1308 a 35 sqq.). This is not mentioned here.

14. τὰς ἀριθείας. Ἐριθεία ('canvassing for office') occurs in the sing. in c. 2. 1302 b 4, but both it and ἐριθεύεσθαι (16) are very rare words.

ὥσπερ ἐν Ἡραίᾳ. Heraea appears to have been under an oligarchy when this change was introduced (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 130). The lot is spoken of as an antidote to στάσις in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 12 sqq. Compare the reason for which the lot was introduced in 1268 at Venice in the election of the Doge (De La Houssaye, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, 1. 15: Yriarte, Patricien de Venise, pp. 340 sqq., 345), and also that for which the

practice of 'imborsazione' was introduced at Florence. The names of all who were to hold any of the magistracies for a long time to come were put into a bag or purse and drawn out from time to time when an office had to be filled. 'It was thought that these "imborsations" would prevent much trouble to the city and remove the cause of those tumults which took place on the creation of magistrates from the number of candidates for office' (Machiavelli, History of Florence, Book ii, c. 6: Eng. Trans., p. 81). 'The lot was introduced at Basle in 1718 to prevent election intrigues. The only exception made was in the case of the Burgomaster and of envoys' (Roscher, Politik, p. 369, note 13). See note on 1305 a 28 as to the risks attending the filling of offices by popular election.

15. ἐποίησαν, sc. τὰς ἀρχάς, which is suppressed because it will readily be supplied (see note on 1296 a 5). It is hardly likely, however, that all the offices, the military ones not excepted, came to be filled by lot. Still Aristotle seems to imply that the change amounted to a modification of the constitution in a democratic direction.

16. καὶ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν κ.τ.λ. Hence the advice given in c. 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. That a magistrate had special opportunities of overthrowing a constitution we see from Plato, Laws 715 A, παραφυλάττοντες δὲ ἀλλήλους ζῶσιν, ὅπως μή ποτέ τις εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀφικόμενος ἐπαναστῇ μεμνημένος τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονότων κακῶν: see also note on 1310 b 23. It is well known how many precautions were taken at Florence to prevent Ghibellines finding their way into office.

17. εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίας παριέναι. Cp. Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 10, Πομπήϊος δὲ καὶ θριαμβεύειν ἠξίου μήπω παριὼν εἰς σύγκλητον, and [Demosth.] Epist. 3. p. 1481, εἰς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι παρῆμι. Τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίας, 'the supreme magistracies.' The phrase recurs in c. 9. 1309 a 33 sq. and c. 10. 1310 b 20 and in 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 7: cp. 2. 8. 1268 a 23, 3. 6. 1278 b 10, 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 25, and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 31 sq. In 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 30 we read of ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας, which is not quite the same thing. The expression αἱ κύριαι ἀρχαί does not seem to be of frequent occurrence outside the Politics. It does not occur in the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία.

18. ὅσπερ ἐν Ὠρεῷ κ.τ.λ. Hestiaea in Euboea (mentioned under that name in c. 4. 1303 b 32 sqq.) came to be often called by the name of Oreus, one of its demes, when after its revolt from Athens in B.C. 446 its citizens were expelled from Euboea and their place was taken by 2,000 Athenian cleruchs. Sus.[2] (Note

1529) and Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 64. 2, refer the change introduced by Heracleodorus to B.C. 377, when the State revolted from the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 56 sq.) and joined the new Athenian Confederacy, in which it appears under the title [Ἐσ]τιαιῆς (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 81). This was, in fact, still the official name of the colony, though the name Oreus was more commonly used (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 430. 2). According to Pausanias (7. 26. 4) some people even in his day called Oreus by its old name Hestiaea. Oreus lay on the coast a little to the west of Hestiaea (Baedeker's Greece, p. 208). Compare with the case of Heracleodorus at Oreus that of Leontiades at Thebes, who, holding the office of polemarch, introduced the Spartan Phoebidas and his troops into the Cadmeia and revolutionized the State (Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 76: vol. 10, p. 80 sqq.).

20. καί, 'or rather': see Shilleto on Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 90 (102), *ἀπόλωλε καὶ γέγονεν ἀσθενής*, where Phil. 3. c. 39, *ἀπόλωλε καὶ νενόσηκεν ἡ Ἑλλάς*, is compared, and cp. Thuc. 6. 60. 1, *πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ πεπρᾶχθαι*. See also notes on 1262 a 6 and 1335 b 40.

ἔτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν, 'further on account of the slightness of the difference between one thing and another.' This source of constitutional change is marked off from *ὀλιγωρία* because, while in cases of *ὀλιγωρία* the peril is not overlooked but is made light of, here it is overlooked and escapes attention altogether. For *τὸ παρὰ μικρόν* see Bon. Ind. 562 a 28 sqq., where Anal. Pr. 1. 33. 47 b 38 is referred to among other passages, *αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρόν· ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν διαφέρον εἰπεῖν τόδε τῷδε ὑπάρχειν ἢ τόδε τῷδε παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, συγχωροῦμεν* (a passage evidently based on Plato, Phaedrus, 261 E sq., which Eaton quotes). In c. 7. 1307 b 2 sq. and c. 8. 1307 b 32 *τὸ μικρόν* takes the place of *τὸ παρὰ μικρόν*. As to Ambracia see note on 1304 a 31.

22. *τῶν νομίμων*. The expression *τὰ νόμιμα* is used in much the same sense as *οἱ νόμοι* in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5, 7 (see note), but in Plato, Crito, 53 C and Laws 793 A sqq. *τὰ νόμιμα* and *οἱ νόμοι* are distinguished, the latter passage explaining *τὰ νόμιμα* to be the unwritten customs which are the best support of written laws. In the passage before us *τὰ νόμιμα* probably includes both written and unwritten law, so that Susemihl's rendering 'der gesetzlichen Zustände' ('of the legal order of things') is perhaps not far from the truth.

25. *στασιωτικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον, ἕως ἂν συμπνεύσῃ*.

Here we enter on the class of *στάσεις* caused by *ἀνομοιότης* (c. 2. 1302 b 5). There may be *ἀνομοιότης* of race (i. e. *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*) or *ἀνομοιότης* of site (*τῶν τόπων*). The former is dealt with in 1303 a 25–b 3, and the latter in 1303 b 7–17. Aristotle does not say that unlikeness in either respect causes constitutional change, but only that it causes *στάσις*. For *στασιωτικόν* (the adjective *στασιαστικός* is not given in the Index Aristotelicus and does not appear to be used by Aristotle, though all MSS. have *στασιαστικῶς* in 3. 13. 1284 b 22), cp. c. 6. 1306 a 38, where Π^2 have *στασιωτικῶς* and M^s P^1 and possibly Γ *στασιαστικῶς*. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 708 D (where Plato may remember the experience of Thurii), *τὸ δ' αὖ παντοδαπὸν ἐς ταὐτὸ ξυνερρυηκὸς γένος ὑπακοῦσαι μέν τισιν νόμων καινῶν τάχα ἂν ἐθελήσειε μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ συμπνεῦσαι καὶ καθάπερ ἵππων ζεῦγος καθ' ἕνα εἰς ταὐτόν, τὸ λεγόμενον, ξυμφυσῆσαι χρόνου πολλοῦ καὶ παγχάλεπον*. Cp. also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4 *sub fin.*, *πόλεως οὔπω συμπεπνευκυίας*, and Sympos. 4. 1. 2, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3. 10 *sub fin.*, *ἡ δ' ὑμετέρα πόλις ἀδιακόσμητός ἐστιν ἔτι καὶ ἀδιάτακτος, ἅτε νεόκτιστος οὖσα καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν συμφορητὴ ἐθνῶν, ἃ μακρῶν δεῖ χρόνων καὶ παθημάτων παντοδαπῶν, ἵνα καταρτισθῇ καὶ παύσηται ταραττομένη καὶ στασιάζουσα ὥσπερ νῦν*. See also Eth. Nic. 8. 4. 1156 b 25 sqq. and 9. 5. 1167 a 11 sqq. As to *τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον* see note on 1330 a 26. It would seem from the examples adduced in what follows that Aristotle denies the name of *ὁμόφυλοι* not only to Achaeans and Troezenians or to Lesbians and Chians, but also to Zanclaeans and Samians and to Amphipolitans and Chalcidians, though all four peoples were of Ionic extraction. Aristotle's remark is illustrated by our own experience in South Africa. 'There is a native population in South Africa in varying stages of civilization, and there is a white population of diverse nationalities. There are descendants of Dutch settlers and of French refugees, a considerable German population, and a large number, but not a majority, of English people. It is not an easy matter to carry on the administration of affairs in such a country, but it has been the aim of the Colonial Governments to weld together as one people those various nationalities' (Speech of Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, *Times*, August 5, 1886). It will be noticed that in most of the instances given by Aristotle either the one stock or the other was expelled from the State. Conflicts of race were as bitter within the Greek City-State as conflicts of class. We notice also that after a time distinct races came to pull better together. The children born in the colony

would feel less removed from each other in race, and would agree better together, than the immigrants themselves had done, and the lapse of time would do something to improve the relations even of the latter to each other. Plutarch (Num. c. 17) gives an interesting account of the way in which he conceives that Numa at Rome sought to make the distinction between the Sabines and Romans less sharp (see note on 1319 b 19).

26. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πόλις γίγνεται. Sus.[2] (Note 1531 b) refers to 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18 and to 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16, *ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλῆθός ἐστιν οὐ τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὔταρκες*, which explains the passage before us. Not any and every body of men will serve to form a *πόλις*: they must not be too many or too few (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 2 sqq.), nor all slaves nor all poor men (3. 9. 1280 a 32: 3. 12. 1283 a 18), nor all *βάναυσοι* (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18 sqq.); some of them must be fighting men (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.), some fit to be judges and members of the deliberative (1291 a 22 sqq.). They must be unlike (2. 2. 1261 a 22 sqq.), yet not too unlike (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 sqq.). For *ὥσπερ οὐδέ* followed by *οὕτως οὐδέ*, cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 18, *λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, ὦ πάτερ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γεωργοῦ ἀργοῦ οὐδὲν ὄφελος, οὕτως οὐδὲ στρατηγοῦ ἀργοῦντος οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι.*

27. διὸ ὅσοι ἤδη συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλεῖστοι διεστασίασαν. See in *Rhein. Mus.* 42. p. 424 O. Crusius' remarks on the Greek proverbs, *ποίησόν με ἔνοικον, ἵνα σὲ ποιήσω ἔξοικον*, and *ἅπληυς τὸν ἔνοικον· λείπει τὸ ἐξέβαλλεν.* *Διό*, 'hence,' because *τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον* is productive of *στάσις*. It is implied that *σύνοικοι* and *ἔποικοι* will not be *ὁμόφυλοι*. The word *σύνοικοι* is here used of those who join in founding a city, but it is not always used in this strict sense; it is not, for instance, in Thuc. 2. 68. 5 and Diod. 14. 9. 9, where the *σύνοικοι* spoken of might have been called *ἔποικοι*. Aristotle's first two examples are of *σύνοικοι*, the rest of *ἔποικοι*. All his illustrations of *ἔποικοι* are taken from colonies. States in Greece Proper, however, must sometimes have recruited their population with *ἔποικοι*. The introduction of *ἔποικοι* from the mother-city will hardly have been attended with the risks here described, though even *ἔποικοι* from the mother-city would perhaps not be accounted *ὁμόφυλοι*. It was when, as at Antissa and Zanclê, the *ἔποικοι* came not from a variety of alien sources, but from a single State which was not the mother-State of the colony, or when they belonged to an alien stock powerful in the vicinity, as

at Amphipolis and Argos Amphilochicum (Thuc. 2. 68. 5), or when, as at Syracuse, they formed a body of men accustomed to act together, that the operation of introducing ἔποικοι was attended with most risk. The metoeci and other aliens to whom Cleisthenes gave citizenship at Athens probably came from a variety of sources, not from a single city or stock, and their successful fusion with the older citizens was no doubt due partly to this, and partly to the pains which Cleisthenes took to mingle the two elements of the citizen-body (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.: Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21). Ἤδη, 'ere now,' cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 5 sq., Xen. Mem. 4. 8. 5, *οὐχ ὁρᾷς . . . ὅτι οἱ Ἀθήνησι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέλυσαν;* and Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 18 sq. 'Ἤδη with the perfect, as in Hist. An. 7. 6. 585 b 7 sq., is much less common than ἤδη with the aorist' (Richards). Διεστασίασαν is here intrans. as in Polyb. 1. 82. 4: it is used in a transitive sense in c. 4. 1303 b 26 and c. 6. 1306 a 3.

28. οἷον Τροιζηνίοις Ἀχαιοὶ συνῴκησαν Σύβαριν. 'Cp. Solin. 2. 1' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 398. 5)—Solin. 2. 10 Mommsen. Some identify the expulsion of the Troezenians here mentioned with the expulsion by the demagogue Telys of the five hundred wealthiest citizens mentioned by Diodorus (12. 9. 2), but with doubtful correctness. The expulsion of the Troezenians probably occurred at a far earlier date.

30. ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις. The ἄγος at Athens is well known. We hear of an ἄγος also at Megara (Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 59) and at Delphi (Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32. 825 A sqq.), to say nothing of that which arose from the murder of Aesop there (Plut. De Sera Numinis Vindicta, c. 12). In the last-named chapter we read of a *μήνιμα τῆς Λευκαδίας Ἥρας* with which Sybaris was afflicted—*Συβαρίταις δὲ φράζων (ὁ Ἀπόλλων) ἀπόλυσιν τῶν κακῶν, ὅταν τρισὶν ὁλέθροις ἱλάσωνται τὸ μήνιμα τῆς Λευκαδίας Ἥρας*—but whether this was identical with the ἄγος mentioned in the text does not appear. See as to the passage before us Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 769. 1, where other crimes are noticed which were supposed to have led to the destruction of Sybaris.

31. καὶ ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρῖται τοῖς συνοικήσασιν, sc. *διεστασίασαν* or *ἐστασίασαν*. Cp. Diod. 12. 11. 1, *ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον ὁμονοήσαντες οἱ Θούριοι στάσει μεγάλῃ περιέπεσον οὐκ ὀλόγως· οἱ γὰρ προϋπάρχοντες Συβαρῖται τὰς μὲν ἀξιολογωτάτας ἀρχὰς ἑαυτοῖς προσένεμον, τὰς δ' εὐτελεῖς τοῖς ὕστερον προσγεγραμμένοις πολίταις, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπιδύειν τοῖς θεοῖς*

φοντο δεῖν πρώτας μὲν τὰς πολίτιδας, ὑστέρας δὲ τὰς μεταγενεστέρας· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὴν μὲν σύνεγγυς τῇ πόλει χώραν κατειληφούχουν ἑαυτοῖς, τὴν δὲ πόρρω κειμένην τοῖς ἐπήλυσι· γενομένης δὲ διαφορᾶς διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, οἱ προσγραφέντες ὕστερον πολῖται πλείους καὶ κρείττους ὄντες ἀπέκτειναν σχεδὸν ἅπαντας τοὺς προϋπάρχοντας Συβαρίτας (Aristotle says that the Sybarites were driven out) καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοὶ κατῴκησαν, and Strabo, p. 263, ὕστερον δ' οἱ περιγενόμενοι (Συβαρῖται) συνελθόντες ἐπῴκουν ὀλίγοι· χρόνῳ δὲ καὶ οὗτοι διεφθάρησαν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, οἳ συνοικήσοντες μὲν ἐκείνοις ἀφίκοντο, καταφρονήσαντες δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν διεχειρίσαντο . . . τὴν δὲ πόλιν εἰς ἕτερον τόπον μετέθηκαν πλησίον καὶ Θουρίους προσηγόρευσαν ἀπὸ κρήνης ὁμωνύμου. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 523. 3) bases partly on this passage of Strabo, partly on other considerations, his conclusion that the colonization of Thurii from Athens and other parts of Hellas was preceded by a similar colonization of Sybaris, and that it was from Sybaris, and not from the subsequently founded colony of Thurii, that the Sybarite section of the colonists was expelled in consequence of the position of superior privilege assumed by it. Aristotle's language in the passage before us, however, leaves no doubt that, in his view at any rate, the expulsion took place at Thurii.

32. ὡς σφετέρας τῆς χώρας, 'in the view that the country belonged to them.' **Τῆς χώρας** means, I think, 'the country,' not 'the soil.' Cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 177, ὡς αὐτοῦ τῆς χώρας οὔσης. The extent to which the Sybarite members of the colony of Thurii carried their claims may be inferred from the fact that the name **πολίτιδες** is given in Diod. 12. 11. 1 (quoted above on 31) to their wives and daughters exclusively. So in Thera and in Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf the descendants of the first settlers were alone accounted **ἐλεύθεροι** and were alone admissible to office (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq.). In our own day, as has been noticed already, the 'burghers' of the South African Republic, representing the original colonists, claim in a similar way to exclude the 'Uitlanders,' or alien new-comers to the colony, from all real participation in political power.

33. καὶ Βυζαντίοις κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known of this event, or of the events at Antissa mentioned in the next line. The success of the people of Antissa in ridding themselves of the Chians is evidently contrasted with the failure of the Zanclaeans to rid themselves of the Samians. It was a bold step on the part of a small Aeolian State like Antissa to receive a body of exiles belonging to

a powerful Ionian State like Chios. It was through receiving exiles from Colophon that the Aeolic city of Smyrna was detached from the neighbouring group of Aeolic States (Hdt. 1. 150). These Chian exiles probably hoped to repeat at Antissa the *coup* which had succeeded so well at Smyrna.

35. Ζαγκλαῖοι δὲ Σαμίους ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον αὐτοί. According to Hdt. 6. 22 sqq. the Zanclaeans did not invite the Samians who fled their country after the suppression of the Ionic Revolt to join them at Zanclê; they invited the Ionians of Asia Minor in general to found a new Ionic colony at Calê Actê on the north coast of Sicily, no doubt with the object of strengthening the Ionic element in Sicily against the Doric and of strengthening Zanclê against the Sicels; it was a foe of Zanclê, Anaxilaus tyrant of Rhegium, who suggested to the Samians to give up colonizing Calê Actê and to seize Zanclê during the temporary absence of its citizens, who were occupied in besieging a Sicel city. The whole story is told by Herodotus (6. 22 sqq.): see also Freeman, Sicily, 2. 109 sqq. *Ἐξέπεσον αὐτοί* contrasts the case of Zanclê with those of Byzantium and Antissa, in which the new settlers were expelled.

36. καὶ Ἀπολλωνιᾶται οἱ ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ κ.τ.λ. The last five words are added to distinguish this Apollonia, which was a colony of Miletus, from other cities of the same name, and especially from Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf, which was a colony of Corinth and Corcyra. The busy seaport of the Euxine coast of Thrace with its two large harbours, situated, partly on an island, close to the southern horn of the deep bay of Bourgas, was, however, a very different sort of place from the quiet and 'well-ordered' city of Illyria nearly seven miles from the sea, as to which see note on 1290 b 9. The Thracian city owed its name to its famous temple of Apollo (Strabo, p. 319: Head, Hist. Num. p. 236), and perhaps also to its Milesian origin, for one of the chief worships of the Milesian State was that of Apollo at Branchidae. It is said in the poem which passes under the name of Scymnus Chius (730 sqq.) to have been founded 'fifty years before the kingship of Cyrus,' i.e. in B.C. 610, but if it was founded by the philosopher Anaximander (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 17), who was apparently born in B.C. 611 and died soon after B.C. 547 (Diog. Laert. 2. 2), it must have been founded at least twenty or thirty years later. It deserves notice that the Megarian colony of Heracleia, which was founded on the south coast of the Euxine by Megarians and Boeotians

(Ephor. Fragm. 83: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 259) about the middle of the sixth century B. C. (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 487), and which was situated at about the same distance from Byzantium as Apollonia, was named after Heracles just as Apollonia was named after Apollo, probably because Heracles was born at Thebes and his mother Alcmênê and son Hyllus had tombs at Megara (Paus. 1. 41: cp. Justin, 16. 3. 4). Apollonia was in all likelihood founded a good deal earlier than Heracleia, but the resemblance of the names of the two colonies suggests that the latter may have been founded in rivalry with the former. The Euxine (Εὔξεινος, not Εὔξενος, probably because it received its name from the Milesian settlers on its shores) is here called by its full title: more usually Aristotle speaks of it as ὁ Πόντος (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 21: 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 36, 1306 a 9). We read in c. 6. 1306 a 7 sqq. of an oligarchy at the Pontic Apollonia which was overthrown by citizens attacking dishonest office-holders, but whether the incident mentioned in the passage before us was connected with the fall of this oligarchy it is impossible to say.

88. καὶ Συρακούσιοι κ.τ.λ. As to this passage see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 5. 318, note. The 'aliens and mercenaries' referred to were already citizens before the fall of the tyranny of Thrasybulus —they had been made citizens by the tyrants (Diod. 11. 72. 3)— but now the Syracusans made them citizens, rendering them however—and this important fact Aristotle does not mention—inadmissible to office (Diod. ibid.). It was the infliction of this disability on men who, as Grote says, had been the first citizens of the State under the tyrants, that led them to rebel. They rebelled, in fact, not because they were citizens of a different stock from the rest, which is the cause assigned by Aristotle for their rebellion, but because the citizenship conferred on them was of an inferior kind. 'This is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens' (Grote). Sus.[2] (Note 1538) seeks to reconcile Aristotle's account with that of Diodorus by taking *μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά* exclusively with *ἐστασίασαν* and not also with *ποιησάμενοι*, but it seems hardly possible to get over the difficulty in this way.

μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά. See note on 1270 b 11.

τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους. Καί is here explanatory (see note on 1257 b 7). The addition of *καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους*, however, also serves to place the step in its full significance before the

reader. To make ξένοι citizens was a strong measure, but to make μισθοφόροι citizens was a still stronger one. Μισθοφόροι were both disliked and despised in Greece (Plato, Laws 630 B: Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 123). Wyttenbach (Index to Plutarch, s. v. μισθοφόρος) remarks, 'In vita Dionis μισθοφόροι dicuntur Dionysii milites, ξένοι Dionis milites. Attamen aliquoties Dionis milites dicuntur μισθοφόροι, sed ex persona Syracusanorum, qui iam Dionis ξένους odisse incipiebant.' See note on 1310 b 12, ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους.

2. καὶ Ἀμφιπολῖται κ.τ.λ. The people of Amphipolis were rash. 1303 b.
The city lay in the immediate neighbourhood of the powerful Chalcidian Confederacy, the cities composing which had from the first viewed with jealousy its colonization by Athens (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 560), and to admit a body of Chalcidians to citizenship was to incur a great risk. This soon became evident. The newly-made Chalcidian citizens, strong in the support of the neighbouring Confederacy, expelled most of the older citizens of Amphipolis (cp. c. 6. 1306 a 2 sqq.). It is possible that Amphipolis was already on friendly terms with the Chalcidian Confederacy when it decided to admit these new citizens; it is, however, also possible that the step prepared the way for the close relation in which we find Amphipolis standing to Olynthus, the head of the Chalcidian Confederacy, in B.C. 365–4. Schäfer (Demosthenes, 2. 9) takes the latter view. In any case the victory of the Chalcidian settlers at Amphipolis strengthened the hold of Olynthus on the city and secured to the Chalcidian Confederacy the important bridge over the Strymon at Amphipolis which was a main means of communication between Macedon and Thrace, much no doubt to the dissatisfaction of Macedon. Amphipolis was, in fact, in B.C. 365–4, not long in all probability after the event here mentioned by Aristotle, 'a free Greek city inhabited by a population in the main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 344, who refers to Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 150). Hence Timotheus, seeking in that year to recover Amphipolis for Athens, attacked and took many Chalcidic towns allied with Olynthus (Diod. 15. 81: Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 14, c. Philocl. c. 17). Olynthus was thus weakened, and 'the most effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement' broken down (Grote, 10. 525). The coins both of Amphipolis and of the Chalcidian Confederacy have a head of Apollo on the obverse, in the former however facing, in the latter in profile (Head, Hist.

Num. pp. 185, 190). It is probable that some of the Amphipolitans who were exiled by the Chalcidian intruders on the occasion referred to in the text lived to see with vengeful exultation the destruction of Olynthus by Philip of Macedon in B.C. 348. For the qualifying addition of *οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν* cp. Strabo, Book 7. Fragm. 11, *ἐξ ὧν* (sc. *πόλεων*) *ὕστερον ἐκβαλλόμενοι* (*οἱ Χαλκιδεῖς*) *συνῆλθον εἰς μίαν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν.*

3. [*στασιάζουσι δὲ—7. ὄντες*]. I agree with Sus. and others that this paragraph is not in place here. Sus.[3] thinks that there is no other place to which it can fitly be transferred, but it has been already suggested in the critical and explanatory notes on 1301 a 39, *στασιάζουσιν*, that it should be inserted after that word.

4. *ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις.* In aristocracies also, it would seem (c. 7. 1307 a 23 sqq.).

5. *πρότερον*, in c. 1. 1301 a 33 sqq. It is no objection to the proposed transposition that, if we place 1303 b 3–7 after 1301 a 39, *στασιάζουσιν*, the reference in *καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον* will be to what has been said eight lines above. Reference is made in a similar way to passages equally near or nearer in 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 11, where *ὅπερ εἴρηται πρότερον* refers to 1328 a 1 sqq., in 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29, where *καθάπερ εἴπομεν* refers to 1328 b 24–28, and in De Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 19, where *ὥσπερ εἴρηται* refers to 268 a 13 sqq.

7. *στασιάζουσι δὲ ἐνίοτε αἱ πόλεις καὶ διὰ τοὺς τόπους κ.τ.λ.* *Καὶ διὰ τοὺς τόπους* stands in tacit contrast to *διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*, or in other words *διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον*, which is the origin of *στάσις* dealt with in what precedes, if we remove 1303 b 3–7 to another place. See note on 1303 a 25. Cp. Plut. Solon, c. 13, *οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι . . . τὴν παλαιὰν αὖθις στάσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτείας ἐστασίαζον, ὅσας ἡ χώρα διαφορὰς εἶχεν, εἰς τοσαῦτα μέρη τῆς πόλεως διαστάσης.* Cities, both Greek and other, were often built partly on an island close to the coast and partly on the mainland itself: so Cnidus, which Strabo calls *δίπολις* on this account (p. 656), Apollonia on the Euxine (note on 1303 a 36), and also Aradus and Tyre. 'Comme Arad, Tyr avait une partie insulaire où s'élevaient ses temples et ses arsenaux, une partie continentale qu'on appelait la vieille Tyr, Palae-Tyros' (Maspero, Hist. Ancienne des Peuples de l'Orient, p. 192). We read of the Aradians in Polyb. 5. 68. 7, *τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κατέπαυσεν* ('Αντίοχος), *διαλύσας τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πρὸς τοὺς τὴν ἤπειρον κατοικοῦντας τῶν 'Αραδίων.* Part of Clazomenae, again, was on an island, part on the mainland

opposite to it, and the two parts did not pull well together. The interest of those who dwelt in the island would be to favour the masters of the sea, for instance Athens; the interest of those who dwelt on the mainland would be to favour Persia. So in Thuc. 3. 34 Persia finds it easier to win Colophon than Notium, the seaport of Colophon. We are reminded of the feud between Plymouth and Plymouth Dock in Boswell's Life of Johnson. 'Johnson affecting to entertain the passions of the place was violent in opposition . . . No, no! I am against the Dockers; I am a Plymouth man. Rogues! Let them die of thirst. They shall not have a drop!' The relations between England and Ireland might have been better if the two countries were not severed by the sea.

9. οἱ ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ, sc. *στασιάζουσι*. Sus.[3] and Mr. E. L. Hicks (Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 76) follow Sylburg in reading Χυτῷ in place of Χύτρῳ, referring to Corpus Inscr. Att. 2. pp. 397, 423, with which Sus. compares Ephor. Fragm. 136 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 271), and it is much in favour of their view that the phrase *οἱ ἐπὶ Χυτῷ* occurs in the inscription, and that *τ* and *τρ* are easily confused (see critical note on 1338 b 23), but Strabo (p. 645) has Χύτριον, and this fact lends some support to the reading Χύτρῳ here. There was a town called Χύτρος in Cyprus, and another called Χυτρόπολις in Thrace (Theopomp. Fragm. 150: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 304). Why ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ, not ἐν Χύτρῳ? Is ἐπί here = ἐν, or does it mean 'near' (cp. Soph. Philoct. 353, *τἀπὶ Τροίᾳ πέργαμα*)?

10. καὶ Ἀθήνησιν κ.τ.λ. Ἀθήνησιν, 'in the Athenian State,' as in 2. 7. 1267 b 18, 3. 2. 1275 b 35, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 24 etc., not specially 'at Athens,' for evidently Ἀθήνησιν includes the Peiraeus. Compare the use of *ἐν Λακεδαίμονι* in 2. 5. 1263 a 35, where see note. Aristotle does not say of the Athenian citizens resident at the Peiraeus and of those resident at Athens what he says of the two sections of Clazomenians, that they *στασιάζουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, though that did come about in the days of the Thirty (Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 24 sqq., 35–37), but only that there is a difference of political sentiment between them. Perhaps, however, this was more due to a difference of class and occupation, the Peiraeus being full of *ναύτας καὶ κελευστὰς καὶ κυβερνήτας* (Plut. Themist. c. 19 *sub fin.*), than to residence on a distinct site. The site of Eleusis was distinct from that of Athens, but no great difference of political sentiment seems to have resulted.

12. ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις. Aristotle implies that the thing did not happen much in marches in time of peace.

15. μεγίστη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'the greatest severance is perhaps that of virtue and vice.' This is so because it involves a difference of soul and of character (Poet. 2. 1448 a 2 sqq.), a difference in respect of goods of the soul, not external goods (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 6 sqq.). It is only on a severance of this kind that Aristotle consents to base the distinction of slave and free, well-born and low-born (1. 6. 1255 a 39 sqq.). Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it, but it is perhaps virtually taken up by ὧν μία καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστίν, i.e. 'but the severance we have mentioned is a severance, though a minor one.'

διάστασις. We expect rather διαφορά, but Plato (Rep. 360 E) had spoken of the διάστασις of the ἄδικος and the δίκαιος.

16. καὶ οὕτω δή. See note on 1296 b 5.

μᾶλλον, sc. διάστασίς ἐστιν.

C. 4. 17. γίγνονται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle's reference to the effect of small differences of locality in producing στάσεις leads him to notice other minute causes of στάσις. Μὲν οὖν introduces a summing-up of what has just been said, in order that a further statement may be added to make the exact extent of Aristotle's assertion clear. Some might infer from his remarks that στάσις is in his view concerned with things of trivial moment, and Aristotle hastens to correct this impression by adding that though the occasions of στάσις are often small (I do not understand him to mean that they always are), the things with a view to which recourse is had to στάσις are great, and indeed that small discords are most fruitful of result when they arise within the circle of those who are supreme in the State (ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις, 19). In 1303 b 17—1304 b 5 we have to do with the ἐξ ὧν of constitutional change, its immediate occasions, not its profound causes. We see this from the recurrence of ἐκ in 1303 b 18, 21, 37, 1304 a 4, 10, 14, 18 (see note on 1303 a 13). That disagreements often arise ἐκ μικρῶν we have been told in 2. 5. 1263 a 17 sqq. We read in De Gen. An. 5. 6. 785 b 36 εὔφθαρτον καὶ εὐκίνητον τὸ μικρόν. Solon had said of the beginnings of Atê (Fragm. 13. 14),

ἀρχὴ δ' ἐξ ὀλίγου γίγνεται ὥστε πυρός,
φλαύρη μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνιηρὴ δὲ τελευτῇ,

and a similar thought may be traced in Soph. Aj. 1077 sq.: Eurip. Fragm. 415 Nauck (411, ed. 2),

μικροῦ γὰρ ἐκ λαμπτῆρος Ἰδαῖον λέπας
πρήσειεν ἄν τις,

and 424 Nauck (420, ed. 2): Demosth. in Lept. c. 162 (already referred to in vol. i. p. 525, note 2): Polyb. 3. 7. 7, *ἐπειδὴ φύεται μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πολλάκις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων*: Tac. Ann. 4. 32 *sub fin.* Compare also De Caelo, 4. 3. 310 b 26, *καίτοι ἐνίοτε καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ αὐτῶν μεταβάλλει, καὶ μικρᾶς γενομένης ἐν τοῖς ἔξω κινήσεως τὸ μὲν εἰς ὑγίειαν ἔρχεται τὸ δ' εἰς αὔξην.* Aristotle does not consider whether constitutional change is not sometimes prevented, as well as brought about, by small things. It should be noticed that the instances which Aristotle gives in what follows of *στάσεις* arising from small causes seem all to be taken from oligarchies (cp. c. 6. 1306 a 31 sqq.). Quarrels would be especially frequent and mischievous in oligarchies.

19. μάλιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ *al μικραί*, sc. *στάσεις*, 'even small discords' (much more great ones): cp. 30, *καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἁμάρτημα.* Plato had said in Rep. 545 D, *πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται, ὁμονοοῦντος δέ, κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ᾖ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι.* Compare also for the thought De Gen. An. 4. 4. 771 a 11, *τὰ μὲν οὖν μικρὸν παρεκβαίνοντα τὴν φύσιν* (sc. *τῶν τικτομένων*) *ζῆν εἴωθεν, τὰ δὲ πλεῖον οὐ ζῆν, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις τοῦ ζῆν γένηται τὸ παρὰ φύσιν*, and Hist. An. 8. 2. 590 a 2, *ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συστάσει ἀκαριαίου τινὸς μεταβάλλοντος τῷ μεγέθει, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀρχοειδές, γίνεται τὸ μὲν θῆλυ τὸ δ' ἄρρεν.*

20. οἷον συνέβη καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις. Καὶ *ἐν Συρακούσαις*, 'for example in Syracuse' (see note on 1255 a 36). If Busolt is right (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 785. 2), this feud arose under the oligarchy of the Gamori at Syracuse shortly before it was overthrown by the demos and the serfs (see note on 1302 b 31), an event followed by Gelon's seizure of Syracuse in B.C. 485. For *ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις* cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 13, *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων*, and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7, *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων*, and see note on 1285 a 30. This story and that told about Delphi in 37 sqq. are told with added details in Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32, where we read, *ἐν δὲ Συρακούσαις δυοῖν νεανίσκων συνήθων, ὁ μὲν τὸν ἐρώμενον τοῦ ἑταίρου λαβὼν φυλάσσειν διέφθειρεν ἀποδημοῦντος· ὁ δ' ἐκείνῳ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἀνταποδιδοὺς ὕβριν ἐμοίχευσε τὴν γυναῖκα· τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων τις εἰς βουλὴν παρελθὼν ἐκέλευσεν ἀμφοτέρους ἐλαύνειν πρὶν ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἀναφλησθῆναι τὴν πόλιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῆς ἔχθρας· οὐ μὴν ἔπεισεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ*

τούτου στασιάσαντες ἐπὶ συμφοραῖς μεγάλαις τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἀνέτρεψαν. Plutarch not only, like Aristotle here, tells the two stories together, but also, as U. Köhler points out (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 491), prefixes to them a remark very similar to that made by Aristotle in 1303 b 26 sqq., οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῷ πολιτικῷ προσήκει ταῦτα (i. e. τὰς ἐκ πραγμάτων καὶ προσκρουσμάτων ἰδίων διαφορὰς) ἰᾶσθαι καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν, ὅπως τὰ μὲν οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔσται, τὰ δὲ παύσεται ταχέως, τὰ δ' οὐ λήψεται μέγεθος οὐδὲ ἅψεται τῶν δημοσίων, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μενεῖ τοῖς διαφερομένοις, αὐτόν τε προσέχοντα καὶ φράζοντα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἴδια κοινῶν καὶ μικρὰ μεγάλων αἴτια καθίσταται, παροφθέντα καὶ μὴ τυχόντα θεραπείας ἐν ἀρχῇ μηδὲ παρηγορίας. Köhler thinks that Aristotle and Plutarch derive the stories from some common source in which they were narrated together and the moral was drawn as to the duty of the statesman which both of them draw. It should be noticed, however, that the two stories are told by Plutarch in a different order, the Delphian story coming first and the Syracusan second, and the intervening story about Hestiaea being omitted; that no mention is made by Plutarch of the point on which Aristotle especially insists, the fact that the two young Syracusans belonged to the ruling class; and that the moral drawn by Plutarch is not the same as that drawn by Aristotle, for while Plutarch advises that private feuds should be prevented from spreading to public affairs, Aristotle's advice is that feuds about small matters arising between members of *leading families* should be prevented from ending in a conflagration involving the whole State. If Aristotle and Plutarch, therefore, used a common source, one or other of them must have failed to follow it closely. Other hypotheses are possible. It will be observed that the two stories told by Plutarch are love-stories, and that he does not tell the story of the two brothers who quarrelled over an inheritance at Hestiaea. This fact suggests that the source from which the two stories came to him may have been a collection of Ἐρωτικά, possibly that of the Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos, from whom he gets the story that the hostility between Aristides and Themistocles at Athens began in a love-quarrel (Aristid. c. 2, and Themist. c. 3, where the account ends, ἐκ δὲ τούτου διετέλουν καὶ περὶ τὰ δημόσια στασιάζοντες, words which remind us of the passage quoted above from Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32). Whether the more detailed form in which Plutarch gives the two stories came ultimately from the 'Constitutions' ascribed to Aristotle, as has been suggested in vol. ii. p. xix, it

is impossible to say, but Ariston of Ceos would no doubt be acquainted with the 'Constitutions.'

22. ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὄντων. Köhler remarks (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 490, note) that 'these words should not be taken to refer to the holding of definite offices, a view which has often been taken of their meaning, but to indicate that the two Syracusans belonged to the ruling class.' His interpretation of them suits the passage before us well, for it is a little surprising to hear of two νεανίσκοι holding office, and also of one of them being absent from the State, though in office, unless indeed his office was a military office. The word νεανίσκοι, however, must not be pressed too much, for one of the νεανίσκοι was old enough to have a wife, and the use of ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 2 sq., where it seems clearly to mean 'to be in office,' makes against Köhler's view. Looking to this passage we shall probably be right in interpreting the phrase in the same way in c. 3. 1302 b 6 sqq., c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq., c. 8. 1309 a 3, and the passage before us: cp. c. 8. 1308 a 5 sq., 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 12, and Thuc. 8. 89. 2.

23. ἑταῖρος ὢν τις, 'a person, though being his comrade': cp. c. 10. 1312 b 16, κηδεστὴς ὤν. We expect ἄτερος in place of τις (so Coray, placing it before ἑταῖρος), but cp. Philipp. Ἀργυρίου Ἀφανισμός, Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 469),

ἂν γὰρ ἀναθῇ τις, εὐθὺς ἕτερος ἥρπασεν,

and Epicrat. Inc. Fab. Fragm. (Meineke, 3. 371),

λάχανόν τις ἔφη στρογγύλον εἶναι,
ποίαν δ' ἄλλος, δένδρον δ' ἕτερος.

25. ὡς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν. Cp. Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 a 24 sq. (Bon. Ind. 872 b 2). If adultery was a criminal offence at Syracuse, as it was at Heracleia and Thebes and elsewhere (see note on 1306 a 36), the aggrieved husband might have prosecuted the adulterer, though the fact that he was the original offender would probably have told against him in the lawcourt. But we hear nothing of any resulting lawsuit, only of a στάσις and διάστασις.

26. διεστασίασαν, here transitive (see note on 1303 a 27).

διόπερ ἀρχομένων κ.τ.λ. Τῶν τοιούτων, 'the feuds which we have described,' cp. c. 8. 1308 a 31, τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις. Aristotle's precept is based on an early medical precept, which may be traced in Theogn. 1133,

Κύρνε, παροῦσι φίλοισι κακοῦ καταπαύσομεν ἀρχήν,
ζητῶμεν δ' ἕλκει φάρμακα φυομένῳ,

quoted by Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 308, in their note on the proverb *ἀρχὴν ἴασθαι πολὺ λώιον ἢ τελευτήν*, where they also refer to Ovid, Rem. Amor. 91 sq. and Pers. Sat. 3. 64. Compare too Xen. De Re Equestri, 4. 2, and Hippocr. Aphor. vol. iii. p. 716 Kühn.

28. *τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων*. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 525 E, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ . . . ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἀνθρωποι*.

ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἁμάρτημα, 'for the error arises in a starting-point' (or 'source'). The error referred to is the initial feud. Aristotle is led to speak of the ruling class as a starting-point, because the Greek word for 'rule' means also 'beginning.' Compare the similar play on the word in the De Pace of Isocrates, §§ 101, 105. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Laws 792 C, *ἔστι γὰρ οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη πρᾶξις διαφθορὰ μεγίστη πασῶν· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε τροφῆς*. Cp. c. 1. 1302 a 6, and De Anim. Motione, 7. 701 b 24, *ὅτι δὲ μικρὰ μεταβολὴ γινομένη ἐν ἀρχῇ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς ποιεῖ διαφορὰς ἄποθεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· οἷον τοῦ οἴακος ἀκριβῶν τι μεθισταμένου πολλὴ ἡ τῆς πρῴρας γίνεται μετάστασις*: De Gen. An. 1. 2. 716 b 3 sqq., 4. 1. 766 a 28 sqq., and 5. 7. 788 a 11, *μικραὶ μεταστάσεις μεγάλων αἰτίαι γίνονται, οὐ δ' αὐτάς, ἀλλ' ὅταν συμβαίνῃ ἀρχὴν συμμεταβάλλειν· αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ μεγέθει οὖσαι μικραὶ τῇ δυνάμει μεγάλαι εἰσίν, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὴν μὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι πολλῶν, ταύτης δ' ἄλλο ἄνωθεν μηδέν*, together with Fragm. Aristot. 85. 1491 a 2 sqq.

29. *ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἥμισυ εἶναι παντός*. As to this familiar proverb see Eaton's note and that of Leutsch and Schneidewin in Paroem. Gr. 2. 13.

30. *ἀνάλογόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν*, 'bears a similar proportion to the errors in all the other parts,' i. e. is half of the whole, and therefore is equal to them, as they can be no more. Cp. De Caelo, 1. 5. 271 b 6 sqq., and especially 11, *τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει, διόπερ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ γίνεται παμμέγεθες*.

31. *ὅλως δὲ* κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly' (i. e. whether they arise *περὶ ἐρωτικὴν αἰτίαν*, like the one at Syracuse just referred to, which involved the whole State in its consequences, or not).

32. *οἷον ἐν Ἑστιαίᾳ* κ.τ.λ. As to Hestiaea see note on 1303 a 18. As to *τὰ Μηδικά* see note on 1341 a 28. This quarrel appears to have happened between the battle of Plataea and the reduction of Hestiaea by Athens in B.C. 446. It is likely that the dissatisfied brother brought his case before a court of law, but without success.

Hestiaea was probably under an oligarchy at the time (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 64. 2), and the law or the lawcourts of an oligarchy may have favoured the richer suitor. *Ἀποφαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν* is a technical expression: cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 4. l. 8, and [Demosth.] Or. 42. in Phaenipp. cc. 1, 11, 14. It will be noticed that in 35 the treasure discovered by the father is distinguished from *ἡ οὐσία*, perhaps because it was less unequivocally the property of the deceased man. This treasure may have been a treasure buried by the Persians like that discovered by Ameinocles the Magnesian, as to which compare (with Eaton) Hdt. 7. 190. See Schneider's note. But it may also have been a treasure 'laid up' by some Greek 'for himself and his family': cp. Plato, Laws 913, where we learn what was thought of those who took up such treasures.

37. *καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς κ.τ.λ.* The story is thus told by Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32, *οἷον ἐν Δελφοῖς ὁ μέγιστος λέγεται γενέσθαι νεωτερισμὸς ὑπὸ Κράτητος, οὗ μέλλων θυγατέρα γαμεῖν Ὀργίλαος ὁ Φάλιδος, εἶτα τοῦ κρατῆρος αὐτομάτως ἐπὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς μέσου ῥαγέντος οἰωνισάμενος καὶ καταλιπὼν τὴν νύμφην ἀπῆλθε μετὰ τοῦ πατρός· ὁ δὲ Κράτης ὀλίγον ὕστερον θύουσιν αὐτοῖς ὑποβαλὼν χρυσίον τι τῶν ἱερῶν, κατεκρήμνισε τὸν Ὀργίλαον καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀκρίτους, καὶ πάλιν τῶν φίλων τινὰς καὶ οἰκείων ἱκετεύοντας ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τῆς Προναίας ἀνεῖλε· πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γενομένων, ἀποκτείναντες οἱ Δελφοὶ τὸν Κράτητα καὶ τοὺς στασιάσαντας ἐκ τῶν χρημάτων ἐναγικῶν προσαγορευθέντων τοὺς κάτω ναοὺς ἀνῳκοδόμησαν.* See also Aelian, Var. Hist. 11. 5. The name of the defaulting bridegroom should perhaps be Orsilaus, not Orgilaus. At the marriage-feast in the house of the bride's father, at the close of which the bride would be conducted in procession to her new home, and in the presence of many of her relations and friends the cratêr, or vessel for mixing wine and water, burst asunder just when the libations were being made, the worst moment at which the mischance could happen. U. Köhler (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 487) takes the *κάτω ναοί* of Plutarch to be three temples in a line with a fourth, identified by him as that of Athene Pronaia, the foundations of which have been traced below the road leading from Arachova to Delphi, a little before it crosses the brook which flows from the fountain of Castalia (see Frazer, Pausanias, 5. 251), but the point is uncertain. Aesop seems to have met a similar fate at Delphi to that which befel Orgilaus and his brother (Plut. De sera numinis vindicta, c. 12: Aristoph. Vesp. 1446 sqq. Didot). Vict. and many after him have compared the story of the jilting of a girl of the Amidei family at Florence by

young Buondelmonte (Machiavelli, Hist. of Florence, Book ii: Eng. Trans. Bohn, p. 50). The Emperor Frederick the Second, Machiavelli adds, took the side of the Amidei and Uberti, who drove out the Buondelmonti, 'and so our city came to be divided into Guelfs and Ghibellines, as the whole of Italy was for a long time.' However, Orgilaus had a better case than Buondelmonte, for the latter had no ill omen to plead. It is not surprising that Delphi was much troubled with *στάσις*, for, to begin with, it was a small State, and small States were more troubled with *στάσις* than large (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 9 sqq.), and then again we can easily imagine how many opportunities of lawful and unlawful gain the authorities of the Delphic temple must have possessed (see for instance Diod. 14. 13), and how keen in consequence must have been the struggle for political power and control over the temple. Inscriptions recently discovered at Delphi have shown also how much profit of a lawful kind the Delphians and their phratries derived from the influx of strangers desirous of consulting the oracle (see Buchheim, Beiträge zur Geschichte des delphischen Staatswesens, 1. 21 sqq.).

38. διαφορᾶς. See note on 1334 b 37.

ἐγένετο, sc. *ἡ διαφορά*. For the construction compare 1304 a 4 sqq. and 10 sqq., and see Vahlen's note on Poet. 4. 1449 a 9.

1304 a. **1. οἰωνισάμενός τι σύμπτωμα.** Not, as Vict., 'cum enim sponsus ominatus esset quendam gravem casum,' but, as Welldon, 'interpreting as an omen of evil some accidental occurrence': compare Plutarch's narrative (quoted on 1303 b 37) and also Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 1, *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔξω τῆς οἰκίας ἐγένοντο, λέγονται ἀστραπαὶ καὶ βρονταὶ αὐτῷ αἴσιοι γενέσθαι· τούτων δὲ φανέντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔτι οἰωνιζόμενοι ἐπορεύοντο.*

2. οἱ δ' ὡς ὑβρισθέντες κ.τ.λ. The bride's relations thought that they were treated with *ὕβρις*, but in reality Orgilaus' act was not one of *ὕβρις*, but of superstitious dread. We learn from Plutarch that Orgilaus and his brother were put to death without trial: cp. Aelian, Var. Hist. 11. 5, *λαβόντες οὖν αὐτοὺς ὡς θεοσύλας, ἀπήγαγον ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν, καὶ κατεκρήμνισαν κατὰ τὸν Δελφικὸν νόμον.* Precipitation from a cliff was the recognized punishment at Delphi for persons guilty of sacrilege (Paus. 10. 2. 4), and it may have been lawful, especially for men of high position like Crates, to inflict this punishment without a previous trial on offenders caught in the act. As to summary punishments of this kind see Thonissen, Droit Pénal de la République Athénienne, p. 92. Crates' subsequent

murder of friends and relatives of the victims, when suppliants in a temple, cannot, however, have been even technically legal.

4. καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Prof. Jowett's note. I agree with him that there is no inconsistency between the passage before us and the account given by Thucydides of the revolt of Mytilene, except that the deeper causes of the revolt are better set forth by the latter. Thucydides explains how the proxenus of Athens 'spurred on' the Athenians in 3. 2. 3, *Τενέδιοι γὰρ ὄντες αὐτοῖς διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναῖοι καὶ αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων, μηνυταὶ γίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ξυνοικίζουσί τε τὴν Λέσβον ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην βίᾳ καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἅπασαν μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει ἐπείγονται.* It is evident from the speech of the Mytilenean envoys in Thuc. 3. 9 sqq. that the real cause of the revolt was the fear which the Mytileneans not unnaturally entertained of the ultimate loss of their independence, and nothing would do more to intensify this fear than the consciousness that they had been denounced to the Athenians. Aristotle was for some time a resident at Mytilene (vol. i. p. 466), and he may have heard this story there, possibly from a descendant of Timophanes, or he may have heard it from his friend and pupil Theophrastus, who belonged to Eresus in Lesbos.

5. ἐγένετο, sc. *ἡ στάσις* (see note on 1303 b 38).

7. Τιμοφάνους γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We are more familiar with the Corinthian Timophanes, the brother of Timoleon, of whom we read in c. 6. 1306 a 23 sq. We do not learn whether Timophanes had made a will and bequeathed his two orphan heiresses to others than the two sons of Dexander, or why, if he had not, they did not pass in marriage to the nearest male relative (see note on 1270 a 21). Perhaps the question who the nearest male relative was may have been a disputed one and may have been decided by the magistrates or lawcourts of the Mytilenean oligarchy against Dexander, or perhaps the strict rules which prevailed at Athens with respect to succession to the hand of an orphan heiress did not prevail at Mytilene, and much was left to the discretion of the magistrate or the heir of the deceased father (as at Sparta: see note on 1270 a 21). It is evident that a precise rule as to the succession to the hand of an orphan heiress and an honest application of it by the magistrate or the lawcourt were things very conducive to the internal peace of Greek States. Aristotle's narrative does not make it clear why Dexander avenged his disappointment, not on his successful

rival, but on the State of Mytilene; probably, however, the authorities of the State had in some way or other lent support to the claims of his opponent.

8. ὁ περιωσθείς, cp. c. 6. 1306 a 32.

τοῖς υἱέσιν αὐτοῦ, 'for his own sons,' a dative of gain.

9. The difference of tense in ἦρξε and παρώξυνε (a continued action) should be noticed.

10. καὶ ἐν Φωκεῦσιν κ.τ.λ. Περὶ Μνασίαν, 'in connexion with Mnaseas': cp. Hdt. 3. 76, τὰ περὶ Πρηξάσπεα γεγονότα, 'the circumstances that had happened in connexion with Prexaspes.' Τὸν Ὀνομάρχου, sc. πατέρα. The passage before us is our only source of information with respect to this στάσις. Mnason was a friend of Aristotle (Timaeus ap. Athen. Deipn. 264 d) and was probably his informant, as Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 445) has pointed out. He seems to have given evidence favourable to the conduct of Aeschines in Phocian matters at the trial of the latter in B.C. 343 for misconduct on his second embassy to Philip, which ended in his acquittal (Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 142 sq.), and later to have become the tyrant of Elateia (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 36). His house and that of Onomarchus were among the leading houses of Phocis (Schäfer, 1. 444 sq.). As to his patronage of artists see Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 99, 107. Aristotle does not tell us in what way the quarrel between the two houses resulted in the Sacred War. The immediate causes of the war were 1. the imposition of a heavy fine by the Amphictyonic Council under the influence of Thebes on some Phocians (Onomarchus perhaps being one of them) who had cultivated land belonging to the Delphic temple, and 2. a threat that, if the fine remained unpaid, Phocis should be declared to have escheated to the Delphic god (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 11. 342: Curtius, Hist. of Greece, Eng. Trans., 5. 62 sqq.: Schäfer, 1. 443 sqq.). Aristotle probably means that the existence of this στάσις in Phocis encouraged Thebes and the Amphictyons to do what they did, or else that Mnaseas invoked the aid of Thebes. Justin (8. 1) lays the blame of the war entirely on Thebes; Aristotle, on the other hand, as a friend of Macedon, which had overthrown and ruined Phocis in the war, was perhaps not sorry to be able to point out that some leading families of Phocis itself were partly to blame (see note on 1306 a 10).

18. μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμικῶν κ.τ.λ. The change of constitution at Epidamnus here referred to may

probably be the same as that described in c. 1. 1301 b 21 sqq., but we cannot be certain of this. Does καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ imply that the troubles arising ἐκ γαμικῶν at Delphi and Mytilene and in Phocis had also led to a change of constitution?

14. ὑπομνηστευσάμενος, 'having betrothed his daughter to a man.' Ἄτερος is added in 16 with fatal results to the sentence: see note on 1306 b 9.

17. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1303 a 13. So far we have had to do with cases in which στάσις has arisen from contumely or wrong: now we learn that constitutional change may arise from the growth in reputation or power of a magistracy (such as the Council of the Areopagus) or a part of the State (such as the demos or the ναυτικὸς ὄχλος or the γνώριμοι). A similar transition from τὸ ἀτιμάζεσθαι to ὑπεροχή is made in c. 3. 1302 b 15.

20. οἷον ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ κ.τ.λ. The Council of the Areopagus had induced the poorer citizens to man the triremes and to fight at Salamis by distributing eight drachmae to each man (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 23: Plut. Themist. c. 10: see note on 1297 b 10). Cicero goes further in De Offic. 1. 22. 75, where he says of the war against the Persians, est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui a Solone erat constitutus.

21. συντονωτέραν, i.e. more approaching oligarchy (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27: Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 23 sqq.: Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 26. l. 2). Cp. 2. 12. 1273 b 39 sq.

καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος κ.τ.λ., 'and on the other hand the naval multitude, having been the cause of the victory at Salamis and by means of it of the hegemony by reason of the power [of the State] by sea, made the democracy of a more decided type.' Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 12 sqq. and Plut. Aristid. c. 22, and for ἰσχυροτέραν 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 9. With Sus. and Welldon I take διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν with what precedes, and not (as Lamb. and Stahr) with τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν. Πάλιν here, as in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 4 and other passages, 'contrarium motum vel actum significat' (Bon. Ind. 559 a 60 sqq.). Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος refers to the trireme-oarsmen who formed a large element in the Athenian demos (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23 sq.). Διὰ ταύτης, sc. τῆς νίκης.

25. καὶ ἐν Ἄργει κ.τ.λ. The γνώριμοι referred to are the thousand picked warriors of the richest class (Diod. 12. 75. 7, 80. 3), who after the battle of Mantineia in B.C. 418 'took it in hand' to overthrow the democracy at Argos, and indeed ruled the State for some months

(eight according to Diod. 12. 80. 4, but see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 7. 136. 2), and might have ruled it longer but for the brutal conduct of their leader Bryas (Paus. 2. 20. 2). See as to the thousand Thuc. 5. 67, Diod. 12. 75, 80, Plut. Alcib. c. 15, and Paus. 2. 20, with Gilbert's note in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 78. As to their success against the Lacedaemonians see Thuc. 5. 72. 3 and Diod. 12. 79. 4 sqq. That they won credit in a war with the Lacedaemonians is mentioned because this added to the credit acquired, and it is for the same reason that we are told in what follows that the war in which the Syracusan demos triumphed and won political supremacy was a war with Athens. *Καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον* recurs in c. 5. 1304 b 30, 31, 34, and c. 7. 1307 b 24. In c. 5. 1304 b 35 we have *κατελύθη ἡ δημοκρατία. Καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον, κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου* were the phrases used in the *νόμος εἰσαγγελίας*, as to which see *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 8. l. 25 sq. and Sandys' note.

27. *καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις κ.τ.λ.* For *τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου* cp. Plato, Laws 641 A, *νίκη πολέμου τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἂν γίγνοιτο*, and 638 A, *νίκην τε καὶ ἥτταν λέγοντες μάχης*: Thuc. 1. 121. 5, *μᾷ τε νίκῃ ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἁλίσκονται*. Aristotle sometimes distinguishes *ὁ δῆμος* from *οἱ ὁπλῖται* (c. 6. 1305 b 33: cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12–14). Does he mean here that the failure of the Athenians in the siege of Syracuse was brought about rather by the fleet and light troops of the Syracusans than by their hoplites and cavalry? The turning-point of the siege came when the victory of Gylippus (Thuc. 7. 6) made it possible for him to complete the building of his wall (Freeman, Sicily, 3. 254 sq.). This victory was won by the Syracusan hoplites assisted by their cavalry and light troops (*ἀκοντισταί*), but, to judge by Thucydides' account, the cavalry did more to win it than the hoplites and light troops. Aristotle may have been otherwise informed, or he may have regarded the first victory won by the Syracusan fleet in the Great Harbour (Thuc. 7. 41: Freeman, 3. 298 sqq.) as the real turning-point of the siege. There is at any rate no doubt that the Syracusan fleet and light-armed did much to make the disaster complete and irreparable (Thuc. 7. 71: 7. 81. 4: 7. 84. 4). 'The Syracusan heavy-armed infantry seems to have been of a very inferior description and never to have encountered the Athenians with effect except when supported by the Syracusan cavalry' (Arnold on Thuc. 7. 84). But the cavalry, a force not recruited from the demos, appears to have often done good service. At the same time nothing reflected more lustre on Syracuse or did

more to depress the spirits of the Athenians than the unexpected victory of her fleet (Thuc. 7. 55). Aristotle appears to consider that a polity or aristocracy (c. 10. 1312 b 6–9) existed at Syracuse from B.C. 466–5, when the tyranny was overthrown, to B.C. 413, the date of the failure of the Athenian expedition. Yet in c. 12. 1316 a 32 sq. we are told that the tyranny was succeeded by a democracy. As to the part of the Twelfth Chapter in which this statement occurs, however, see vol. i. p. 519, note 1. Thucydides (7. 55) says that the Syracusans were under a democracy at the time of the Athenian invasion. The main change in the institutions of Syracuse which was made after the Athenian repulse seems to have been that the lot came into use in appointments to magistracies (Diod. 13. 34. 6). It is perhaps this change that Aristotle has in view when he says that a polity was succeeded by a democracy. **Τὴν πολιτείαν** must apparently be supplied with *μετέβαλεν*.

29. καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known about the tyrant Phoxus at Chalcis, or about the tyrant Antileon, who is mentioned in c. 12. 1316 a 31 sq. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 66) surmises that these two tyrannies occurred as temporary breaks in the continuity of the oligarchy of the Hippobotae at Chalcis, which seems to have lasted from very early times till the reduction of Chalcis by Athens in B.C. 506. Unlike the tyranny of Antileon, which was followed by an oligarchy (1316 a 31), the tyranny of Phoxus was followed by a democracy. Hence it is not likely that Phoxus was the last tyrant of a dynasty founded by Antileon. *Φοξός* (the accent being altered, as usual, in proper names) means 'peaked in the head,' an indication of impudence ([Aristot.] Physiognom. 6. 812 a 8); Thersites is *φοξός* in Hom. Il. 2. 219. But *φοξοί* were believed often to possess great physical strength (Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6: vol. iii. p. 583 Kühn). Compare such names as Simus and Pyrrhus. The name Phoxus occurs at Phocaea (Polyaen. Strateg. 8. 37).

31. εἶχετο τῆς πολιτείας, 'took firm hold of the constitution.'

καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ κ.τ.λ. We might have expected the order of the words to be *Περίανδρον τὸν τύραννον τοῖς ἐπιθεμένοις ὁ δῆμος συνεκβαλών*, but then it would have resembled too nearly the order of the words in the preceding sentence, and therefore a different order is preferred. Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, sent his illegitimate son Gorgus to found a colony at Ambracia, and Gorgus had two sons, Psammetichus and Periander. The former in B.C. 585 succeeded Cypselus' son Periander in the tyranny of Corinth and was slain,

and the tyranny overthrown, three years later. The latter became tyrant of Ambracia and was expelled (Plutarch, Amat. c. 23, says slain), probably not long after the fall of Psammetichus at Corinth, under the circumstances narrated in c. 10. 1311 a 39 sqq. A democracy was then established at Ambracia, but as this revolution occurred early in the sixth century B.C., it is perhaps hardly likely that in the democracy then set up the low property-qualification for office existed of which we read in c. 3. 1303 a 23 sqq. It may have been introduced later. The neighbouring Corinthian colony Leucas seems to have undergone a somewhat similar change in a democratic direction (2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq.), but we are not told at what time this happened. At Corinth, on the other hand, the tyranny was succeeded by an oligarchy, which held its own for a very long time (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 90).

33. καὶ ὅλως δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'and further broadly this must not escape notice' etc. For καὶ . . . δή, see note on 1253 a 18, and cp. 1. 13. 1259 b 32, καὶ καθόλου δή. Aristotle has said that when a magistracy or a part of the State, such as the demos or the γνώριμοι, grows in reputation or influence, constitutional change is apt to follow, and now he adds the broad statement that all winners of power for the State, even if the winner is not a magistracy or an important part of the State like the demos or γνώριμοι, but only a private individual or a body of individuals, become the source of στάσις. Of men who won power for their State as magistrates and who afterwards were not willing μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων we have a conspicuous instance in Lysander (see Diod. 14. 13. 1 sq.). Themistocles may have been another (see note on 1302 b 15). Hermocrates of Syracuse made his State great by his policy of resistance to Athens and was eventually banished by his fellow-citizens (Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 27: Freeman, Sicily, 3. 429 sqq.). The Council of the Areopagus helped to make Athens great by its action before the battle of Salamis (1304 a 20 sq.: Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 23), and the honours paid it in consequence may well have aroused jealousy and caused στάσις, and ultimately led to a limitation of its powers. Aristotle may possibly have before him among other things in his reference to private individuals, and also in ὁπωσοῦν πλῆθος, the services rendered by Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans to Croton. It was during the period of their ascendency that Croton conquered and destroyed Sybaris in B.C. 510, and the honours they then earned may probably have led to the attack which was subsequently made on them and to their expul-

sion from Croton. I do not know to what tribes Aristotle refers. The Aeantid tribe at Athens covered itself with glory at Marathon and Plataea and received special honours in consequence (Plut. Sympos. 1. 10. 3, Aristid. c. 19), but whether these honours aroused the jealousy of other tribes, we are not told. The Aeschrionian tribe at Samos must have done much for the greatness of the State, for some members of it were resident in Herodotus' day in the Great Oasis, seven days' journey west of Thebes (Hdt. 3. 26), but we know of no resulting *στάσις*. It is possible that Aristotle has in view the case of Sicyon, where the tribe Aegialeis, to which the tyrant Cleisthenes belonged and on which he heaped honours (Hdt. 5. 68), may well have helped him to achieve greatness for the State with the result that *στάσις* followed and the tyranny was overthrown. That *στάσις* sometimes arose in connexion with gentes we see from the story of the Myletidae in Thuc. 6. 5. The case of the Aegeidae at Sparta (Hdt. 4. 149) may have been similar. *Ὁποιονοῦν πλῆθος*, e.g. whether composed of rich men like the 'thousand picked warriors' at Argos or of poor men like the *ναυτικὸς ὄχλος* at Athens or of philosophers like the Pythagoreans. Aristotle does not notice that those to whose mismanagement a diminution in the power of the State is due are still more often the cause of *στάσις* than those who have added to its power. The troubles, for instance, of the reigns of Richard the Second and Henry the Sixth in England were to some extent due to the loss of the possessions of the Crown in France. National ill-success had something to do with the French Revolution of 1789 and the following years. 'Throughout ancient as well as modern history defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 598).

34. **οἱ δυνάμεως αἴτιοι γενόμενοι.** Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 2, *ὁ δῆμός ἐστιν ὁ ἑλαύνων τὰς ναῦς καὶ ὁ τὴν δύναμιν περιτιθεὶς τῇ πόλει.*

37. **διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν.** Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 6, *ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν.*

38. **κινοῦνται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle here passes from cases in which one part of the State is greatly superior in position to the rest to the case in which the rich and the demos stand on an equality in respect of strength. For the thought cp. Manil. Astronom. 1. 334 (a line pronounced by Bentley to be spurious),

Semper erit paribus bellum, quia viribus aequant,

and Justin, 13. 2. 3, who says of the generals of Alexander after

his death, inter ipsos vero aequalitas discordiam augebat, nemine tantum ceteros excedente ut ei aliquis se submitteret, and 16. 3. 1, adsiduum inter pares discordiae malum. Εἶναι δοκοῦντα, because the really contrary parts of the State are the good and the bad (c. 3. 1303 b 15). That the rich and the poor are thought to be contrary we have seen in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2–11; they are treated as actually so in 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 27 sq.

1304 b. 1. οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος. Ὁ δῆμος is contrasted with οἱ πλουσίους here and in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 11 sqq., with οἱ εὔποροι in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 28, 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 9 sq., and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 6 sq., with οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25; still oftener with οἱ γνώριμοι, especially in the present Book (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq.: 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 25 sqq., 30: 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 16 sq.: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 29 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12 sq.: 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 18); elsewhere with οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς (2. 12. 1274 a 12 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 34 sq.). In 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 33 ὁ δῆμος is distinguished from οἱ ὁπλῖται, and in the passage before us by implication from τὸ μέσον. And yet we see from 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. that ὁ δῆμος includes classes many members of which must have been rich, for instance the τεχνῖται (3. 5. 1278 a 24, πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν).

5. ὀλίγοι γὰρ γίγνονται πρὸς πολλούς, 'for they come to be few against many.' See notes on 1252 b 7 and 1264 a 14, and cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24.

καθόλου μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is virtually repeated in 17, ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., and it is very possible that the passage 7–17, which intervenes between these two sentences, is a later addition, though it may well have been placed where it stands by Aristotle.

7. κινοῦσι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. This is mentioned in order that those who seek to preserve constitutions may be prepared for the various methods to which those who seek to destroy them may be expected to have recourse. Peisistratus won his tyranny on the first two occasions by deceit and on the third by force (Ἀθ. Πολ. cc. 14, 15), and Dionysius the Elder imitated him in beginning by deceit (Diod. 13. 95. 5 sq.). Lysander had sought to change the Lacedaemonian constitution by attempting to suborn various oracles to give answers in support of his policy (Diod. 14. 13), and was no doubt prepared, if necessary, to follow up his intrigue by the use of force. Tyrants were commonly conceived to win their tyrannies either by deceit or by force (Diog. Laert. 3. 83: cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 10 and

Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 9 sq.): it was Aristotle's merit to have pointed out that all persons who sought to change a constitution were apt to resort either to force or to deceit or to a combination of the two. To win by deceit was more odious than to win by force (Thuc. 4. 86. 4: Dio Cass. 52. 2. 6 sq.). We need not take Aristotle to mean that constitutional change is always effected either by force or by deceit or by a combination of the two.

10. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διττή, 'for deceit also is twofold [and therefore it is not surprising that force is so].' Καὶ γάρ here retains its full meaning, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 8. There is deceit which is eked out by a subsequent use of force, force being called in to complete what deceit has begun, and there is deceit which is not supplemented subsequently by force, but suffices by itself and is employed throughout.

12. κατέχουσιν, sc. *τὴν πολιτείαν* (cp. 15 : see Bon. Ind. 377 a 12), 'keep the constitution in their hands.' Cp. Demosth. Ol. 2. 9, *καὶ μὴν εἴ τις ὑμῶν ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ἡγεῖται, οἴεται δὲ βίᾳ καθέξειν αὐτὸν τὰ πράγματα τῷ τὰ χωρία καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα προειληφέναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται.*

οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων κ.τ.λ. 'Aristotle seems to imply that Peisander and his colleagues had overstated from the first their confidence in the promises of Alcibiades, and were not so sinned against as Thucydides describes' (Mr. E. L. Hicks in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 8. 403, note).

13. ἐξηπάτησαν, sc. *οἱ μεταβάλλοντες τὴν πολιτείαν.*

τὸν βασιλέα. The article is usually omitted (as in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 29. ll. 4, 8) when the Persian king is referred to (see Liddell and Scott s.v.).

14. ψευσάμενοι, 'after this false statement' (Welldon). Bonitz (Ind. s.v.), however, explains ψευσάμενοι as synonymous with ἐξαπατήσαντες, 10. Perhaps the latter of these two interpretations is to be preferred.

17. αὐτῶν, i. e. those living under the constitution.

19. Καθ' ἕκαστον δ' εἶδος πολιτείας κ.τ.λ., 'but [we must not rest content with ascertaining the broad causes common to all constitutions;] we must take each kind of constitution, and making these broad principles our starting-point, we must study kind by kind what happens in each.' So in c. 12. 1316 a 3 sqq. Aristotle finds fault with the Platonic Socrates for not tracing the overthrow of the best constitution to causes special to it. Μερίζοντας, sc. τὰς C. 5.

πολιτείας, 'dividing constitutions as a whole into the different kinds composing the whole.' For τὰ συμβαίνοντα cp. c. 10. 1310 b 1 sq. and see Bon. Ind. 713 a 19 sqq.

20. αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is taken up by μὲν οὖν. 1305 a 34, and then answered by δέ in c. 6. 1305 a 37. In the chapter before us Aristotle dwells only on those modes of change special to democracy which are most apt to affect democracies (μάλιστα, 20: yet πᾶσαι σχεδόν, 1305 a 35). Demagogues are especially fatal to them, causing them to change into oligarchies and formerly into tyrannies, and also causing them to change from the traditional kind of democracy into the ultimate democracy. We have been told in c. 3. 1302 b 6 sqq. that ὕβρις and πλεονεξία in magistrates are sources of constitutional change, but now we learn that the misconduct of demagogues, who are not necessarily magistrates, is a source of constitutional change in democracies. That there are other causes of change in democracies not special to them, we have learnt already. They are subject to changes arising from contempt engendered by disorder (c. 3. 1302 b 27 sqq.), from the disproportionate increase of a class (in their case the rich: cp. c. 3. 1303 a 10 sqq.), from the admission to important offices of men unfriendly to the constitution (c. 3. 1303 a 16 sqq.), and from the aggrandizement of single individuals or a few persons (c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.), to mention no others. Plato had ascribed the fall of democracies rather to ἡ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία (Rep. 562 B, 564 A) than to the license of demagogues; he had also said (Rep. 564 A: cp. c. 12. 1316 a 22 sq.) that democracies tended to change into tyrannies, and Aristotle agrees that this is especially true of the extreme democracy (see note on 1316 a 24), but he thinks, as the chapter before us shows, that democracies were in his own day less apt to change into tyrannies than they had once been, and that their tendency then was rather to change into oligarchies (cp. c. 12. 1316 a 23 sq.). The view that the 'impudent license' of demagogues leads to the fall of democracies comes to Aristotle from Lysias (Or. 25. 27, quoted by Eaton) and from Isocrates (De Pace, §§ 108, 123). In the hope of counteracting this source of change in democracies Aristotle gives some wholesome advice in c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq. and c. 9. 1310 a 2 sqq., and also in 8 (6). 5, where he suggests means of checking the abuse of the lawcourts by demagogues. Possibly too the advice given in c. 8. 1308 b 10 sqq. not to make any single individual overgreat refers

to demagogues among others, though it seems rather to refer to the aggrandizement of magistrates. It will be noticed that in 8 (6). 5 what he dreads for the extreme democracy is not its conversion into a tyranny, but its tendency to alienate the rich. Democracies do not seem, to judge by the chapter before us, often to have changed into aristocracies or polities, nor do we often hear of the extreme democracy changing into *ἡ πατρία δημοκρατία*. Yet that this sometimes occurred seems clear from c. 6. 1306 b 21, *ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνας*.

21. *τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν*. The passage before us should be compared with 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq. In all these three passages some light is thrown on the ways in which the rich were oppressed in those democracies in which they suffered oppression. In 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. democracy is said not only to exile the notables, but also to destroy them secretly and openly. Of this we do not hear anything in the passage before us or in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq. The demagogues are said in the passage before us to oppress the rich in a variety of ways. Sometimes they made the rich as a class the object of their attacks, setting the many on them (cp. c. 9. 1310 a 3 sqq.); sometimes they singled out individual rich men for attack and brought calumnious accusations against them with a view to the confiscation of their property, or confiscated their property without these preliminary accusations, often exiling them to make the thing easier (we do not learn whether in these cases confiscation was effected by the assembly—cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6, *δημαύσεως*—or by the dicasteries); sometimes, again, they robbed the rich of part of their income by imposing heavy liturgies upon them (cp. c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq.). From the third passage, 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq., we gather that what the rich had to fear in a democracy was rather the confiscation of their property by dicasteries and as a result of 'public actions' than its confiscation by the assembly, and that they were especially exposed to oppression in those extreme democracies in which, the assembly being a very numerous body, a large sum of money was required to provide it with pay, and there were no special revenues to supply the pay. In such democracies the eisphora would be heavy, confiscations frequent, and the dicasteries bad. We sometimes find democracy credited with a leaning to a general redivision of the land and a cancelling of debts—e. g. by Plato (Rep. 565 E sq.) and Polybius (6. 9. 8 sq.: cp. Justin, 16. 4. 2)—but of this Aristotle says nothing.

22. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is based on Plato, Rep. 565 A–B. Compare the circumstances under which the famous σκυταλισμός at Argos arose, which are thus narrated by Diodorus (15. 58. 1), τῆς πόλεως τῶν Ἀργείων δημοκρατουμένης καί τινων δημαγωγῶν παροξυνόντων τὸ πλῆθος κατὰ τῶν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις καὶ δόξαις ὑπερεχόντων, οἱ διαβαλλόμενοι συστάντες ἔγνωσαν καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον κ.τ.λ., though it is not clear that in this instance the demagogues singled out individual rich men for calumnious attack.

23. συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς φόβος. Cp. Plut. De Solert. Anim. c. 31, ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστορεῖ φιλίας ἀλωπέκων καὶ ὄφεων διὰ τὸ κοινὸν αὐτοῖς πολέμιον εἶναι τὸν ἀετόν, however the fox and snake are said to be friends in Hist. An. 9. 1. 610a 12: cp. also Rhet. 1. 6. 1362b 36, οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐνίοτε ταὐτὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· ὅθεν λέγεται ὡς τὰ κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν ᾖ ταὐτὸ βλαβερὸν ἀμφοῖν.

24. ἐπάγοντες, 'setting on,' as hunters do dogs (Hom. Odyss. 19. 445: Xen. Cyneg. 10. 19: Plut. Pelop. c. 29: see Liddell and Scott s.v.).

τοῦτο, i. e. the overthrow of democracies owing to the misconduct of demagogues.

25. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Κῷ κ.τ.λ. Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 427) connects this change with the defection of Cos from the Athenian Confederacy in B.C. 357 (Diod. 16. 7. 3), but nothing is certainly known as to its date. We notice that the examples which follow are taken from Dorian States (Cos, Rhodes, the Pontic Heracleia, and Megara).

27. καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1302b 23. The demagogues at Rhodes, in their anxiety to provide funds for the supply of pay to the poorer citizens (for attendance probably at the assembly and dicasteries, etc.), seem to have prevented, or at any rate delayed, the payment to the trierarchs (who would of course belong to the class of γνώριμοι) of sums due to them from the State for work done by ship-builders or ship-fitters by their direction, the result being that the ship-builders or ship-fitters brought actions against the trierarchs for the recovery of the money owing to them. In other words the demagogues obtained the means of providing pay for the poorer citizens by leaving expenses in connexion with ship-building or ship-fitting for which the State was properly responsible to be defrayed by the trierarchs. As to liturgies at Rhodes connected with the navy see Strabo, p. 653, where however a lacuna in

the text makes the exact nature of the liturgy obscure. At Rhodes there was a refusal under the influence of demagogues to pay money justly due to γνώριμοι from the State, or at any rate a delay to pay it; at Heracleia, Megara, and Cyme the demagogues went further and exiled many of the γνώριμοι.

28. ἐπόριζον . . . ἐκώλυον. The tense used shows that the demagogues kept doing this (cp. 33, ἐξέπιπτον, and 36, ἐξέβαλλον).

29. διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας. Cp. Diod. 20. 62. 5, ὁ δὲ φοβηθεὶς τὰς ἐπιφερομένας εὐθύνας καὶ κρίσεις ἀπεχώρησεν εἰς τὴν Γέλαν.

31. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ κ.τ.λ. What Heracleia is here referred to? The Trachinian Heracleia according to C. O. Müller and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 190. 2), the Pontic Heracleia according to Bonitz (Ind. 319 b 39), Sus.[2] (Note 1555), and Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 395). The latter view is probably correct, for though in c. 6. 1305 b 36 we have ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ as the designation of this city, the words ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ (without τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ) in c. 6. 1305 b 5 and 1306 a 37 appear to refer to the Pontic Heracleia, as do the words ἡ πόλις τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν in 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 14. So in Diog. Laert. 7. 166 πόλεως δὲ Ἡρακλείας refers to the Pontic Heracleia. This was a colony of Megara, founded in the middle of the sixth century B.C. (see note on 1303 a 36), and it would seem from the passage before us to have been at the outset democratically governed. It is not clear whether it is to this democracy that Aeneas refers in Poliorc. 11. 10, or to a democracy of a later date (see note on 1305 b 33). The chronology of the constitutional changes at Megara in the sixth century B.C. is too little known to us to allow of a certain answer to the question whether a democracy existed at Megara when it founded Heracleia, but this may possibly have been the case (Plut. Quaest. Gr. cc. 18, 59: see note on 1300 a 17). The transition to Megara in 34 sqq. makes in favour of the view that the Pontic Heracleia is referred to. The demagogues appear to have behaved in much the same way in the mother-city and in the colony, and with fatal results to the democracy in both places. We observe that the contrast of δῆμος and γνώριμοι existed in Heracleia immediately after the foundation of the colony; this seems to show that the original lots of land there cannot have been equal (see note on 1266 b 1). Newly founded cities were often in a disturbed state (Isocr. De Pace, § 49, χεῖρον καὶ ταραχωδέστερον τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν διοικοῦμεν τῶν ἄρτι τὰς πόλεις οἰκιζόντων).

32. Some light is thrown on the meaning of **ἀδικούμενοι** by 1305 a 3–5.

34. παραπλησίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1300 a 17. It appears from c. 3. 1302 b 31 that the democracy at Megara referred to fell not only owing to the conduct of the demagogues, but also because much *ἀταξία καὶ ἀναρχία* prevailed under it. The democracies introduced by Thebes in the cities of Achaia fell in a somewhat similar way to this Megarian democracy (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 43).

36. ἵνα χρήματα ἔχωσι δημεύειν, 'in order to be able to confiscate property': cp. 1305 a 6 sq. The proceeds of the confiscated property, or whatever part of them was not plundered on the way by the demagogues, would be distributed among the poorer citizens or used to provide them with pay for attendance at the assembly and dicasteries. 'Nullo loco Aristoteles optativo post particulas finales utitur, sed promiscue et post tempus praesens et post praeteritum coniunctivum adhibet' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 52). In 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35, *τεχνασταῖον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνος*, according to Eucken, 'videtur particula *ὅπως* vi plane relativa uti,' and in Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 9–12 Eucken would read *γίνωνται* with M^b in place of *γίγνοιντο*. Weber, however (Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 25), retains *γίγνοιντο* and explains it by attraction to *ποιοῦσι*. He produces (ibid.) another exception to the rule (overlooked apparently by Eucken), Hist. An. 9. 9. 614 b 14, *καὶ τιθασσευόμενος δέ τις ἤδη ἀμύγδαλον εἰς ῥωγμὴν ξύλου ἐνθείς, ὅπως ἐναρμοσθὲν ὑπομείνειεν αὐτοῦ τὴν πληγήν, ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ πληγῇ διέκοψε καὶ κατήσθιε τὸ μαλακόν*, but adds that this exception does not interfere with our acceptance of the rule.

39. τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, perhaps 'the well-known oligarchy': cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq.

συνέβη δὲ ταὐτὸν κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known about these events. Which Cyme is referred to, is uncertain both here and in 2. 8. 1269 a 1. 'Forma generis neutrius *ταὐτόν* saepe legitur non solum ante vocales, verum etiam ante consonantes' (Bon. Ind. 125 b 16).

1305 a. **2. τῶν ἄλλων,** sc. *πόλεων*. See note on 1266 b 1.

3. ἵνα χαρίζωνται, sc. *τῷ δήμῳ*, the mark of a demagogue (see Plato, Gorg. 502 E, and note on 1274 a 5).

4. ἢ τὰς οὐσίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 8. 1309 a 15 sqq. 'It is curious that in both places *ἀναδάστους* is applied somewhat loosely to the second substantive. The annual proceeds are not *re*-divided' (Richards). See notes on 1257 a 21, 1297 a 40, and 1297 b 27.

7. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων κ.τ.λ. For this expression see notes on 1303 b 20 and 1285 a 30. In *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 28. l. 28 sqq. Nicias, Thucydides son of Melesias, and Theramenes are marked off from *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι*. *Μετέβαλλον*, sc. *αἱ δημοκρατίαι*. We read in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 22 *ὅτι Πεισίστρατος δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὢν τύραννος κατέστη*. Plato (Rep. 565 C sqq.), following Herodotus (3. 82) and Euripides (Fragm. 628 Nauck: 626, ed. 2), had depicted the conversion of the *δήμου προστάτης* into a tyrant, evidently holding that the change was as likely to occur in his own time as in earlier days, but Aristotle thinks otherwise for three reasons—1. the modern demagogue was not, like the demagogue of earlier times, a man of military skill and prowess, therefore he was not equally able to seize power by force; 2. great magistracies held by individuals were rarer than they had been; 3. the demos no longer lived a busy life in the country, so as to be unable to control the action of its champion in the city, but dwelt to a large extent in the city. It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle speaks of the change of democracy into tyranny in c. 8. 1308 a 20 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq. without any intimation that it was of rarer occurrence than it had once been. Cypselus, the founder of the tyranny at Corinth, was a demagogue (c. 10. 1310 b 29: c. 12. 1315 b 27) and also polemarch (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 58: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 392). Panaetius of Leontini (Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 47), Peisistratus, and Dionysius the Elder were, like him, both demagogues and holders of high military offices. The same thing is true of Euphron, who made himself tyrant of Sicyon in B.C. 368 or soon after (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 44 sqq.). The tyrants of mediaeval Italy also were commonly men of military prowess, though this is not true of the founders of the Medicean dynasty (Roscher, Politik, p. 684). Military prowess alone, however, did not usually suffice in ancient Greece to enable a man to win a tyranny; he had also to gain the confidence of the demos by action hostile to the rich. Plato had said much the same in Rep. 565 D sq., but he goes farther than Aristotle in that passage, for he speaks as if tyranny *always* arose *ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης*, whereas Aristotle only says that *most* of the ancient tyrants had been demagogues before they were tyrants. There were, in fact, kings (like Pheidon of Argos), and holders of great offices (like the tyrants of Ionia, and also Phalaris) who had made themselves tyrants without having been demagogues (c. 10. 1310 b 18–29). The same thing holds

of δυνάσται in oligarchies (c. 8. 1308 a 22 sqq.), and of commanders of mercenary troops (c. 6. 1306 a 21 sqq.). Indeed we gather that any citizen who surpassed the rest in wealth and influence was often suspected of a design to make himself tyrant (3. 13. 1284 a 20 sqq.: 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.: Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 22: Diod. 19. 1). That the orators at Athens were no longer also the generals of the State had already been remarked by Isocrates (De Pace, § 54 sqq.: cp. Philip. § 140). Phocion, indeed, made it his aim, according to Plut. Phocion, c. 7, to be both ῥήτωρ and στρατηγός, as Solon Aristides and Pericles had been (see this passage, which confirms what Aristotle says), but he probably stood almost alone in this ambition at Athens. At Thebes, however, Epaminondas and Pelopidas were surely both δημαγωγοί and στρατηγοί.

8. σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 14, σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστα τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν ὡς εἰκεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους, where ἀρχαίων disappears, and Plato, Rep. 565 D sq. For τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 18, τὰς ἀρχαίας τυραννίδας. 'With ἀρχαίων the perfect γεγόνασιν is hardly logical. I have noticed a few similar uses, e. g. Thuc. 1. 50. 2, γεγένηται: Plato, Apol. Socr. 28 C, τετελευτήκασιν: Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 70, περιγεγόνασι. In all these places the perfect seems = the aorist. Γέγονα is very commonly thus used in late Greek, e. g. in giving a man's date, γέγονε κατὰ τὴν . . . 'Ολυμπιάδα' (Richards).

11. οὐ γάρ πω δεινοὶ ἦσαν λέγειν, 'nondum hominibus dicendi facultatem adeptis' (Sepulveda). I prefer this interpretation to that of Sus., 'because there were as yet no trained speakers' ('weil es damals noch keine geschulten Redner gab'). It seems better to render ἦσαν 'men were' than 'there were.'

14. πλὴν εἴ που κ.τ.λ., 'except if anywhere one or two cases of the kind have occurred.' For βραχύ τι cp. Plato, Rep. 496 B and Laws 711 D. 'Βραχύ τι, per breve tempus?,' suggests Bonitz (Ind. 143 a 44), but I do not think that he can be right. To what cases Aristotle refers is unknown.

15. ἐγίγνοντο δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 20 sqq. and c. 8. 1308 a 20 sqq., from which passages we learn that the tenure of great offices for long terms was especially apt to result in tyranny, and that great offices were often held for long terms even in democracies in early days, though not many would be so in the democracies of Aristotle's own day (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq.).

16. ὥσπερ ἐν Μιλήτῳ ἐκ τῆς πρυτανείας. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt.

2. 139. 2) thinks that the tyranny of Thrasybulus (Hdt. 1. 20) is here referred to as arising out of the office of prytanis. The same thing is said of tyranny throughout Ionia in c. 10. 1310b 28 sq. The prytanis at Miletus appears to have been a sole magistrate, like the annual prytanis who took the place of the king at Corinth under the Bacchiadae (Diod. 7. 9. 5: Paus. 2. 4. 4), and unlike the later prytaneis at Rhodes, who were six in number (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 178). As to the title see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.

18. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τότε τὰς πόλεις κ.τ.λ. Τὰς πόλεις here must mean 'the cities,' not, as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sq. and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22, 'the States.' As the demos lived a busy life in the country, it could not itself rule, and it was obliged to allow the leader whom it trusted to seize and exercise supreme power. The Eupatridae lived in the city, the demos lived in the country and were mostly tillers of the soil (Etymol. Magn. p. 395. 50: Thuc. 1. 126. 7, 2. 14). Thus the ἄγροικοι formed in early days a large section of the demos at Athens ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 13: see Sandys' note). Compare Theogn. 55 sqq., and as to Epidaurus Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 1. Compare what we read of the Allobroges at a far later time (Strabo, p. 186, Ἀλλόβριγες δὲ . . . γεωργοῦσι τὰ πεδία καὶ τοὺς αὐλῶνας τοὺς ἐν ταῖς Ἄλπεσι· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κωμηδὸν ζῶσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπιφανέστατοι τὴν Οὐίεννων ἔχοντες . . . κατεσκευάκασι πόλιν). At Plataea in the fourth century B. C. the peasants lived in the city (Paus. 9. 1. 4–7), but this was owing to their distrust of the Thebans. Tanagra is a better instance of a 'peasant-town.' There the townsmen were largely tillers of the soil (Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus, c. 9: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 257). In c. 10. 1310 b 17 sqq. the acquisition of tyrannies by demagogues is said to have occurred ἤδη τῶν πόλεων ηὐξημένων, where τῶν πόλεων probably means 'the States' (see note); the cities may well have been small, however, even if we take τῶν πόλεων to mean 'the cities.'

20. οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου here takes the place of οἱ δημαγωγοί, 11. In c. 6. 1305 a 39, 40 προστάτης is explained by ἡγεμών. Οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου is probably a somewhat narrower term than οἱ δημαγωγοί, for not every demagogue would be one of the heads of the demos. For τυραννίδι ἐπετίθεντο see note on 1305 b 41.

21. πάντες δὲ τοῦτο ἔδρων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευθέντες. Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 14 sqq.

23. Πεισίστρατος, sc. ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος.

24. τοὺς πεδιακούς. The form πεδιακός recurs in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13.

The more usual form is *πεδιεῖς* (see Sandys' note). Cp. Plato, Rep. 566 A, *οὗτος δή, ἔφην, ὁ στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας;* In Diog. Laert. 1. 58 the Pedieis are distinguished from *οἱ ἐξ ἄστεως* as well as from *οἱ παράλιοι*.

καὶ Θεαγένης κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known from any other source of the exploit mentioned in the text.

25. λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπινέμοντας, 'having caught them grazing their herds and flocks in land not their own by the river.' '*Επινέμειν* est in alieno agro pascere' (Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 843 D): cp. Demosth. Or. 55. in Callicl. c. 11.

26. καὶ Διονύσιος κ.τ.λ. Daphnaeus was one of the Syracusan generals who failed to save Agrigentum from capture by the Carthaginians and who were consequently accused by Dionysius the Elder before the Syracusan assembly and dismissed from office, Dionysius himself being one of the generals appointed in their place (Diod. 13. 86–92). When Dionysius had made himself tyrant, Daphnaeus became one of his chief opponents till Dionysius convoked an assembly and had him put to death (Diod. 13. 96. 4). We can guess what allegations Dionysius would make against generals who were rich men from Diod. 13. 91. 5.

28. ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν. It was Peisistratus' reputation for being *δημοτικός* that more than anything else enabled him to become tyrant (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 13. l. 21 : c. 14 *init.* : c. 16. l. 29 sq.).

μεταβάλλουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply *αἱ δημοκρατίαι*. Cp. c. 6. 1306 b 17 sqq., where however the contrast is between *αἱ ἔννομοι δημοκρατίαι* and *αἱ κύριοι*. We have *ἡ πατρία δημοκρατία* here, but *ἡ πάτριος δημοκρατία* in 2. 12. 1273 b 38. *Πάτριος* is the more common form of the fem. in Aristotle's writings (see critical note on 1285 b 5), but all the MSS. have *πατρίας* here except P^4, which has *πατρίδος* wrongly: in 3. 14. 1285 b 5 only Π^2 and possibly Γ have *πάτριαι*. *Τὴν νεωτάτην*, cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41, *τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη*. Polybius (6. 57) gives a somewhat similar account of the change of democracy into ochlocracy. We gather from the passage before us that in the *πατρία δημοκρατία* there may be no property-qualification for office, and this agrees with 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27–32. The absence of a property-qualification for office is said to be characteristic of democracy in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 9 sq. (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 22 sq.); yet it would seem from 2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 21 sqq.) that the absence of a property-qualification for office makes a constitution

too democratic; hence a *πατρία δημοκρατία* in which there is none is defective. It is true that in a polity there may be no property-qualification for office (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq.), but then in a well-organized polity it is not the demos that elects to office, but the hoplites (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sq.). The teaching of Aristotle in the passage before us is in effect that if in a *πατρία δημοκρατία* there is no property-qualification for office and the demos elects, a keen competition for office results (see note on 1303 a 14), and the competitors make rival bids for the favour of the demos with the result that they eventually place the demos in a position of superiority to the laws. (Thurot has already pointed out in Études sur Aristote, p. 82, referring to c. 6. 1305 b 30 sqq., that even when there is a property-qualification for office, candidates for office will do the same thing; hence he proposes to place *μὴ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων δέ* after *ὁ δῆμος*, translating 'où l'élection est faite par le peuple entier, sans condition de cens,' while Sus. proposes to omit these words, but the tendency to demagogy would at any rate be stronger where there was no property-qualification for office. For one thing the competitors would be more numerous.) Aristotle adds that this would happen less often if the magistrates were elected not by the demos as a whole, but by the tribes. We do not learn whether what he recommends is that the right of electing the magistrates should fall to each tribe in turn (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.), or that one tribe should elect to one magistracy and another to another, or that the magistracies should be organized as boards and that each tribe should elect a member of each of the boards. Perhaps he would prefer the last-mentioned alternative. Chorêgi, *τειχοποιοί*, *ταφροποιοί*, and *τριηροποιοί* were elected by the tribes at Athens (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 202), and at one time the preliminary selection of the persons out of whom the magistrates appointed by lot were so chosen seems to have rested (with one or two exceptions) with the tribes (Gilbert, ibid., p. 217: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 145). Election by the tribe would have the advantage that no competitor for office, however eager he might be, would be likely to make the tribe with which the election lay superior to the laws. At Rome even in its democratic days the assemblies voted not *per capita* as in Greece, but by divisions (curiae, centuriae, tribus)—see Roscher, Politik, p. 343, and Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 168—but Aristotle would hardly have been satisfied with this. He seems to have desired

that the magistrates should be elected, not in a collective assembly of the citizens, but by each tribe meeting separately from the rest. The evil of which he complains would be remedied by the adoption of the lot in appointments to office, but he probably does not think the lot a fit means of filling high offices in a πατρία δημοκρατία (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.); some offices, indeed, could not well be filled by lot. Another remedy would be, as Thurot says, to introduce a property-qualification for office, but this it might be difficult to do under the circumstances described in the text. Aristotle forgets to mention in the passage before us that an abundance of pay must be forthcoming before an ultimate democracy can come into being even in a State in which there is no property-qualification for office (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sqq.). The experience of modern States has confirmed Aristotle's view that the filling of the highest offices by popular election has its dangers, but it has taught us that these dangers exist, whether the election is made in a collective assembly or not. The influential men who compete for high office are exposed to the temptation of making rival bids for popular support, and of promising, where the institutions of the State give them opportunities of fulfilling their promises, to promote an alteration of the constitution in a popular direction.

32. ἄκος δὲ τοῦ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1267 a 3. If ἄκος is here used in its usual sense of 'remedy,' τοῦ κ.τ.λ. will be in the genitive after it and will express the effect of the remedy.

C. 6. **37 sqq.** In the sixth chapter we have in strictness to do only with those causes of the fall of oligarchies which are special to them: still some of the causes enumerated must have affected other constitutions also; we know, for instance, that the paucity of those admitted to office was perilous to aristocracies as well as to oligarchies (c. 7. 1306 b 22 sqq.). Causes which affect oligarchies in common with other constitutions have been already dealt with in cc. 3 and 4 (for instance in c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. and 1303 a 16 sqq. and in c. 4. 1304 a 17 sqq.). Some additional causes of the fall of oligarchies over and above those mentioned in cc. 3, 4, and 6 may be gleaned from c. 8. 1308 a 18 sqq. and c. 10. 1310 b 22 sq., where the long tenure of a great office by one man or the union of several great offices in the hands of one man is said to be often fatal to them (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq. and 3. 15. 1286 b 16 sqq.), and from 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 14 sqq. and 26 sqq., whence we gather that oligarchies were often overthrown owing to their making no satis-

factory provision for the admission of deserving members of the demos into the privileged body, and owing to the defective numbers and quality of their light-armed troops. On two or three points Aristotle differs from Plato. The latter had said in Rep. 564 A, *εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας*: Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that extreme oligarchy was specially apt to pass into tyranny (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq.: cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 16 sq. and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.). Plato, again, had spoken in a passage of the Republic (545 D: cp. Laws 683 E) as if changes of constitution were always due to quarrels among the holders of supreme power: Aristotle, on the contrary, points out in the chapter before us that oligarchies were often overthrown without discord among the oligarchs. Indeed, oligarchies based on a property-qualification (and polities also) might owe their fall to a mere accidental rise of the average level of the wealth of the individual members of the State. So again in Rep. 551 D sq. Plato had spoken of oligarchies as unable to make war without risk of overthrow, and hence Aristotle is careful to point out that they ran a similar risk in time of peace (1306 a 19 sqq.). The sixth chapter distinguishes between *ἔννομοι* and *κύριοι ὀλιγαρχίαι* (1306 b 20 sq.), but it takes no account of this distinction in dealing with the causes of the fall of oligarchies; it is evident, however, that most of the causes which it enumerates would affect *κύριοι ὀλιγαρχίαι* in a higher degree than *ἔννομοι*. Not a few of these causes were probably pointed out here for the first time; there is more that was new in this chapter than in the preceding one. Here and there we may suspect that Aristotle exalts the occasions of constitutional change into its causes.

Αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαι κ.τ.λ. The use of *διά* in *διὰ δύο τρόπους* ('owing to two modes') is remarkable. In c. 11. 1314 a 29 we have *ὁ μὲν οὖν εἷς τρόπος δι' οὗ γίγνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν*. The two *φανερώτατοι τρόποι* are (1) *ἐὰν ἀδικῶσι* (sc. *οἱ ὀλιγαρχοῦντες*) *τὸ πλῆθος*, or if in some other way civil discord originates with others than the oligarchs (see note on 1305 b 1), and (2) if it originates with the oligarchs.

38. *ἕνα μέν* has nothing strictly answering to it, but is virtually taken up in 1305 b 22, *κινοῦνται δ' αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.*

39. *πᾶς γὰρ ἱκανὸς γίνεται προστάτης*, i. e. *πᾶς γὰρ προστάτης (καὶ ὁ τυχὼν) γίνεται ἱκανός* (Coray, p. 329).

μάλιστα δέ, sc. *ἱκανὸς γίνεται*, not, I think, *μεταβάλλουσιν*.

ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας = ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων: cp. c. 1. 1302 a 12.

40. καθάπερ ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις κ.τ.λ. Supply ἐγένετο ὁ τύραννος. As to Lygdamis see Hdt. 1. 61, 64, Aristot. Fragm. 517 (from the 'Constitution of the Naxians' ascribed to Aristotle, ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 348), Oecon. 2. 1346 b 7 sqq., and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 15 with Sandys' notes. The fragment of the 'Constitution of the Naxians' traces the Naxian στάσις to an outrage committed by some young Naxians of the wealthy class on a fellow-citizen named Telestagoras belonging to the same class and his two daughters, not on members of the demos, but it is likely enough that similar outrages were also committed on the demos. We find Lygdamis first heading the Naxian demos in its successful revolt against the oligarchs and establishing, it would seem, a democracy in place of the pre-existing oligarchy, then after an interval of uncertain length visiting Eretria to offer Peisistratus aid in men and money in acquiring for the third time the tyranny at Athens—whether as head of the Naxian democracy or after his own fall from power or the fall of the democracy, we do not know—and thus paving the way for his own accession to the tyranny of Naxos, which followed on Peisistratus' capture of the island. When the fragment of the 'Constitution of the Naxians' says that Lygdamis became tyrant of Naxos in consequence of his leadership of the people against the authors of the outrage referred to, the statement may be so far correct that, if he had not led the demos, he would not have been in a position to induce Peisistratus to make him tyrant. See Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 324. 3.

1305 b. 1. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφοράς. Compare 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διαφορὰς πλείους. Ἄλλων has been interpreted in many different ways. Sepulveda, Giphanius, Heinsius, and Göttling take it to mean ἄλλων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους, but if we so take it, it is difficult to explain the mention in 1305 b 18 sqq. of the revolution at Erythrae, which was caused by the demos, and also to explain καί, for we have not been clearly told that, when civil discord originates with the many, it originates in different ways. Stahr's interpretation, 'from other causes than that just mentioned' ('es gehen aber auch noch aus andern Ursachen die Anfänge zu Revolutionen hervor, die verschiedene Erscheinungen bieten'), escapes the first of these difficulties, but ἄλλων in ἐξ ἄλλων is probably masculine. Vict. explains ἄλλων as 'others than those

who have governed oppressively' ('expertibus illius iniustae potestatis'), but not, I think, rightly. The natural meaning of *ἄλλων* appears to me to be *ἄλλων ἢ τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων*: I translate, therefore, 'but when civil discord originates also with others than the oligarchs [as well as when it originates with the oligarchs], it originates in different ways.' That civil discord originating with the oligarchs originates in different ways, we see from 1305 b 22 sqq. Some would emend *ἄλλων*, but the emendations hitherto proposed do not seem satisfactory. *Αὐτῶν* is suggested in place of it in the margin of the third Basle edition of Aristotle and is read by Schneider, Coray, and Welldon; *αὑτῶν* by Nickes and Congreve. Spengel, followed by Sus., would read *ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἀρχὴν στάσεως διαφορά*. But if we read *αὐτῶν*, *αὑτῶν*, or *ἀλλήλων*, we must take these words to mean *τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων*: the examples which follow, however, are of changes of constitution brought about not by *οἱ ὀλιγαρχοῦντες*, but by *εὔποροι* or *γνώριμοι* excluded from office, as Prof. Jowett has already pointed out, or else by the spontaneous action of the demos, as at Erythrae.

2. *ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* There is nothing to answer to this *μέν*, but Aristotle intended to go on 'and sometimes from the demos.'

οὐ τῶν ὄντων δ' ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. For the phrase see note on 1303 b 22.

3. *γίγνεται καταλυσις*. Cp. c. 11. 1314 a 30, *γίγνεται σωτηρία*. At Istrus there was a complete *κατάλυσις* of oligarchy, but at Massalia and Heracleia only a *κατάλυσις* of the extreme oligarchy in favour of a moderate form.

4. *οἷον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ κ.τ.λ.* As to the repetition of *ἐν* here see notes on 1294 a 12 and 1325 b 10, and cp. Plato, Rep. 563 E, *ἐν ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα*, and Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 3, *ἐπείπερ ἔγνωσαν τὸ πείθεσθαι μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν στρατιᾷ καὶ ἐν οἴκῳ*. In the States here mentioned it was the rule that father and son or more brothers than one should not be in office at the same time. The object of the rule no doubt was to place on an equal footing the various households comprised within the privileged class and to prevent any one of them acquiring a disproportionate share of power, but this object might have been attained equally well if three or four members of each household, not one or two only, had been allowed to be in office at the same time, and then the number of those in office would not have been so small. At Venice three members of the same family

could be Senators at the same time (Yriarte, Patricien de Venise, p. 76), though two nobles from the same quarter of the city or the same family could not be Counsellors of the Doge at the same time (Yriarte, p. 349). The rule mentioned by Aristotle finds many parallels in mediaeval Italy. Thus at Siena there were five families two of whose members 'could be in the government at the same time, while for all other families the number was limited to one' (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 73). So again in the Republic of San Marino, 'as of old at Venice, precautions are taken that family rings should not dominate the State, for' in elections to the Council 'but one member from each family may be chosen, and if personal interests are discussed in Council, the Statutes provide that relations to the third degree shall leave the hall' (E. Armstrong, 'A Political Survival,' *Macmillan's Magazine*, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 199). Spinoza adopts a similar rule for the judges and councils of an aristocracy (Tractat. Polit. c. 8. 39, quamvis non opus sit ut unusquisque (iudex) ex diversa sit familia, necesse tamen est ne duo sanguine propinqui simul in subselliis locum occupent; quod in reliquis conciliis observandum est, praeterquam in supremo, in quo sufficit, si modo in electionibus lege cautum sit ne cuiquam propinquum nominare, nec de eo, si ab alio nominatus sit, suffragium ferre liceat, et praeterea ne ad imperii ministrum quemcumque nominandum duo propinqui sortem ex urna tollant). If, as is probable, the Heracleia here mentioned is the Pontic Heracleia, the three States instanced by Aristotle were all of them situated in positions of peril on the outskirts of the Hellenic world, and precautions of this kind would be especially in place under those circumstances; the restriction, however, also existed at Cnidus (12 sqq.), which was in a different geographical position.

6. ἐκίνουν, 'turbas ciebant' (Sus.[2], 'Unruhen erregten'): cp. Polyb. 1. 69. 6, πλεῖστα κεκινηκὼς κατὰ τὰς προειρημένας ταραχάς.

10. καὶ ἔνθα μὲν πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλιγαρχία, i. e. ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ. For πολιτικωτέρα cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 39. It was at this time in all probability that the machinery was devised by which members of the demos were admitted to the privileged class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 29 sqq., where Aristotle gives it his approval). In B.C. 196 (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 200) and in the time of Strabo (p. 179) the city was ruled by a Council of 600 timuchi, holding office for life, who were required to be fathers of children and to be

descended from three generations of citizens, but it is doubtful whether this supreme Council of 600 came into existence on this occasion, for in that case we might have expected Aristotle to say of Massalia what he says of Heracleia, *ἐξ ἐλαττόνων εἰς ἑξακοσίους ἦλθεν ἡ ὀλιγαρχία.*

11. **ἀπετελεύτησεν**, sc. *ἡ ὀλιγαρχία.*

12. **εἰς ἑξακοσίους ἦλθεν**, sc. *ἡ ὀλιγαρχία*, cp. c. 7. 1307 a 36, *εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται.* The chief place in the oligarchy overthrown by Agathocles at Syracuse was held by a Council of 600 (Diod. 19. 5. 6). See above on 1305 b 10 as to Massalia. It is not clear whether the arrangement as to the dicasteries at the Pontic Heracleia described in 1305 b 34 sqq. existed there under the oligarchy of 600 which is here referred to.

μετέβαλε δὲ κ.τ.λ. At Cnidus, unlike the States just mentioned, the oligarchy was not overthrown by the excluded *γνώριμοι*, but by the demos, as in Naxos (1305 a 38 sqq.), but this case is distinguished from that because at Cnidus (as also at Erythrae) the demos was not driven to revolt by oppression; its revolt was due rather to contempt (c. 3. 1302 b 25 sqq.). As this oligarchy was overthrown by the demos, it is probably to be distinguished from the oligarchy at Cnidus which is said in 1306 b 3 sqq. to have been overthrown by some members of the privileged class disgusted with the despotic character of its rule.

15. **ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πρεσβύτατον.** Bonitz (Ind. 33 a 61 sqq.) includes this among the passages in which '*ἀλλ' ἤ* ad significationem particulae *πλήν* vel *εἰ μή* prope accedit,' of which he gives a considerable number.

18. **καὶ ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We find a gens of Basilidae also at Ephesus (Baton ap. Suid. *Πυθαγόρας*, quoted by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141. 2: cp. Strabo, p. 633, *διόπερ τὸ βασίλειον τῶν Ἰώνων ἐκεῖ* (at Ephesus) *συστῆναί φασι, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὀνομάζονται βασιλεῖς ἔχοντές τινας τιμάς, προεδρίαν τε ἐν ἀγῶσι καὶ πορφύραν ἐπίσημον τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, σκίπωνα ἀντὶ σκήπτρου, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς Ἐλευσινίας Δήμητρος*), and perhaps also at Chios (Gilbert, 2. 153. 1). See Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 240. The gens of the Basilidae was probably composed of descendants of the kings: compare the Neleidae at Miletus (Aristot. Fragm. 515. 1562 a 29), the Penthilidae at Mytilene (7 (5). 10. 1311 b 25 sqq.: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 162), and the Eupatridae at Athens, who are described by one authority as *οἱ αὐτὸ τὸ ἄστυ οἰκοῦντες καὶ*

μετέχοντες βασιλικοῦ γένους (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 102. 3).

19. καίπερ καλῶς ἐπιμελομένων τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ. Lamb. 'quamvis ea quae ad rempublicam pertinerent bene procurarent,' and Sus.[3a] (Ind. p. 347) apparently takes τῶν to be neuter, but surely τῶν is masc., and the sentence should be rendered 'though those who possessed rights under the constitution managed [the affairs of the State] well.'

22. κινοῦνται δ' αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now passes to the second of the heads under which he groups the causes of the overthrow of oligarchies, causes originating with the oligarchs themselves. Cp. Thuc. 8. 89. 3, κατ' ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται· πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι (which is partly based on Hdt. 3. 82), and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13, where ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονικία is mentioned as a cause of στάσις at Athens.

23. ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις κ.τ.λ. This is repeated in c. 8. 1308 a 17. Ἡ μέν is answered not without some roughness by ἡ ὅταν κ.τ.λ., 28: cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 23 sqq., where ἐνίας μέν is followed by ἥ (see note on 1275 a 24), and see note on 1338 b 1. Δημαγωγία is a humouring of the propensities of the δημαγωγούμενος with a view to the aggrandizement of ὁ δημαγωγῶν, and may be resorted to not only in relation to a few persons or many, but even in relation to one (c. 10. 1312 b 12 sq.).

25. οἷον ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα κ.τ.λ. Οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα, i. e. Charicles (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 66). It would seem that in Aristotle's opinion the Thirty were led into the excesses which proved fatal to them by Charicles rather than by Critias. The name of Charicles also comes first in Lys. c. Eratosth. c. 55, ἕτεροι οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐναντιώτατοι Χαρικλεῖ καὶ Κριτίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐκείνων ἑταιρείᾳ. We hear nothing of Charicles in the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, which is remarkable if the work is from Aristotle's pen. According to Isocr. De Big. § 42, Charicles was a returned exile and eager both to enslave Athens to the Lacedaemonians and to rule over her himself. Δημαγωγοῦντες τοὺς τριάκοντα, 'through courting the Thirty.' Kaibel (Stil und Text der Ἀθ. Πολ., p. 54) remarks, 'Everywhere in the Ἀθ. Πολ. the word δημαγωγεῖν is used absolutely: δημαγωγεῖν τὸν ὄχλον etc. occurs in the Politics, but not in the Ἀθ. Πολ.'

26. καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle was friendly to

Theramenes (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 28: Plut. Nic. c. 2), and we find him here, unlike most people, laying the responsibility for the fall of the Four Hundred not on his shoulders, but on those of Phrynichus.

29. οἷον ἐν Λαρίσῃ κ.τ.λ. As to the πολιτοφύλακες see note on 1268 a 22. They may probably have been annual magistrates, but it would seem that they were re-eligible. We see from 2. 8. 1268 a 21 sqq. that their office was a very important one—the custody of the city and of its walls and gates was probably in their hands (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33 sqq.: compare the functions of the πολίταρχος in Aen. Poliorc. 26. 12 and of the πολιτάρχαι in Acts 17. 6 sqq.)—and we may perhaps infer from the passage before us that at Larissa it was tenable only by persons possessed of a high property-qualification, though the right of electing the πολιτοφύλακες belonged to the whole people. We are not told that the demos at Larissa elected the magistrates generally, as in some of the oligarchies mentioned in 30 sqq. All we are told is that it elected the πολιτοφύλακες. The rivalry of these great officials with each other in courting the body which elected them may have ended (cp. 1306 a 26 sqq.) in the transfer of their functions to an ἄρχων μεσίδιος at the head of a body of mercenaries, who used his position to make himself tyrant of the city. No wonder that a State so disunited as Larissa found it difficult to make head against the tyrants of Pherae and was obliged to call in Philip of Macedon against them (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 458).

30. καὶ ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντές εἰσιν κ.τ.λ. It is not quite clear what should be supplied before ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις. Should we supply δημαγωγοῦσι, or κινοῦνται αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι, or κινοῦνται αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων? I incline to think that we should supply the last-mentioned words. We may probably infer from the passage before us that in most oligarchies the magistrates were elected by the class which was eligible for the magistracies. Among the oligarchies referred to here the first form of oligarchy must, it would seem, find a place, for in that form the right of electing to the higher magistracies would commonly be possessed by a far more numerous body than that which had the right to hold them, inasmuch as the latter right was commonly confined to citizens possessing a high property-qualification (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21 sqq.). The same weakness, however, was shared by other constitutions

also—for instance by aristocracies, for offices seem often to have been unpaid in aristocracies (2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq.) and must therefore in practice have been tenable only by the rich, and indeed by democracies of the Solonian type, in which office was confined to the three higher property-classes and some offices were confined to the highest class, though the whole people had the right of electing to them. The cause of constitutional change here indicated by Aristotle—the rivalry of the holders of great offices in courting those who elect them with a view to their own aggrandizement—is indeed widely traceable in history both ancient and modern—for instance in the history of ancient Rome and in that of our own country—and is far from being confined in its operation to oligarchies (see note on 1305 a 28).

31. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσὶν ἢ ἑταιριῶν, αἱροῦνται δ' οἱ ὁπλῖται ἢ ὁ δῆμος. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 24, ὀλιγαρχιῶν δ' εἰσὶ δύο τρόποι· ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ἑταιρείας ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν τιμημάτων. Here, however, we have ἐκ (not ἀπὸ) τιμημάτων μεγάλων, and τίμημα must mean not 'property-qualification,' but 'the class possessing the property-qualification.' For ἐκ τιμημάτων αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἰσίν cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, ὅπου δ' ἐκ τιμημάτων (αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται), πλουτοκρατίαν, ὅπου δ' ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν, Plato, Rep. 553 A and Laws 698 B, and for ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων Pol. 2. 6. 1266 a 20, οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων, and Plato, Laws 756 D, τετάρτῃ δὲ φέρειν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ σμικροτάτου τιμήματος ἅπαντας. Oligarchies in which only members of certain clubs are eligible for office are not distinctly named in the list of oligarchies in 6 (4). 5–6, though the class of oligarchies to which they belong is referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 15 sqq. (cp. also 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 40 sqq.). The oligarchies established by Lysander after Aegospotami were of this nature (Plut. Lysand. c. 13, καταλύων δὲ τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἕνα μὲν ἁρμοστὴν ἑκάστῃ Λακεδαιμόνιον κατέλιπε, δέκα δὲ ἄρχοντας ἐκ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συγκεκροτημένων κατὰ πόλιν ἑταιρειῶν· καὶ ταῦτα πράττων ὁμοίως ἔν τε ταῖς πολεμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμάχοις γεγενημέναις πόλεσι παρέπλει σχολαίως, τρόπον τινὰ κατασκευαζόμενος ἑαυτῷ τὴν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμονίαν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀριστίνδην οὔτε πλουτίνδην ἀπεδείκνυε τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἀλλ' ἑταιρείαις καὶ ξενίαις χαριζόμενος τὰ πράγματα καὶ κυρίους ποιῶν τιμῆς τε καὶ κολάσεως. The oligarchy of Abydos so far resembled those founded by Lysander that the magistracies were tenable only by persons belonging to certain clubs, but it differed from them in this, that the hoplites or the demos had the right of electing the magistrates, a peculiar arrange-

ment, as Prof. Jowett has already remarked; it appears, in fact, to have resulted in the tyranny of an *ἄρχων μεσίδιος* supported by mercenary soldiers (1306 a 26 sqq.). The competition of the oligarchs for the favour of the electors would be intensified by the circumstance that they belonged to rival clubs. How soon oligarchy at Abydos assumed the form described in the text, we have no means of knowing, but an oligarchy of some kind was probably set up there after the revolt of the city from Athens in B.C. 411 (Thuc. 8. 62), when it became for more than twenty years 'the great military station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 443), remaining faithful to the Lacedaemonians even after the defeat of their fleet at Cnidus in B.C. 394, notwithstanding the general defection of the Greek States of Asia Minor. This fidelity was ill repaid at the peace of Antalcidas, when with most of Asiatic Greece Abydos was abandoned by the Lacedaemonians to Persia. Still even down to the time of Demosthenes (c. Aristocr. c. 158) the dissolute (Athen. Deipn. 524 f sqq.) but gallant little city (see the story of its heroic defence against Philip V of Macedon in B.C. 200 in Polyb. 16. 29–33) remained 'persistently hostile to Athens' and in all probability an oligarchical State. Sestos on the opposite side of the Hellespont was also hostile to Athens (see the account of its fate at the hands of Chares in B.C. 353 in Diod. 16. 34); no cities, in fact, were more coveted by Athens than these two, which, lying as they did at the narrowest point of the Hellespont, were the natural stepping-stones between Europe and Asia, and hence of great importance. Another important advantage possessed by Abydos was the excellence of its harbour, which offered a secure anchorage to vessels, while outside it a strong current ran in the Hellespont (Polyb. 16. 29. 13 sq.). That the *ἑταιρίαι* at Abydos, or at any rate their domination, had passed away at the time at which Aristotle wrote seems to be implied by his language in 1306 a 30 sq. *Τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἑταιρείας* was bad; cp. Dio Chrysost. Or. 45 (2. 206 R), *μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ ἠξίουν μηδὲ ἕτερον μηδένα τοιοῦτον ἦθος εἰσάγειν μηδὲ καθ' ἑταιρείας πολιτεύεσθαι μηδ' εἰς μέρη διασπᾶν τὴν πόλιν.*

33. **καὶ ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματός ἐστιν,** 'and where the dicasteries are composed of others than those who are eligible for office.' As to *πολίτευμα* cp. 1306 a 14 sq., where this seems to be the meaning of the word. Aristotle probably does not

mean that the members of the πολίτευμα were excluded from the dicasteries, but that membership of the dicasteries was not confined to them (cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 8, γίνονται δ' ἐκ τοῦ δήμου πάντες). This arrangement existed at one time at Heracleia on the Euxine, and it seems to have led to a change of the oligarchy into a democracy. If so, this democracy cannot have been that which appears to have been instituted at Heracleia at the foundation of the colony (see note on 1304 b 31); it must have arisen at a later date. If the dicasteries referred to by Aristotle were popular dicasteries, and if they possessed the power of inflicting the penalties of death and exile, no arrangement was more alien to the spirit of an oligarchy (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 31–34). This important power was reserved for a few not only in most oligarchies but also in such aristocracies as the Lacedaemonian and the Carthaginian (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 31 sqq.: 3. 1. 1275 b 9 sqq.). The authority which Solon conceded to dicasteries open to persons who were not under his constitution admissible to office (2. 12. 1274 a 3, 18 sqq.) was thought by many to have proved fatal to the moderate democracy founded by him (1274 a 3 sqq.). When C. Gracchus gave judicial authority to the equestrian order (Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., vol. iii. p. 116), he dealt a heavy blow at the oligarchy. Still Aristotle knew of constitutions in which the deliberative and the magistracies were oligarchically organized, but the dicasteries were organized as in an aristocracy (8 (6). 1. 1317 a 4 sqq.).

38. ἔτι δ' ὅταν ἔνιοι κ.τ.λ. Supply μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν before ὅταν. This is mentioned in connexion with changes due to τὸ διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγεῖν because calling in the demos is akin to τὸ δημαγωγεῖν, though in strictness there is no φιλονεικία in the case, for the excluded members of the oligarchy are *obliged* to call in the demos. The narrowing of an oligarchy is conceived to lead to democracy in a slightly different way in 3. 15. 1286 b 18, ἀεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι' αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστ' ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δημοκρατίας.

39. γίγνονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. Compare (with Prof. Jowett) c. 12. 1316 b 14 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 555 D: cp. also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 552 Bothe (588 Dindorf),

> πολλοὺς πένητας, ὀλβίους δὲ τῷ λόγῳ
> δοκοῦντας εἶναι, συμμάχους ἄναξ ἔχει,
> οἳ στάσιν ἔθηκαν καὶ διώλεσαν πόλιν

ἐφ' ἁρπαγαῖσι τῶν πέλας, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις
δαπάναισι φροῦδα διαφυγόνθ' ὑπ' ἀργίας.

Aeneas (Poliorc. 14. 1) says of debtors in a besieged city, *ὅπου γε καὶ φοβερώτατοι ἔφεδροί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῖδε ἄνθρωποι.* The loss of wealth would be especially likely to cause constitutional change in oligarchies, because it would often entail exclusion from the ruling class, but would it not tend to cause constitutional change in democracies also? This cause of change is guarded against in c. 8. 1308 b 20 sqq. In illustration of Aristotle's remark the instances of Catiline and Julius Caesar may be referred to (Appian, Bell. Civ. 2. 1 sq.).

40. ἀναλώσωσι, sc. *τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τινές.* Cp. c. 12. 1316 b 18, *ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς ἀπολέσωσι τὰς οὐσίας, καινοτομοῦσιν.*

καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, 'for men of the kind just described also.'

41. ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοί. *Ἐπιτίθεσθαι τυραννίδι* here, as in c. 5. 1305 a 21 and c. 8. 1308 a 22 sq., means 'affectare tyrannidem' (Bon. Ind. 281 a 51 sq.), but we have in c. 10. 1311 a 26 *ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις* and in 1312 b 18 *ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίσι*, where the meaning is 'attack monarchies' or 'tyrannies.' Ruined oligarchs, as well as men of wealth and influence, seem to have been able to make themselves tyrants (see note on 1302 b 15).

1. ὅσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συρακούσαις. See Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 599 and 11. 76 (Congreve). Hipparinus was a leading citizen of Syracuse and was, like Dionysius the Elder, one of the stratêgi who were chosen when the previous stratêgi were deposed by vote of the people (Diod. 13. 92), and were themselves displaced when Dionysius was elected *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* in B.C. 406–5 (Diod. 13. 94: Plut. Dion, c. 3: Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, art. Hipparinus). His position as a colleague of Dionysius would make it easy for him to aid the designs of the latter. That his support of Dionysius, who married his daughter Aristomache, enabled him completely to retrieve his fortunes, is pointed out by Grote (11. 76), who refers to the fact that his son Dion became one of the richest men in Syracuse. Aristotle does not mean to imply that Syracuse was under an oligarchy when Dionysius the Elder obtained the tyranny; it was, in fact, democratically governed (c. 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.: Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. 176 D). 1306 a.

2. καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει κ.τ.λ. See note on 1303 b 2. 'A man whose name was Cleotimus' introduced Chalcidian *ἔποικοι*, and after

their arrival created a *διάστασις* between them and the rich of Amphipolis, whether with the view of making himself tyrant or some one else, Aristotle does not explain, nor does he tell us how the thing ended. We cannot even infer from the passage with any certainty that an oligarchy existed at Amphipolis before the events here narrated. All that is clear is that Cleotimus' conduct was caused by his dissipation of his own fortune, and that his object was tyranny, for himself or for another.

ᾧ ὄνομα ἦν Κλεότιμος. Cp. Hdt. 3. 143, *ταῦτα εἴπε ἐὼν ἐν τοῖσι ἀστοῖσι δόκιμος, τῷ οὔνομα ἦν Τελέσαρχος*: Diod. 15. 30. 3, *Νεσγένης τις ὄνομα*: [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 8. 2, *Ἀρχίλοχον τὸν ποιητὴν Κόραξ ὄνομα ἔκτεινε*: Aristot. Fragm. 508. 1561 a 39, *Εὔξενος δ' ὁ Φωκαεὺς Νάνῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ, τοῦτο δ' ἦν αὐτῷ ὄνομα, ἦν ξένος*: Ammian. Marc. 27. 8. 10, Civilem nomine. It is evident that in some of these passages the explanation that the word is a proper name is added because otherwise misapprehension might occur, but this does not seem to be the case in the passage before us.

3. ἐλθόντων. See notes on 1281 b 4, 13.

4. καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known of this 'transaction with Chares' from any other source, but it is easy to guess what happened. A wealthy Aeginetan who had wasted his fortune in riotous living made application to the Athenian general Chares, who usually had mercenaries at his disposal, for the assistance of his mercenaries in an attempt to make himself or some one else (we are not told which) tyrant in Aegina, offering Chares no doubt a great reward in the event of success. The attempt seems to have been made, but to have failed. The 'promises of Chares' were proverbially delusive (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 463). The date of the 'transaction' referred to may have been B.C. 367, when Chares was stationed at Corinth with Athenian mercenaries (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 372, 393). Athens was then siding with the Lacedaemonians against Thebes, and Aegina, her constant foe, may not improbably have been on the side of Thebes. Chares would therefore be glad to substitute for the existing government of Aegina a tyrant who would owe his position to Athens. For the unfavourable use of *τὴν πρᾶξιν πράττειν* cp. Plato, Laws 831 D. The phrase itself occurs in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 18. l. 13 sq.

6. διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, i.e. because he had dissipated his fortune (cp. 1306 b 17 and 3. 13. 1284 a 23 sq.).

7. ὅθεν κ.τ.λ., 'whence civil trouble is stirred against the oligarchs either by the depredators or by those who resist them in their depredations.' 'The two cases are (1) where the government does not connive at these misappropriations of public moneys, in which case the thieves attempt to create a *στάσις* to escape punishment (*διὰ φόβον*, c. 3. 1302 b 21 sqq., which should be compared); (2) where it *does*, in which case the section opposed to the peculations rises against the conniving government' (Postgate, Notes on the Politics of Aristotle, p. 22). It would seem that at Apollonia on the Euxine the revolt against the oligarchy was raised by the opponents of the depredators, so that here the oligarchs must have connived at the depredations. Cp. Hdt. 3. 82, where we are told that when some champion of the demos put a stop to the misdeeds of plunderers of public property, he often became a tyrant.

9. ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὐτῆς. Plato (Rep. 545 D) had said that no constitution can be overthrown if *τὸ ἔχον τὰς ἀρχάς* is at one with itself; Aristotle will commit himself only to this, that an oligarchy of which this can be said is not easily overthrown from within; it may be overthrown by the demos or by excluded rich men. He remembers the case of Erythrae (1305 b 18 sqq.).

10. σημεῖον δὲ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. The expression *τὸ χρῆσθαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καλῶς* suggests, if we compare c. 8. 1308 a 10 sqq., that Pharsalus put the members of the privileged class as far as possible on a level, both in respect of participation in office and in other ways. Pharsalus had not always been free from *στάσις*. We read in Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 2 sq. that, having been in a state of civil discord (*στασιάσαντες*), the citizens of Pharsalus at some time previous to B.C. 375 entrusted Polydamas, one of their number, with the custody of the acropolis and with the receipt and employment of the revenue, and that Polydamas proved himself worthy of their confidence. Not long after B.C. 375, however, Pharsalus was forced to become dependent on Pherae (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 18), and Jason's successor, Polyphron, put Polydamas and eight other Pharsalians to death (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 34). In B.C. 352, when Philip of Macedon reduced Pherae, Pharsalus exchanged its dependence on Pherae for a virtual dependence on Macedon. Philip showed much favour to the city (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 248, 324, 503), which derived considerable importance from its position at 'the entrance of the most direct and central of the passes which

lead from the plains of Thessaly to the vale of the Spercheius and Thermopylae' (Leake, Northern Greece, 1. 449). For how long the Pharsalian oligarchy had deserved the praise which Aristotle gives it, we cannot say with any certainty; it did so at any rate at the time at which he wrote. His commendation of Pharsalus is just what we should expect from a friend of Macedon (see note on 1304 a 10). Not long after it was penned, Pharsalus took part in the rising of Thessaly against Macedon in the Lamian War (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 352).

11. πολλῶν κύριοί εἰσι, 'are masters of many men': cp. Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 8, where we read of 'the cities dependent on Pharsalus' in B.C. 375 (*τῶν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἠρτημένων πόλεων*). Philip gave Halus to Pharsalus (Strabo, p. 433: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 248. 1).

12. καταλύονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is perhaps suggested by what immediately precedes, for to create an oligarchy within an oligarchy is the opposite to *τὸ χρῆσθαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καλῶς*. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 101. 1) identifies these senators with the *δημιουργοί* of Thuc. 5. 47. 9, but this is doubtful. That this oligarchy at Elis was overthrown is clear from the passage before us, but we are not told whether it was overthrown by the members of the *πολίτευμα* who found themselves virtually excluded from the senate or by an union of these persons with the demos or by the demos acting by itself. It was probably overthrown by a man named Phormion: compare (with Schn.) Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 10, *οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δὲ ὅτι καὶ βουλὴν τινὲς ἐπαχθῆ καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν κολούσαντες, ὥσπερ Ἐφιάλτης Ἀθήνησι καὶ Φορμίων παρ' Ἠλείοις, δύναμιν ἅμα καὶ δόξαν ἔσχον*. It is quite uncertain, however, when Phormion lived (see Sus.[2], Note 1586, and Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 102. 4).

18. ἐνενήκοντα ὄντας, 'being only ninety in number.'

τὴν δ' αἵρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων. *Δυναστευτικήν*, 'of a character savouring of a *δυναστεία*,' i. e. favourable to the interests of a few very wealthy families: see notes on 1271 a 9 and 1272 b 2.

19. γίγνεται δὲ . . . 31. Ἰφιάδου. We have still to do here with revolutions in oligarchies due to the oligarchs themselves, for in the cases now described the overthrow of the oligarchy is brought about by the oligarchs, who entrust the defence of the State in war to mercenary troops or to the demos, or its custody in peace to a neutral magistrate at the head of mercenaries. This passage corrects Plato, Rep. 551 D sq. (see note on 1305 a 37 sqq.). Καὶ

ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ continues *ὅταν*, 1305 b 39 and 1306 a 13. Constitutional change was usually more to be feared in time of war than in time of peace (Thuc. 3. 82. 3: Plato, Laws 709 A). The Athenian democracy, according to Isocr. De Pace, § 51, throve in time of peace, but had been twice overthrown in time of war.

21. *ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ.* Should *τῷ* be added before *πολέμῳ*? In 26 we have *ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ*, where *τῇ* is added before *εἰρήνῃ* probably because *καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ* has preceded in 20: cp. c. 8. 1308 b 21, *τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσυμφόρως πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.* Yet it should be noticed that in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17, 18 *ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις* is followed by *ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἴβηρσιν* just as in the passage before us *ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ* is followed by *ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ.*

τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀπιστίαν. Cp. c. 10. 1311 a 12, where *τὸ τῷ πλήθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν* is said to be characteristic of oligarchy.

22. *ᾧ γὰρ ἂν ἐγχειρίσωσιν*, sc. *τοὺς στρατιώτας.*

23. *οὗτος πολλάκις γίγνεται τύραννος.* Cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 139, *ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ', ὅτι πάντες οἱ ξεναγοῦντες οὗτοι πόλεις καταλαμβάνοντες Ἑλληνίδας ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι*, and Aen. Poliorc. c. 12, *οἷον καὶ Ἡρακλεώταις τοῖς ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ συνέβη· ἐπαγαγόμενοι γὰρ ξένους πλείονας τοῦ προσήκοντος, πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἀντιστασιώτας ἀνεῖλον, ἔπειτα αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν, τυραννευθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰσαγαγόντος τοὺς ξένους.* This seems to refer to Clearchus, who founded in B. C. 364 a tyranny which lasted till B. C. 285 (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 190: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 98, vol. 12. 622 sqq.). Here we come upon tyrants who became tyrants, unlike some of their earlier compeers (c. 5. 1305 a 8 sqq.), without having been demagogues. In this, and also in having been leaders of mercenary troops, they resemble many tyrants of mediaeval Italy.

ὥσπερ ἐν Κορίνθῳ Τιμοφάνης. As Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 90. 4) points out, Aristotle here implies that Corinth was under an oligarchy when Timophanes was appointed. This agrees with Plut. Dion, c. 53. It was at the time at war with Argos and Cleonae (Plut. Timol. c. 4). According to Diod. 16. 65. 3, Timophanes did not actually make himself tyrant, but only acted like a tyrant; Plutarch, however (Timol. c. 4), and Aristotle here speak otherwise. As to Timophanes, see Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 85, vol. 11. 192 sqq. The distrust of the demos felt by the Corinthian oligarchs would be intensified by the circumstances connected with the return from Argos of the exiled democrats,

which Diodorus refers to B.C. 375 (15. 40. 3), and by the scheme of Athens in B.C. 366 to get possession of Corinth, in which she may probably have counted on aid from the Corinthian demos (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 4 sq.: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 79, vol. 10. 396 sq.). The appointment of Timophanes was subsequent to the failure of this Athenian project (Grote, Part 2, c. 85, vol. 11. 193).

24. ἂν δὲ πλείους κ.τ.λ. Supply ὦσιν. Ἔσται is omitted in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 17 (where see note), and ἂν εἴη probably in 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 35 sq., and ἔστω apparently in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 38.

25. ὅτε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 551 D sq. Machiavelli remarks (Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, 1. 6) that the circumstance that the Romans did not, like the Venetians, abstain from employing the plebs in war 'gave the plebs additional force and influence and infinite occasions of raising tumults.' We read in a quotation from the *Fremdenblatt* of Vienna (*Times*, Oct. 12, 1893) that 'the introduction of conscription [in Austria] made it morally incumbent on the State to grant the right to vote to those who had borne heavy burdens for the commonweal.' 'Taine (Origines de la France Contemporaine: Le Régime Moderne, 1. 284–296) justly describes conscription as the natural companion or brother of universal suffrage' (Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, ed. 1, 1. 261).

26. ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ κ.τ.λ. See note on 21. Ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ, 'to a neutral magistrate' standing midway between the contending parties: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 22, καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι, and Pol. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 4, ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειαν (sc. οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ πένητες) διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· παντὸς δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητὴς δ' ὁ μέσος, where διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους again occurs. Were the services of a 'neutral magistrate' ever resorted to in conflicts between rich and poor as well as in conflicts between two oligarchical factions? The position of Polydamas of Pharsalus (see note on 1306 a 10) must be distinguished from that of a 'neutral magistrate,' for we are not told that he was at the head of a body of mercenaries, and besides he was charged with the receipt and employment of the revenue, which the 'neutral magistrate' does not seem to have been.

29. ὅπερ συνέβη κ.τ.λ. Ὅπερ refers to ὃς ἐνίοτε γίνεται κύριος ἀμφοτέρων. Larissa and Abydos are here again named together, as in 1305 b 29–33. Perhaps in both the competition of high magis-

trates for the favour of the people produced in the minds of the two oligarchical factions a strong distrust of each other, and led to the custody of the acropolis, walls, and gates of the city being placed in the hands of a 'neutral magistrate,' who however ultimately made himself master of both factions. That there were two factions at Larissa in B.C. 431 we see from Thuc. 2. 22, *ἡγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκ μὲν Λαρίσης Πολυμήδης καὶ Ἀριστόνους, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἑκάτερος.* I take *ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἀρχῆς τῶν περὶ Σίμον* to mean 'in the time of the rule of Simus the Aleuad' (cp. c. 10. 1312 b 10, *ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα τυραννίς*), and Simus was in all probability the 'neutral magistrate' referred to, just as Iphiades was at Abydos. The name Simus (as to which see note on 1304 a 29 and cp. Plin. Nat. Hist. 11. 158, where the Roman name Silo, derived from silus, 'snub-nosed,' is compared with it) is one which occurs more than once in the family of the Aleuadae—for instance, the father of an early Aleuas was named Simus (Euphorion in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 72)—but there can be little doubt that the Simus of the passage before us is the well-known Simus of Larissa, who is said by Demosthenes (De Cor. c. 48) to have, in conjunction with Eudicus, also of Larissa, brought Thessaly into subjection to Philip of Macedon, and to have lost his favour as soon as he had done so. We read of his dissolute youth in [Demosth.] c. Neaer. cc. 24 sq., 108. He is thought to have been tetrarch of one of the four divisions into which Thessaly was broken up by Philip in B.C. 342 (Demosth. Phil. 3. 26: Curtius, History of Greece, Eng. Trans., 5. 368: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 402: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 13. 3), and his name may appear in this capacity on some coins of Larissa of the fourth century B.C. which bear the inscription ΣΙΜΟΣ (Gardner, Catalogue of Greek Coins, Thessaly, Introduction, p. xxvi, and p. 31: Head, Hist. Num. pp. 253, 255). As to Iphiades, that he was a skilful soldier appears from the narrative in Aen. Poliorc. c. 28. 6 (referred to by Schneider). The Iphiades mentioned in Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 176–7, who had a son in Cersobleptes' custody as a hostage on behalf of Sestos, may probably be the same man. Another Iphiades of Abydos is mentioned in Polyb. 16. 30. 7. That clubs were often 'centred round a single individual' we see from the example of those at Athens, where we hear of the clubs of Phaeax, Euphiletus, Alcibiades, and others (Vischer, Kleine Schriften, 1. 153–204, quoted by L. Whibley, Political Parties in Athens, p. 83 sq.).

31. γίνονται δὲ στάσεις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been describing how oligarchies were often overthrown if power were placed in the hands of captains of mercenaries or a demos or a neutral magistrate, and now he goes on to show that στάσεις might arise within the circle of the oligarchs themselves without any external intervention. They might arise either when the oligarchs treated each other despitefully or when the oligarchy itself was intrinsically over-despotic. In either case some of the oligarchs might step in and overthrow the oligarchy. Aristotle suggests precautions against the former source of trouble in c. 8. 1308 a 31 sqq. Cp. Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32. 824 F sqq.

32. τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ. Cp. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 126 (an inscription from Chios), οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ.

34. μέν is answered by δέ, 36.

αἱ εἰρημέναι πρότερον, in c. 4. 1303 b 37–1304 a 17. Supply ἐγένοντο from γίνονται, 31.

35. καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἱππέων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 36–40. This Eretrian oligarchy helped Peisistratus in his final recovery of the tyranny at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 15). Diagoras was evidently one of the oligarchs, and his disappointment (probably of the hand of an heiress) was due not to the decision of a dicastery, but to a factious intrigue against him (cp. 33, καταστασιάζεσθαι κατὰ γάμους). The Diagoras mentioned in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 12 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 217), Διαγόρᾳ εἰς Σπάρτην πορευομένῳ καὶ ἐν Κορίνθῳ τελευτήσαντι Ἐρετριεῖς εἰκόνα ἔστησαν, is probably the same man. Müller distinguishes him from the famous Διαγόρας ὁ ἄθεος of Melos. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 66) thinks that the overthrow of this oligarchy by Diagoras probably occurred before the Persian wars.

36. ἐκ δὲ δικαστηρίου κρίσεως κ.τ.λ. Μοιχεία was a criminal offence in Greek States (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 91 : Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 59). The technical term μοιχεία included at Athens not only adultery, but also some kinds of illegal intercourse with unmarried women or widows, and the offender, if taken in the act, might be put to death by the husband, or, in the case of an unmarried woman or widow, by the father, brother, or grandfather, if her κύριος (Meier und Schömann, Der attische Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 402 sqq.). Aristotle makes some suggestions as to the punishment of adultery in 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 38 sqq.; he seems to regard the degrading punishment mentioned in the text as excessive. The κύφων was

a wooden yoke placed on the back of the neck, which kept the head bowed down (see Suidas, s. vv. *Κύφωνες* and *Ἐπίκουρος*, and Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 476), and exposure in it in the most public part of the city was a punishment rather for thieves than for nobles (Pollux, 10. 177: Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 114: Plut. Nic. c. 11, where we read of Hyperbolus, *οὗτος ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ τοῦ μὲν ὀστράκου πόρρω τιθέμενος ἑαυτόν, ἅτε δὴ τῷ κύφωνι μᾶλλον προσήκων*). It may, however, have been an obsolete punishment revived for the occasion, for a similar punishment was inflicted on adulteresses at Cyme (Plut. Quaest. Gr. 2). The punishment inflicted on Dercyllidas by Lysander (Xen. Hell. 3. 1. 9: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 72, vol. 9. 289) was far less degrading, yet he felt it deeply. The *στάσεις* at Heracleia (probably the Pontic Heracleia) and Thebes to which Aristotle refers were apparently well known. We are not told whether they led to any change in the constitution.

1. **ἐφιλονείκησαν γὰρ αὐτούς.** *Φιλονεικεῖν* seems here to have an accusative of the person after it because it contains much of the meaning of *φιλονείκως ἐδίωξαν* or *ἐκόλασαν*. But verbs compounded with *φιλο-* occasionally take an accusative of the person: so *φιλοστοργεῖν* in Plato, Laws 927 B and Polyb. 5. 74. 5, and *φιλανθρωπεῖν* in Polyb. 3. 76. 2 and 11. 26. 5. Richards, however, would read *αὐτοῖς* with Liddell and Scott (s. v. *φιλονεικέω*). 1306 b

2. **ἐν ἀγορᾷ**, as in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 16 and often in Plato (see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v. *ἀγορά*). In 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 20 we have *τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καθήμενον*. As to *κατὰ πόλιν* and *κατὰ τὴν πόλιν* see note on 1285 b 13.

3. **πολλαὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We read in Diod. 15. 40. 2 that the holders of office in the Peloponnesian oligarchies in the days of Lacedaemonian supremacy had dealt with the citizens imperiously (*ἐπιτακτικῶς*), and that they suffered in consequence after the fall of the oligarchies. This throws light on the meaning of *ἄγαν δεσποτικάς* here. Cp. also 3. 6. 1279 a 21 and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27 sq.

6. **γίγνονται δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Compare 2. 12. 1274 a 12 and the changes *διὰ τύχας* mentioned in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 3 sqq. The polity would be exposed to changes of this kind because it imposed a property-qualification on members of the assembly (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sqq.). Some oligarchies would not be affected by the change in the value of property to which Aristotle refers—for instance, those in which office was confined to members of certain clubs (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 31 sq.), or to persons who in addition

to possessing a high property-qualification were elected by the πολίτευμα (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 1 sq.) or succeeded to office by right of birth (1292 b 4 sqq.). Aristotle omits to refer to the democracies in which a property-qualification for office existed (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 39 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.). If there were aristocracies in which there was a property-qualification for office, notwithstanding the counsel given in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq.—and Thurii seems to have been a case in point (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 23–29)—Aristotle is silent also as to these. Nor does he take any notice here of the liability of the same constitutions to a change in the opposite direction—that of increased narrowness—if the general level of wealth in the State should fall instead of rising, though he deals with this also in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. A property-qualification for the assembly appears to have existed in some oligarchies in which an assembly existed (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.), but Aristotle refers here only to property-qualifications for office. For the effect of peace on the prosperity of Greek States see Diod. 11. 72. 1 and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 95 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 259). It is possible that the cessation of internal war in Greece enforced by the Congress of Corinth after the battle of Chaeroneia (see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 48) had done something by the time at which Aristotle wrote to raise the average level of wealth in Greek States (see as to Athens Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 272). According to Roscher, Politik, p. 412, 'the old centurial constitution of Rome had wellnigh lost its timocratic character by the time of Fabius Maximus, in B.C. 304, because the property required for the first class hardly implied even well-to-do circumstances.'

8. βουλεύουσι, i. e. *βουλευταί εἰσι* (Sus.[2] Ind. s.v.). Cp. 3. 11. 1282 a 29 sq. See note on 1299 b 32.

τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς. In many of the oligarchies to which Aristotle refers judicial functions would be exercised by magistrates; indeed, some claimed that a member of a dicastery held a magistracy (see note on 1275 a 26).

9. πολλάκις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. s.v. Anacoluthia) compares this passage with De Gen. An. 3. 9. 758 b 2, *τὰ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ζῳοτοκοῦντα τρόπον τινὰ μετὰ τὸ σύστημα τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς φοιτιδὲς γίνεται*, De Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 31 sqq., and Top. 1. 15. 106 a 1 sqq., remarking that in all these passages 'nominativus in principio enunciati ponitur quasi absolute et tituli instar.' Susemihl, like Coray, Thurot, and others, believes that something has dropped out of the text after

συμβαίνει, but Bonitz is probably right. See notes on 1304 a 14, 1315 b 40, and 1326 a 34.

11. **εὐετηρίας γιγνομένης.** Cp. Xen. Hiero, 5. 4, *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν εὐετηριῶν γενομένων ἀφθονία τῶν ἀγαθῶν γίγνηται, οὐδὲ τότε συγχαίρει ὁ τύραννος.*

14. **ἐκ προσαγωγῆς.** See note on 1336 a 18.

17. **στασιάζουσι** refers to 1306 a 31 sqq. I have not found any other passage in which constitutions are said *στασιάζειν*: this is often said of States. Yet cp. Plato, Laws 757 A.

ὅλως δὲ κ.τ.λ. All constitutions are said in c. 12. 1316 a 18 sqq. to change more often into their opposites than into allied forms. Aristotle more than once traces, though less fully than we should wish, how democracies ruled by law pass into absolute democracies (e.g. in c. 5. 1305 a 28 sqq. and 2. 12. 1273 b 35–1274 a 21), and we learn something as to the way in which a similar change occurs in oligarchy from c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq., c. 6. 1306 a 24 sq., c. 8. 1308 a 18 sqq., b 6 sqq., and 1309 a 23 sqq., but of the change from absolute oligarchies and democracies into oligarchies and democracies ruled by law we hear hardly anything from him. He does not tell us how this happy change was to be brought about (for instances of it see note on 1305 b 3), but it is easy to see that anything which promoted a more equal distribution of property would tend in this direction in oligarchies, and that anything which diminished the omnipotence of the assembly and the demagogues would tend in a similar direction in democracies.

20. **τὰς κυρίους.** For the fem. form *κύριος* cp. (with Sus.[3] Ind.) 3. 15. 1285 b 36 and 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 7. It is not meant that there are more *κύριοι δημοκρατίαι καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι* than one (cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17). In 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5 sqq. only one form of each in which the law is not supreme is recognized.

22. **Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις κ.τ.λ.** Nothing answers to *αἱ μέν*, but these words seem to be virtually taken up in 1307 a 5 sqq. Some *στάσεις* in aristocracies arise from the fewness of those who share in office (cp. c. 8. 1309 a 2, *τὸ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν*), and others from too large a proportion of power being given to the rich. The latter sort seems to be thought by Aristotle to be the more destructive (*λύονται δὲ μάλιστα*, 1307 a 5). The former cause of *στάσις* is said to be most operative when it is reinforced by other causes of discontent—(1) when virtue is thought not to meet with its due meed of honour, whether it is that the many claim to be equal in virtue to the ruling few, or that indi- C. 7.

viduals of high merit and position are insulted by men of still higher position, or that an individual of manly character is excluded from office; or again (2) when there is a great inequality of wealth in the State, some of the citizens being very rich and others very poor; or again (3) when an individual already great is not satisfied with his greatness but seeks to be sole ruler. All Aristotle's examples but one are taken from Lacedaemonian history, and he evidently regards the sharers in office in the Lacedaemonian aristocracy as few, notwithstanding that the ephorate was open to all the citizens. The Lacedaemonian aristocracy was also affected by the other cause of *στάσις* in aristocracies. It did not, indeed, like Thurii at one time (1307 a 27 sqq.), make a high property-qualification a condition of the tenure of office, but it allowed property to find its way into the hands of a few (1307 a 35 sq.). It is implied in c. 8. 1308 a 3 sqq. that aristocracies are not safe constitutions. It will be noticed that in none of the instances adduced in 1306 b 27–1307 a 5 was the *στάσις* successful.

23. **εἴρηται**, in c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq.

24. **διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναί πως.** Cp. 1307 a 34 sq.

25. **οἱ ἄρχοντες = οἱ τοῦ ἄρχειν μετέχοντες = οἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν μετέχοντες**: cp. c. 8. 1308 b 34 sq., 37 sq.

οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταὐτὸν ὀλίγοι. The rulers are few in an oligarchy because the rich are few, in an aristocracy because the good are few.

26. **ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἀριστοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία εἶναι.** This is added in confirmation of what has just been said, that the rulers are few both in aristocracy and in oligarchy. It is because they are few in both that some take aristocracy to be a kind of oligarchy (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16 sq.). The inference drawn from the fact is a proof of the reality of the fact. Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 25 sqq., where a false inference drawn from the fact that happiness is concerned with the use of absolute goods is adduced in evidence of the fact. For the interposition of *οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταὐτὸν ὀλίγοι* between *ἐπεὶ—εἶναι* and *ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες*, cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 22 sq., where *τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου* is similarly interposed, 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 27, where *τὸ εἰρημένον* refers not to what immediately precedes, but to 23, *ἡ μὲν ἀριστοκρατία εἰς ὄλιγον*, and 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 24, where *ταύτην* refers not to *τυραννίδος*, which immediately precedes, but to *τῆς ὀνομαζομένης πολιτείας*.

27. **τοῦτο**, i. e. the production of *στάσις* by the fewness of the rulers.

28. ὅταν ᾖ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς ὅμοιον κατ' ἀρετήν, 'when the mass of the people is of the type which is elated with the belief that it is like the ruling few in virtue.' Τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων, sc. πληθῶν. Τὸ πλῆθος (= ὁ δῆμος in Diod. 15. 72. 2) here stands in opposition to the ruling few, just as it is opposed to οἱ ἄρχοντες in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 34 sqq. The true πλῆθος for an aristocracy is a πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν (3. 17. 1288 a 10 sqq.): if the πλῆθος thinks itself just as ἡγεμονικὸν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν as the rulers, trouble will result. When the ruled are of a high spirit, they are inclined to plot against their rulers (c. 11. 1314 a 15 sqq.: cp. Plato, Symp. 182 C, 190 B).

29. οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κ.τ.λ. Different accounts are given of the origin of the Partheniae: perhaps those who were friendly to Tarentum took a more favourable view of it than others. Aristotle often speaks well of Tarentum, and the account given of the origin of the Partheniae in the passage before us is more favourable than most. Antiochus, an historian belonging to the rival city of Syracuse and contemporary with Thucydides, says (ap. Strab. p. 278) that they were sons of 'Lacedaemonians' who had been degraded to the rank of Helots because they had failed to serve in the Messenian War (the First Messenian War), and that they were themselves ἄτιμοι. I do not think (with Sus.[2], Note 1592) that by 'Lacedaemonians' Antiochus means Perioeci, for the word is used of Spartans in the account given by Strabo (p. 279) of Ephorus' views (cp. Diod. 15. 66 and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 26). The account given on the authority of Ephorus by Strabo (p. 279) is less unfavourable. According to Ephorus the Spartans serving in Messenia in the tenth year of the Messenian War, finding that owing to their ten years' absence from home the citizen-population was dwindling, and being themselves precluded from returning by the oath which they had taken not to return till the Messenians were conquered, sent home the younger men, who had not taken the oath, to recruit the population by intercourse with Spartan virgins. This account treats the founders of Tarentum as the sons of Spartan fathers (whether of Homoei is not clear) and Spartan mothers, but by irregular, though specially authorized, unions. Aristotle, on the other hand, in the passage before us implies that in his opinion the Partheniae had Spartan Homoei for their fathers; of their mothers he says nothing. A fourth account

is to be found in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 26, *ὅτε δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Μεσσηνίοις ἐπολέμουν, αἱ γυναῖκες, ἀπόντων τούτων, παῖδάς τινας ἐγέννησαν, οὓς ἐν ὑποψίαις εἶχον οἱ πατέρες ὡς οὐκ ὄντας αὐτῶν καὶ Παρθενίας ἐκάλουν.* If this statement is founded on the 'Constitutions' ascribed to Aristotle, like many others in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspublicis, the 'Constitutions' did not agree with the Politics. For while the Politics represent the Partheniae as the sons of Spartan Homoei, [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspublicis represents them as the sons of Spartan women by unknown fathers, possibly Helots. For another instance of a discrepancy between the Politics and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. see note on 1294 b 10. It should be noticed that a similar, but still keener, controversy raged as to the position and character of the original colonists of the Epizephyrian Locri, the unfavourable side being here taken by the 'Constitution of the Locrians' ascribed to Aristotle and the favourable by Timaeus (Polyb. 12. 5, 6, 10–12: Aristot. Fragm. 504). The fact probably is that many unions were temporarily recognized as legitimate during the First Messenian War, when the numbers of the Spartans were being thinned by the war, which were no longer regarded as legitimate when the war came to an end and the drain ceased. Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 28 sqq.

30. *ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν*, 'for they were descended from the Homoei,' is added to explain why they held themselves to be like the ruling few in virtue. Descent from the good, however, is not a sure evidence of goodness (1. 6. 1255 b 1 sqq.). Aristotle implies that the Partheniae were not Homoei, but does not tell us why they were not. His view may be that they were the sons of fathers who were Homoei by mothers of an inferior grade. As to the Homoei of the Lacedaemonian State, see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 39.

31. *ἢ ὅταν τινὲς κ.τ.λ.* *Τινές* stands in contrast to *τὸ πλῆθος*, 28. It appears to refer to single individuals, for Lysander is mentioned in illustration. See note on 1327 b 38.

33. *οἷον Λύσανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων.* First by king Pausanias when he intervened against Lysander at Athens in B.C. 403 after the fall of the Thirty (Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 29), and afterwards by king Agesilaus in Ionia (Plut. Lysand. c. 23).

34. *ἀνδρώδης*, and therefore *φιλότιμος* (Rhet. 2. 17. 1391 a 22 sq.) and *δυνάμενος ἄρχειν* (Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 b 1 sq.). Thus *ἀνδρώδης* is not far removed in meaning from *ἡγεμονικός* (c. 8. 1308 a 8).

οἷον Κινάδων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 5, where we read of Cinadon, *οὗτος δ' ἦν καὶ τὸ εἶδος νεανίσκος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὁμοίων.* See for the story of Cinadon Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 4–11, Polyaen. 2. 14, and Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 73, vol. 9. 343 sqq. His object was to be *μηδενὸς ἧττων ἐν Λακεδαίμονι* (Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 11). His case illustrates the danger of excluding from office and placing in a position of inferiority a man of manly and vigorous character, where the ruling class is small and those excluded have weapons of any kind at their disposal (Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 5, 7). It does not appear that Cinadon had been oppressed or ill-treated in any way. Aristotle probably remembers the affair of Cinadon when in c. 8. 1308 a 8 he recommends aristocracies to bring within the constitution any of those outside it who are fit to rule. The oligarchy of Massalia was in this matter wiser than the Lacedaemonian aristocracy, for it would have brought Cinadon within the privileged class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 29 sqq.). Compare the conspiracy of Francesco Balduino at Venice in 1412 (H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 271 sq.).

36. ἔτι ὅταν κ.τ.λ. Precautions are taken against this evil in c. 8. 1308 b 24 sqq. For the results of a great inequality of property see 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 sqq. and 1296 a 1 sqq. Cp. Sallust, De Coniur. Catil. c. 20. 11 sqq.

37. καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται. Aristotle's remark is confirmed by the experience of Rome in the Second Punic War (see Lange, Röm. Alterth. 2. 170 sq.). The English landowners grew richer in the long war with Napoleon and the poor poorer.

συνέβη δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. 'This also,' i. e. *στάσις* resulting from the production by war of strong contrasts of wealth and poverty, occurred at Lacedaemon, as well as *στάσις* resulting from the causes mentioned before. There is nothing to show whether the Messenian War here referred to is the same as that mentioned in 2. 9. 1270 a 3. It seems likely from 2. 9. 1269 b 3 sqq. that Aristotle looked back to more wars than one between the Lacedaemonians and Messenians. If we follow the traditional account and that of Pausanias, we shall say that the Messenian War referred to is the Second Messenian War. The raids of Aristomenes from his fastness at Eira during this war were so ruinous to the farms of the Spartans both in Messenia and in the neighbouring part of Laconia that the Messenians profited more by the cultivation of the land than the Spartans, and an ordinance was made that the land

exposed to these raids should not be sown while the war lasted, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου σιτοδεία ἐγένετο ἐν Σπάρτῃ καὶ ὁμοῦ τῇ σιτοδείᾳ στάσις· οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο οἱ ταύτῃ τὰ κτήματα ἔχοντες τὰ σφέτερα ἀργὰ εἶναι, καὶ τούτοις μὲν τὰ διάφορα διέλυε Τυρταῖος (Paus. 4. 18. 1–3). The owners of land in Messenia and the border of Laconia, in fact, were impoverished, while the owners of land farther from the seat of war grew richer, because they alone had produce to sell.

39. δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τοῦτο] ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας. As to [καὶ τοῦτο] see critical note. For ποίησις in the sense of 'poem' see Liddell and Scott. The poem was intended to compose dissensions at Sparta, and hence its title.

1307 a. **1.** θλιβόμενοι γάρ τινες κ.τ.λ. This is mentioned to show that war produces στάσις by producing extremes of wealth and poverty.

2. ἔτι ἐάν τις μέγας ᾖ κ.τ.λ. We pass here to a case in which the plotter is not, as in the instances previously given, driven to plot by humiliation or poverty, but plots purely from ambition. See note on 1304 a 17.

3. Before ἵνα μοναρχῇ supply στάσιν κινεῖ.

ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κ.τ.λ. See notes on 1333 b 34 and 1301 b 19. The aim ascribed to the Pausanias of the passage before us, that of becoming sole ruler, agrees well with that ascribed to 'Pausanias the king' in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 32 sqq., where he is said to have been accused of seeking to rule his own State. In 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20 sq., on the other hand, 'Pausanias the king' is said to have sought according to some to abolish the ephorate, which might seem at first sight a more restricted aim; still, as the ephorate resembled a tyranny in the extent of its power (2. 9. 1270 b 13 sq.: 2. 6. 1265 b 40), there is nothing in this account of his aim to show that 'Pausanias the king' is not referred to in the passage before us. The ephorate was the main barrier in the way of any one who sought to set up a tyranny at Sparta. Aristotle does not commit himself to a positive statement that Pausanias was guilty. For κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον cp. c. 12. 1315 b 28, κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, and Hdt. 7. 137, κατὰ τὸν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων πόλεμον.

5. καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἄννων. As to Anno or Hanno see Justin, 20. 5 and 21. 4. He appears to have been one of the Carthaginian generals in a war in Sicily with Dionysius the Elder (Justin, 20. 5. 11 sqq.). Aristotle is careful not to affirm his guilt, and it seems to have been doubted (Justin, 22. 7. 10); at any rate he did not succeed any more than Pausanias did in making himself tyrant.

Meltzer, however (Gesch. d. Karthager, 1. 504), takes Aristotle to refer here and in c. 12. 1316 a 34 to an earlier Hanno. To what Hanno Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 3 and Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 30 and Hist. An. 5. 39, refer is uncertain. In 2. 11. 1272 b 32 Aristotle says that no *στάσις* worth mentioning had occurred at Carthage.

λύονται δὲ μάλιστα κ.τ.λ. *Λύονται* is emphatic. If aristocracies are troubled with *στάσις* for the reasons which have been mentioned, both polities and aristocracies are mostly *overthrown* owing to some contravention of justice in the framing of the constitution itself, and especially to an undue leaning in favour of either the rich or the many. Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 6, *ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον ἡ πολιτεία μιχθῇ, τοσούτῳ μονιμωτέρα.* In the passage before us *αὐτὴ ἡ πολιτεία* seems to be tacitly contrasted with the administration of the State (cp. c. 8. 1308 b 32, *καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ*, and 2. 9. 1270 a 13 sqq.).

7. ἀρχὴ γάρ, sc. *λύσεως*. Cp. c. 8. 1307 b 39.

11. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for it is only these two things that polities endeavour to mingle and most of the so-called aristocracies also.' See note on 1293 b 20.

13. τούτῳ, 'only in this,' i. e. in the way in which they mix these two things.

14. διὰ τοῦτ', 'on account of this,' i. e. the way in which the two things are mixed. For the repetition of *τοῦτο* see notes on 1284 b 28, 1325 b 11, and 1317 b 5.

αἱ μέν, aristocracies: **αἱ δέ**, polities.

15. τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινούσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, sc. *πολιτείας*. For the phrase cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 34–38.

16. τὸ πλῆθος. See note on 1322 b 16.

17. κρεῖττόν τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The many are stronger than the few and therefore have a securer hold of power, and besides they are more apt to be content with an equal share. Euripides had already said of the rich (Suppl. 225 Bothe, 238 Dindorf),

οἱ μὲν ὄλβιοι
ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλειόνων τ' ἐρῶσ' ἀεί.

In *μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἴσον ἔχοντες* Aristotle repeats the remark of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 483 C, *ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοί* (i. e. *οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι καὶ οἱ πολλοί*), *ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες.* Cp. also c. 8. 1308 a 11 sq. With *ἀγαπῶσιν* supply *οἱ πλείους* from *τὸ πλεῖον* (see note on 1319 b 14).

19. For **οἱ ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις** cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 19, *τοὺς ἐν*

ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις, and Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 b 35, οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μεγάλαις ὄντες.

20. ὅλως δ' ἐφ' ὁπότερον κ.τ.λ. According to Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 21 sq. the normal constitutions are most apt to change into their παρεκβάσεις—kingship into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, timocracy (i. e. polity) into democracy. But according to Pol. 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 18 sqq. constitutions are most apt to change into their opposites—democracy, for instance, into oligarchy, and *vice versa*. Ἡ πολιτεία, 'the constitution,' as in 19.

21. ἑκατέρων, 'either favoured class,' whether it be the rich or the poor.

τὸ σφέτερον, 'quod suum est' (Vict.).

22. ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δῆμον. So at Tarentum (c. 3. 1303 a 3 sqq.) and at Syracuse (c. 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.). The freedom with which the article is added and omitted in 22–25 deserves notice. See Vahlen on Poet. 21. 1457 b 7.

ἀριστοκρατία δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. Aristotle appears to have anticipated a change of this kind at Carthage (see note on 1273 b 1).

23. εἰς τἀναντία. We expect ἐπὶ τἀναντία (cp. 21, ἐπὶ ταῦτα), but εἰς is continued from εἰς δῆμον, εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, and takes the place of ἐπί in εἰς τἀναντία.

26. μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον κ.τ.λ., i. e. for all constitutions are wanting in durability in which there is an unfair leaning to one side or the other (20) and advantages are not distributed in strict accordance with desert. For the thought cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 14.

τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὑτῶν, 'the possession of one's due': cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 28, b 17, and 5. 8. 1133 b 3.

27. τὸ εἰρημένον, i. e. the change of a constitution into its opposite, in this case the change of aristocracy into democracy. At Thurii the property-qualification for office was high, whereas in an aristocracy there ought to be no property-qualification for office at all (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq.). The aristocracy of Thurii favoured the rich too much, and this infraction of justice in the constitution led to its change into a democracy. It should be noticed, however, that this aristocracy with oligarchical leanings was rash enough to employ the demos in war, always a dangerous thing for an oligarchy to do (c. 6. 1306 a 25 sq.). Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 199, note 104) and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 244. 1) refer these events to the early days of the colony of Thurii, when the Sybarite section of the colonists was expelled or put to

death (see note on 1303 a 31) for various acts of encroachment, one of them being (according to Diod. 12. 11) that they allotted to themselves all the land near the city, and it is true that at this time (Diod. 12. 23) a war was waged by Thurii with Tarentum which might be the war referred to in 1307 a 32, and that the word *πλεονεκτεῖν*, which is used in 31, is applied in c. 3. 1303 a 32 to the encroachments of the Sybarite section of the colonists, but Sus.[2] (Note 1602) is probably right in questioning the correctness of this view. The grievance at Thurii at that time, in fact, was, not that a high property-qualification was required for office, but that the Sybarite citizens of Thurii claimed all the chief offices for themselves; not that the leading citizens had bought up all the land, but that the Sybarites had allotted to themselves all the land near the city; nor was the penalty inflicted on the Sybarites simply deprivation of the land, for they were slain or expelled from the State. Sus.[2] (Note 1602) holds that the events narrated by Aristotle occurred during the time which followed the disastrous defeat of Athens at Syracuse, when the party friendly to Athens at Thurii was expelled ([Plut.] Decem Orat. Vitae, 3, Lysias, 835 D sq.). An aristocracy with a leaning to oligarchy may well have then been introduced and have been overthrown later on in the way described by Aristotle. Busolt, on the other hand (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 533. 4), places the constitutional change at Thurii described in 1307 b 6–19 before the constitutional change described in 1307 a 27–33, and takes that which he regards as the later of the two changes to have occurred in the fourth century B.C. He argues that the concentration of the whole of the landed property of the State in the hands of the *γνώριμοι* and the language of Plato in Laws 636 B, *ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ξυσσίτια πολλὰ μὲν ἄλλα νῦν ὠφελεῖ τὰς πόλεις, πρὸς δὲ τὰς στάσεις χαλεπά· δηλοῦσι δὲ Μιλησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θουρίων παῖδες*, point to the fourth century B.C., but I do not find this argument convincing. Nor can I think that the constitutional change described in 1307 a 27–33 occurred in the *δυναστεία* the establishment of which is described in 1307 b 6–19, for a narrow oligarchy of this type would hardly be based on a property-qualification, however high; the constitution in which the change occurred seems rather to have been, if we may judge from the context, an oligarchical kind of aristocracy.

διὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the form of the sentence cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11 sqq.

28. εἰς ἔλαττον μετέβη, i. e. *εἰς ἔλαττον τίμημα μετέβη ἡ πολιτεία*, not *τὸ τίμημα*. So Bonitz (Ind. 458 a 35 sqq.).

29. καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω. This also was a change in a democratic direction, for it gave access to office to a larger number of citizens, and the democratic principle is *τὸ ἄρχειν πάντας μὲν ἑκάστους ἕκαστον δ' ἐν μέρει πάντων* (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 19: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.). Cp. also Plato, Polit. 303 A, where *τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανενεμῆσθαι κατὰ σμικρὰ εἰς πολλούς* is said to be characteristic of democracy.

30. συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Συγκτήσασθαι, 'bought up,' like *συνωνεῖσθαι, συμπρίασθαι* (1. 11. 1259 a 24). The law referred to seems to have resembled those mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8 sqq. and 2. 7. 1266 b 16 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the constitution was in fault, for the point which the example is adduced to illustrate is that a deviation from justice in the constitution itself often causes the overthrow of polities and aristocracies (cp. 5 sqq., 20 sqq.).

32. ὁ δὲ δῆμος κ.τ.λ. See critical note on 1307 a 31.

τῶν φρουρῶν. The *φρουροί* mentioned here and in 1307 b 9 were probably citizens of Thurii placed in the *φρούρια* scattered over the territory of the State to guard it from the Lucanians (cp. Oecon. 2. 1351 a 26 sqq.). They may perhaps have been young men (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 27 sq.) and of the wealthy class, for they are contrasted with the demos.

33. πλείω, 'more than the law allowed' (Vict. 'plus aequo'). Πλείω ἦσαν ἔχοντες takes up *πλεονεκτεῖν*, 31.

34. ἔτι διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is 'besides (apart from any deviation from justice in the constitution) the mere fact that aristocracies give office to a few only makes it possible for the *γνώριμοι* to have their own way too much.' Μᾶλλον goes with *πλεονεκτοῦσιν* (cp. 36, *ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον*).

35. οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 a 15 sqq.

37. κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσιν. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 a 26 sqq.

38. διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle implies that the Epizephyrian Locri was under an aristocracy, and an aristocracy not well compounded but favouring the rich too much in its mixture of elements, at the time when it voted the acceptance of Dionysius the Elder's proposal to marry the daughter of one of its citizens (Diod. 14. 44. 6: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 82, vol. 10. 663). Forty years later Locri suffered for its acceptance, for when Dionysius the Younger, the offspring of this marriage, abandoned

Syracuse in B.C. 356 and removed to Locri, the tyranny which he exercised there for six years was of so outrageous a kind that the Locrians rose in insurrection as soon as his absence from Locri made a successful insurrection possible, and avenged his misgovernment on his wife and family (Clearch. ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 541: Justin, 21. 2 sq.: Strabo, p. 259 sq.: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 85, vol. 11. 188 sq.). The city, however, would probably have suffered still more if it had rejected the proposals of Dionysius, for Rhegium, which did so, was pursued by the tyrant in consequence with relentless hostility till it was destroyed and its inhabitants enslaved in B.C. 387. The Epizephyrian Locri is here called simply *ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις* because the mention of Dionysius makes it unnecessary to add, as in 2. 12. 1274 a 22 sq., *τῶν ἐπιζεφυρίων. Τοῖς ἐπιζεφυρίοις* is omitted for a similar reason in Rhet. 2. 21. 1395 a 1. Its omission in Pol. 2. 7. 1266 b 19 cannot be thus explained, but the Italian Locri may nevertheless well be referred to there, for in 3. 16. 1287 a 8 the Opuntian Locri is called simply *Ὀπούς*.

39. *ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ.* *Ὅ* refers to *τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας*: for other instances of a neuter referring to words not in the neuter, see notes on 1263 a 1, 1289 b 25, and 1291 a 16. Rhegium was probably democratically governed when it refused Dionysius' matrimonial proposals (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 239): this may be present to Aristotle's mind. Was Croton under an aristocracy when Philippus, one of its citizens, had to retire into exile after his betrothal with the daughter of Telys, the tyrant of Sybaris (Hdt. 5. 47)? Whether Aristotle regarded the Lacedaemonian constitution as a 'well-tempered aristocracy' is uncertain, but at any rate the Lacedaemonian kings were not allowed to marry any but Spartan women (Schömann, Gr. Alterth. 1. 233 sq., who refers to Plut. Agis, c. 11: see also Hdt. 5. 32). Athens was under an oligarchy when Cylon married the daughter of Theagenes tyrant of Megara (Thuc. 1. 126), but the Solonian democracy must have been in existence when Megacles married Agaristê, the daughter of Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon (in B.C. 576 or 572, according to Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 661. 4). Whether Peisistratus was tyrant of Athens when he married the Argive woman Timonassa is doubtful (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 17), so that we need not ask what the government of Argos was at the time. Demosthenes says in Phil. 2. 21, *οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλεῖς ταῖς πολιτείαις αἱ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους αὗται λίαν ὁμιλίαι.* 'The nobles of Venice cannot

marry alien women, nor give their daughters in marriage to subjects of a foreign Prince' (De La Houssaye, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, 1. 30). In a few exceptional cases noticed by De La Houssaye in which Venetian women had married foreign Princes, the Senate adopted the brides (ibid.).

40. μάλιστα δὲ λανθάνουσιν κ.τ.λ., 'and aristocracies are most apt to undergo insensible change through being overthrown little by little.' Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Phaedr. 262 A, ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα, and see note on 1307 b 30. In what other ways aristocracies undergo insensible change, he does not tell us. They would probably do so if the numbers of the rich or the poor insensibly increased (c. 3. 1303 a 1).

1307 b. 2. ὅπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν. Ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, in c. 3. 1303 a 20 sqq. For εἴρηται κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν Bonitz (Ind. 368 a 34 sqq.) compares among other passages De An. 1. 4. 408 a 1, ἁρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον καθ' ὑγιείας λέγειν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς.

4. τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, 'of the things which pertain to the constitution': cp. Metaph. Z. 15. 1040 a 6, τῶν πρὸς ὅρον ('quod ad definitionem attinet,' Bonitz). In 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 18 we have τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, and in 1298 b 31 τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν.

5. πάντα τὸν κόσμον (sc. τῆς πόλεως, Bon. Ind. 406 a 30) is explained by ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας, 18.

6. συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων πολιτείας, 'and this happened in the case of the constitution of Thurii for example' (see note on 1255 a 36). If this sentence followed more closely than it does on 1307 a 27, I should read with Garve καὶ τοῦτο in place of τοῦτο καί. It is not quite clear that the constitution of Thurii was an aristocracy when the change into a δυναστεία described in the text occurred. The displaced constitution may have been the democracy the origin of which is traced in 1307 a 27 sqq., for it is evident that under it the stratêgi were elected by the demos and that νεώτεροι were eligible subject to the restriction mentioned in respect of a repeated tenure of the office. The existence, however, of σύμβουλοι charged, it would seem, with the duty of guarding the laws against alteration savours rather of aristocracy (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 8), and if the displaced constitution was a democracy, it was one of a qualified character. Democracies were especially opposed to the repeated tenure of most offices, but

the law prohibiting a repeated tenure of the office of stratêgus, except after an interval of five years, was an unusual one even in them (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23 sq.), and it strikes us as out of place in a State like Thurii, which needed generals of experience if it was to hold its own against its Lucanian neighbours. A similar law, however, existed at Tarentum (Diog. Laert. 8. 79), though it was contravened in favour of Archytas, and a law was enacted at Rome in B.C. 342, 'ne quis eundem magistratum intra decem annos caperet' (Liv. 7. 42. 2: cp. 10. 13. 8), but instances of the contravention of this law occur from time to time (see Plut. Marius, c. 12, and Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 1. 424. 3), and then again Rome was a much larger State than Thurii, and fit candidates for military offices would be more plentiful there. The law was no doubt a safeguard against the rise of tyrants, and the feeling against a monopoly of important offices by a few men would be all the stronger at Thurii because the attempt of the Sybarite section of the colonists to keep the more important offices to themselves would be remembered with bitterness. The revolution described in the text seems to have been due to a combination between certain younger members of the wealthy class, the *φρουροί*, and the demos against the chief magistrates of the State (*τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι*, 9), who were probably for the most part older men of the wealthy class. If, as is likely, it occurred in the fourth century B.C., the aim of its promoters may have been in part to meet an increasing pressure from the Lucanians and Bruttians who threatened the existence of the State by preventing the removal from office of capable and experienced generals. The narrow *δυναστεία*, however, to the establishment of which the movement actually led, was not likely to be a source of strength to Thurii, which declined greatly in power in the course of the fourth century B.C. Indeed, if Diod. 16. 15. 2 is to be trusted, it was reduced by the Bruttians.

9. **τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι.** Schneider compares Thuc. 3. 28. 1, *οἱ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν*. Cp. also Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1461, *τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων ὄντας*, and (with Richards) Demosth. De Cor. c. 45, *τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ πράττειν*, and Hdt. 2. 82, *τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ ἐν ποιήσει γενόμενοι*.

10. **νομίζοντες ῥᾳδίως κατασχήσειν**, i. e. 'fore ut obtinerent, perficerent id quod susceperant' (Bon. Ind. s. v.). Cp. (with Liddell and Scott) Lys. Or. 3. in Simon. c. 42, *εἰ δὲ μὴ κατέσχον*, and Pol.

7 (5). 10. 1312 a 32, ἂν μὴ μέλλῃ κατασχήσειν τὴν πρᾶξιν, where we have the full phrase.

13. οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ καλούμενοι σύμβουλοι. For *οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι*, cp. Plato, Laws 952 E, *τοῖς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄρχοντας τεταγμένους*: Pol. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 22 sq.: and Sandys' note on Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 15. l. 20, *οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι*. The *σύμβουλοι* at Thurii appear to have been entrusted with the duty of guarding the laws against change, but they cannot have possessed a veto on proposals of change, as otherwise their ultimate resistance would not have been in vain. Probably all they could do was to advise the popular assembly against such proposals, and hence their name, a softened version of *πρόβουλοι*. It is interesting to find at Thurii, a colony founded under the supervision of Pericles, a magistracy designed to protect the laws against change, like the Council of the Areopagus, the powers of which he had done so much to curtail. But it must be remembered that the Council of the Areopagus had not confined itself to its function of guarding the laws, but had drawn to itself a large share of administrative authority (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 34 sqq.: c. 23. l. 2 sqq.). Hence probably its fall (see note on 1299 b 16).

18. ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. Something like this probably often happened: see as to Megara 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq., and cp. Thuc. 8. 66. 1, ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔξειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθιστάναι ἔμελλον.

19. πᾶσαι δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1312 a 39 sqq. and Polyb. 6. 57. 2. Compare also De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 31, *τῶν δὲ τοιούτων ἐνίων μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις (μέρος γάρ τι ἡ διαβολὴ τῆς πάσης ταραχῆς ἐστίν), ἐνίων δ' ἔξω, οἷον αἱ τέχναι τῶν δημιουργουμένων καὶ ὁ λύχνος τῆς καιομένης οἰκίας.*

22. ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, 'in the days when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece.' So Lamb. followed by Schneider in his translation (vol. i. p. 494). Cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 7, *οὔτε δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου*, and [Demosth.] Phil. 4. 51, *τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον ἅπαντα (χρόνον) εἰς δύο ταῦτα διῄρητο τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἡμᾶς, τῶν δ' ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων οἱ μὲν ἡμῖν οἱ δὲ ἐκείνοις ὑπήκουον.* Dr. Welldon translates 'in the case of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians,' not, I think, rightly. As to the fact compare 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 32 sqq., Thuc. 1. 19 and 3. 82. 1, and

(with Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 225. 2) Isocr. Paneg. § 105 and Panath. § 54. Busolt, however, remarks (p. 224) that we find oligarchical governments existing in Samos and Mytilene, notwithstanding their alliance with Athens (Thuc. 1. 115: 3. 27, 47: cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 24. l. 7 sqq.). It is to be noted that Aristotle does not say of the Thebans what he says of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. At a later date than that of which Aristotle is here speaking (in B.C. 375) the Athenian commander Timotheus acted very differently, not interfering with the political constitutions of the States whose alliance he won for Athens (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 64). See also Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 2, 7 as to the Lacedaemonian ephors.

23. οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες. We have Λακεδαιμονίων in 22, and οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες here. The same thing occurs in 2. 9. 1271 b 17 and 2. 10. 1271 b 23, and in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 12 and 19, and also in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 19. l. 7 and c. 23. l. 18 sqq. (cp. also c. 19. l. 20 sqq.). If we examine the Ninth chapter of the Second Book, we shall find that after the formal use of the long name Λακεδαιμόνιοι at its commencement (1269 a 29), the shorter name Λάκωνες is preferred throughout (1269 a 38, b 3, 31, 36 sq., 40, 1271 a 29). Xenophon sometimes uses the two words in a similar way (see Anab. 7. 6. 4, τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, and 7, τοὺς Λάκωνας, τὼ Λάκωνε, and 7. 7. 12, 15, 19). 'In Attic writers, e.g. in Aeschylus, Euripides, Isocrates, Lysias, Andocides, etc., the word Λάκων is either not used at all, or for the most part in the singular only . . . Aristophanes, however, often uses it. Plato uses it in the plural in Meno 99 D' (Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der gr. Eigennamen, s.v. Λάκων).

26. Περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας κ.τ.λ. The opening recommendations of cc. 8 and 9 (1307 b 30—1308 b 10) are mostly addressed to the two least safe constitutions, aristocracy and oligarchy, but from 1308 b 10 onwards to 1310 a 36 (end of c. 9) Aristotle's recommendations are for the most part applicable to all constitutions. As to the counsels given in these two chapters see Appendix A. C. 8.

27. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. There is nothing to answer to this μὲν οὖν.

29. τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων κ.τ.λ. So that the opposite of what produces φθορά will produce σωτηρία.

30. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὖ κεκραμέναις πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ. This μὲν οὖν is taken up by μὲν οὖν, 39, and then answered by ὅπειτα, 40. Aristotle has before him in this passage Plato, Rep. 424 B–D: compare especially τούτου ἀνθεκτέον τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως

ἂν . . . παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι, τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν περὶ γυμναστικήν τε καὶ μουσικὴν παρὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα φυλάττειν, and ἡ γὰρ παρανομία ῥᾳδίως αὕτη, ἔφη, λανθάνει παραδυομένη, and οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἔφη, ἄλλο γε ἡ κατὰ σμικρὸν εἰσοικισαμένη ἠρέμα ὑπορρεῖ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle, however, seems to have in view small changes or infractions of law, such as those which led to the overthrow of the constitution of Thurii, rather than the small changes in education of which Plato speaks. These small changes of law would be especially dangerous to well-tempered constitutions, for 'a constitution made up of balanced powers must ever be a critical thing' (Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, Nov. 3. 1774: Works, 1. 448 Bohn). Hesiod's lines (Op. et Dies, 361),

> εἰ γάρ κεν καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθεῖο,
> καὶ θαμὰ τοῦτ' ἔρδοις, τάχα κεν μέγα καὶ τὸ γένοιτο,

are remembered by Plato in Rep. 401 C and Laws 843 B and by Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. c. 228, and are no doubt present to Aristotle's memory here. Greek physicians dreaded those fevers most which begin κατὰ μικρόν (Plut. Praec. Coniug. c. 22). Aristotle appears to have said elsewhere much the same thing as he says here: cp. Plut. Libr. Perdit. Fragm. 11. 17 (Comm. in Hesiod.), καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἀληθές, ὀρθῶς Ἀριστοτέλης ἔλεγεν, ὅτι χείριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὸ 'μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο' λεγόμενον· εἰ γὰρ καταφρονοῖτο ὡς μικρὸν ἕκαστον καὶ ἐπιλέγοιμεν 'μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο,' κακῶς πράξομεν . . . ἡ γὰρ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον ἔλλειψις μεγάλην ἀθροίζει τοῖς παρορῶσι τὴν βλάβην, with which Wyttenbach compares De Profect. in Virt. c. 17, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὸ πλουτήσειν ἀπεγνωκότες ἐν οὐδενὶ τίθενται τὰ μικρὰ δαπανήματα, μηδὲν οἰόμενοι ποιεῖν μέγα τὸ μικρῷ τινὶ προστιθέμενον. Cp. also Plut. Cleom. c. 9, where Aristotle is said to have explained the object of the ephors' proclamation to the citizens, κείρεσθαι τὸν μύστακα καὶ προσέχειν τοῖς νόμοις, to have been, ὅπως καὶ περὶ τὰ μικρότατα τοὺς νέους πειθαρχεῖν ἐθίζωσι. Theramenes, whose political views were in some respects akin to those of Aristotle, was a great foe to illegality (see Meineke's notes in Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 867 and 1165, where he quotes Hesych. τῶν τριῶν ἕν: Θηραμένης ἐψηφίσατο τρεῖς τιμωρίας κατὰ τῶν παράνομόν τι δρώντων, and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 28 end, ed. Sandys, where I have already referred to these notes of Meineke). Aristotle's advice is probably addressed to the Lacedaemonians among others, as to whom we read in Diod. 7. 14. 7 that 'after a while annulling each of the laws little by little and turning aside into luxury and idleness, and

further being corrupted by using money and accumulating wealth, they lost the hegemony of Greece.'

31. παρανομῶσι, sc. οἱ πολῖται.

34. λανθάνει δὲ ἡ δαπάνη διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίγνεσθαι. Cp. c. 6. 1306 b 14 sq.

35. παραλογίζεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the mind is misled by the small outlays in the fashion indicated by the sophistical puzzle, "if each is small, all also are small."' For παραλογίζεται ἡ διάνοια, Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares Probl. 5. 25. 883 b 8 sq. and 30. 4. 955 b 15 sq. Ὑπ' αὐτῶν, 'by the repeated small outlays': cp. c. 10. 1311 a 33, τῆς δ' ὕβρεως οὔσης πολυμεροῦς, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν μερῶν τῆς ὕβρεως) αἴτιον γίγνεται τῆς ὀργῆς. The sophistical puzzle referred to turned on the difficulty of supposing that what holds of each of a number of things does not hold of the whole which they make up. If each is small, all are small, and the whole, it is inferred, must be small. But 'all' may mean either 'all taken individually' or 'all gathered into a whole.' 'All taken individually' are small, but not so 'all gathered into a whole.' What is true of each individual thing is not necessarily true of the whole which the individual things make up. For instance, the parts may be odd and the whole even (2. 5. 1264 b 20 sqq.). That the converse of this is true, and that what holds of the whole does not necessarily hold of each of its parts, we see from 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq. and from 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq. Compare Plato, Laws 901 B, ἡ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, and 902 D sq.

39. ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, sc. μεταβολῆς or φθορᾶς: cp. c. 7. 1307 a 7.

40. ἔπειτα μὴ πιστεύειν κ.τ.λ. Plato's language in Rep. 459 C sqq. had given some encouragement to the opposite view, and Aristotle probably regarded some of the arrangements in his Laws as σοφίσματα of the kind which he disapproves (see note on 1297 a 14 and vol. i. p. 502, note 2).

2. ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν κ.τ.λ., 'and what constitutional sophisms we refer to, has been explained before,' i.e. in 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 14 sqq. 1308 a.

3. ἔτι δ' ὁρῶν κ.τ.λ. Some aristocracies and even some oligarchies—for oligarchies are less safe than aristocracies—held their ground because those who from time to time were in office dealt justly and kindly with those outside the constitution, not wronging them and bringing those fit for rule within the privileged class, and treated those within the constitution in a democratic spirit of

equality, making office accessible to all. Cp. Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 16, *γιγνώσκων ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν αὗται πλεῖστον χρόνον διαμένουσιν, αἵτινες ἂν ἄριστα τὸ πλῆθος θεραπεύωσιν.* Aristotle perhaps also remembers a saying of the Lacedaemonian king Theopompus, *Θεόπομπος πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτήσαντα πῶς ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς τηροίη τὴν βασιλείαν, Εἰ τοῖς μὲν φίλοις, ἔφη, μεταδιδοίη παρρησίας δικαίας, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχομένους κατὰ δύναμιν μὴ περιορφη ἀδικουμένους* (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Theopomp. 1). It will be noticed that the passage before us implies that there may be persons outside the constitution not only in oligarchies, but also in aristocracies. It is uncertain to what aristocracies Aristotle here refers. Carthage (2. 11. 1273 b 18 sqq.: 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4 sqq.) and Tarentum (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 9 sqq.) to a certain extent answer to his description, but the practice which obtained at Carthage of allowing one man to hold several offices (2. 11. 1273 b 8 sqq.) is not at all in harmony with the advice which Aristotle gives in 1308 a 10 sqq. The Lacedaemonian *ἀριστοκρατία* erred in its treatment of those outside the constitution, as the conspiracy of Cinadon proved (see note on 1306 b 34), and also in its treatment of those within it, for though the ephorate was open to all citizens, some of the chief offices at Sparta were tenable for life and therefore accessible only to a few, and the mode of electing senators was *δυναστευτική* (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 18 sq.). As to oligarchies, those of Massalia (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 29 sqq.) and Pharsalus (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 10 sqq.) are probably present to Aristotle's mind, though we do not hear from him of any oligarchy which combined all the merits he mentions. The oligarchy of Elis seems also to have been one of those which dealt kindly with the many, so much so that they were quite content to remain in the country on their farms (Polyb. 4. 73. 8, *τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μεγάλην ποιεῖσθαι σπουδὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν τοὺς πολιτευομένους τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας κατοικούντων, ἵνα τό τε δίκαιον αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τόπου διεξάγηται καὶ τῶν πρὸς βιωτικὰς χρείας μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ*). At Naxos, on the contrary (7 (5). 6. 1305 a 38 sqq.), the oligarchs oppressed the many. Oppression of this kind was one of the causes which led to the French Revolution. 'It was not a question of the power of the king, or the measure of an electoral circumscription, that made the Revolution; it was the iniquitous distribution of the taxes, the scourge of the militia service, the scourge of the road service, the destructive tyranny exercised in the vast preserves of wild game, the vexatious rights and imposts of the lords of manors, and all

the other odious burdens and heavy impediments on the prosperity of the thrifty and industrious part of the nation' (J. Morley, Burke, p. 159). But Aristotle holds that it is just as dangerous to insult the aspiring few among those outside the constitution, or even to fail to bring within it those who are fit for rule, as to oppress the many. We read of the Spanish colonies in America:—'If as an exception to the rule an aspiring, and therefore dangerous, individual appeared in the ranks of the negroes, recourse was had to the means by which so many demagogues have been reduced to silence; a patent was given him "that he should count for a white." If he did not thus become a direct adherent of the privileged class, at any rate he was made an object of suspicion to the men of his own race. So in the Dutch East Indies every child which an European father recognized as his own was counted as European, and the great danger to which the State would otherwise have been exposed from the half-breeds was thus diminished' (Roscher, Politik, p. 156).

5. τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γινομένους. Cp. Thuc. 4. 74, *ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο.*

6. καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι. *Πολιτεία* and *πολίτευμα* are here evidently used as terms not far removed from each other in meaning: cp. c. 6. 1306 a 14, 16, and see 3. 6. 1278 b 11 and 3. 7. 1279 a 25 sq.

9. τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς εἰς κέρδος. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16, *οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ὀρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς.* For the use of *εἰς* see Bon. Ind. 222 b 55 sqq. *Κέρδος* does not quite answer to *ἀτιμίαν*, but the same thing may be said of c. 11. 1315 a 17 sqq., where *ἡ εἰς τὰ χρήματα ὀλιγωρία* is distinguished from *ἡ εἰς ἀτιμίαν*. I cannot follow Schmidt and Sus., who would read *ἰσοτιμίαν* for *ἀτιμίαν*.

10. πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας κ.τ.λ. *Καί* is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 10 and often elsewhere. *Δημοτικῶς* = *ἴσως*, as we see from the next sentence. In many Greek oligarchies a few members of the privileged class seem to have monopolized the whole authority. The chief offices might be held for long terms, so that vacancies would occur only at long intervals, or more than one might be held by a single individual (c. 10. 1310 b 22 sq.), or re-election might be made too easy, or only one member of each family might be allowed to hold office at the same time (c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq.), or the most important offices might be confined to a few

(c. 6. 1306 a 12 sqq.). Aristotle's wish is, on the contrary, that all the members of the privileged class should as far as possible stand on an equal footing, and that all should have a turn of office. Compare Isocr. Nicocl. § 15, *αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ δημοκρατίαι τὰς ἰσότητας τοῖς μετέχουσι τῶν πολιτειῶν ζητοῦσι, καὶ τοῦτο εὐδοκιμεῖ παρ' αὐταῖς, ἢν μηδὲν ἕτερος ἑτέρου δύνηται πλέον ἔχειν*, and Rhet. ad Alex. 3 1424 a 39 sq. 'Within the Roman Senate itself precautions were taken to prevent any one man from aspiring to rise above the little circle of his peers; the offices of the State must be held at fixed intervals, and no man might hold the same office twice except after the lapse of ten years' (Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 28 sq.). In the oligarchy of Berne the offices were awarded in the eighteenth century by lot (Von Mülinen, Bern's Geschichte, p. 179). 'Within the circle of the ruling families of Berne an equalizing spirit prevailed. Pensions and promotions from foreign princes were forbidden, and in order that no family might have any advantage over its fellows, it was decided in 1783 that each family should have the right of prefixing "von" to its name' (ibid. p. 180). Macaulay remarks in the margin of his copy of the Politics (*Macmillan's Magazine*, July, 1875, p. 221), 'The Venetian aristocracy carried this rule as far as it could be carried.' The advice which Aristotle gives here, however, seems hardly consistent with the advice which he gives to the first form of oligarchy in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq., to make the property-qualification higher for the higher offices than for the lower.

11. **ὃ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους κ.τ.λ.** Democrats claimed equality with the few for the many, though the many are not like the few: what they claimed without good ground for the many may justly be claimed for those who *are* alike.

13. **διὸ κ.τ.λ.** *Ἐὰν πλείους ὦσιν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι* is added because, if the number of those who enjoy political rights under the constitution is small, the difficulty referred to is not likely to arise, for there will be offices enough for all the Homoei, and all of them may be in office simultaneously. Indeed, there may conceivably be more offices than Homoei to fill them (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 1 sqq.). Aristotle would probably recommend the adoption in aristocracies and oligarchies not only of the democratic practice which he here recommends for their adoption, but also of others, such as the prohibition of a repeated tenure of most offices and of the cumulation of offices. It is evident, however, from c. 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.

that he would not recommend the use of the lot in appointments to important offices.

15. οἷον τὸ ἑξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι. So at Venice the six Counsellors of the Doge, 'who kept him in a state of absolute vassalage,' held office only for eight months, the six Savii Grandi and the five Savii agli Ordini only for six (Yriarte, Patricien de Venise, pp. 35, 36, 348, 349).

16. ἔστι, not εἰσί, cp. (with Richards) Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 a 13 sq.: Thuc. 3. 112. 1, ἐστὸν δὲ δύο λόφω ἡ Ἰδομένη ὑψηλώ, and 5. 66. 4, σχεδὸν γάρ τι πᾶν πλὴν ὀλίγου τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσί: Plato, Rep. 422 E: Aristoph. Thesmoph. 21, Nub. 247 sq. The singular verb is due to the number of the predicate.

18. πρότερον, in c. 6. 1305 b 24 sqq.

ἔπειθ' ἧττον κ.τ.λ. The measures just recommended—the fixing of a short term for the tenure of offices and other similar measures —will not only serve to content the members of the class favoured by the constitution, but also to save oligarchies and aristocracies from becoming δυναστεῖαι. An oligarchy or aristocracy might easily become a δυναστεία, if the holders of the chief offices in them held office for long terms, for these men would be enabled to become very rich and to gather round them a large body of dependent friends, and so not only to secure the reversion of their offices for their sons, but also to make their will supreme over the law. A δυναστεία would then arise (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5 sqq.: 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.). Cp. Liv. 4. 24. 4, maximam autem libertatis custodiam esse, si magna imperia diuturna non essent, et temporis modus imponeretur, quibus iuris imponi non posset (quoted by Meier, Aristotelis Politicorum Analysis ac Expositio, p. 479). For the meaning of κακουργεῖν, which includes embezzlement of public money, see Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 109 sq.

20. ἐπεὶ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Διὰ τοῦτο, i. e. διὰ τὸ πολὺν χρόνον ἄρχειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. It is evident from what follows that both in oligarchies and in democracies men sometimes won tyrannies simply through holding important offices tenable for long terms—especially, it would seem, the offices of δημιουργός and θεωρός (c. 10. 1310 b 21 sq.)—even though they were not demagogues or men of the chief oligarchical families. Compare the Argument to Demosthenes' speech against Androtion (p. 590), where the Epistatês of the Athenian Boulê of 500 is referred to, ἕκαστος δὲ ἄρχων ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκαλεῖτο ἐπιστάτης. διὰ τί δὲ μίαν μόνην ἦρχεν; ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς

τὰς κλεῖς τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἐπιστεύετο καὶ πάντα τὰ χρήματα τῆς πόλεως ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἐρασθῇ τυραννίδος, διὰ τοῦτο μίαν ἡμέραν ἐποίουν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν.

23. οἱ δημαγωγοί. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 466 B, ΠΩΛ. πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες); . . . ΣΩ. δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτιννύασί τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

24. σώζονται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι κ.τ.λ. This refers back to and corrects c. 7. 1307 b 19 sqq., where we have been told that constitutions are overthrown when an opposite constitution is near at hand. This is not always so. Sometimes, on the contrary, the nearness of those who would be glad to overthrow the constitution is a cause of its preservation; it engenders fear in the minds of the rulers of the State and makes them vigilant. Hence the wise statesman will produce fears in the minds of those entrusted with the charge of the constitution, so as to prevent them from relaxing their vigilance. Cp. Xen. Oecon. 7. 25, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ φυλάττειν τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα τῇ γυναικὶ προσέταξε, γιγνώσκων ὁ θεὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὸ φυλάττειν οὐ κάκιόν ἐστι φοβερὰν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πλεῖον μέρος καὶ τοῦ φόβου ἐδάσατο τῇ γυναικὶ ἢ τῷ ἀνδρί, Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 5, τὸ μὲν γὰρ θάρρος ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ ἀπείθειαν ἐμβάλλει, ὁ δὲ φόβος προσεκτικωτέρους τε καὶ εὐπειθεστέρους καὶ εὐτακτοτέρους ποιεῖ, and Demosth. Prooem. 43. p. 1450 sq. By what measures this state of fear is to be produced, Aristotle does not tell us. Partly perhaps by laws and penalties (compare the use of φοβεῖσθαι in reference to ζημίαι in 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 34), partly by magistracies enforcing vigilance on the magistrates, like the Council of the Areopagus or the Ephorate, partly by a policy resembling that recommended by the Chian statesman Onomademus, who advised his party, when they had won the victory, not to banish the whole of the opposite party for fear lest for want of foes they should proceed to fall out among themselves (Plut. De capienda ex inimicis utilitate, c. 10). In a similar spirit Scipio Nasica (Corculum) advised that Carthage should not be destroyed, wishing τοῦτον γοῦν τὸν φόβον ὥσπερ χαλινὸν ἐπικεῖσθαι σωφρονιστῆρα τῇ θρασύτητι τῶν πολλῶν (Plut. Cato Censor, c. 27: cp. Plut. De capienda ex inimicis utilitate, c. 3 *sub fin.*; Sallust, De Bell. Iugurth. c. 41, nam ante Carthaginem deletam populus et senatus Romanus placide modesteque inter se rempublicam tractabant, neque gloriae neque dominationis certamen inter cives erat; metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat. Sed ubi illa formido mentibus decessit, scilicet ea quae secundae res amant,

lascivia atque superbia, incessere; Plin. Nat. Hist. 33. 150, pariterque luxuria nata est et Carthago sublata, ita congruentibus fatis ut et liberet amplecti vitia et liceret; and Vell. Paterc. 2. 1. 1). Compare the unwillingness of Dionysius the Elder that the power of Carthage should be entirely destroyed lest Syracuse should have leisure to regain its liberty (Diod. 14. 75. 3). To what States does Aristotle refer when he says that constitutions are sometimes preserved by the nearness of those who desire to overthrow them? He may possibly, like Plato (Laws 698–9), connect the preservation of the moderate democracy at Athens till after the Persian War with the fear of Persian attack which prevailed there until the repulse of the invasion of Xerxes. Perhaps he also refers to Pharsalus, which was within easy reach of the tyrants of Pherae, and yet retained its oligarchical constitution (c. 6. 1306 a 10 sqq.). Megara, again, long retained the oligarchy which was set up there in B. C. 424 (Thuc. 4. 74), notwithstanding that, or perhaps because, it was close to Athens (cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 118). The same thing may be said of Corinth, which retained its oligarchy though it lay between the two powerful democracies of Athens and Argos. Compare the case of the Lacedaemonian State, which was surrounded by foes (2. 9. 1269 b 3 sqq.). It is probably to it that Plutarch refers when he says (De cap. ex inim. utilitate, c. 3), *καθάπερ αἱ πολέμοις ἀστυγειτονικοῖς καὶ στρατείαις ἐνδελεχέσι σωφρονιζόμεναι πόλεις εὐνομίαν καὶ πολιτείαν ὑγιαίνουσαν ἠγάπησαν.* It was in moments of elation and self-confidence that changes in the direction of extreme democracy were made in the Athenian constitution (see note on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 22. § 3 in Sandys' edition). Machiavelli remarks in his Discourse on reforming the government of Florence (*init.*), that the constitution introduced at Florence by Maso degli Albizzi 'would not have lasted so long as forty years, had it not been for the wars with the Visconti, Dukes of Milan, which happened in that period and kept the State united.' It may be noticed that the entire absence of any check of the nature here referred to by Aristotle (see Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3. 335) has not so far interfered with the preservation of the United States' constitution.

26. **φοβούμενοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.,** sc. **οἱ πολῖται.**

28. **φόβους παρασκευάζειν.** Cp. Philo, Mechan. Syntax. p. 90. 22 Schoene, *ἵνα φόβον καὶ φθορὰν ταχεῖαν παρασκευάζῃ τοῖς τιτρωσκομένοις*, and p. 98. 39, *ἵνα φόβον τε ὡς πλεῖστον παρασκευάσῃς*, and Plato, Phaedo, 84 A, *γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα.* Cp. also (with Bon.

Ind. s. v. φόβος) Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 18, πάντες γὰρ ἢ διαβάλλουσιν ἢ φόβους ἀπολύονται ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις.

29. φυλάττωσι, sc. οἱ πολῖται.

μὴ καταλύωσιν ὥσπερ νυκτερινὴν φολακὴν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν. For καταλύειν νυκτερινὴν φυλακήν, cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 2.

31. ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 b 6 sq. Contrast the tendencies of tyranny (c. 11. 1313 b 16 sqq.). Among these φιλονεικίαι would be those mentioned in c. 6. 1305 b 22 sq. Καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων, 'by means of the laws also,' as well as by other means, such as the voluntary action of the magistrates or the intervention of private friends. So at Cumae we find a rising στάσις composed by the intervention of the elder citizens (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 4). Aristotle would have wished that 'the first seeds of the bitter and incurable quarrel' between Marius and Sulla, which arose out of Bocchus' surrender of Jugurtha to Sulla, and (in the words of Plutarch, Marius, c. 10) 'went near to overthrow Rome,' had been dealt with as he suggests. By what laws would he seek to prevent the rise of discords and rivalries among the notables? Partly perhaps by laws requiring differences to be at once referred to authorities entrusted with the task of reconciling them (cp. c. 4. 1303 b 27, διαλύειν τὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων στάσεις), partly by other laws. The difference, for instance, between the two brothers at Hestiaea may have arisen in part from a failure of the law to provide means of compelling the richer brother to disclose the amount of the patrimony and of the treasure (c. 4. 1303 b 32 sqq.), and that in Phocis (1304 a 10 sqq.) from a failure of the law clearly to settle the question who had the best right to marry the orphan heiress. Again, men hopelessly at feud might be required by law to go into exile, a course vainly recommended by one of the elder citizens at Syracuse before the rise of the στάσις described in c. 4. 1303 b 20 sqq. (Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32. 825 C).

32. καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλονεικίας ὄντας, sc. φυλάττειν.

33. πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς, 'before they too have caught' (or 'inherited') 'the rivalry': cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 8 sq. and 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 22 sq., and Plut. Ages. c. 4, διὸ καὶ πατρικήν τινα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ παλαιοῦ διεστήλουν εὐθὺς οἱ βασιλεῖς φιλονεικίαν καὶ διαφορὰν παραλαμβάνοντες.

ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ κ.τ.λ. This is added in support of what precedes. Discords and rivalries among the notables should be prevented from

arising, for if they arise in a section of the notables and spread beyond it, no one but a statesman will be able to detect the evil at its beginning, the only time when it can be easily healed. Pittacus had said (Diog. Laert. 1. 78: Stob. Floril. 108. 73: cp. Plato, Rep. 564 C, and 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 14. l. 8 sqq.), *συνετῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὶν γενέσθαι τὰ δυσχερῆ, προνοῆσαι ὅπως μὴ γένηται, ἀνδρείων δὲ γενόμενα εὖ θέσθαι.* Cp. Epicharm. Fragm. 131 Ahrens,

οὐ μεταγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ προγνοεῖν χρὴ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν σοφόν,

and Manil. Astron. 5. 354 (punctuation uncertain and text of fourth line),

Ille tenet medicas artes ad membra ferarum,
Et non auditos mutarum tollere morbos
(Hoc est artis opus, non exspectare gementis),
†Et sibi non aegros iam dudum credere corpus†.

Solon had detected the design of Peisistratus to make himself tyrant long before it was executed (Diog. Laert. 1. 49), and Stesichorus the similar design of Phalaris (Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq.) Prince Metternich said to Ticknor, 'C'est toujours avec le lendemain que mon esprit lutte' (Ticknor's Life and Letters, 2. 17).

35. *πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα κ.τ.λ.* See note on 1306 b 6. The valuations mentioned in the passage before us were probably made in most Greek States. In oligarchies based on a property-qualification and in polities they would be made in order to determine who possessed the property-qualification for office or citizenship and who did not; in constitutions not based on a property-qualification they would be made with a view to the imposition of *λειτουργίαι* and the *εἰσφορά*. The fact that they were made annually in small States shows that men's property or its value fluctuated a good deal in Greek States (cp. [Demosth.] Or. 42. in Phaenipp. c. 4, *διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οἱ νόμοι καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀντιδόσεις, ὅτι τὸ διευτυχεῖν συνεχῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὐ πολλοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν διαμένειν εἴθισται*), and that the authorities took much pains to proportion their demands to these variations. In larger States the labour and cost of making the valuation were greater, and the valuations were consequently made at longer intervals. At Rome the period was five years (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 316 sq.). In mediaeval Florence 'l'*estimo* ou estimation des biens de toute sorte pour fixer des taxes proportionnelles' was made afresh every ten years (F. T. Perrens, La Civilisation Florentine, p. 99). The valuations were probably made in Greece by self-assessment corrected by *ἐπιγραφεῖς*, as at Athens (Plato, Laws

754 D: cp. Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 365). Compare the practice at Rome (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 363 sq.: Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 273 sq.). In the advice which Aristotle gives in 38 sqq. he appears to 'assume the population of the State to be stationary. Otherwise it would be the average *τίμημα* that ought to be taken' (Richards). He appears also to take it for granted that the increase or decrease of the total valuation of the State indicates an increase or decrease of the wealth of the individual citizens generally, and not of a small minority of them.

37. **εὐπορίας δὲ νομίσματος γιγνομένης.** For an instance of this at Rome see Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 94.

38. **τοῦ τιμήματος τοῦ κοινοῦ,** 'of the total valuation of the State': cp. Demosth. Or. 14. De Symmor. c. 19, *τὸ τίμημα τὸ τῆς χώρας.*

39. **πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν,** sc. *πλῆθος.*

1308 b. **2.** **τοῦ πρότερον,** sc. *πλήθους.*

ἐν ᾧ, sc. *χρόνῳ,* explains *πρότερον*: cp. *ἐν τοσούτῳ,* 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 30.

αἱ τιμήσεις τῆς πολιτείας, 'the ratings of the constitution for political purposes' (Liddell and Scott, who compare Diod. 18. 18. 4, *ἀπὸ τιμήσεως εἶναι τὸ πολίτευμα*).

3. **νόμον εἶναι,** sc. *συμφέρει.*

καὶ τὰ τιμήματα, 'the property-qualifications also,' as well as the total valuation of the State.

4. **ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνιέναι,** sc. *τοὺς ἄρχοντας.*

6. **ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις μὴ ποιούντων μὲν οὕτως κ.τ.λ.** Sus.[3a] brackets the first *μέν* and (following Niemeyer) transposes the second *μέν* to after *οὕτως,* but I doubt whether the second *μέν* is answered by *ἐκείνως δέ,* as is implied in this transposition. Both the first and the second *μέν* appear to be cases of *μέν solitarium,* which is not rare in the Politics (see note on 1262 a 6). For the repetition of *μέν* cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 23 sqq.

9. **ἐκείνως δέ,** 'in the opposite case,' i. e. if the total valuation of the State has increased (so Vict. 'si facultates privatorum valde creverint,' and Schn.). I prefer this explanation to that of Lambinus, 'si altero modo non agant, hoc est, si auctis censibus aestimationes non intendant,' with which Dr. Welldon appears to agree, as he translates, 'if there is no increase of the requisite assessment from time to time.'

10. **κοινὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Here we pass from recommendations chiefly applicable to oligarchy and aristocracy to recommendations

applicable to all constitutions. Aristotle probably at first intended to follow up *μήτ' αὐξάνειν* by *μήτε ταπεινοῦν* or some similar words, but the regular sequence of the passage is broken after *εὐτυχίαν*, 15, and thus *μήτε*, 11, remains without anything to answer to it. For *μήτε* followed by *ἀλλά*, and not by any answering *μήτε*, see above on 1339 a 17, and cp. also *Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς* 14. 477 b 9–12. As to [*καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ*] see critical note on 1308 b 11. Demagogues tended to become overgreat in democracies (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 25 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22 sq.: cp. Plato, Rep. 565 C, *οὐκοῦν ἕνα τινὰ ἀεὶ δῆμος εἴωθε διαφερόντως προϊστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν;*), but oligarchies also sometimes made men overgreat (c. 10. 1310 b 22 sq.). At Rome the rule which fixed a minimum age for the tenure of the quaestorship praetorship and consulship was a check on this tendency (see Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 242). Aristotle has before him Solon, Fragm. 11, Theogn. 823,

μήτε τιν' αὖξε τύραννον ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, κέρδεσιν εἴκων,
μήτε κτεῖνε θεῶν ὅρκια συνθέμενος,

and Eurip. Fragm. 628 Nauck (626, ed. 2),

μηδ' ἄνδρα δήμῳ πιστὸν ἐκβάλῃς ποτέ,
μηδ' αὖξε καιροῦ μείζον', οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλές,
μή σοι τύραννος λαμπρὸς ἐξ ἀστοῦ φανῇ.
κόλουε δ' ἄνδρα παρὰ δίκην τιμώμενον.

The advice against taking away great honours at a blow was newer than the advice not to make a single individual overgreat. Aristotle no doubt remembers the sudden fall from power of Themistocles (Diod. 11. 27. 3), Alcibiades, and Lysander (Plut. Ages. cc. 8, 20), and the perilous state of affairs which resulted.

14. *φέρειν οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχίαν.* Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 28 sqq. and Solon ap. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 12,

τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται[αι]
ἀνθρώποισιν ὅσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ.

15. *εἰ δὲ μή*, κ.τ.λ., 'but, if they do not act thus,' etc. Cp. c. 11. 1315 a 12 sqq.

16. *καὶ μάλιστα μὲν* κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1302 b 19 sqq. and 3. 13. 1284 b 17 sqq. As to the means of doing this see note on 1284 a 17. For *δύναμις φίλων, χρημάτων*, cp. Plato, Rep. 366 C, *ᾧ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους.*

19. *εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν*, 'but, failing that, to make removals imposed on such men removals beyond the limits of the State.' Cp. Plato, Laws 855 C, and see

Liddell and Scott. Men in the position described by Aristotle were probably often removed to a distance from the chief city without being banished from the State. Dionysius the Elder acted otherwise. Suspecting the fidelity of his brother Leptines, who was popular with the Syracusans, he sent him on a mission to Himera and on his arrival ordered him to stay there and not return to Syracuse (Aen. Poliorc. c. 10. 20 sqq.). 'The most exciting moment of the reign of King Luis of Portugal was when in 1870 he received the demand of the octogenarian Duke of Saldanha for the dismissal of his liberal adviser Loulé. The request was accompanied with the threat of armed revolt, and Dom Luis, judging the Duke to be strong, consented. Immediately afterwards he followed an excellent example set him by many other monarchs, and sent his inconvenient subject away on a mission of honour. Saldanha came as Minister to England, and died in London six years later' (*Times*, Oct. 21, 1889). The nomination of Marshal MacMahon as Governor-General of Algeria in 1864 by the Emperor Napoleon III is said to have been made from a similar motive.

20. ***ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.*** ***Καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους βίους,*** 'on account of their private mode of life also,' as well as on account of public honours heaped on them or suddenly withdrawn. In oligarchies spendthrift ways of life were often unchecked (Plato, Rep. 555 C) and often ended in schemes of tyranny (c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq.), and the same thing must have happened in democracies also. Even habits of luxury were thought to be perilous to constitutions (vol. i. p. 199, note 2). Nothing aroused more suspicion of the designs of Pausanias and Alcibiades than the *παρανομία* of their habits of life (Thuc. 1. 130, 132 and Diod. 11. 44. 5: Thuc. 6. 15. 4). The magistracy which Aristotle wishes to set up would be modelled more or less on the Lacedaemonian Ephorate (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4) and the Council of the Areopagus at Athens (Isocr. Areopag. § 46: Athen. Deipn. 168 a sq., a passage which shows that a similar jurisdiction existed at Abdera: Philochor. Fragm. 143: Plut. Solon, c. 22). It is possible that a magistracy charged with these functions existed in Aristotle's time in the oligarchy of Corinth: compare a fragment of the *Ἔμπορος* of Diphilus (ap. Athen. Deipn. 227 e sqq.: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 388), in which we read of the Corinthians,

ἐὰν δ' ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν τύχῃ,
ἀπεῖπον αὐτῷ τοῦτο μὴ ποιεῖν ἔτι,
ὃς ἂν δὲ μὴ πίθηται, ἐπέβαλον ζημίαν·

ἐὰν δὲ μηδ' ὁτισοῦν ἔχων ζῇ πολυτελῶς,
τῷ δημίῳ παρέδωκαν αὐτόν.

A law of Solon at Athens punished *ὁ τὰ πατρῷα κατεδηδοκώς* with *ἀτιμία* (Diog. Laert. 1. 55), and Theodorus Metochita (see Kluge, Aristoteles de Politia Carthaginiensium, p. 215) says of Carthage, *ἀσωτεύων ἀνὴρ καὶ ἀκολάστως πατρῴοις κλήροις χρώμενος ὑπεύθυνος ἦν τῷ νόμῳ καὶ δίκας ἐπράττετο.* Compare also the *νόμος περὶ τῆς ἀργίας* at Athens, which was ascribed to Draco or Solon or Peisistratus (see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 149. 1, who refers to Hdt. 2. 177, Diod. 1. 77. 5, Diog. Laert. 1. 55, and Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 32 : cp. also Isocr. Areop. §§ 44–46). But Aristotle would not be satisfied with a law. What he asks for is a special magistracy to keep an eye on spendthrifts and to save them from themselves. One of the duties of the Council of Ten in the Venetian oligarchy was 'the conservation of public morals and the discipline of a riotous young nobility' (H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 180).

24. *ἑκάστῃ.* Supply *ἐν.* For its absence cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 23, and see Bon. Ind. s. v. Praepositio.

καὶ τὸ εὐημεροῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply *δεῖ.* Giphanius (p. 620) gives two alternative renderings of this passage—'Adhibenda quoque est cautio ei civitatis parti quae praeter ceteras floreat iisdem de causis, vel cavendum quoque iisdem de causis, ne qua pars civitatis praeter ceteras floreat.' *Τὸ εὐημεροῦν τῆς πόλεως ἀνὰ μέρος* may, in fact, either mean *τοὺς εὐημεροῦντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνὰ μέρος* or may be a similar phrase to *τὸ χαῖρον ὑμῶν* in Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 1 (see for other instances of this use of the neut. sing. of the present participle with the article Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, ed. 2, § 829 a). Welldon interprets the words in the former way, and Sus. in the latter. If parallel instances of this use of the participle can be adduced from Aristotle's writings, other than *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* in Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 21 sqq., I should prefer the latter interpretation, but in their absence the former. *Διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας,* i. e. because *νεωτερισμός* is apt to result (cp. 20, 30 sq.). Aristotle remembers the experience of the Lacedaemonian State (c. 7. 1306 b 36 sqq.). He has just been advising that a single individual should not be allowed to tower over the rest, and the transition is easy to the advice given in the passage before us. Giphanius (p. 621) has already referred to Cic. De Offic. 1. 25. 85, according to which it was a maxim of Plato's, ut (qui reipublicae praefuturi sunt) totum corpus reipublicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas

abierint formas, referre studio supersedemus.' For the construction *μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν* cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 24 sq. and a fragment of Philemon in Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 6,

κοὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερον παρ' ἑτέρου λαβεῖν τύχην.

34. *οὐ γὰρ οὕτως κ.τ.λ.* This account of the feelings of the many agrees with the account of the *γεωργικὸς δῆμος* given in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11–26 (cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 b 4, *τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος οὐχ οὕτω τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀγαναστεῖ στερούμενον ὡς ἔχει βαρέως ὑβριζόμενον*), but in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 29 sqq. the poor (*οἱ πένητες*), who must be identical with the many, are placed in a less favourable light, for they are said to plot against the rich and to covet their goods. Again in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18 sqq. we are told that the demos of Erythrae overthrew the oligarchy of the Basilidae, notwithstanding that they ruled well (which implies, we may suppose, that they governed purely), simply because they were so few in number.

36. *πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις σχολάζειν*, 'to have leisure to attend to their own business' (Welldon). Cp. 1309 a 5, *πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι*.

37. *τότε δὲ κ.τ.λ.* We expect *γάρ* rather than *δέ*, but see notes on 1268 b 30 and 1321 a 19.

38. *μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ.* *Καί* qualifies the whole sentence. The meaning is, 'and not only is the constitution safer when office is not allowed to be a source of gain, but there is this further advantage, that then, and then only, aristocracy and democracy may exist together.' Democracy will exist, because the demos will have all that it cares about having if office does not bring gain, i. e. a right to hold office, and aristocracy will exist, because the notables will have what they want, i. e. office. Compare 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32 sqq. According to a saying placed in the mouth of Periander in [Plut.] Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 11 *sub fin.* (cp. Isocr. Panath. §§ 131, 153) democracy is best when it is most like aristocracy. Many had claimed that the Athenian democracy was a mixture of aristocracy and democracy (Thuc. 2. 37. 2: [Plato,] Menex. 238 C sq.), or that it was so at any rate in early days (Isocr. ibid.); Aristotle may here intend to correct contentions of this kind.

40. *ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ.*, 'for it would then be possible' etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 a 34 sqq.

1309 a. **2.** *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικόν.* Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 31 sq.

τὸ δὲ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν. In strictness perhaps τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφέροντας should take the place of τοὺς γνωρίμους, for not all γνώριμοι are διαφέροντες κατ' ἀρετήν (6 (4). 3. 1289 b 40 sqq.), and it is to these that office falls in a true aristocracy (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sq.).

7. ὥστε συμβήσεται κ.τ.λ. It was by attention to their regular work, not by pay for attendance in the assembly and dicasteries, that the poor were enriched (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 20 sq.).

9. τοῖς δὲ γνωρίμοις μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων. This was what the notables most disliked (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 35 sqq.).

10. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by δέ in τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν, 13. The magistrates might make illicit gains either by plundering public property or by plundering private individuals or receiving bribes from them. To guard against the former evil Aristotle recommends in effect that the whole body of citizens shall be enabled to keep an eye on the public property. It was already the custom at many places—at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 47. l. 5 sq.), Ephesus (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 143. 1), and Delos (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 367 *init.*)—for the outgoing treasurers of sacred property to hand it over to their successors in presence of the Boulê, but Aristotle recommends a still stricter rule in reference to public property; he advises that public property shall be transferred in the presence not of the Boulê only, which might be corrupt or collusive, but of all the citizens (cp. Plut. Timol. c. 10 *init.*), and that not merely shall a list be kept of the articles, but that copies of this list shall be distributed (τιθέσθωσαν, literally 'deposited') by phratries companies and tribes, so that all the citizens may know what articles are comprised in the list. All that was usually done probably was to put up a list in some public spot (see the examples given by Dittenberger in Syll. Inscr. Gr. Nos. 366, 367). Παράδοσις is the technical term for the handing over of property to successors (cp. [πα]ρέδοσαν in Dittenberger, No. 366 a. l. 9). What does Aristotle include under τὰ χρήματα? In 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 25 τὰ ἱερὰ χρήματα must include land. Yet how would it be possible to transfer land or houses or (e. g.) the contents of the dockyards in the presence of the whole citizen-body? With κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλάς Bonitz (Ind. 368 b 23 sqq.) groups such phrases as κατὰ ζεύγη ('by pairs') in Hist. An. 9. 8. 613 b 24. Cp. also 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 1. Each of these subdivisions must evidently have had some central

place in which to keep its copy. Those of the tribe would be kept in the sacrarium of its eponymous hero, or exposed to view in the place where other public notices connected with the tribe were posted (as to Athens see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 423). As to public notices to members of the phratry see Busolt, 2. 428. 7. It is not clear why Aristotle does not require copies to be deposited with demes also. When oaths were taken by all the citizens, they were sometimes taken *κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ κατὰ δήμους* (Andoc. De Myst. c. 97). As to *λόχους* see note on 1264 a 7 and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 68 (cp. p. 41), whence it appears that one at any rate of the Spartan *λόχοι* was a quarter of Sparta, so that the *λόχος* may well have usually been a local subdivision. It seems more natural to take *τιθέσθωσαν* (with Welldon) as passive than (with Sus.) as middle: for the use by Aristotle of a verb in the plural after a nominative in the neuter plural see Bon. Ind. 490 a 51 sqq. Magistrates in Greek States probably in many cases received an inadequate amount of pay, and this may have been one reason why they were often corrupt. If that was so, the remedy for the evil suggested by Aristotle may not have been the true one.

18. *τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν* κ.τ.λ. So at Athens *νόμος ἦν τὴν βουλὴν τὴν δόξασαν τῷ δήμῳ καλῶς βεβουλευκέναι στεφανοῦσθαι* (Argument to Demosth. c. Androt. p. 590: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 267). See also Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 333.

14. *δεῖ δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις* κ.τ.λ. The recommendations contained in 1309 a 14–32, like that contained in 1308 b 31–1309 a 14, are made with a view to heal or prevent the 'prospering by sections' of which we read in 1308 b 24 sqq. Compare with the passage before us c. 5. 1305 a 3 sqq., Lys. Or. 21. c. 13 sq., and Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 31 sqq. Just as Aristotle holds that the best way of preserving a tyranny is to make it more like the normal constitution of which it is the deviation-form (c. 11. 1314 a 34 sq.), so he holds that democracies and oligarchies may be preserved by their studying the advantage of the less favoured class and thus making as near an approach as they can to constitutions existing for the common advantage.

16. *ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν*. E. g. in the constitution of Rhodes at one time (c. 5. 1304 b 27 sqq.), and perhaps also in that of Athens still (Isocr. De Pace, § 128).

17. καὶ βουλομένους. How willingly liturgies of this kind were sometimes undertaken, we see from Lys. Or. 21. cc. 1–5.

18. τὰς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας. Cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4, τῶν ματαίων λειτουργιῶν. A trierarchy would no doubt be regarded by Aristotle as an useful liturgy. Χορηγίαι, on the contrary, whether in connexion with dramatic lyrical musical or dancing competitions, are classed by him with the λαμπαδαρχία (the function of providing the expenses of a torch-race), so far at any rate as their utility is concerned. The office of χορηγὸς τραγῳδοῖς cost in one instance, according to Lys. Or. 21. c. 1, 3000 drachmae, and that of χορηγὸς αὐληταῖς ἀνδράσι, according to Demosth. c. Mid. c. 156, was much more costly (see A. Müller, Die gr. Bühnenalterthümer, in C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 332. 4). In Crete the public liturgies were defrayed from public funds and did not fall on the rich (see note on 1272 a 17). Demetrius of Phalerum, a pupil of Aristotle, seems to have shared his low estimate of the value of the χορηγία, to judge by a fragment of his writings pointed out by F. Dümmler in Plut. De Gloria Atheniensium, c. 6, where he calls the tripod awarded to the winning chorêgus (if we adopt Reiske's emendations) ἐπίσπεισμα τῶν ἐκκεχυμένων βίων καὶ τῶν ἐκλελοιπότων κενοτάφιον οἴκων (see U. Köhler in *Rhein. Mus.* 53. 491 sqq.).

19. ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται, e. g. the ἑστίασις or feasting of the tribe.

20. ἐν δ' ὀλιγαρχίᾳ κ.τ.λ. That oligarchies did not commonly act as Aristotle here advises is clear from Isocr. De Pace, § 125. *Mutatis mutandis*, we can gather what measures he would recommend for giving help to the poor from the counsel which he gives to extreme democracies in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq., b 7 sqq. Aeneas (Poliorc. c. 14) suggests that during a siege the poor should be excused the payment of the interest or even the principal of debts, but Aristotle is silent as to that. It would have been well if the policy he recommends had been followed when the English Inclosure Acts of the early part of the present century were passed. 'They may have been good for the country as a whole, but there is no doubt that the interests of the poor were treated with a carelessness which has led to very evil results' (Mr. C. Elton, *Academy*, March 10, 1888). The class which then ruled in this country often acted more wisely. 'In the eighteenth century it was the poor who enjoyed exemption from taxation in England, in France it was the rich. In the one case the aristocracy had taken upon its own

shoulders the heaviest public charges in order to be allowed to govern; in the other case it retained to the end an immunity from taxation in order to console itself for the loss of government' (De Tocqueville, L'Ancien Régime, p. 146 sq., quoted by Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, ed. 1, 1. 279).

21. τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφ' ὧν λήμματα, 'the offices from which gains accrue.' Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3, *ὁπόσαι δ' εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ μισθοφορίας ἕνεκα καὶ ὠφελείας εἰς τὸν οἶκον, ταύτας ζητεῖ ὁ δῆμος ἄρχειν.* What offices are referred to we are not told, except that those of the stratêgi and hipparchs are not among them. See as to the emoluments of offices at Athens, Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 222, note 4. Aristotle can hardly refer here (as in 2. 10. 1272 a 40 sqq.) to illicit gains, for in recognizing them he would abandon the ground taken up by him in 1308 b 31 sqq. If, as he holds (c. 10. 1311 a 9 sq.), the end for which oligarchies exist is wealth, he is asking much from them in asking them to abandon the offices of which he speaks to the poor. But some oligarchies have done what he recommends. 'Veneti cum plebe communicare solent minores aliquot magistratus et curationes—immo vero primicerium, cuius summa in republica dignitas est—ac fructuosissima scribarum munera plebeiis attribuere, ac patricios ab huiusmodi honorum petitione summovere' (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 706).

22. κἂν τις ὑβρίσῃ κ.τ.λ., 'and if any one among the rich outrages these, the penalties should be greater than if he outraged one of his own class.' So Vict. Sus. and others. The sentence *ἢ ἂν σφῶν αὐτῶν*, if complete, would apparently run *ἢ ἄν τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἴς τινα σφῶν αὐτῶν*, not that it is necessary to supply *τινα*, for the same meaning may be expressed by the partitive genitive *σφῶν αὐτῶν* (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 30, *τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων*). Sepulveda, followed by Lamb. and Giph., takes *σφῶν αὐτῶν* to refer to the poor, translating 'et graviori poena sanciendum, si quis locupletum in pauperes, quam si quis ipsorum contumeliam inferat,' but not, I think, rightly. For the thought cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 b 3 sqq. Aristotle's suggestion is perhaps modelled on a similar provision in the laws of Charondas for the protection of slaves (Herondas, 2. 46 sqq.: cp. Plato, Laws 777 D). We read of the Venetian oligarchy in Bodinus, De Republica, p. 771, 'iniurias plebeiis ab optimatibus illatas acerrime ulciscuntur.'

23. καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently thinks that if

in an oligarchy inheritances pass not by kinship but by gift or bequest (for δόσις includes the two things: see Liddell and Scott), they will tend to go to those who are already rich. This had been the experience of the Lacedaemonian State, where land at any rate, if not property of all kinds, could be given or bequeathed by its owner to any one whom he chose to select, and indeed an orphan heiress might be given in marriage not only by her father, but also after his death by his representative, to any one, however rich, whom the father or his representative chose to name (2. 9. 1270 a 18–29). Whether in the Lacedaemonian State or elsewhere there existed a right of gift or bequest so absolutely free that a father could disinherit his own children without cause, may well be doubted, but the owner of property may often have been in a position to disappoint less near relatives. What Aristotle would wish to be done if a man had no kin, we do not learn. He would no doubt wish that the policy which he suggests should be followed in reference to the disposal of orphan heiresses in marriage. See on the whole subject note on 1270 a 21. The Thirty at Athens appear to have taken exactly the opposite course to that which Aristotle here recommends to oligarchies (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 35. l. 14, οἱο[ν] περὶ τοῦ δοῦναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ᾧ ἂν ἐθέλῃ κύριον ποιήσαντες καθάπαξ κ.τ.λ.). He would evidently be opposed to succession by primogeniture in oligarchy, and indeed to the succession of any single son exclusively of the rest. There was no right of primogeniture in the case of the Venetian nobility (De La Houssaye, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, 1. 32 sq.).

27. συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and it is expedient both in democracy and in oligarchy to allow to those whose share in the advantages of the constitution is less either an equality or precedence in all other things . . . except only the magistracies which are supreme over the constitution.' These 'other things' include the less important offices and other positions of dignity and emolument, though not of power, such as priesthoods, and marks of respect such as those referred to by Xenophon in De Vect. 3. 4, ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ καλὸν καὶ προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξένιά γ' ἔστιν ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν ἀξιολόγοις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν. Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 4. 5 and Athen. Deipn. 235 a. Yriarte (Patricien de Venise, p. 94) says of Venice, 'Si la politique est réservée aux nobles, l'administration est ouverte aux citoyens; mais les hautes directions sont toujours données

aux patriciens.' Much the same thing may be said of Ragusa (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 309).

30. πλὴν ὅσαι ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας. The expression *κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας* is often used in the Politics of the rich or the few or the poor (3. 8. 1279 b 17 sq. : 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 33, etc.), but nowhere else of magistracies. In Antiphon, Tetral. 2. 1. 1 we read *ὑπό τε τῶν ψηφισαμένων, οἳ κύριοι πάσης τῆς πολιτείας εἰσίν.*

31. ταύτας δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 40, *τούτων δὲ* (i.e. *τῶν ἀρχῶν*) *εἶναι τὰς μὲν πλείστας κληρωτάς, τὰς δὲ μεγίστας κρυπτῇ ψήφῳ μεθ' ὅρκων καὶ πλείστης ἀκριβείας διαψηφιστάς.*

τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. Thuc. 8. 75. 2, *τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας.* More usually we hear of *οἱ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ* (c. 6. 1306 b 4: 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 32). So in 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 33 we have *οἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ* and in 1341 b 28 *οἱ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας.*

ἢ πλείοσιν, 'or in a majority.'

C. 9. **33. Τρία δέ τινα κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle adds this advice because if the holders of the supreme magistracies in a State are not what they should be, the safety of the constitution will be imperilled: cp. c. 3. 1303 a 16 sqq. What offices are meant by *αἱ κύριαι ἀρχαί*? Not perhaps exclusively those which are *κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας* (30), but the chief offices generally, those for instance of a stratêgus or tamias (1309 b 4 sqq.). In c. 10. 1310 b 20 sqq. the offices of demiurgus and theorus are given as instances of *κύριαι ἀρχαί*. Here, as in 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq. and 3. 13. 1284 a 5 sqq., Aristotle requires the ruler to possess not only virtue but also political skill (see note on 1284 a 6). Giphanius (p. 636) has pointed out the resemblance between the passage before us and a passage in a speech of Pericles in Thuc. 2. 60. 5, *καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε ὃς οὐδενὸς οἶμαι ἧσσων εἶναι γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων.* He also compares (p. 634) Rhet. 2. 1. 1378 a 6 sqq. Dionysius the Elder had advised the Syracusans (Diod. 13. 91. 5) *αἱρεῖσθαι στρατηγοὺς μὴ τοὺς δυνατωτάτους* ('the most powerful men,' opposed in what follows to *τοὺς ταπεινοτέρους*), *ἀλλὰ τοὺς εὐνουστάτους καὶ δημοτικοὺς μᾶλλον.* In elections to high offices at Athens popular opinion probably set most store by friendliness to the constitution (in combination, of course, with official skill) and regarded this as the best safeguard of the democracy (cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 7 and 2. 19, and Lys. Or. 13. c. Agorat. c. 10). Isocrates, however, had already said (Panath. § 139: cp. Plato, Rep. 558 B) that the rulers in a democracy should not only be

men devoted to the constitution but also men of worth and good character, and Aristotle follows in his track. Compare the view of Cicero in pro Planc. 25. 62. It is evident that Aristotle cannot have approved of the use of the lot even in a democracy in appointments to the *κύριαι ἀρχαί* of which he speaks here, unless indeed the subsequent *δοκιμασία* was made very strict and inquisitorial. See note on 1309 b 3.

35. δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς. This is explained by *ἐμπειρία* in 1309 b 5 and by *ἐπιστήμη* in 1309 b 8 (cp. *εἰδότες*, 1309 b 12). Compare such expressions as *τὴν τοῦ λόγου δύναμιν* (Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 52: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 250).

36. τρίτον δ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην κ.τ.λ. For *ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην* cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 12, *ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους* (where see note), and Lys. Or. 12. c. Eratosth. c. 5, *ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην*. For *τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν* cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 30 and *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 25. l. 5. *Δικαιοσύνη* is the *ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσίν* (Eth. Nic. 5. 1. 1129 a 6 sqq.), so that if what is just varies in relation to each constitution, justice, the habit which enables men to do what is just, will do so too. The kind of justice which the citizen, for instance, of a democracy will possess will be different from true justice, for it will be unduly favourable to numbers and free birth as contrasted with wealth and virtue. Aristotle seems to imply here and in 3. 4. 1276 b 30 that not merely the justice of a good citizen, but also his virtue generally, will vary with each constitution, but he does not trace in detail how his courage, temperance, and moral prudence will do so. Probably in a *παράκβασις* each of these virtues will be adjusted to an end which is other than the true one.

37. μὴ ταὐτὸν . . . κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, 'not the same in relation to all constitutions': cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 20, *καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας δέ, πότερον διαφέρει καθ' ἑκάστην καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος.*

39. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. *Ἀπορίαι* are rare in this Book, but here we have one. Aristotle probably has before him some sharp sayings of Themistocles and Aristides which are recorded in Plut. Aristid. c. 24, *μέγα δ' οὖν ὄνομα τοῦ Ἀριστείδου καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἔχοντος ἐπὶ τῇ διατάξει τῶν φόρων ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς λέγεται καταγελᾶν, ὡς οὐκ ἀνδρὸς ὄντα τὸν ἔπαινον, ἀλλὰ θυλάκου χρυσοφύλακος· ἀνομοίως ἀμυνόμενος τὴν Ἀριστείδου παρρησίαν· ἐκεῖνος γάρ, εἰπόντος ποτὲ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀρετὴν ἡγεῖσθαι μεγίστην στρατηγοῦ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ προαισθάνεσθαι τὰ βουλεύματα τῶν πολεμίων, "Τοῦτο μέν," εἶπεῖν, "ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὦ Θεμιστόκλεις, καλὸν δὲ καὶ στρατηγικὸν ἀληθῶς ἡ περὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐγκράτεια."*

(cp. Aristid. c. 4). Aristotle, unlike Aristides, regards generalship as the quality to be most insisted on in a general (cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 2. 1164 b 24 and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 23. l. 12 sqq.: Vict. compares the rejoinder of Cicero in Plut. Cic. c. 38 to Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, who wished to appoint a man who was no soldier to a military command and dwelt on his moral excellence, Τί οὖν οὐκ ἐπίτροπον αὐτὸν τοῖς τέκνοις φυλάσσεις;). So far he agrees with Themistocles, but he does not agree with him in setting little store by the virtue of a treasurer. A treasurer needs to have virtue much above that of most men.

1309 b. **8.** ἔοικε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle tells us to prefer the man who possesses the *rarest* of the three qualities demanded by the office. Should we not rather say the man who possesses the *most indispensable* of them? It was on this principle that St. Theresa's sage advice was based, to choose, if possible, a confessor both wise and pious, but, if that was not possible, to prefer the former quality. Aristotle appears to take it for granted that ταμίαι will be chosen by election, not by lot: this was the case with the ταμίαι στρατιωτικῶν at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 43), but not with the ταμίαι τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 47). In the passage before us, as in 3. 11. 1282 a 31 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sq., ταμίαι and στρατηγοί are taken as instances of high officials.

5. στρατηγίας = στρατηγικῆς, as in Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 40 (Bon. Ind. s. v.): see also Liddell and Scott. Μετέχουσι, sc. πάντες.

6. ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Hiero, 6. 11, καὶ δεῖ μὲν δίκαιον τοὺς φύλακας μηδὲν οὕτω ποιεῖν δύνασθαι ὡς πιστοὺς εἶναι. Φυλακή is here used not in a military sense, as in 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10, but in a financial sense, of the custody of property and especially money, as in Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 9. Καὶ ταμιείᾳ is added to make this clear.

7. τἀναντία 'prope adverbii instar usurpatur' (Bon. Ind. 247 b 26): cp. Plato, Laws 636 E.

8. ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη, sc. τοῦ φυλάττειν καὶ ταμιεύειν. The knowledge how to keep things is possessed even by women (3. 4. 1277 b 24 sq.). See note on 1277 b 24.

9. κἄν, 'if also': see note on 1298 b 23.

For τῆς πολιτείας φιλία cp. c. 3. 1303 a 17, τοὺς μὴ τῆς πολιτείας φίλους: Xen. Anab. 1. 3. 5, τῇ Κύρου φιλίᾳ, and 5. 6. 11.

10. ποιήσει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δύο. Cp. Rhet. 3. 12. 1414 a 21, τὸ γὰρ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι ποιήσει δῆλον ὅτι τὰ εἰρημένα.

11. ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ. Aristotle implies that though a man who possesses full knowledge and is friendly to the constitution may be *ἀκρατής*, a man who possesses virtue cannot be so. The same thing is implied in 1310 a 14–19 of men 'habituated and educated by the rule of the constitution,' no doubt because habituation and education result in virtue. That knowledge is no security against wrong action is well known to Euripides (Hippol. 358 sqq. Bothe, 380 sqq. Dindorf: Fragm. 838 Nauck (841, ed. 2) etc.): cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1095 a 8 sq. and 7. 2. 1145 b 12 sq. That friendliness to the constitution is no security against wrong action would be proved by daily experience, for many men who betrayed constitutions would be observed to do so not because of any unfriendliness to them, but because they were corrupted by bribes or the like.

14. ἁπλῶς δέ κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly whatever provisions in the laws we speak of as advantageous to constitutions.' See vol. i. p. 537, note 2. Cp. Diod. 5. 82. 4, *αὐτὸς δ' ὁ Μακαρεὺς ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ βασιλεύων νόμον ἔγραψε πολλὰ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων περιέχοντα*, and [Plut.] De Fato, c. 4, *ἔπειτα μὴν καθόλου (ὁ πολιτικὸς νόμος) τὰ πόλει προσήκοντα εἰς δύναμιν περιλαμβάνει*. I follow Sus. and others in my interpretation of this passage. Gilbert (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. xxxvi, note 3) interprets it otherwise. He takes Aristotle to refer to a *συναγωγὴ τῶν νόμων* drawn up by himself and Theophrastus, 'a compilation of the laws obtaining in the various States and a description of the various authorities entrusted with their execution.' See also Zeller, Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 506 foot.

16. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον κ.τ.λ., 'and the often mentioned elementary principle of paramount importance.' For the order of the words see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm. (ed. 2 and ed. Gerth), §§ 405. 4 and 464. 7, and cp. Plato, Laws 708 D, *τὸ παντοδαπὸν ἐς ταὐτὸ ξυνερρυηκὸς γένος*. For *στοιχεῖον* see note on 1295 a 35. Πολλάκις, in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 14 sqq. and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 4 sqq. It is again alluded to in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 25 sqq. As has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 491, this principle was inherited by Aristotle from Theramenes. It was forgotten by those who made oligarchies too narrow (c. 6. 1305 b 2–22), or who took no pains to conciliate those outside the constitution (c. 8. 1309 a 20–32) or the moderately well-to-do (6 (4). 12. 1296 b 36 sq.), or who in planning aristocracies trusted to puerile devices

intended to conceal from the many their exclusion from power (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq.). 'Like Dumouriez and at a later period Bonaparte, Danton was of opinion that in politics everything depends on being the strongest' (Von Sybel, French Revolution, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 474). It should be noticed that while Aristotle regards it as essential to every constitution that those who are on the side of the constitution should be stronger than those who are against it, he is still better pleased when the constitution is so framed that there is not even a minority which wishes for a different constitution from the existing one (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 36 sqq.).

18. παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. For *παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα* cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 23, 32. *Παρὰ πάσας* is used in a slightly different sense in c. 11. 1315 a 15. This warning is suggested by Plato, Laws 701 E, *λαβόντες δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκατέρας μετριότητά τινα, τῶν μὲν τοῦ δεσπόζειν, τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθεριάσαι, κατείδομεν ὅτι τότε διαφερόντως ἐν αὐταῖς ἐγένετο εὐπραγία, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἄκρον ἀγαγόντων ἑκατέρων, τῶν μὲν δουλείας, τῶν δὲ τοὐναντίου, οὐ συνήνεγκεν οὔτε τοῖς οὔτε τοῖς*, and Rep. 562. Compare with the passage before us Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 21–30. Roscher (Politik, p. 319. 11) quotes from Mommsen the remark, 'die Demokratie hat sich immer dadurch vernichtet, dass sie die äussersten Consequenzen ihres Princips durchführt.' Compare also the following passage from J. S. Mill, System of Logic, vol. ii. p. 521, ed. 3: 'Inasmuch, however, as no government produces all possible beneficial effects, but all are attended with more or fewer inconveniences, and since these cannot be combated by means drawn from the very causes which produce them, it would be often a much stronger recommendation of some practical arrangement, that it does not follow from what is called the general principle of the government than that it does. Under a government of legitimacy the presumption is far rather in favour of institutions of popular origin, and in a democracy in favour of arrangements tending to check the impetus of popular will. The line of argumentation so commonly mistaken in France for political philosophy tends to the practical conclusion that we should exert our utmost efforts to aggravate, instead of alleviating, whatever are the characteristic imperfections of the system of institutions which we prefer, or under which we happen to live.'

20. πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 35 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 2 sqq., and Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 21–30. Aristotle's remark is based on Plato, Rep. 562 B. Among the *δοκοῦντα δημοτικά* and

ὀλιγαρχικά referred to by him as fatal to democracy and oligarchy are probably the exaggerated devotion to wealth in oligarchies and to liberty in democracies on which Plato had commented: cp. 1310 a 25 sqq. as to democracy and 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 26 sqq. as to oligarchy.

21. οἱ δ' οἰόμενοι κ.τ.λ., 'but they' (i. e. the adherents of deviation-forms) 'thinking that this' (i. e. τὸ παρεκβεβηκός) 'is the only right thing.' For the attraction in ταύτην, cp. 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32, αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων. For μίαν ἀρετήν, cp. Menand. Ἡνίοχος, Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 127),

μί' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τὸν ἄτοπον φεύγειν ἀεί.

For the thought, cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 82.

22. ἄλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν. Cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 37 sq.

23. ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The verbs ἀποβαλεῖ (27), ποιήσει (28), ἔχει (29), and συμβαίνει (30) appear to be all of them dependent on ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, 25, i. e. though this is so, still etc.

26. πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'first he will let slip all the moderation of the feature, and at last will carry matters to such a point that it will not even seem to be a nose at all owing to the excess and defect in it of the two opposite elements (hookedness and snubness).' Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 3. 769 b 6, καὶ πάλιν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς προγόνους ὁμοιότητος, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ὁτὲ μὲν ἄνθρωπος μὲν τούτων δ' οὐδενὶ προσόμοιος, ὁτὲ δὲ προϊὸν οὕτως τέλος οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ ζῷόν τι μόνον φαίνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἃ δὴ καὶ λέγεται τέρατα. For the strangeness of the order in τέλος δ' οὕτως κ.τ.λ., see vol. ii. p. li, note 3. Ποιήσει is displaced in order that special emphasis may be thrown on οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲ ῥῖνα.

30. τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας. Vict. suspects that ἄλλας is a mere repetition of ἄλλων in the preceding clause, though he does not venture to omit it. Schneider brackets and Coray omits it. Sus. thinks that Vict. may be right, but leaves ἄλλας in his text. Prof. Jowett, on the other hand, holds (Politics of Aristotle, 2. 213), that 'ἄλλας is used adverbially, as in Plato and Thucydides, in the sense of "likewise."' Perhaps this is so: compare the use of ἄλλος in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 30 (see note) and in Περὶ μακροβιότητος 6. 467 b 5, περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων.

31. καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν κ.τ.λ. In his reference here to democracy Aristotle may possibly have Pericles in view; at any rate Isocrates says of Pericles in De Pace, § 126, παραλαβὼν τὴν πόλιν χεῖρον μὲν φρονοῦσαν ἢ πρὶν κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἔτι δ' ἀνεκτῶς πολιτευομένην.

Compare 2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq. For *ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν* cp. (with Bon. Ind. 220 b 8) Probl. 31. 17. 959 a 13, *ἔστιν ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐν δύο.*

34. *οὐδὲ πολιτείαν.* Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 30 sqq.

35. *τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν.* See note on 1274 b 36.

38. *οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. *Γάρ*, 'I say "destroys," for' etc. *Μέν* is answered by *ἀλλά* in the next line. For *εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν* cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 22. It would seem that in Aristotle's view neither oligarchy nor democracy can be said to exist in a State all whose citizens have an even amount of property.

40. *ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν*, i. e. the constitution of a State in which an even amount of property is possessed by all. *Ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν* = *τὴν τούτων πολιτείαν*, as in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 6.

1310 a. **1.** *φθείροντες*, sc. *τοὺς εὐπόρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος.*

2. *ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle passes on to another mistake common to democracies and oligarchies like the last. Statesmen in each often make the State two and thus produce *στάσις* and constitutional change (cp. c. 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). As to the structure of the sentence see Vahlen, Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 24, who remarks that *ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικούς* (6 sq.) should have been adapted in structure to 3 sq., whereas in fact the structure of this clause is affected by what immediately precedes. He compares c. 10. 1310 b 9–14 and 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 7–11.

3. *ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δημαγωγοί, ὅπου τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων.* This is the mark of an ultimate democracy (c. 5. 1305a 31 sq.). According to 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 10 sq., it is only in a democracy of this kind that demagogues exist; at any rate it is in such a democracy that they are most likely to court the many by fighting with the rich. There may be a reference here to Pericles' struggle with Thucydides son of Melesias (Plut. Pericl. c. 11), which is said by Plutarch to have broken the State into two sections, the few and the demos. It was characteristic of a demagogue to boast that he 'fought for the many' (Aristoph. Vesp. 665 sqq.).

5. *δεῖ δὲ τοὐναντίον* κ.τ.λ. Solon had done this, as Aristotle probably remembers: cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 5, *καὶ γὰρ . . . πρὸς ἑκατέρους ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρων μάχεται καὶ διαμφισβητεῖ*, and Aristid. 2. 361, quoted by Sandys in his note on this passage, *καίτοι Σόλων τὰ μὲν εἰς Μεγαρίας ἔχοντα φῆσαι λέγεται, τοὺς δὲ νόμους οὐκ ἤδε περιὼν οὐδὲ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν εὐπόρων πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους οὐκ ἤδεν.* Cp. [Demosth.] Phil. 4. c. 45.

6. *ὑπὲρ εὐπόρων.* For the omission of the article cp. 3. 13.

1283 b 6, *ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι*, where see note. See also note on 1307 a 22.

7. καὶ τοὺς ὅρκους κ.τ.λ. Aristotle speaks of the oaths to which he refers being taken only 'in some oligarchies'; they would probably be especially taken in oligarchies set up after an actual battle with the demos (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 27 sqq.), or in oligarchies ruled by *ἑταιρίαι*, though of course not in those oligarchies of this type in which the demos elected the magistrates (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). They resembled in their terms the oaths taken by hostile States against each other. So the *ἀγελάοι* of Drerus in Crete swear by Hestia and other deities, *μὴ μὰν ἐγώ ποκα τοῖς Λυττίοις καλῶς φρονησεῖν μήτε τέχνᾳ μήτε μαχανᾷ μήτε ἐν νυκτὶ μήτε πεδ' ἀμέραν καὶ σπευσίω, ὅτι κα δύναμαι, κακὸν τᾷ πόλει τᾷ τῶν Λυττίων* (Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 121, already referred to by Prof. Jowett). We read of oaths sworn by oligarchs against the Athenian demos in Andoc. De Myst. c. 98, but we are not told what their terms were. Compare also a Thasian decree in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 8. 402, *ὅρκον δὲ ὀμόσαι πάντας Ἀ[θηναίους τοὺς] ὀλιγαρχίην καταστήσαντας, κ[αὶ ὀμόσαι τοῦ δ]ήμου ὃν ἂν ἡ βουλὴ συνγράψῃ*. Mr. Freeman (Sicily, 2. 175, note 3) quotes a remark as to the 'scoffing anapaestic cadence' of the oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle here. Oaths to maintain democracy were sometimes taken by its partisans (Thuc. 8. 75. 2).

10. χρὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but the right thing is both to hold and to simulate the opposite opinion' (that it is against the interest of an oligarchy to wrong the demos), 'signifying in the oaths that "I will not wrong the demos."' So the tyrant is advised in c. 11. 1314 a 40 to simulate the ways of a king.

12. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 552 E (cp. 554 B, *ἀπαιδευσίαν*) and Laws 793 and 870 A, and of Isocrates, Areop. § 40 sqq., a passage which Eaton has already compared. For the thought cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 3 sq.: also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4, *μικρὸς γὰρ ἦν ὁ τῶν ὅρκων φόβος, εἰ μὴ διὰ τῆς παιδείας καὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς οἷον ἀνέδευσε τοῖς ἤθεσι τῶν παίδων τοὺς νόμους καὶ συνῳκείωσε τῇ τροφῇ τὸν ζῆλον τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστε πεντακοσίων ἐτῶν πλείω χρόνον τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα διαμεῖναι τῆς νομοθεσίας, ὥσπερ βαφῆς ἀκράτου καὶ ἰσχυρῶς καθαψαμένης*. Education and habituation must make the fulfilment of the behests of the law second nature to the citizens, or else the State will always be liable to accesses of *ἀκρασία* fatal to that obedience to the laws which is essential to the maintenance of

the constitution (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 3 sq. and 2. 8. 1269 a 20 sqq.). Compare the saying of Vinet, 'qu'on est malheureux quand on n'a pas le tempérament de ses principes.' What sort of education would be favourable to the maintenance of an oligarchy? An education which excludes luxury (22 sqq.) and an excessive love of gain or honour or both (2. 7. 1266 b 35 sqq.) and which inculcates justice and considerate treatment of those outside the privileged class. An education favourable to the maintenance of a democracy, on the other hand, would be one which discountenanced the disregard of law and the *ἀταξία καὶ ἀναρχία* which often proved fatal to democracies (c. 3. 1302 b 27 sqq.) and inculcated justice to the rich and considerate treatment of them. Compare also Isocr. Areop. § 24, and see note on 1337 a 14. Aristotle does not repeat here what he has said in 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq., that this training must be extended to women and girls. It is evident that when a constitution was suddenly introduced, it must have been very liable to overthrow till habits and ideas grew up to support it, and some time must have been needed to develope these. For *μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων* cp. Isocr. Philip. § 136, *τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τῶν εἰρημένων.*

13. *οὗ νῦν ὀλιγωροῦσι πάντες.* For *νῦν πάντες* cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 21.

15. *συνδεδοξασμένων ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν πολιτευομένων*, 'ratified by the consentient voice of the whole civic body' (Welldon). For *τῶν πολιτευομένων*, 'those who exercise the rights of citizenship,' see note on 1328 a 17. All the citizens of Athens took an oath to observe the laws of Solon (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 7). It is evident from Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq. that those laws were held to be laws in the fullest sense, *οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε.* *Συνδοξάζω* is a rare word, especially as used here. It is possible, as Richards points out, though perhaps hardly likely, that *συνδεδοξασμένων* here means 'extolled,' not 'ratified.'

16. *εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ*, 'trained through habituation and education by the rule of the constitution': cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 2, *ἐπαιδεύθη γε μὴν ἐν Περσῶν νόμοις.* In 14 we have *τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας* and in 19 sq. *τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν* (cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14). For *εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι* cp. 3. 18. 1288 b 1, *καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη.*

18. *εἴπερ γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle probably regarded Athens as *ἀκρατής*: cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1152 a 19, *καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει*

ἡ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν, "ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει," and Diog. Laert. 5. 17, *πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀποτεινόμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔφασκεν* (*ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης*) *εὑρηκέναι πυροὺς καὶ νόμους, ἀλλὰ πυροῖς μὲν χρῆσθαι, νόμοις δὲ μή.* Cp. also Demosth. De Rhod. Libertate, c. 1, and Plato, Laws 689 B.

21. οἷς δυνήσονται κ.τ.λ. For the dative cp. Plato, Rep. 477 B, *φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅ τί περ ἂν δύνηται;*

22. *νῦν δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις* κ.τ.λ. Plato (Rep. 556 B) had already said of the rulers in an oligarchy, *σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν, ἆρ' οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀργούς;* Cp. also Rep. 556 C sq., Eurip. Fragm. 55 Nauck (54, ed. 2), and Aristoph. Plut. 559 sqq. 'The Roman Noble was encouraged to spend his youth in luxury and extravagance' (Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 44).

25. *ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαις δημοκρατικαῖς* κ.τ.λ. See as to this expression note on 1298 b 13. It is implied in the passage before us that 'living as one pleases' was realized only in the extreme form of Greek democracy. But in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 11 sqq. this is said to be a concomitant of democracy in general. If a *νόμος περὶ τῆς ἀργίας* existed in the Solonian democracy (see note on 1308 b 20), 'living as one pleases' cannot have been permitted in it.

27. *αἴτιον δὲ τούτου ὅτι κακῶς ὁρίζονται τὸ ἐλεύθερον.* *Ὁρίζονται,* 'men define.' The passage before us makes it probable that Aristotle would define freedom as obedience to rightly constituted law: cp. Metaph. Λ. 10. 1075 a 19, *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν.* Compare also Cic. pro A. Cluentio, 53. 146 (quoted by Giph.), legibus denique idcirco omnes servimus, ut liberi esse possimus, and Plut. De recta ratione audiendi, c. 1 *sub fin.*, *ἀντὶ μισθωτοῦ τινὸς ἢ ἀργυρωνήτου θεῖον ἡγεμόνα τοῦ βίου λαμβάνουσι τὸν λόγον ᾧ τοὺς ἑπομένους ἄξιόν ἐστι μόνους ἐλευθέρους νομίζειν, μόνοι γάρ, ἃ δεῖ βούλεσθαι μαθόντες, ὡς βούλονται ζῶσι.* For the view that freedom is doing as one likes cp. Plato, Laws 701 A sqq., Rep. 557 B, 560 E, 572 E: Isocr. Areop. § 20, Panath. § 131. When a slave was manumitted, he was declared to be *ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ πάντων τὸμ πάντα*

βίον, ποιῶν ὃ κα θέλῃ καὶ ἀποτρέχων οἷς κα θέλῃ (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 462: cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 13). There was a proverb, Ἐλευθέρα Κέρκυρα, χέζ' ὅπου θέλεις. 'The Stoics defined freedom, no doubt in agreement with the Cynics, ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας (Diog. Laert. 7. 121): cp. also Arrian, Diss. Epictet. 4. 1. 1, ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν ὁ ζῶν ὡς βούλεται, Cic. Paradox. Stoic. 5. 1. 34, quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis, and De Offic. 1. 20. 70, libertatis proprium est sic vivere ut velis' (Kaerst, Studien zur Entwickelung und theoret. Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum, p. 29, note).

28. δύο γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here uses the word δοκεῖ, but in 8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40—b 17 he adopts this view as his own. The two characteristics of democracy here mentioned are not quite consistent with each other. If the will of the majority is supreme in democracy, the individual citizen cannot be free to live as he likes; he must live in subordination to the will of the majority. It should be added that Aristotle's teaching more often is that in democracy it is not the will of the majority that is supreme, but the will of the poor (3. 8. 1279 b 16 sqq.: 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 30 sqq.). Richards draws attention to the attraction in this passage, the dative τῷ taking the place of the nominative, and refers for parallel instances to Riddell's Digest of Platonic Idioms, § 192 (Apology of Plato, p. 192).

30. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ. Δοκεῖ, i.e. seems to democrats. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3–10 and 3. 9. 1280 a 11. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that justice requires that the will of the multitude should be supreme. In Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 20 *init.* we read ἡττώμενος δὲ ταῖς ἑταιρείαις ὁ Κλεισθένης προσηγάγετο τὸν δῆμον, ἀποδιδοὺς τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν.

31. ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ ἴσον, and therefore suitable to democracy, for freedom and equality are thought to be accompaniments of democracy (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq.).

32. ὥστε ζῇ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 30, Plato, Rep. 557 B, and Isocr. De Pace, § 102 sq.: also [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 25.

33. εἷς ὃ χρῄζων, sc. τυγχάνει (Eurip. Fragm. 883 Nauck: 891, ed. 2). Cp. Cratin. Νόμοι, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 87), where Solon is probably the speaker,

νῦν γὰρ δή σοι πάρα μὲν θεσμοὶ
τῶν ἡμετέρων, πάρα δ' ἄλλ' ὅ τι χρῇς.

34. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ φαῦλον. Cp. Plato, Laws 780 A.

οὐ γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably has before him Plato,

Laws 715 D. But a similar view is expressed in Andoc. c. Alcib. c. 19, *νομίζω δὲ ταύτην εἶναι σωτηρίαν ἅπασι, πείθεσθαι τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις*: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 6, *ἐκεῖνό γε εὖ εἰδώς, ὅτι ὅταν διατηρηθῶσιν οἱ νόμοι τῇ πόλει, σώζεται καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία*: Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 19, *ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως*: and Demosth. c. Mid. c. 126 (cp. [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 21).

39. καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας. As to the distinction here implied between *πολιτεῖαι* and *μοναρχία* see vol. i. p. 521 and vol. ii. p. xxvii. It should be noticed that Aristotle deals with the causes of the fall of monarchy and the means of preserving it at very considerable length, and is especially full on the subject of tyranny, notwithstanding that he has told us in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 1 sqq. that there is not much to be said about it. He probably wished to do what could be done to amend the worst of Greek institutions, and he may also have desired to keep the Macedonian kingship in the right track (see below on 1313 a 34). C. 10.

40. σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλήσια κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1311 a 22 sqq. and 1312 b 34 sqq.

2. ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐστίν. Cp. 31 sq. 1310 b. and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq. Kingship is *κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν* because it is *κατ' ἀξίαν* (31 sqq.). Yet we are told in 1313 a 10 sqq. that in hereditary kingships the sceptre often falls to contemptible persons. For the use of *κατά* cp. 32, 3. 14. 1285 b 31, Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 20, and Plato, Rep. 555 A. As kingship corresponds to aristocracy, the causes of its fall will resemble the causes of the fall of aristocracy. Aristocracy is especially destroyed by infractions of law and justice (c. 7. 1307 a 5 sqq., 40 sqq., c. 8. 1307 b 30 sqq.), and kingship will be so too (c. 10. 1313 a 1 sqq.).

3. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας. Cp. 1312 b 34 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sq. The grounds on which tyranny is said to be composed of ultimate oligarchy and democracy are explained in 1311 a 8 sqq. Tyranny being thus composed, the causes which overthrow it are the same as those which overthrow the constitutions of which it is composed (1312 b 34 sqq.). For *ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης* cp. 1312 b 35, *τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας*. *Τῆς ὑστάτης* probably qualifies both *ὀλιγαρχίας* and *δημοκρατίας*: see note on 1296 a 3.

5. διὸ δὴ κ.τ.λ. For *διὸ δή*, 'just for this reason,' cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 and Poet. 24. 1460 a 22. *Διό* is followed by *δή* just as the relative pronoun is often followed by *δή*. For *δυοῖν κακῶν* cp. 3.

5. 1278 a 34, *ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν*. To be visited with two evils was proverbially bad: cp. Hdt. 3. 80, *δύο δ' ἔχων ταῦτα ἔχει πᾶσαν κακότητα*. Eurip. Ion, 531 Bothe (591 Dindorf),

ἵν' ἐσπεσοῦμαι δύο νόσω κεκτημένος,

Plato, Rep. 391 C, and Aristoph. Eccl. 1096,

ἑνὶ γὰρ ξυνέχεσθαι κρεῖττον ἢ δυοῖν κακοῖν.

Κακὸν ἐπὶ κακῷ was a proverb (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 148 and 2. 177, where we are referred to Hom. Il. 16. 111 and 19. 290). Compare also the prophecy (Thuc. 2. 54),

ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος, καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ' αὐτῷ.

And that which is bad is harmful: cp. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 22, *οὔτε γὰρ θερμοῦ τὸ ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ θερμαίνειν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀγαθοῦ τὸ βλάπτειν.*

7. *τὰς παρ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν*. See note on 1276 a 14.

ὑπάρχει δ' ἡ γένεσις κ.τ.λ. To show how different kingship and tyranny are, Aristotle points out that they are different in their very origin (cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 23 sq.). Kingship comes into existence for the defence of the good against the many, and the king belongs to the *élite* of the good, whereas the tyrant is a bulwark of the many against the good. This is true of those tyrants who became tyrants after being demagogues, but does it hold of the earlier ones who became tyrants through being kings or through holding important magistracies? Aristotle does not make this clear, but he apparently regards these tyrants also as owing their position to the force (*κατεργάζεσθαι*, 1310 b 24) which their position as kings or high officials enabled them to exercise, and not to virtue and desert. Tyranny, in fact, in his view owes its origin to *δύναμις*, not to *ἀρετή*. For the view that the tyrant must be a bad man cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35 sqq, and Strabo, p. 310, *ἐκαλοῦντο δὲ τύραννοι, καίπερ οἱ πλείους ἐπιεικεῖς γεγονότες*. That tyranny is hostile to the *ἐπιεικεῖς* we see from 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 19. The view that kingship is on the side of the *ἄριστοι* against the many is implied in Plut. Themist. c. 19. Aristotle here traces kingship in general to much the same origin to which he traces the heroic kingship of Greece in 3. 14. 1285 b 4 sqq. He seems to forget that he has traced kingship back to a family origin in the rule of the father in 1. 2. 1252 b 19 sqq. He is led to take a too favourable view of the origin of kingship partly by the ambiguity of the word *ἐπιεικεῖς*, partly by myths like those of Bellerophon (Hom. Il. 6. 189 sqq.) and others (see note

on 1285 b 7). According to Bacon (Essay on Nobility), 'there is rarely any rising but by a commixture of good and evil arts.'

9. πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι γέγονεν. All the MSS., including Γ, have *τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου* in place of *τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον*, but I have not found any parallel to the use of *ἀπό* in the sense of 'against' with *βοήθεια*, though in De Part. An. 4. 6. 682 b 33 we have *πρὸς βοήθειαν τῶν βλαπτόντων* ('for repelling those who injure them'), and other instances of a similar use of *βοήθεια* with the genitive are to be found in Bon. Ind. s. v. It seems, therefore, best to read *ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον* with Rassow Sus. and Welldon.

11. καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, i.e. especially *εὐεργεσιῶν*, for *ἀρετή* is defined in Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36 sqq. as *δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων* (cp. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 10 sq.). According to Paus. 8. 1. 4 Pelasgus was made king of the Arcadians for the first of these two reasons (*μεγέθει μέντοι καὶ κατὰ ἀλκὴν καὶ κάλλος προεῖχεν ὁ Πελασγός, καὶ γνώμην ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους ἦν, καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα αἱρεθῆναί μοι δοκεῖ βασιλεύειν ὑπ' αὐτῶν*). Many were made kings in return for benefits conferred (34 sqq.). *Τῆς* is added before the second *ἀρετῆς* because *ἀρετή* has been mentioned just before (see note on 1286 b 17).

12. καθ' ὑπεροχὴν τοιούτου γένους, 'by reason of superiority in respect of a family stock of like character' (i. e. virtuous or given to action which flows from virtue): cp. 33, *ἢ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένους*. To be *ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀγαθῶν* was even better than to be *ἀγαθός*.

ὁ δὲ τύραννος κ.τ.λ. So in Theogn. 39 sq. the tyrant is referred to as *εὐθυντὴρ κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετέρης*, the writer being a *γνώριμος*. But Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 569 A, where the demos is represented as saying to the tyrant that it begat him and set him up, *ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθείη ἐκείνου προστάντος*.

ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους. The addition of *καὶ τοῦ πλήθους* adds emphasis to *τοῦ δήμου* and places its meaning beyond a doubt. The expression *ὁ δῆμος* might be used, as it was by Hippodamus (2. 8. 1268 a 12 sq.), of the whole citizen-body. See note on 1303 a 38, *τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους*, and cp. 3. 11. 1281 b 15, *περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος*: Plato, Laws 689 B, *ὅπερ δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς ἐστιν*, and 684 C: and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 2. 18, *εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι οὐχὶ τοῦ δήμου ἐστὶν οὐδὲ τοῦ πλήθους ὁ κωμῳδούμενος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*. If Aristotle's language implies that the *τύραννος* was not himself one of the *γνώριμοι*, this was not always the case, as the

instances of Peisistratus and Lygdamis (c. 6. 1305 a 39 sqq.) will suffice to show, to say nothing of the cases in which the *τύραννος* had been a king. That he was often of low origin, however, seems to be implied in Diod. 19. 1. 5.

14. *φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων*, i. e. that the tyrant is *ἐκ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους*.

σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων κ.τ.λ. In c. 5. 1305 a 8 sqq. this is said of *οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων*. Many men who won tyrannies in days nearer to those of Aristotle were not demagogues, but leaders of mercenary troops like Timophanes (c. 6. 1306 a 19 sqq.: see note on 1305 a 7). For *πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους* cp. c. 5. 1305 a 21 sqq.

16 sqq. Compare with this classification of Greek tyrants according to the status which enabled them to win their tyrannies the similar classification of tyrants in mediaeval Italy given by J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy—Age of the Despots, p. 100 sqq.

17. *ἤδη τῶν πόλεων ηὐξημένων*. It is doubtful whether *τῶν πόλεων* here means 'the States,' as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1, 2 and apparently in 3. 15. 1286 b 9 sq., 20 sq., and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 (see notes on these passages), or 'the cities,' as in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq. (see note), but perhaps the former interpretation is the true one, for Aristotle may well have before him Thuc. 1. 13, *δυνατωτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης, τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων (πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι)*. Thucydides omits to explain why the increase in the wealth of Hellas led to the rise of tyrannies, but his meaning may be that as the revenues of individuals became larger, they became better able to establish tyrannies, or else that tyranny, being a costly form of government, could not exist without a large revenue to support it, and that this revenue could not be provided by States till their wealth had considerably increased. The connexion which Aristotle traces in the passage before us between the increased greatness of the States and the rise of demagogue-tyrants rests on a somewhat different basis, for his view seems to be that as the States grew greater, the demos and the demagogues came to be more powerful (cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 sqq.).

18. *αἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτων κ.τ.λ.* Kingships, which are here contrasted with elective magistracies (*αἱρετῶν*, 20, and *αἱρουμένων*, 23), belong to the era of small States (3. 15. 1286 b 7 sqq.). Kings who could

not rest content with the great office of king but sought to become tyrants were ill regarded (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 34 sq.: Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 10 sqq.). They often lost their kingships for their pains (1313 a 1 sqq.). Polybius (6. 7. 6 sqq.) depicts more in detail the steps by which kingship becomes tyranny.

21. τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον κ.τ.λ. As to the time indicated by τὸ ἀρχαῖον see notes on 1285 a 30 and 1305 a 7. οἱ δῆμοι = *al δημοκρατίαι*, as in 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 13. Magistrates entitled δημιουργοί ('doers of public business') existed in many Greek States (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 327), and θεωροί (compare the title ἔφοροι) existed at Mantineia (Thuc. 5. 47. 9), Tegea (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 7), and Naupactus (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 183), but Aristotle's reference is to States which, in addition to possessing these high offices, were democratically governed at an early date, and we do not know of which of the States in which they are found this is true. As the tenure of them was an assistance to the would-be tyrant in the acquisition of his tyranny, it is likely that their functions were in part military. The epithet πολυχρονίους probably implies that they were tenable for more than a year.

22. αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν κ.τ.λ. Compare the practice at Carthage (2. 11. 1273 b 8 sqq.) and at Epidamnus and Opus (3. 16. 1287 a 6 sqq.). As the tyrants of Ionia and Phalaris of Agrigentum, who are referred to in 28 sq. as owing their tyrannies to the fact of their holding offices, probably won them under an oligarchical *régime*, they may well have held several great offices at the same time. Cp. c. 5. 1305 a 15 sqq. and c. 8. 1308 a 22 sqq. For αἱρεῖσθαι ἐπί cp. 20 and Plato, Meno 90 B.

23. πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπῆρχε κ.τ.λ., 'for in all these ways [those who aimed at tyranny] had it in their power to effect their purpose with ease' etc. Compare what Callicles says in Plato, Gorg. 492 B, ἐπεί γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων υἱέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχήν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν κ.τ.λ., and Diod. 20. 10. 2, ὁ γὰρ Βομίλκας πάλαι μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμητὴς τυραννίδος, οὐκ ἔχων δ' ἐξουσίαν οὐδὲ καιρὸν οἰκεῖον ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τότε ἔλαβεν ἀφορμὰς ἀξιολόγους, τυχὼν τῆς στρατηγίας, and see note on 1303 a 16. Βασιλικὴ ἀρχή is here contrasted with ἡ τιμή (cp. βασιλείας and τῶν τιμῶν just below), but in 36 kingship is referred to as τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης and in 1313 a 13 we have βασιλικὴν τιμήν. Thus Aristotle's use of the words τιμή and ἀρχή seems to vary a good deal. In 1312 b 22 we read of τὰς ἀρχάς of tyrants. Socrates had regarded both kingship

and tyranny as *ἀρχαί* (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12), and Aristotle may perhaps do so too.

27. *ἕτεροι τύραννοι*, e.g. Charilaus (c. 12. 1316 a 33 sq.), the kings of Cyrene after the first Battus (Diod. 8. 30. 1), and the kings of Achaia (Polyb. 2. 41. 5).

28. *οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν κ.τ.λ.* This was the case with Thrasybulus of Miletus, who was 'dux Milesiorum' when Miletus was besieged by Alyattes, before he became tyrant (Frontin. Strateg. 3. 15. 6). We hear of tyrants also at Ephesus (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141) and at Samos (ibid. 2. 149), where Polycrates won the tyranny. Was it true also of them? As to Phalaris see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 65 sqq. According to Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 1 he was made by the Agrigentines *ἐπιστάτης* of the work of building a costly temple of Zeus Polieus in the acropolis of the city. But perhaps Aristotle is rather thinking of the story of his appointment as *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* of Himera narrated in Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq. The same thing occurred in the municipalities of mediaeval Italy. So Ezzelino da Romano was named captain of the people by the cities of Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Feltre, and Belluno, and 'soon changed into a tyranny the authority which he derived from the people' (Sismondi, Italian Republics, pp. 69, 88). So again Marsilio Zorzi being elected count of Curzola in 1254 changed his elective magistracy into an hereditary principality (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 239).

29 sqq. As to Panaetius see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 56 sqq. He seems, however, to have held the office of polemarch in addition to being a demagogue (Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 47), and the same thing is true of Cypselus (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 58: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 392). A demagogue was not usually able to make himself tyrant unless he held the office of polemarch or stratêgus, or was, at any rate, a man of military prowess (c. 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.). As to Peisistratus and Dionysius the Elder see c. 5. 1305 a 21 sqq. and 26 sqq.

32. *εἴπομεν*, in 1310 b 2 sq.

τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν. See note on 1310 b 2.

33. *κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32, *ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς (ἡ κοινωνία) ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα*, and Pol. 3. 5. 1278 a 18, *οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἣν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ᾗ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν. Τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν δίκαιον* is *τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον* (7 (5).

1. 1301 b 35 sq.), and though *ἀξία* attaches in some degree to wealth, free birth, and the like (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 24–29), it is most truly found in virtue (Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq.). See note on 1278 a 20. In strictness, however, kingship and aristocracy are not *κατ' ἀρετήν*, but *κατ' ἀρετὴν κεχορηγημένην* (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq.).

ἢ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετήν, as in the case of Pelasgus (see note on 11).

ἢ κατὰ γένους, sc. *ἀρετήν*, as in the case of the Heracleidae (Isocr. Archid. § 20). For *ἀρετὴν γένους* cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 37.

34. ἢ κατ' εὐεργεσίας. See notes on 1310 b 11 and 1285 b 6, 7, and Polyb. 5. 11. 6. Cp. also Diod. 11. 26. 6, where we read of Gelon, *τοσοῦτον ἀπεῖχε τοῦ τυχεῖν τιμωρίας ὡς τύραννος ὥστε μιᾷ φωνῇ πάντας ἀποκαλεῖν εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα καὶ βασιλέα.* Benefits conferred create a presumption that the person who confers them is virtuous (see note on 1286 b 10, and cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 12, *οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ πλεῖστοι ὁρίζονται τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἑαυτῶν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι*), so that to make a man king in return for benefits conferred is much the same thing as to make him king for virtue.

ἢ κατὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ δύναμιν. Vict. 'extremum ponit eorum quae aliquem perducunt ad hunc honorem, cum iam expositis rebus adiunctae sunt opes et facultas valde iuvandi; neque enim tantum honore afficiuntur qui iam bonum aliquod magnum salutemque dederunt, sed etiam qui potestatem habent id praestandi.' Cp. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 28, *τιμῶνται δὲ δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ εὐεργετηκότες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμῶνται καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος εὐεργετεῖν.* So Thucydides says of Theseus, *γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατός* (2. 15), and Solon *ἔλεγε βασιλέα τὸν ἰσχυρότατον τῇ δυνάμει* (Diog. Laert. 1. 58). Welldon appears to take *ταῦτα* to refer not to *ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐεργεσίας*, but to *εὐεργεσίας* only, and perhaps he is right.

35. τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη. City-States like Athens and Lacedaemon, nations like the Persians, Macedonians, and Molossians.

36. τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης. See note on 23.

οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος. *Κατὰ πόλεμον* goes with *δουλεύειν*, cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 23, *τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν.* According to the traditional account Codrus was already king of Athens when he delivered his country from a Dorian invasion by the sacrifice of his life, whereas Aristotle evidently takes him, if the text is correct, to have won a kingship by saving his country from enslavement. It is Melanthus, the father of Codrus, whom the prevailing tradition represents to have won the kingship

of Athens: cp. Strabo, p. 393, οὗτος δὲ (i. e. ὁ τῆς Μεσσήνης βασιλεὺς Μέλανθος) καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐβασίλευσεν ἐκόντων, νικήσας ἐκ μονομαχίας τὸν τῶν Βοιωτῶν βασιλέα Ξάνθον. Some have thought that Aristotle here follows a tradition according to which not Melanthus, but Codrus defeated Xanthus in single combat and won the kingship, and this is possible, for we find that Pausanias (in 9. 5. 16: cp. 2. 18. 8) also follows a tradition of his own and ascribes the victory over Xanthus neither to Melanthus nor to Codrus, but to the father of Melanthus, Andropompus. But Toepffer (Att. Genealogie, p. 230), followed by Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 127. 5), objects that the war with Xanthus was a mere border-war and did not, like the invasion of the Dorians, threaten Attica with enslavement, so that, if Codrus saved his country from enslavement, he must have saved it not from Xanthus, but from the Dorians. The probability is that Aristotle follows some tradition or other of his own, as Plato does in Symp. 208 D (Busolt, ibid. p. 129. 1), but it is also possible that he here makes a mistake, just as he makes a mistake in attributing the overthrow of the Peisistratid tyranny to Harmodius and Aristogeiton (c. 10. 1312 b 30 sq.).

37. **οἱ δ' ἐλευθερώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κῦρος.** Cp. Hdt. 3. 82, where Darius asks, *κόθεν ἡμῖν ἡ ἐλευθερίη ἐγένετο καὶ τεῦ δόντος;* and adds, *ἔχω τοίνυν γνώμην ἡμέας ἐλευθερωθέντας διὰ ἕνα ἄνδρα τὸ τοιοῦτο περιστέλλειν*, where Cyrus is referred to, and also [Plato,] Menex. 239 D, *ὧν ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Κῦρος ἐλευθερώσας Πέρσας κ.τ.λ.*

38. **ἢ κτίσαντες**, like Dardanus, first founder and king of Dardania, the city which preceded Troy (Hom. Il. 20. 215 sqq.).

ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 7, *πορίσαι χώραν.* So we read of the Celts in Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 105 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 457), *τιμῶσι δὲ μάλιστα τοὺς χώραν τῷ κοινῷ προσκτησαμένους.*

39. **οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς.** Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 20.

καὶ Μακεδόνων. Cp. Hdt. 8. 138 and Porphyr. Tyr. Fragm. 1 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 690).

καὶ Μολοττῶν. Neoptolemus son of Achilles became king of the Molossians after bringing followers and conquering the territory (Plut. Pyrrh. c. 1, referred to by Eaton).

40. **βούλεται δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηδὲν ἄδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μηδέν.** Aristotle has been dwelling on the difference in the origin of kingship and tyranny, and now he turns to the difference of their aim. He here repeats what Isocrates had said to Nicocles king of Salamis

in Cyprus (Ad Nicocl. § 16, *καλῶς δὲ δημαγωγήσεις ἐὰν μήθ' ὑβρίζειν τὸν ὄχλον ἐᾷς μήθ' ὑβριζόμενον περιορᾷς, ἀλλὰ σκοπῆς ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι μὲν τὰς τιμὰς ἕξουσιν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι μηδὲν ἀδικήσονται· ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν*). Cp. also Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 1 sq., Solon, Fragm. 5. 5 sq. and ap. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 12 *sub fin.*, and Plut. Aristid. c. 6, *ὅθεν ἀνὴρ πένης καὶ δημοτικὸς ἐκτήσατο τὴν βασιλικωτάτην καὶ θειοτάτην προσηγορίαν τὸν Δίκαιον.* Kingship has occasionally in modern times also been useful in the way pointed out by Aristotle. Thus Mr. S. R. Gardiner (The Thirty Years' War, p. 197 sq.), speaking of France in the time of Cardinal Richelieu, says, 'The establishment of a strong monarchical power was, as France was then constituted, the only chance for industry and commerce to lift up their heads, for the peaceable arts of life to develope themselves in security, for the intellect of man to have free course, and for the poor to be protected from oppression . . . The late growth of the royal power and the long continuance of aristocratic oppression threw the people helpless and speechless into the arms of the monarchy.' See also Sir J. R. Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 169 sq.

8. πολλάκις, in 3. 7. 1279 b 6 sq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 17–22. 1311 a. **εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν,** cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 35 sqq.

5. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων κ.τ.λ. So Isocrates (Epist. 7 *init.*) praises Timotheus tyrant of Heracleia on the Euxine, *ὅτι προαιρῇ δόξαν καλὴν κτήσασθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῦτον μέγαν συναγαγεῖν.* Cp. Diod. 10. 32. 2, *ἡ δὲ τυραννικὴ πλεονεξία καὶ τὰ μικρὰ τῶν λημμάτων οὐ παρίησιν,* and Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 50 R, *καὶ μὲν δὴ οἴεται (ὁ βασιλεὺς) δεῖν πλεῖον ἔχειν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ τῶν χρημάτων οὐδὲ τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐπιμελείας καὶ τῶν φροντίδων.*

7. καὶ φυλακὴ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 24–29. It is *καλόν* to be guarded by fellow-citizens.

8. ὅτι δ' ἡ τυραννὶς κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1310 b 3 sqq.

10. τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον. This is the end of oligarchy (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 15), though in Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 41 sqq. the quest of gain is connected rather with democracy, and it is also the end of tyranny, for if in Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 6 we read that the end of tyranny is self-defence (*φυλακή*), wealth was a condition both of the maintenance of a bodyguard and of the luxurious life which tyrants sought to live, and hence the first aim of a tyrant was to amass a treasure (Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 10). Thucydides (1. 17, *ἐς τὸ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον αὔξειν*) virtually says the same thing.

καὶ διαμένειν, 'to continue his also,' in addition to being originally acquired. Cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 14, καὶ βιάζεσθαι.

12. καὶ τὸ τῷ πλήθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν. Cp. c. 6. 1306 a 21, where we read of ἡ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀπιστία of oligarchies.

διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦνται τῶν ὅπλων. We find oligarchies resorting to this measure in Mytilene (Thuc. 3. 27), and Athens (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 20), and tyrants frequently (e.g. Peisistratus at Athens in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 15 and Aristodemus at Cumae in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8). See Eaton's note. It is here implied that the πλῆθος possessed heavy arms (see note on 1294 a 41).

13. καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον, 'and ill-treatment of the multitude.' Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 628 Nauck (626, ed. 2),

δήμῳ δὲ μήτε πᾶν ἀναρτήσῃς κράτος
μήτ' αὖ κακώσῃς, πλοῦτον ἔντιμον τιθείς,

and Lys. Or. 13. c. Agorat. c. 91, τὸν δὲ δῆμον, ὃν αὐτός φησι πατέρα αὑτοῦ εἶναι, φαίνεται κακώσας, which is illustrated by ἔτυπτε καὶ οὐδὲν παρεῖχε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων and ἀφείλετο ἃ ἦν ὑπάρχοντα ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθά. Herodotus (2. 124) says of Cheops the pyramid-builder, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον βασιλεύσαντά σφεων Χέοπα ἐς πᾶσαν κακότητα ἐλάσαι. That oligarchies often ill-used the demos we see from c. 9. 1310 a 8 sqq., and that tyrants often did so may be inferred from the conduct of Gelon to the demos of the Sicilian Megara and Euboea (Hdt. 7. 156): cp. c. 11. 1314 b 1 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 568 E sq.

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν. The Thirty at Athens drove the demos from the city to the Peiraeus and elsewhere (Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 1: Lys. Or. 12. c. Eratosth. c. 95: Diod. 14. 32. 4: Justin, 5. 9. 12), and it was in the interest of oligarchy that the διοικισμός of Mantineia by the Lacedaemonians took place. Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 177 sqq., where the Lacedaemonians are charged with having made the demos perioeci, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διελόντας τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ὡς οἷόν τ' ἦν εἰς ἐλαχίστους εἰς τόπους κατοικίσαι μικροὺς καὶ πολλούς, ὀνόμασι μὲν προσαγορευομένους ὡς πόλεις οἰκοῦντας, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντας ἐλάττω τῶν δήμων τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 b 7, where oligarchies are advised μὴ συνάγειν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν τὸν ὄχλον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων συνόδων συστρέφεται τὰ πλήθη καὶ καταλύει τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας. Tyrants are here charged with driving the demos from the city, as oligarchies did, and we know that Gelon held a demos to be συνοίκημα ἀχαριτώτατον (Hdt. 7. 156), and that many tyrants sought to induce their subjects to live in the country and to follow country-pursuits, e.g. Periander (Diog.

Laert. 1. 98), Peisistratus ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 16: cp. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1150–1156 and Pollux, 7. 68), and the tyrants of Sicyon (Pollux, 7. 68): see also [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 32. Here and in 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 29 all MSS. have ἄστεος. In Poet. 3. 1448 a 38, on the other hand, we find ἄστεως, and this form is exclusively used in the 'Αθ. Πολ. (see Sandys' Index). It is the only form which appears in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 108: see also Kühner, Ausführl. Gramm. der gr. Sprache, ed. Blass, 1. 441, Anm. 2).

15. ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ κ.τ.λ. So we read of the Athenian democracy in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 14, *διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς ἀτιμοῦσι καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσι καὶ ἀποκτείνουσι, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς αὔξουσιν* (cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 42, whence we gather that the leading citizens were often banished when democracy was introduced). The same thing is said of Euphron tyrant of Sicyon in Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 8. Cp. also c. 11. 1314 a 19 sqq., Isocr. Epist. 7. 8, and Diod. 14. 45. 1. See, however, as to democracy note on 1304 b 21. For other measures adopted both by tyranny and by democracy see c. 11. 1313 b 32 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq.

16. διαφθείρειν λάθρᾳ, as the Peisistratidae made away with Cimon, father of Miltiades (Hdt. 6. 103).

17. ὡς ἀντιτέχνους, 'as rivals in the craft [of ruling]': cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 13, *ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐφιεμένους φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται "καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ"* (sc. *κοτέει*, Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 25).

καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐμποδίους. Cp. c. 11. 1314 a 9 sq., 19 sqq.

18. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιβουλάς, 'for it is from these that the conspiracies also [as well as the passive hindrances to the tyrant's rule] in fact proceed.' For the use of *ἐκ* cp. Xen. Hiero, 1. 38 (quoted on 1311 b 6). Cp. Polyb. 6. 7. 9 and Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book 3. c. 6, 'We find in history that conspiracies are always formed and conducted either by great men or by such as are intimate with their Prince.' Were those who were led to plot by *ὕβρις*, however, always *γνώριμοι*? Aristogeiton is said by Thucydides (6. 54) to have been a *μέσος πολίτης*.

19. τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν αὐτῶν βουλομένων. Αὐτῶν has been interpreted in different ways. Sepulveda translates the clause, 'dum quidam eorum imperare volunt' (so Lamb.), and Vict. 'cum hi velint

imperium in ipsos habere,' but Giph. is probably right in translating it 'quorum hi quidem imperare ipsi velint' (so Stahr and Sus.).

20. *ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμά ἐστιν* κ.τ.λ. Here, as in 3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq., the famous counsel is said to have been given by Periander to Thrasybulus, and not by Thrasybulus to Periander (see note on 1284 a 26).

22. *καθάπερ οὖν* κ.τ.λ. In c. 2. 1302 a 34 sqq. several *αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων* in constitutions are enumerated. They are the following—the sight of others justly or unjustly enjoying a superior share of gain and honour, *ὕβρις, φόβος, ὑπεροχή, καταφρόνησις, αὔξησις ἡ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀριθεία, ὀλιγωρία, μικρότης, ἀνομοιότης.* That the first of these causes operates in the case of monarchies, or at any rate tyrannies, we see from 1312 a 22 sqq. Of *ὕβρις φόβος* and *καταφρόνησις* as causes of attacks on monarchs we hear much. As to *ὑπεροχή* see c. 11. 1315 a 8 sqq. Of the operation in reference to monarchies of the five last causes we hear little, if anything. As to the order followed in the enumeration see note on 1302 a 34.

26. *ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις.* Cp. 1312 b 18, *ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίσι*, and see note on 1305 b 41.

27. *τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας* κ.τ.λ. In c. 8. 1308 a 9 sq. (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 17 sqq.) we find a distinction drawn between *τὸ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν* and *τὸ ἀδικεῖν εἰς κέρδος*, which corresponds roughly to that which is drawn here.

ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων στέρησιν. As Giph. points out (p. 665), the conspiracy of the Pazzi against the Medici at Florence was in part brought about by Giovanni de' Pazzi's loss of a rich inheritance owing to a law enacted through the influence of the Medici (Machiavelli, Discorsi, Book 3. c. 6: Sismondi, Italian Republics, p. 267 sq.).

28. *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταὐτά* κ.τ.λ. *Καὶ τὰ τέλη*, i.e. *περὶ ὧν ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις* (cp. c. 2. 1302 a 31 sq.), as well as *αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν* (23 sq.). It appears from 1312 a 22 sqq. that some assailants of tyrants were led to make their attempts by the sight of the gains and honours enjoyed by tyrants, and from 1312 a 15 sq. that others were influenced partly by a desire for gain and partly by contempt, but it would seem from 1312 b 17 sqq. that most attacks on tyrannies were prompted by feelings of hatred and contempt, and it may be doubted whether such feelings usually

left much room in the minds of the assailants for a desire of wealth or honour.

29. καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας. For the non-repetition of the preposition see critical note on 1330 b 31, and notes on 1284 a 35 and 1302 a 33.

30. μέγεθος γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 846 Nauck (850, ed. 2),

ἡ γὰρ τυραννὶς πάντοθεν τοξεύεται
δεινοῖς ἔρωσιν,

and Isocr. De Pace, § 111. For μέγεθος πλούτου καὶ τιμῆς cp. 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 34, καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας.

31. τῶν δ' ἐπιθέσεων κ.τ.λ. Τῶν ἐπιθέσεων takes up ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις (26 sq.). Aristotle has just been speaking as if the aim of all those who attack tyrannies were to win for themselves the wealth and honour the tyrants enjoy, but now he points out that not all of them direct their attacks against the rule of the tyrant, and that most of those who do not do so seek vengeance, not greatness (35 sq.). In strictness he is only concerned with ἐπιθέσεις aiming at an overthrow of the tyranny, but he does not accept this limitation of his subject. Ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν probably means ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς διαφθοράν, cp. c. 11. 1315 a 24, τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθοράν. Ἐπιθέσεις are described in 1311 a 32—1312 a 39 as occurring δι' ὕβριν (1311 a 32–b 36), διὰ φόβον (1311 b 36–40), διὰ καταφρόνησιν (1311 b 40—1312 a 14), διὰ πλείω τούτων (1312 a 15 sq.), διὰ φιλοτιμίαν (1312 a 21–39). Those which occur δι' ὕβριν may be caused either (1) by ὕβρις in the form of insult, verbal or other (1311 a 36—b 6), or (2) by ὕβρις εἰς τὸ σῶμα, and this may take the form either of ἐρωτική and other ὕβρις (1311 b 6–23) or of πληγαί (1311 b 23–34). For the various kinds of ὕβρις cp. c. 11. 1315 a 14 sqq. Many successful attempts had been made on the lives of kings and tyrants in the course of the fourth century B.C. Among these attempts the following may be mentioned. Archelaus, king of Macedon, was assassinated in B.C. 399; Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, in B.C. 374; Jason of Pherae in B.C. 370; Euphron, tyrant of Sicyon, in B.C. 367; Alexander of Pherae and Cotys, king of the Odrysae, in B.C. 359; Clearchus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, in B.C. 352; and Philip of Macedon in B.C. 336. It will be noticed that most of these assassinations occurred in Northern Greece, Macedon, and Thrace. It is remarkable that both the elder and the younger Dionysius escaped assassination.

32. αἱ μὲν οὖν δι' ὕβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα. Μὲν οὖν is not, I think,

answered by δέ, 33. Aristotle appears to have intended to pass on to another class of ἐπιθέσεις directed against the throne, not the person, of the monarch, the mention of which would have been introduced by δέ, but he loses sight of his intention in the course of the long enumeration of ἐπιθέσεις caused by ὕβρις and fails to complete his inquiry in the intended way. He does not say that attacks provoked by ὕβρις were the only ones directed against the person of the monarch (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 24 sqq.); those provoked by deprivation of property and those caused by fear and contempt will often have had a similar aim.

33. τῆς δ' ὕβρεως—**36.** ὑπεροχῆς, 'and though insolence assumes many forms, each of them gives rise to the anger [which animates those who make these attempts]' etc. A further characteristic of attacks on tyrants caused by ὕβρις is here pointed out. Not only do those who make them assail the tyrant's person, not his throne, but they attack in anger (cp. 1312 b 29 sqq.), and consequently in most cases seek vengeance, not superiority of position.

34. αὐτῶν, i. e. τῶν μερῶν, to be supplied from πολυμεροῦς: cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 24, where νόμος has to be supplied from νομοθέτης: De Gen. An. 4. 5. 773 b 11, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ μιᾷ συνουσίᾳ πλεῖον τὸ ἀπιὸν ἐστι σπέρμα, ὃ μερισθὲν πυιεῖ πολυτοκεῖν, ὧν (sc. τόκων) ὑστερίζει θάτερον: and Hom. Il. 9. 383,

αἶψ' ἑκατόμπυλοί εἰσι, διηκόσιοι δ' ἀν' ἑκάστας
ἀνέρες ἐξοιχνεῦσι σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν.

τῶν δ' ὀργιζομένων κ.τ.λ. Most angry men, not all, for sometimes assailants whose attacks were provoked by ὕβρις and who attacked in anger sought not only vengeance but also greatness. Crataeas did so (see note on 1311 b 8); see also note on 1316 a 29 as to the Gonzagas of Mantua.

35. τιμωρίας χάριν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 21, παῦλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα, and Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 12 sqq. Phanias of Eresus, a disciple of Aristotle, wrote a work entitled Τυράννων ἀναίρεσις ἐκ τιμωρίας (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 293).

36. ὑπεροχῆς, 'superiority of position,' as in c. 7. 1307 a 19 and c. 11. 1314 a 8.

οἷον—**b 1,** κύει. For the structure of this sentence (οἷον followed by δέ) see note on 1313 b 13.

οἷον ἡ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν, sc. ἐπίθεσις ἐγένετο (cp. 1311 b 7, γεγένηνται) 'the attack on the Peisistratidae happened.' For the

objective genitive cp. 1311 b 30, *τῆς Ἀρχελάου ἐπιθέσεως*, and see Bon. Ind. 149 b 10 sqq., where Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 21, *τὴν ἑκάστου* (i. e. *πρὸς ἕκαστον*) *ὀργήν*, is given as an instance. For the fact cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 18, *ἐρασθεὶς γὰρ* (Θετταλὸς) *τοῦ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ διαμαρτάνων τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίας, οὐ κατεῖχε τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλ' ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνεσημαίνετο πικ[ρ]ῶς, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀδελφὴν κανηφορεῖν Παναθηναίοις ἐ[κώ]λυσεν λοιδορήσας τι τὸν Ἁρμόδιον ὡς μαλακὸν ὄντα, ὅθεν συνέβη παροξυνθέντα τὸν Ἁρμόδιον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτονα πράττειν τὴν πρᾶξιν μετεχόντων πολλῶν.* Whether Aristotle in the passage before us ascribes the *ὕβρις* to Hipparchus (with Thuc. 6. 54) or to Thessalus (with the *Ἀθ. Πολ.*), it is impossible to say, nor is it clear whether (with the *Ἀθ. Πολ.*) he conceives that a separate insult was offered to Harmodius in addition to that offered to his sister. It would rather seem from 38, *ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἁρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφήν*, that he does not. In 1312 b 30 sqq. (cp. Rhet. 2. 24. 1401 b 11 sq.) Aristotle evidently connects the overthrow of the Peisistratidae with the act of *ὕβρις* here referred to, unlike both Thucydides and the *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, but like Plato (Symp. 182 C). A similar story is told of Antileon and Hipparinus at the Italian Heracleia (Phan. Eres. Fragm. 16 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 298: Plut. Amat. c. 16. 760 C). Many of the illustrations which Aristotle gives in this chapter of plots arising from *ὕβρις* are derived from the history of Macedon Thrace and Mytilene, regions with which he was personally acquainted.

37. *ἐπηρεάσαι δ' Ἁρμόδιον*, 'and treated Harmodius with spiteful contumely.' Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 17, *ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεσιν οὐχ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐκείνῳ*, and see Wyttenbach on Plut. Praec. Sanit. Tuend. p. 135 D. *Ἐπηρεάζειν* usually takes a dative after it, and M^s (possibly with Γ: see critical note) has *ἁρμοδίῳ* here, but in c. 4. 1304 a 17 we have the passive *ἐπηρεασθείς*, and in Plut. Lucull. c. 42, *εἰς δὲ τὴν σύγκλητον* (*κατέβαινεν*) *εἰ Πομπηΐου τινὰ δέοι σπουδὴν ἢ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπηρεάσαι*, the construction with the accusative.

38. *ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἁρμόδιος κ.τ.λ.* Lamb. apparently supplies *ἐπέθετο*, for he translates 'in eos impetum fecerunt': Vict., on the other hand, translates 'commotus est,' and Sus. 'aufgebracht ward.' I incline to follow Lamb.

39. *ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ κ.τ.λ.* As to this Periander see note on 1304 a 31, and Plut. Amat. c. 23. 768 F. Compare the circumstances of the assassination of

Caligula by Cassius Chaerea (Merivale, Romans under the Empire. c. 48, vol. 6. 95, note 3).

1311 b. 1. ἡ δὲ Φιλίππου κ.τ.λ. Supply *ἐπίθεσις ἐγένετο*. See Diod. 16. 93 sq., and Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 90. Τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, i. e. Attalus himself (see note on 1305b 25). Aristotle perhaps thought that the honours with which Philip sought to console Pausanias for the indignities inflicted on him (Diod. 16. 93. 9) were inadequate (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 23 sq.).

8. καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Δέρδα κ.τ.λ. It is not known what Amyntas and Derdas are referred to. 'Amyntas the little' was evidently a king or prince, but whether he was one of the kings of Macedon of that name is doubtful; he may, for instance, have been a king not of Macedon, but of Elimeia. It is hardly likely that Amyntas III of Macedon, the father of Philip, is referred to, for if he were, we should expect that he would be described not as *ὁ μικρός*, but as Philip's father, especially as Philip is named in the preceding sentence. Besides, it is probable that Derdas succeeded in his attempt on the life of Amyntas the little, as those in connexion with whom he is named did so, but we are nowhere told that Amyntas the father of Philip died a violent death (see Isocr. Archid. § 46: Diod. 15. 60. 3: Justin, 7. 4. 8). The addition of *ὁ μικρός* is not altogether respectful: see Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 497. and note on 1335 a 13, and cp. Plato, Protag. 323 D. Nor is it likely that Amyntas the little was the son of Archelaus king of Macedon who is mentioned in 14, and who became king of Macedon himself as Amyntas II for a short time in B. C. 392 (see as to him Sus.[2], Note 1678, Curtius, Hist. of Greece, Eng. Trans., 5. 35, note, and Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 60, note, and Addenda, p. 659: No. 77, ed. 2), for, if he was, he would probably be called *ὁ μικρός* again in 14, or some indication would be given in 14 that he had already been mentioned in 3. Whether the Derdas here mentioned is the Derdas who was king or prince of Elimeia in B. C. 382 and an ally of Amyntas III against Olynthus (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 38 and 5. 3. 1 sq.) is quite uncertain.

4. καὶ ἡ τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ κ.τ.λ. Supply *ἐπίθεσις ἐγένετο τιμωρίας χάριν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς*. Τῷ Κυπρίῳ is added to distinguish this Evagoras from other men of the same name, and perhaps especially from the famous Olympian winner Evagoras the Lacedaemonian (Hdt. 6. 103). A short abstract by Photius of the story of the murder of Evagoras as told by Theopompus

will be found in Theopomp. Fragm. 111 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 295): see also Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76. According to this story Nicocreon, the master of the eunuch mentioned in the text, the eunuch being an Eleian named Thrasydaeus, had been detected in a conspiracy against Evagoras and had fled from Salamis. Thrasydaeus in revenge decoyed Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras into successive visits to a daughter whom Nicocreon had left behind, and seized the opportunity to slay both of them. Aristotle's brief reference to the event is not wholly inconsistent with the account of Theopompus, but he does not mention the fact that Pnytagoras shared his father's fate, and he gives a different account from Theopompus of the cause of the assassination, for according to him Thrasydaeus acted as he did not to avenge the failure of his master's illegal enterprise, but to avenge a wrong done to himself by the son of Evagoras, a wrong which under the singular circumstances of the case would be felt with especial bitterness. Machiavelli mentions a somewhat similar plot in his Discourses, Book 3. c. 6. 'Even in our own times Giulio Belanti conspired against Pandolfo lord of Siena, who, though he had given him his daughter to wife, afterwards took her away from him.' Looking to the tragical end of Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras after glorious careers, it is natural that Isocrates in the Ad Nicoclem (§ 29) should exhort Nicocles, the son and successor of Evagoras, to control his desires, and that Nicocles himself in the address to his subjects written for him by Isocrates (Nicocl. §§ 36–47) should lay special stress on his own practice of *σωφροσύνη*, dropping (§ 39) the significant remark that even the best men are sometimes mastered by desire, which appears to be an allusion to his father's fate. Nicocles does not seem to have long continued a model of *σωφροσύνη* (see note on 1314 b 28). Prof. W. Ridgeway (*Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc.* 2. 152) remarks that, in proof of the fact that married eunuchs were by no means uncommon, 'it is sufficient to quote the case of Potiphar (Genesis 37. 36), where the Septuagint version states, *οἱ δὲ Μαδιηναῖοι ἀπέδοντο τὸν Ἰωσὴφ εἰς Αἴγυπτον τῷ Πετεφρῇ τῷ σπάδοντι Φαραὼ ἀρχιμαγείρῳ*. Again, Montesquieu (Esprit des Lois, 15. 19) says, "Au Tonquin, dit Dampier, tous les Mandarins civils et militaires sont eunuques. Le même Dampier nous dit que dans ce pays les eunuques ne peuvent se passer de femmes et qu'ils se marient." Juvenal (1. 22) alludes to the same custom:

Cum tener uxorem ducat spado.'

6. πολλαὶ δ' ἐπιθέσεις κ.τ.λ. Here we pass to the second main division of acts of ὕβρις (see note on 1311 a 31), that of acts into which τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύναι enters, a term which Aristotle uses here in a sense inclusive of both the kinds of ὕβρις which he distinguishes in c. 11. 1315 a 15 sq., ἡ εἰς τὰ σώματα and ἡ εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, where ἡ εἰς τὰ σώματα ὕβρις is restricted to ὕβρις shown in punishment. For the fact mentioned in the text cp. Xen. Hiero, 1. 38, καὶ τοίνυν αἱ ἐπιβουλαὶ ἐξ οὐδένων πλέονες τοῖς τυράννοις εἰσὶν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μάλιστα φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς προσποιησαμένων.

8. οἷον καὶ ἡ Κρατεύα εἰς Ἀρχέλαον κ.τ.λ. The name is variously given—Aelian (Var. Hist. 8. 9) has Crateuas, Plutarch (Amat. c. 23) Crateas or Crateuas, Diodorus (14. 37. 5) Craterus (Sus.², Note 1675). The conspiracy of Crataeas, Hellanocrates of Larissa, and Decamnichus against Archelaus was memorable, because, though two at least of the conspirators were mere youths and one of the two not even a Macedonian, Crataeas actually succeeded in seating himself on the throne of Macedon for three or four days (Aelian. Var. Hist. 8. 9). Decamnichus, however, was the chief author and leader of the conspiracy (1311 b 30 sqq.). As Grote points out (Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76, vol. 10. 63), his grudge against Archelaus must have been nursed for fully six years, for Euripides died in B.C. 406 and the assassination of Archelaus did not take place till B.C. 399. How powerful Archelaus was we see from the fact that Hellanocrates of Larissa looked to him to restore him to his country. A little later Macedon became 'partially dependent on' Jason of Pherae for a time (Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 78, vol. 10. 265).

10. ἢ διότι κ.τ.λ., 'or perhaps [he attacked Archelaus] because,' etc. Crataeas' aspiring character appears in the bargain he made with Archelaus for the hand of one of his daughters. He can hardly have been a welcome suitor, and it is not surprising that Archelaus, pressed in war by the Lyncestae and their chiefs Sirras and Arrabaeus, gave his elder daughter in marriage to the king of Elimeia, whose territory bordered that of the Lyncestae on the south and who would therefore be valuable as an ally against them, and his younger daughter to Amyntas (afterwards Amyntas II, see note on 3), his son by an earlier wife than Cleopatra, his object being to reduce to a minimum the quarrels which he foresaw between him and his son by Cleopatra, his destined successor on the throne.

11. τὴν μὲν πρωτέραν. Πρωτέραν probably means simply πρεσβυτέραν: cp. 1312 a 4, Διονυσίῳ τῷ ὑστέρῳ, where τῷ ὑστέρῳ perhaps

means the younger, not the second, for in Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 435 d we find *Διονύσιον τὸν νεώτερον Σικελίας τύραννον* distinguished from *Διονύσιος ὁ πρότερος* (435 f, 436 a).

12. *κατεχόμενος ὑπὸ πολέμου.* Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 44, *τῷ πολέμῳ κατεχόμενος*, and Demosth. Or. 50. in Polycl. c. 5, *ὑπὸ Κυζικηνῶν κατέχονται τῷ πολέμῳ.*

Σίρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιον. We read of an Arribaeus king of the Lyncestae in Thuc. 4. 79 (B.C. 424): cp. Strabo, p. 326, *οἱ δὲ Λυγκησταὶ ὑπ' Ἀρραβαίῳ ἐγένοντο τοῦ Βακχιαδῶν γένους ὄντι· τούτου δ' ἦν θυγατριδῆ ἡ Φιλίππου μήτηρ τοῦ Ἀμύντου Εὐρυδίκη, Σίρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ.* The Arrabaeus of the text may be the same man, or he may have died and been succeeded by a son named Sirras (his daughter being named Sirra), who may himself have had a son named Arrabaeus. The name Sirras may probably be connected with that of the city Siris or Serrae on a tributary of the lower Strymon (Hdt. 8. 115), for it is called *Σίρρα* by Steph. Byz. (Pape-Benseler, art. *Σῖρις*).

13. *τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἐλιμείας.* Cp. Thuc. 2. 99, *τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ἐλιμειῶται καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μέν ἐστι τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ' ἔχει καθ' αὑτά.*

15. *ἀλλὰ τῆς γε ἀλλοτριότητος* κ.τ.λ., 'but [if this was the cause of the actual attack,] his estrangement from Archelaus at any rate was brought about by,' etc. For *ἀλλὰ . . . γε* cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 41 sq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 9. Aristotle's statement is confirmed by Plut. Amat. c. 23.

16. *τὸ βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισιαστικὴν χάριν.* The use of *βαρέως φέρειν* with *πρός* appears to be rare: Liddell and Scott refer to Julian, Or. 1. Enc. Const. 17 C, *χαλεπῶς φέροντες πρὸς τὸ δουλεύειν.*

17. *Ἑλλανοκράτης ὁ Λαρισαῖος.* The termination of the name is Atticized, the Thessalian form being *Ἑλλανοκράτεις*. See Cauer[2], Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 409. 72, where an Hellanocrates of Crannon is recommended with many others for the citizenship of Larissa by Philip V of Macedon in B.C. 214. As Hellanocrates was a youth, he must probably have been exiled from Larissa in company with his father.

18. *οὐ κατῆγεν*, 'persistently refrained from restoring him to his city': cp. *οὐ κατᾶγεν* in Timocreon, Fragm. 1 (ap. Plut. Themist. c. 21).

19. *δι' ὕβριν καὶ οὐ δι' ἐρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.* Cp. Eubul. *Νάννιον*, Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 238),

καὶ μὴ λαθραίαν κύπριν, αἰσχίστην νόσων
πασῶν, διώκειν, ὕβρεος οὐ πόθου χάριν,

and Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 337 Nauck (409, ed. 2),

ὕβρις τάδ', οὐχὶ Κύπρις, ἐξεργάζεται.

20. εἶναι, 'was.'

Πάρρων δὲ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Αἴνιοι Κότυν διέφθειραν τῷ περὶ τιμωροῦντες. As to **Πάρρων** see critical note. See Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 80, vol. 10. 516 sqq., and Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 138. This happened in B.C. 359. What bodily outrage their father had suffered from Cotys, we do not learn here or elsewhere. Hardly blows or flogging, though Cotys was severe in punishing (Stob. Floril. 48. 45), for then the case would be grouped with those mentioned in 23 sqq. **Οἱ Αἴνιοι** is added to distinguish this Heracleides from Syracusans of the same name and from Heracleides Ponticus.

22. **Ἀδάμας δ' ἀπέστη Κότυος κ.τ.λ.** Adamas was apparently an eunuch in the service of Cotys.

23. **πολλοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We come now to those who took vengeance for *ὕβρις* in the form of blows or flogging. 'And on account also of indignities inflicted on the body through blows many have been roused to anger and have either destroyed or attempted to destroy, as having been outraged, even holders of magistracies and persons connected with regal supremacies, [so that this is much more likely to befal tyrants].' For *βασιλικὰς δυναστείας*, cp. Plato, Critias, 114 D, *ἐν δυναστείαις τισὶ βασιλέων*. **Βασιλικάς** is added because not all *δυναστεῖαι* are regal or even monarchical, cp. Plato, Laws 711 D, *μεγάλαις τισὶ δυναστείαις, ἢ κατὰ μοναρχίαν δυναστευούσαις ἢ κατὰ πλούτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφερούσαις ἢ γενῶν*. In Diod. 15. 60. 3 the words *τῶν ἐν δυναστείαις ὄντων τριῶν* are used of three persons, only two of whom were kings, the third being tagus of Thessaly.

26. **οἷον ἐν Μιτυλήνῃ κ.τ.λ.** As an instance of holders of offices to whom this happened the Penthilidae or Penthalidae are mentioned, and as an instance of royal personages Archelaus. The Penthilidae claimed descent from Penthilus, an illegitimate son of Orestes, who was believed to have headed the Aeolian emigration to Lesbos (Paus. 3. 2. 1: Strabo, p. 582: Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 273. 5). They appear to have been the ruling gens in the early oligarchy of Mytilene, as the Basilidae were at Erythrae and the Neleidae at Miletus (see note on 1305 b 18). As to the Penthilidae see Myrsil. Methymn. Fragm. 12 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 4. 459). Megacles

cannot have slain all the Penthilidae, for Penthilus, who fell later on (28 sqq.), must have been one of them. For misdeeds resembling those of the Penthilidae cp. Demosth. Or. 54. c. Conon. c. 37. The young nobles of Venice played the same pranks (Brown, Venice, p. 259).

29. Σμέρδις. See critical note. ΓΠ have *σμέρδης*. The forms Σμέρδις (Hdt. 3. 30 etc.: Anth. Pal. 7. 29), Σμερδίης (Anth. Pal. 7. 31), and Σμέρδιος (king of Naxos in mythical times, Diod. 5. 51. 3) occur (see Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der griech. Eigennamen, under these titles), but not Smerdes, which may however possibly be right. Pape-Benseler quotes Hesych. *σμέρδος· ῥώμη, δύναμις*, and *εὐσμερδής· εὔρωστος*. Compare the names, also Mytilenean, of Alcaeus and his two brothers, Antimenidas and Cicis, as to which see note on 1285 a 36.

30. διέφθειρεν is probably the aorist: cp. 21 and 24, *διέφθειραν*.

καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ' ἐπιθέσεως κ.τ.λ. For the objective gen. Ἀρχελάου see note on 1311 a 36. As to proper names ending in *-ιχος* see Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der griech. Eigennamen, vol. i. p. xxii, and Kühner, Ausführl. Gramm. der griech. Sprache, ed. Blass, 2. 280.

33. ὁ δ' Εὐριπίδης κ.τ.λ. As Grote (Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76, vol. 10. 65) and others remark, the story gives us an unfavourable impression of Euripides' character, but we do not know exactly what Decamnichus said. The defect in question was sometimes made the ground of scandalous imputations on character (Martial, 11. 30). Comments on it were not readily tolerated in antiquity (Plut. Sympos. 2. 1. 9, referred to by Giph., p. 672, *εἰς δὲ δυσωδίαν μυκτῆρος ἡ στόμαχος ἄχθονται σκωπτόμενοι*).

34. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle may probably refer among others to Jason of Pherae: see Valer. Max. 9. 10. Ext. 2, where the youths who murdered Jason are said to have done so to avenge a flogging inflicted on them by his command. Others, however, gave a different account of the circumstances of his death (Diod. 15. 60. 5).

36. ἓν γάρ τι κ.τ.λ., 'for this was one of the causes we mentioned, as in the case of constitutions, so also in the case of monarchies.' This refers to 1311 a 25. For *ἦν* see note on 1259 a 37. For *ὅσπερ καί* followed by *καί* cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 9 sq. and 2. 9. 1270 b 40 sq. (Sus.[1] Ind. Gramm.). For the omission of *περί* before *τὰς μοναρχίας* see notes on 1269 a 9 and 1311 a 29.

87. οἷον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης κ.τ.λ. According to the story as told (with some variations) in Diod. 11. 69, Justin, 3. 1, and Ctesias, Persica ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 72 (Bekker, p. 39 b foot), Artapanes or Artapanus or Artabanus, the captain of the bodyguard of Xerxes, in the hope of winning the throne of Persia, first murdered Xerxes and then induced Artaxerxes, a younger son of Xerxes, to murder his elder brother Darius by falsely charging Darius with the murder of his father, following up these acts by an attempt to murder Artaxerxes which failed and led to his own execution. If we supply ἀνεῖλεν with the words οἷον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης (and this is the word which it is natural to supply here, as in 1312 a 1 with Σαρδανάπαλλον), the difficulty arises that Aristotle evidently takes the murder of Darius to have preceded that of Xerxes, and not to have followed it, as in the received account. Schneider (whose view is adopted by Sus.[2], Note 1686) escapes this difficulty by taking Ξέρξην to mean Artaxerxes, not Xerxes, but then a new difficulty arises, for in the received account Artaxerxes is present at the murder of Darius, if indeed he does not himself murder him, and this does not agree with Aristotle's version of the story. Another difficulty is that if we adopt Schneider's interpretation of Ξέρξην, we must supply with οἷον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης, not ἀνεῖλεν (for Artapanes failed to slay Artaxerxes), but ἐπεχείρησεν ἀνελεῖν or some such words, whereas in the closely similar passage, 1312 a 1, ἀνεῖλεν has to be supplied. It seems to me that Aristotle follows a different version of the story from that which Diodorus and the rest follow, one which made the murder of Darius precede that of Xerxes, Artapanes being led according to it to murder Xerxes not by a hope of winning his throne, but by a fear that Xerxes would put him to death for murdering Darius. The Emperor Commodus perished in a similar way. It was from fear of being put to death by him that Marcia Laetus and Eclectus conspired against his life and killed him (Herodian, 1. 16 sq.; Dio Cass. 72. 22). According to Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 3, Xerxes 'was slain at night in his bed by his son.' Nöldeke (Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte, p. 49) appears to reject Aristotle's version of the murders of Xerxes and Darius. He remarks that 'we can reconstruct from different Greek writers two accounts of the murder of Xerxes, those of Ctesias and Deinon, differing from each other in a number of particulars. A third is given by Aristotle in Pol. 1311 b. As to scenes of this kind enacted within the seraglio it is not easy for persons outside to

arrive at a trustworthy conclusion, but thus much is clear. Artabanus, captain of the bodyguard, murdered Xerxes, and Artaxerxes, the youngest of Xerxes' sons, in complicity with the murderer, put his elder brother Darius to death, who had a better claim to the throne than he had. It does not follow that he was a parricide.'

40. αἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but other attacks on monarchs are made on account of contempt.' Aristotle has told us (1311 a 32 sq.) that attacks provoked by ὕβρις are directed against the person of the monarch, but he does not say whether attacks arising from contempt and from φιλοτιμία are directed against his person or his throne. Dion at any rate attacked only the latter.

1. ὥσπερ Σαρδανάπαλλον κ.τ.λ. Ἀνεῖλεν must apparently be sup- 1312 a.
plied. There were two accounts of this event (Athen. Deipn. 528 e sqq.). According to one of them, that of Duris, Arbaces, the τις referred to here, who was a Median and one of Sardanapalus' generals, put Sardanapalus to death on the spot, while according to the other, that of Ctesias, Arbaces made war upon him and drove him by defeat to put an end to his own life. Aristotle appears to follow the former account, whereas Diodorus (2. 23–27) and Justin (1. 3) follow the latter. Compare with the story of Sardanapalus that of Midas king of the Lydians in Athen. Deipn. 516 b. The dressing of wool (ξαίνειν) in order to prepare it for use in spinning was regarded as work for women, not men (Aristoph. Lysistr. 536 Didot: Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 7 Nauck—9, ed. 2).

2. οἱ μυθολογοῦντες. Aristotle refers to Herodotus as ὁ μυθολόγος in De Gen. An. 3. 5. 756 b 6, and Strabo (p. 507 sq.) speaks thus of Ctesias Herodotus and Hellanicus. It is to Ctesias, who probably added much to the legend of Sardanapalus, that Aristotle especially refers. As Sus.[2] (Note 1687 b) points out, Aristotle expresses distrust, at any rate of his marvellous stories about India, in Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 a 25, 3. 22. 523 a 26 sq., and 8. 28. 606 a 8. Add De Gen. An. 2. 2. 736 a 2 sqq.

3. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλου γε κ.τ.λ. For ἀλλὰ . . . γε thus used cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 18 sq. and 2. 9. 1269 b 7 sq.

4. καὶ Διονυσίῳ τῷ ὑστέρῳ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1311 b 11 and cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 12, τοῦ πρόσθεν Διονυσίου, Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 435 f and 436 a, Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου, and Plut. Dec. Orat. Vitae, 1, Antiphon, 833 B, τοῦ προτέρου Διονυσίου. It is implied in 21–39 that Dion attacked Dionysius II also from φιλοτιμία. Aristotle probably has the habitual drunkenness of Dionysius II before

him in c. 11. 1314 b 28 sqq. Cp. also Plut. Dion. et Brut. inter se comp. c. 4 and Justin, 21. 2. That Dion saw the weak points in the position of Dionysius II is clear from Plut. Dion, c. 23; the immediate occasion of his attempt was, however, the fact that Dionysius had given his wife to Timocrates in addition to confiscating his property (Plut. Dion, cc. 18, 21).

6. I propose the insertion after μεθύοντα of 17, μάλιστα δὲ—20. ἐπιθέσεις, which seems to be out of place where it stands. I cannot regard it with Sus. as a double recension of 11, ὥσπερ—14, ὤν.

καὶ τῶν φίλων δέ κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed some friends attack monarchs on account of contempt,' not merely the high officers of whom Aristotle will have just been speaking if, as I suggest, we place 17, μάλιστα δὲ—20, ἐπιθέσεις, after μεθύοντα, 6. Διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεύσασθαι καταφρονοῦσιν ὡς λήσοντες will then also correspond to δι' ἃς ἀμφοτέρας ὡς ῥᾳδίως κρατήσοντες, ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις in the preceding sentence. As to attempts of this kind, cp. Rhet. 1. 12. 1372 a 5–21.

8. καὶ οἱ οἰόμενοι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes on to assailants who are led to attack monarchs by a confident belief that they will be able to win the throne for themselves, a belief which practically amounts to a contempt of the monarchs' power, though it is not quite the same thing. Here again compare the passage from the Rhetoric referred to in the last note.

12. οἷον Κῦρος Ἀστυάγει κ.τ.λ. Aristotle speaks of Cyrus as the general of Astyages, and says nothing of his being Astyages' grandson. Ctesias (ap. Phot. Biblioth. p. 36 a 9 sq. Bekker) had denied that there was any relationship between them, against Hdt. 1. 107 sqq. and other authorities, and it is possible that Aristotle here follows him as to this. Deinon ap. Athen. Deipn. 633 d sq. perhaps follows Ctesias.

13. τῆς δυνάμεως is rendered by Sepulveda 'exercitum' and τὴν δύναμιν 'milites,' and Sus.[2] renders these words similarly 'Kriegsmacht,' but Vet. Int. renders them by 'potentia,' and I incline (with Welldon) to interpret them thus.

14. καὶ Σεύθης ὁ Θρᾷξ Ἀμαδόκῳ στρατηγὸς ὤν. Seuthes regained with the help of Xenophon and his troops about B.C. 400 a principality or ἀρχή (over the Melanditae Thyni and Tranipsae) which his father Maesades had held, but lost (Xen. Anab. 7. 2. 32 sqq.), and we find him described about B.C. 390 as ὁ ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἄρχων in Thrace and as being at variance with Amadocus, King of the Odrysae, till he was reconciled to him by Thrasybulus about that year (Xen.

Hell. 4. 8. 26, where Keller reads Ἀμήδοκον in place of the vulg. Μήδοκον), when both Amadocus and Seuthes became allies of Athens. Aristotle probably refers in the text to events subsequent to this. It is not clear from his brief allusion whether Seuthes dispossessed Amadocus of his kingdom or only attempted to do so. His attack apparently was made between the year in which Thrasybulus reconciled the two men and B.C. 386, for in the latter year an inscription discovered at Athens (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., ed. 2, No. 76) mentions Hebrytelmis as king of the Odrysae. Dittenberger thinks that Hebrytelmis was probably the successor of Amadocus, and that Cotys, who was king of the Odrysae from B.C. 383 to 359, may have been the son of Seuthes. Diodorus (13. 105. 3 and 14. 94. 2) describes Seuthes as king, but neither Xenophon nor Aristotle does so (Dittenberger, ibid.). He is called 'the Thracian' in contradistinction to others of the name who were not Thracians, for though most of the bearers of the name known to us were Thracians, it is also traceable at Cyme in Aeolis, and the father of the philosopher Arcesilaus, who belonged to Pitane in Aeolis, was named Seuthes or Scythes (Diog. Laert. 4. 28: Pape-Benseler, art. Σεύθης).

16. ὥσπερ Ἀριοβαρζάνῃ Μιθριδάτης. The same event is probably referred to in Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 4, ὥσπερ Μιθριδάτης τὸν πατέρα Ἀριοβαρζάνην προδούς. Sus.[2] (Note 1692) takes both passages to refer to the Ariobarzanes who was satrap of Pontus from B.C. 363 to 336, and who was succeeded by his son Mithridates II, but Nöldeke (Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte, p. 72) thinks that the reference is to Ariobarzanes the successor of Pharnabazus in the Hellespontine satrapy, who revolted from Persia about B.C. 367, and was captured and put to death by the Persians, probably about two years later.

17. μάλιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ. If we transpose 17–20 to after μεθύοντα, 6, it becomes easy to give διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν the meaning 'from contempt.' For the fact cp. c. 11. 1315a 10 sqq. and Polyb. 6. 7. 9.

18. τιμὴν πολεμικήν. Cp. Plato, Laws 943A, τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ἄρχοντας. The term τιμὴ πολεμική includes many offices besides that of general (see 8 (6). 8. 1322a 33 sqq.).

19. ἀνδρία γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος ἐστίν. I incline to think that Giph. (p. 678), whom Sus. follows, is right in reading θάρσος in place of θράσος: cp. 1. 9. 1258a 10 sq. There was a proverb λέων ξίφος ἔχων, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀνδρείων, ἑτέραν δὲ προσλαμβανόντων ἔξωθεν

βοήθειαν (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 429). See also note on 1255 a 13, and cp. Rhet. 2. 19. 1393 a 1, τό τε γὰρ ὂν δυνάμει καὶ βουλήσει ὂν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα.

21. τῆς αἰτίας, sc. τῆς ἐπιθέσεως.

22. ἔνιοι, those, for instance, who seek to possess themselves of the wealth and honour which tyrants possess or who envy them for possessing these things (cp. 1311 a 28 sqq. and c. 2. 1302 a 31 sqq. and 38 sqq.).

26. οὗτοι δ' ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but these men, just as [they would wish to be allowed to take part,] if any other action out of the common were done on account of which men become noted and well known to their fellows, in the same spirit attack monarchs also.' Aristotle's language here is modelled on that of Plato in Symp. 208 C sq., which Isocrates imitates in Evag. § 3 (cp. Philip. §§ 133–136). Phoebidas, who seized the Cadmeia of Thebes, was a man of this type (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 28). 'Iason Pheraeorum tyrannus, a septem adolescentibus coniuratis δείᾳ ἕνεκα interfectus est, teste Ephoro (Diod. 15. 60. 5), et C. Mucius Scaevola Romanus eodem animo Porsennam regem Etruscorum est aggressus (Liv. 2. 12). Eadem quoque causa Arato ad patriam Sicyonem tyranno liberandam fuit, et eadem Bruto coniurationis in Caesarem' (Giph. p. 679). Brutus' motive, however, was rather an hostility on principle to the absolute rule of a single man, a motive for assailing tyrannies which Aristotle omits to notice (Plut. Brut. c. 8, λέγεται δὲ Βροῦτος μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν βαρύνεσθαι, Κάσσιος δὲ τὸν ἄρχοντα μισεῖν).

30. For οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ . . . γε cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 25.

31. ὑποκεῖσθαι γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'for underlying their enterprise there should be an utter disregard of their own preservation in the event of their not being in a position to make it a success.' See critical note on 1312 a 32. For the absence of τις after μέλλῃ see Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

33. οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ., 'for they must have present in their minds the view of Dion.' For οἷς cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 29.

36. οὕτως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ., 'huius animi se esse praedicans' (Vict.). Supply ὄν with ἱκανόν. For its omission compare the omission of ὄντας with πολεμίους in c. 11. 1314 a 11 sq. (Richards). For the construction cp. Plato, Rep. 461 C, ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσηται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ, and Tim. 29 B, ὧδε οὖν περί τε εἰκόνος

καὶ περὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος αὐτῆς διοριστέον, ὡς ἄρα τοὺς λόγους, ὥνπερ εἰσὶν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ ξυγγενεῖς ὄντας. As to ὅπου see critical note, and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Gerth, § 447. Anm. 4.

39. φθείρεται δὲ τυραννὶς κ.τ.λ. Hitherto we have been concerned with attacks on the person or throne of monarchs, i.e. of both kings and tyrants, and these attacks do not necessarily imply the *φθορά* of the monarchy assailed, but now we pass to the ways in which the *φθορά* of monarchies comes about, and these ways are not the same for kingship and for tyranny. The former, for instance, is very little liable to overthrow from outside, whereas the opposite is the case with the latter.

40. ὅσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη πολιτειῶν. Here Aristotle speaks as if tyranny was a *πολιτεία*, whereas he commonly in this Book marks off *μοναρχίαι* from *πολιτεῖαι*. For the fact cp. c. 7. 1307 b 19 sqq.

ἔξωθεν, ἐὰν ἐναντία τις ᾖ πολιτεία κρειττων. Cp. Demosth. Ol. 1. 5, καὶ ὅλως ἄπιστον, οἶμαι, ταῖς πολιτείαις ἡ τυραννίς, ἄλλως τε κἂν ὅμορον χώραν ἔχωσι.

3. ἃ δὲ βούλονται κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 19. 1393 a 1 sqq. (quoted 1312 b. above on 1312 a 19).

4. καθ' Ἡσίοδον, 'as Hesiod says.' Hesiod had implied in Op. et Dies, 25 sq., that like is at variance with like: see Plato, Lysis, 215 C, and note on 1311 a 17, and contrast [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 10, οἱ γὰρ ὅμοιοι τοῖς ὁμοίοις εὖνοί εἰσι. Supply κοτέει with ὡς κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ. For καθ' Ἡσίοδον cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 a 11, κατὰ Σόλωνα, and Plato, Phaedrus, 227 B, κατὰ Πίνδαρον. Aristotle's explanation accounts for the hostility of the ultimate democracy to tyranny, but not for that of democracy in general, for he does not assimilate democracy in general to tyranny.

5. καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία τυραννίς ἐστιν. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 17 sq., where see note.

6. βασιλεία δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατία κ.τ.λ. Kingship is the opposite of tyranny (1310 b 7—1311 a 8), and aristocracy is nearly akin to kingship (1310 b 2 sq., 32). When Aristotle speaks of kingship overthrowing tyrannies, it is possible that he refers not only to the action of the Lacedaemonian kings, but also to the orders sent to Greece by Alexander after the victory of Gaugamela that all tyrannies should be put down (Plut. Alex. c. 34, φιλοτιμούμενος δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔγραψε τὰς τυραννίδας πάσας καταλυθῆναι καὶ πολιτεύειν αὐτονόμους). This would be about B.C. 330.

7. διὸ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Thuc. 1. 18. 1, Plut. De Herod. Malign. c. 21, where instances are given, and Abbott, Hist. of Greece, 1. 436, note. When the Lacedaemonians gave countenance and support to Dionysius the Elder, they departed greatly from the earlier policy.

8. καὶ Συρακούσιοι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle refers to the period between the fall of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse in B.C. 466–5 and the substitution in B.C. 413 or 412 of a democracy for the aristocracy (or polity, c. 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.) which had existed since B.C. 466–5 (see note on 1304 a 27). Cp. Diod. 11. 72. 1, *κατὰ δὲ τὴν Σικελίαν ἄρτι καταλελυμένης τῆς ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις τυραννίδος καὶ πασῶν τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον πόλεων ἠλευθερωμένων.* What Aristotle means by πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς will be seen from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32 sqq.

9. ἕνα δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. For the phrase *οἱ μετέχοντες* (sc. *τῆς τυραννίδος*) cp. 1313 a 1, *τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας*, and see note on 1312 b 40. I do not notice that Aristotle anywhere suggests any remedy for the rise of discords within the ruling family of a kingship or tyranny.

10. ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα, sc. *τυραννίς*.

νῦν, in B.C. 356, a good many years before this was written, for, as Sus.[2] points out (Note 1699), Aristotle is speaking of the expulsion of Dionysius II from Syracuse by Dion, not of his final departure from Syracuse in B.C. 344. We see that Aristotle uses *νῦν* of events not so very recent (Sus.[2], ibid.).

11. ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος κ.τ.λ. The tyrannies founded by Gelon and Dionysius the Elder both of them came to an end owing to discords arising within the ruling family, but in different ways, the former through a maladroit attempt on the part of the ruling family to save it from destruction by overthrowing one of their own number, the latter through open war waged against it by a member of the ruling family, who called the demos to his assistance.

13. ὁρμῶντος. The transitive use of *ὁρμᾶν* is rare in Aristotle's writings: the Index Aristotelicus omits to mention the passage before us, and gives instances only of the passive, or what it takes to be the passive, in this sense.

ἵν' αὐτὸς ἄρχῃ, 'in order that he himself might rule.' This seems to imply that the son of Gelon (whose name we nowhere learn) was tyrant of Syracuse in however nominal a sense, perhaps from the time of his father's death, but certainly after the death of his uncle Hiero, whereas according to Diod. 11. 66. 4 Thrasybulus

succeeded his brother Hiero in the tyranny. In c. 12. 1315 b 38 also Thrasybulus is treated as Hiero's successor, but the authenticity of c. 12. 1315 b 11–39 is very doubtful. See also Timaeus, Fragm. 84 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 212), and Freeman, Sicily, 2. 304. A similar aim to that here ascribed to Thrasybulus was in later times falsely ascribed to Dion in reference to Dionysius the Younger ([Plato,] Epist. 7. 333 C).

τῶν δὲ οἰκείων συστησάντων κ.τ.λ., 'and the connexions (of Gelon's son) having banded together a body of confederates.' See Prof. Postgate, Notes on the Politics of Aristotle, p. 23, whom I follow in this note and the next, not having any better interpretation to suggest, but with some hesitation. Verbs are often used in the Politics without an expressed object (e. g. in c. 5. 1305 a 31 *καθιστᾶσιν* is thus used, in 2. 11. 1273 b 18 *ἐκφεύγουσι*, in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 29 *μετέβαλεν*, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 *διορθοῦν*: see also note on 1313 a 1), but still the use of *συστησάντων* here without an object is remarkable. **Τῶν οἰκείων** perhaps refers to Chromius and Aristonous, who had married sisters of Gelon and were left by him guardians of his son in the event of the death of his brother Polyzelus (Tim. Fragm. 84: Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 798). **Οἰκειότης** is connected with *κηδεία* in 2. 3. 1262 a 11, and distinguished from blood-relationship there and from *συγγένεια* in Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 b 34.

14. οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ., 'but their band of confederates,' etc. Perhaps, however, Sus.[3] is right in suggesting that *μετ'* should be added before *αὐτῶν* (see critical note on 1312 b 15).

16. στρατεύσας, κηδεστὴς ὤν, καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν δῆμον, 'having made an expedition, though a connexion by marriage, and having added the demos to his side.' Dion had married Arete, the half-sister of Dionysius II. It was because Dion accepted the help of the demos, and yet after winning the day did not introduce a complete democracy, that he ultimately came to a violent end.

17. For the pleonasm of **ἐκεῖνον** cp. Plato, Phileb. 30 D, *ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφηναμένοις ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει ξύμμαχος ἐκείνοις*, and see Stallbaum *ad locum*.

δύο δὲ οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν κ.τ.λ. This results from 1311 a 31—1312 a 20. Aristotle here points out which causes of attack are most fatal to tyrannies, just as he has pointed out how democracies, oligarchies, and aristocracies are most apt to be overthrown in c. 5. 1304 b 20 sqq., c. 6. 1305 a 37 sqq., and c. 7. 1307 a 5 sqq.

19. θάτερον μὲν δεῖ τούτων ὑπάρχειν τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μῖσος.

Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Rep. 567 C, *ἐν μακρᾷ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκῃ δέδεται, ἢ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαύλων τὸν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον, ἢ μὴ ζῆν*: compare Laws 691 C sq. and Polyb. 5. 11. 6, *τυράννου μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκποιοῦντα τῷ φόβῳ δεσπόζειν ἀκουσίων, μισούμενον καὶ μισοῦντα τοὺς ὑποταττομένους*. Yet in c. 11. 1315 b 7 Aristotle seems to imply that the tyrant may escape being hated. For the use of **δεῖ** in a sense not far removed from that of *ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν* cp. c. 11. 1315 a 1 *δέῃ*, and Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 36, *ἅτε δὲ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων παρόντων τῶν Ἀρκάδων . . . πολλοὺς ἔδει τοὺς συλλαμβανομένους εἶναι*.

20. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ., 'but it is in consequence of tyrants being despised [which they might have avoided] that many of the overthrows of tyrannies occur.'

21. For **σημεῖον δέ** followed by *γάρ* Bonitz (Ind. 146 b 16) compares 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 17 sq. and other passages.

τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτησαμένων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Polyb. 6. 1. 14 Hultsch, *ὁ γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἔργων οἱ μὲν κτησάμενοι πρὸς τὴν τήρησιν, οἱ δ' ἕτοιμα παραλαβόντες πρὸς τὴν ἀπώλειαν εὐφυεῖς εἰσίν*.

22. καὶ διεφύλαξαν τὰς ἀρχάς, 'kept their thrones also' (in addition to winning them). A *τυραννίς* is here implied to be an *ἀρχή* (see note on 1310 b 23).

οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες κ.τ.λ. There are many exceptions to this rule—Hiero, Periander, the successors of Clearchus at Heraclea on the Euxine, etc. Aristotle is probably thinking of cases in which the founder of a tyranny was succeeded by a son brought up in luxury, and especially of Dionysius II of Syracuse. It deserves notice that his remark does not hold good of the tyrants of mediaeval Italy, for they often founded dynasties which lasted long.

25. πολλοὺς καιροὺς παραδιδόασι τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. Cp. Antiphanes, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 70 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 155),

ὦ γῆρας, ὡς ἅπασι τοῖς ζητοῦσί σε
ψέγειν ἀφορμὰς παραδίδως τοῦ πράγματος.

μόριον δέ τι τοῦ μίσους καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν δεῖ τιθέναι. Cp. Poet. 5. 1449 a 33, *ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον*, where Bonitz (Ind. 473 b 60) explains *μόριον* as = *εἶδός τι*. In Rhet. 2. 4. 1382 a 1 sqq., where the difference between *ἔχθρα* (=*μῖσος*) and *ὀργή* is explained, *ὀργή* is said to be one of the things which produce *ἔχθρα*.

27. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρακτικώτερον τοῦ μίσους. *Πρακτικώτερον* takes up *πράξεων*. *Λογισμός* often hampers action (Amphis, *Φιλάδελφοι*, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, 3. 316): cp., with Richards, Thuc. 2. 40. 4).

28. *συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται*, sc. *οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι*.

διὰ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος. Cp. Thuc. 2. 11. 8: Demosth. c. Mid. c. 41: Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 64 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 252): Aristot. Fragm. 95–97. 1493 b 24–38.

30. *τοῖς θυμοῖς*. For the plural cp. (with Bon. Ind. 336 a 35 sqq.) Rhet. 2. 13. 1390 a 11 and De Part. An. 2. 4. 651 a 2.

ἥ τε τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν κατελύθη τυραννίς. See note on 1311 a 36.

32. *ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος*. Sepulv. 'odium tamen magis est in causa,' and Vict. 'odium tamen magis efficit quod gerendum suscepit,' but Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 243), who is followed by Schneider, Eaton, Sus., and others, is probably right in supplying *χρῆται λογισμῷ*.

34. *ὅσας αἰτίας*, sc. *τῆς φθορᾶς*. The oppression of the rich, for instance, which is fatal to extreme democracy, and the oppression of the poor, which is fatal to extreme oligarchy, will also be fatal to tyranny. Aristotle speaks here as if he had described the causes of the overthrow of extreme democracy and extreme oligarchy separately from those of the overthrow of democracy and oligarchy in general, but this he has not done.

35. *τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας*. We often hear of *ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία*, but not elsewhere of *ἡ τελευταία ὀλιγαρχία*, though in 1310 b 4 we have *ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης*. *Ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία* is not only *τελευταία* in the sense of 'extremeness' (cp. Soph. Electr. 271, *τὴν τελευταίαν ὕβριν*), but also *τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις* (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sq.); it is doubtful how far this is true of *ἡ τελευταία ὀλιγαρχία* (cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.), though perhaps the decadarchies of Lysander were narrower, and therefore more 'ultimate,' than even the early oligarchies of knights.

37. *καὶ γὰρ αὗται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι διαιρεταὶ τυραννίδες*. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 15 sqq. and 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.

40. *ἕνα μὲν στασιασάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας*. *Οἱ μετέχοντες τῆς βασιλείας* are those who share in the advantages and power of the kingship. Vict. 'intelligit fratres ac liberos eorum qui regnant, hi namque participes amplae illius fortunae non sine causa vocari possunt, degustant enim ipsi quoque plurimum eorum bonorum.' The quarrels of Arcesilaus II of Cyrene with his brothers were one of the causes of the fall of the kingship (Hdt. 4. 160). The success of the royal house of Pergamum was largely due to its freedom from these dissensions (Polyb. 23. 11. 6 sqq.). The Duke of Wellington said that Philippe Égalité, Duke of

Orleans, 'was first driven into opposition by the misconduct of Marie Antoinette, who had taken a violent dislike to him, and encouraged the courtiers to insult him' (Lord Stanhope's Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 64). 'Queen Isabella of Spain's caprices might have been condoned in 1868 as they had been condoned before . . . if there had been no family dissensions and parties. Admiral Topete rose to crown the Duc de Montpensier as much as to punish the lawlessness of the Duke's sister-in-law and her counsellors' (*Times*, Nov. 6, 1885). In ancient Greece these family discords would be all the more likely to arise, because the kings often had families by concubines as well as by their wives, and sometimes indeed appear to have had more wives than one.

1313 a. **1.** ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τυραννικώτερον πειρωμένων διοικεῖν. Supply τῶν βασιλέων with πειρωμένων, and probably τὴν ἀρχήν (rather than τὴν πόλιν) with διοικεῖν (cp. c. 11. 1313 a 35 sq. and 3. 15. 1286 b 30 sq.). Διοικεῖν is similarly used without an expressed object in c. 11. 1314 b 6, οὕτω γὰρ ἂν τις διοικῶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1310 b 18 sqq.: Plato, Laws 690 D–691 A: Polyb. 6. 4. 8 and 6. 7. 6 sqq.: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74. This is the cause to which the fall of kingship is most usually attributed by ancient writers. It was thus that kingship fell in the Lacedaemonian State under Charilaus (c. 12. 1316 a 33 sq.), in Achaia (Polyb. 2. 41. 5), at Megara (Paus. 1. 43. 3), and in part at Cyrene under Arcesilaus II (Diod. 8. 30. 1). If the story of Tarquinius Superbus' reign at Rome is to be trusted, the same thing happened there.

3. οὐ γίγνονται δ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ., 'but kingships do not come into existence any longer now, or if they do come into existence, it is monarchies or tyrannies rather that do so.' This remark appears at first sight to be hardly relevant, occurring as it does in the midst of an account of the causes of the fall of kingship, but the transition is easy from the fall of kingships through tyranny to the fact that they no longer arose for want of men deserving the willing obedience presupposed by the office. Καί in μοναρχίαι καὶ τυραννίδες probably means 'or' (see note on 1262 a 6), unless indeed we take it as explaining and limiting μοναρχίαι (see note on 1257 b 7). Μοναρχία is commonly used by Aristotle in a sense inclusive of kingship and tyranny, but here the word seems to be used in a sense approaching that of tyranny, as in c. 3. 1302 b 17. The kingship of the Archaeanactidae of Panticapaeum arose

in the fifth century B.C., but they were *βασιλεῖς* only in their relation to their barbarian subjects; they ruled the Greek cities which were subject to them as *ἄρχοντες* for life (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 188 sq.).

4. ἄν περ γίγνωνται. '*Ἐάνπερ* non saepe invenitur' (i. e. in Aristotle's writings), 'cf. Rhet. 3. 16. 1417 b 13, Metaph. B. 6. 1003 a 16 (*ἤνπερ*), Metaph. Z. 12. 1038 a 13, Phys. 4. 8. 215 a 2 (*ἄνπερ*), and Phys. 4. 10. 218 a 4,' in addition to the passage before us (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 65).

6. πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 11 sqq. and Plato, Polit. 301 C.

7. τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cp. Plut. Ages. c. 4, *τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρχῆς* (i. e. *τῶν ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν γερόντων*). Compare also Ariphron, Fragm., *τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληΐδος ἀρχᾶς*. As to *τῆς ἀρχῆς* in reference to kingship, see notes on 1310 b 23 and 1301 b 18.

8. ὥστε διὰ μὲν τοῦτο ἑκόντες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. *Μέν* should be subjoined to *ἑκόντες* rather than to *διὰ τοῦτο*, but '*μέν* interdum non ei additur vocabulo, in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. s.v.).

9. ἂν δὲ δι' ἀπάτης ἄρξῃ τις ἢ βίας κ.τ.λ., 'but if a man has won rule by deceit or force [so that those over whom he rules submit to him, though unwillingly],' etc. It is implied here that persons who are induced to submit by deceit submit unwillingly: contrast the use of *ἑκόντες* in c. 4. 1304 b 10–17. For *ἄρξῃ* cp. *ἄρξαντες* in 2. 9. 1271 b 4. Diogenes Laertius ascribes a definition of tyranny in similar terms to Plato (3. 83, *τυραννίς δέ ἐστιν ἐν ᾗ παρακρουσθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες ὑπό τινος ἄρχονται*: cp. 3. 92). Compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 10. For the order of the words, *ἤδη δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς*, cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 3, *δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν*. Π^1 Sus. place the words in a different order, *ἤδη τοῦτο δοκεῖ τυραννὶς εἶναι*.

10. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις κ.τ.λ. *Αἱ κατὰ γένος βασιλεῖαι* are kingships in which succession to the throne is confined to members of a certain family (Diog. Laert. 3. 83); the phrase does not necessarily mean that the throne passes always from father to eldest son, or even from father to son. Aristotle's language implies that there were kingships not *κατὰ γένος*, and we know that the aesymneteship was not so (3. 14. 1285 a 32 sq.), and that the absolute kingship might or might not be so (3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq.). But it is not likely that Aristotle is thinking here of either the one or the other; he must be thinking of some forms of Greek or

barbarian kingship which were not *κατὰ γένος*, but freely elective without any limitation to a particular family. Of these forms we hear nothing in the classification of kingships contained in 3. 14, for the barbarian kingships described there are hereditary as well as elective, but possibly the barbarian kingships referred to in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 11 sq. were of this type, or at any rate some of them, for they are not said to have been hereditary as well as elective.

12. **καὶ τὸ δύναμιν κ.τ.λ.**, 'and the fact of their possessing not the power of a tyrant, but only the dignity of a king, and yet being guilty of outrages.'

δύναμιν μὴ κεκτημένους τυραννικήν. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 18, *ἔχουσι δ' αὗται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν*, and Plato, Gorg. 469 D, *ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν.*

15. **ἀλλ' ὁ τύραννος**, sc. *τύραννός ἐστι*. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 34 sq.

C. 11. **18.** As to **δῆλον** see critical note.

19. **ὡς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον**, sc. *εἰπεῖν*.

τῷ τὰς μὲν βασιλείας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον. **Μέν** is taken up by *αἱ δὲ τυραννίδες*, 34. Aristotle's counsel to tyrannies is, however, substantially the same (see 1314 a 34 sqq.). For *ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον* cp. Plato, Tim. 48 A, Phaedr. 237 E. Plato had given the same advice as to kingship (Laws 690 D–E, 691 D sqq., esp. *εἰς τὸ μέτριον μᾶλλον συνέστειλε*). Aristotle probably has the Macedonian kingship in view, for the Molossian and Lacedaemonian kings did not need this advice, and there were not many other kingships for him to advise. As to the tendencies of the Macedonian kingship even previously to the Oriental triumphs of Alexander see vol. i. p. 278 sq.

21. **πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν**, 'the office in its completeness': see notes on 1253 b 33 and 1271 b 34. Aristotle has before him in 19 sqq. Plato, Laws 691 D sqq.; perhaps he even remembers the phrase used by Plato in 691 D, *πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἠφάνισεν αὐτῆς* (i.e. *τῆς ἀρχῆς*).

αὐτοί τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The kings themselves become less despotic in authority and less disposed in character to exalt themselves above their subjects, and their subjects envy them less. Here Aristotle probably has in his memory Xen. Rep. Lac. c. 15. 8, *αὗται μὲν οὖν αἱ τιμαὶ οἵαι ζῶντι βασιλεῖ δέδονται, οὐδέν τι πολὺ ὑπερφέρουσαι τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐβουλήθη οὔτε τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τυραννικὸν φρόνημα παραστῆσαι οὔτε τοῖς πολίταις φθόνον ἐμποιῆσαι τῆς δυνάμεως.*

23. **διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.** **Τοῦτο**, the limitation of the royal

authority (cp. 20 sq.). Among the Chaonians and Thesprotians of Epirus, or at any rate among some of them, kingship had disappeared before the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2. 80). We infer that the power of the Chaonian and Thesprotian kings had been less limited. One indication of the limitation of kingship among the Molossians was that kings and people took an oath to each other from time to time, the kings engaging to rule in accordance with the laws and the people to preserve the kingship (Plut. Pyrrh. c. 5).

24. ἡ περὶ Μολοττοὺς βασιλεία is followed in 25 by ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, just as in 4 (7). 9. 1329a 18 περὶ τούτους is followed in 25 by τούτων. See Bon. Ind. 579b 43 sqq.

διέμεινεν does not imply that the Molossian kingship had ceased to exist, which was not the fact. For the aorist where we might expect the perfect see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 58, and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 386. 14 (ed. Gerth, § 386. 13).

25. καὶ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle continues to follow in the track of Plato, Laws 691 D sqq. (cp. Epist. 8. 354 B, where however the institution of the ephorate is ascribed to Lycurgus), but, unlike Plato, he does not refer to the senate as a check on the kings. Perhaps he did not think it an effective check (cp. 2. 9. 1270b 35–1271a 18). Aristotle approves of the ephorate as a check on the kings, but not of the ναυαρχία (2. 9. 1271a 37 sqq.). Plato (Laws 692 A) had ascribed the institution of the ephorate to a lawgiver later than Lycurgus, but Aristotle is the first to name Theopompus as its author. Herodotus (1. 65), Xenophon (Rep. Lac. c. 8. 3) and others (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 16, note 1) attribute its institution to Lycurgus. 'Plato (Laws 692 A) and Aristotle in the passage before us (cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 7: Cic. De Rep. 2. 33. 58 and De Leg. 3. 7. 16: Valerius Maximus, 4. 1. Ext. 8) represent the establishment of the ephorate as a weakening of the power of the kings, but this view is obviously an inference from the position of the ephors in the State in later times' (Gilbert, ibid., p. 17, note 1). It does not appear in what other ways besides the establishment of the ephorate Theopompus moderated the power of the kings. With the double Lacedaemonian kingship compare the two kings of the Cadusii (Plut. Artox. c. 24, ὄντων γὰρ δυεῖν ἐν τοῖς Καδουσίοις βασιλέων, ἑκατέρου δὲ χωρὶς στρατοπεδεύοντος κ.τ.λ.): it is not clear, however, whether the Cadusii had two royal

houses, like the Lacedaemonians, or only two kings. See as to Siam Frazer's Pausanias, 3. 312. Instances of more kings than one reigning at the same time are not rare: Waitz (Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 1. 283, note 4, and 1. 300 sq.) refers to cases of this among the Alamanni, Burgundians, Ostrogoths, Thuringians, and Franks. Τε is here answered, as Richards points out, by καί introducing a clause little similar to the preceding one.

26. μετριάσαντος, sc. τὴν βασιλείαν. For the transitive use of this word cp. Plato, Laws 692 B, ὅρκοις μετριάσαι ψυχὴν νέαν λαβοῦσαν ἀρχήν.

29. ἔλαττονα and **30.** μείζονα. These forms of the acc. sing. are less frequently used by Attic writers than the shorter forms. Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm. (ed. Blass), 1. 427, gives instances of their occurrence in Xen. Cyrop. 5. 4. 43 (μείονα) and Hiero, 8. 5, where καλλίονα . . . ἄνδρα is followed in the next line by καλλία. Cp. also Plato, Tim. 39 A and Gorg. 486 B.

30. ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα κ.τ.λ. The story is told also by Plutarch in Lycurg. c. 7 and Ad Princ. Inerudit. c. 1, and by Valerius Maximus, 4. 1. Ext. 8.

31. εἰποῦσαν, not ἐρωτήσασαν, because the remark was rather a comment than a question.

33. οὐ δῆτα, 'by no means': cp. Rhet. 3. 18. 1419 a 34 and Plato, Gorg. 449 E.

34. αἱ δὲ τυραννίδες κ.τ.λ. The two ways of preserving a tyranny differ in this:—in the first it is taken for granted that the subjects of a tyrant are necessarily hostile to him, and the aim is to make them *unable* to conspire against him by making them too poor and mean-spirited and too distrustful of each other, and also too busy and too well-watched, to do so, whereas in the second the aim is to make the subjects of the tyrant *indisposed* to conspire against him by inducing them to regard him as an οἰκονόμος and ἐπίτροπος of the State and not a σφετεριστής (1315 b 1 sq.). The first, again, is demoralizing both to the tyrant and to those over whom he rules, not so the second (1314 a 12–14, 1315 b 4–10). The first method is said by Aristotle to be that followed by most tyrants, not by all; he would not say that Peisistratus or Timotheus of the Pontic Heracleia ruled in this way. The account which he gives of the aims of most tyrants is sombre enough, here and there probably too sombre (as when he ascribes to the tyrants who were great

builders a deliberate purpose to make their subjects poor); he is partly led to make it sombre by the wish to place their actual mode of rule in the strongest possible contrast to that which he himself recommends. But we shall find when we examine the details of the picture that he borrows most of them from earlier authorities and that he is supported by their testimony. If the Greek race had been less opposed to despotic rule than it was, the methods of Greek tyrants would have been less black. Xenophon had already said that the tyrant cannot rejoice when his subjects are brave soldiers or when they become more prosperous and consequently less submissive to him (Hiero, 5. 3 sq.), and Plato had said of the rulers not only in tyranny but also in oligarchy and democracy, *φοβούμενος ἄρχων ἀρχόμενον οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε πλούσιον οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὔτ' ἀνδρεῖον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν πολεμικὸν ἑκὼν εἶσει γίγνεσθαι ποτέ* (Laws 832 C: cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 4, 14 sq.). Aristotle was not the first to seek to lead the tyrant into a better path; Xenophon in the Hiero (cc. 9–11) and Isocrates in the Ad Nicoclem and the Helena (§ 32 sqq.) had already sought to do this; indeed it is possible that the counsel given by Aristotle that a tyrant should assimilate his rule as far as might be to that of a king had already been given by Dion under Plato's influence to the younger Dionysius (Plut. Dion, c. 10: [Plato,] Epist. 3. 315 D sq., 8. 354 A). It is to this method of preserving tyranny that the long examination of the causes of the fall of monarchy leads up, for if hatred anger and contempt are the most frequent causes of its fall, whatever tends to make tyranny less hateful irritating and contemptible must tend to preserve it. The traditional method of preserving tyranny, on the other hand, would in the long run add to its insecurity by intensifying the hatred anger and contempt with which it was regarded. It is possible that not a little in 1313 a 34–1314 a 12 was written in the hope that it might meet Alexander's eye and be useful in strengthening his sense of what is truly kingly in conduct at a time when some of the characteristics which Aristotle ascribes to the tyrant were disclosing themselves in him, but the counsels contained in this passage would also be useful to meaner men. Pupils of Greek philosophers sometimes became tyrants in after-life. Hermias of Atarneus and Clearchus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, had been among Plato's hearers, and Duris of Samos the historian, who became tyrant of Samos, was a pupil of Theophrastus. Nothing is said in 1313 a 34–1314 a 12 of some

measures to which, according to c. 10. 1311 a 8–15, tyrants often had recourse, such as those of disarming the many (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 38) and driving them from the central city (see however note on 1313 b 4), nor of the emancipation of slaves, of which we hear in c. 11. 1315 a 37. If most Greek tyrants sought to preserve their tyrannies in the way described in 1313 a 34–1314 a 12, they chose rather a round-about way of doing so. According to c. 10. 1311 a 18 sqq., plotters against tyrannies belonged to the class of notables. If so, would not the banishment of the notables have made the tyrant secure? It is noticeable that we hear nothing of the employment by tyrants of a police, as distinguished from soldiers and a body-guard on the one hand and spies on the other.

36. *τούτων δὲ* κ.τ.λ. *Τούτων=τῶν παραδεδομένων τυραννικῶν* (cp. 1313 b 10, 1314 a 12 sq.). Tyranny is described in what follows by an enumeration of *τὰ τυραννικά*, just as democracy is described in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 17 sqq. by an enumeration of *τὰ δημοτικά*. *Τὸν Κορίνθιον* is added, as in Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 31, to distinguish this Periander from the tyrant of Ambracia (c. 10. 1311 a 39 sq.). It is not, however, added in 3. 13. 1284 a 26, 28, or in 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20, or (for obvious reasons) in 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 25, 28. *Καταστῆσαι*, 'instituted': cp. Plato, Rep. 410 B, *οἱ καθιστάντες μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν*. We know that Aristotle regarded Periander as the author of the advice to cut down those who overtop the rest (3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20 sqq.). He also probably takes him to have sought to make his subjects busy and poor (1313 b 22: Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 393), and to have been frequently at war (see note on 1313 b 28).

37. *πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς Περσῶν ἀρχῆς ἔστι τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν*. So for instance the cutting down of those who overtop the rest (3. 13. 1284 a 41 sqq.), the encouragement of courtiership, and the employment of spies (see below on these points). The way in which the Persian kings ruled their subjects is well sketched in Plato, Laws 697 C sqq. For *ἔστι λαβεῖν* cp. 1314 a 32.

39. *ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάλαι λεχθέντα* κ.τ.λ., 'and the things to which I refer are both the measures mentioned by me some time ago for the preservation,' etc. *Τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα* refers according to Sus. to c. 10. 1311 a 15–22. For this use of these words cp. 1314 b 36, 2. 4. 1262 b 29, and 3. 11. 1282 a 15. *Τε*, which M^a P^1, but not Γ, omit, is apparently taken up by *καὶ μήτε συνοίσια ὦν* κ.τ.λ., 41.

ὡς οἷόν τε, 'as much as is possible.' Cp. Plato, Rep. 387 C and Stallbaum's note, and also [Plut.] De Fato *init.*

40. τὸ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας κολούειν καὶ τοὺς φρονηματίας ἀναιρεῖν. **Κολούειν** does not necessarily imply **ἀναιρεῖν**, though the advice ascribed to Periander is thus interpreted in c. 10. 1311 a 20 sqq. To make away with men of high spirit would not be enough unless whatever tends to produce high spirit were also discountenanced (41 sqq.). For the non-repetition of *τό* before the infinitives in 1313 a 40–b 6 see note on 1263 a 15.

τοὺς φρονηματίας. See Liddell and Scott for other passages in which this rare word is used by Greek writers.

41. καὶ μήτε συσσίτια ἐᾶν μήτε ἑταιρίαν. The term *συσσίτια* here probably includes not only public meals but also private entertainments. Dionysius the Elder is said to have wished to stop his subjects' convivial dinner-parties (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. Sen. 7. 175 F). The tyrants were commonly experienced soldiers, and they seem to have borrowed this feature of their rule from the precautions which were adopted in besieged cities: cp. Aen. Poliorc. 10. 4, *τάς τε ἑορτὰς κατὰ πόλιν ἄγειν, συλλόγους τε ἰδίους μηδαμοῦ μήτε ἡμέρας μήτε νυκτὸς γίγνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἀναγκαίους ἢ ἐν πρυτανείῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ φανερῷ τόπῳ· μηδὲ θύεσθαι μάντιν ἰδίᾳ ἄνευ τῶν ἀρχόντων· μηδὲ δειπνεῖν κατὰ συσσιτίαν ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν οἰκίαις ἑκάστους, ἔξω γάμου καὶ περιδείπνου, καὶ ταῦτα προαπαγγείλαντας τοῖς ἄρχουσιν.* As to the hostility of tyrants to hetaeriae see Isocr. Nicocl. § 54, *ἑταιρείας μὴ ποιεῖσθε μηδὲ συνόδους ἄνευ τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης· αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται συστάσεις ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις πλεονεκτοῦσιν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μοναρχίαις κινδυνεύουσιν*, where the speaker is a tyrant, and Dio Cass. 52. 36. 2. The hetaeriae referred to in the passage before us would be combinations of the wealthy and powerful, but even combinations of traders and artisans were discouraged under the Roman Empire and by Emperors as excellent as Trajan (Merivale, Romans under the Empire, cc. 63, 65, vol. 8. 61 sq., 146).

1. μήτε παιδείαν. As to the effect of education, and especially philosophical and gymnastic education, in inspiring high spirit see Plato, Phaedr. 269 E sqq. and Symp. 182 B sq., where it is implied that **φιλοσοφία** and **φιλογυμναστία** develope *φρονήματα μεγάλα* in the ruled, unwelcome to tyrants, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 9: also Plut. Pericl. c. 4, *ὁ δὲ πλεῖστα Περικλεῖ συγγενόμενος καὶ μάλιστα περιθεὶς ὄγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον, ὅλως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἤθους, Ἀναξαγόρας ἦν ὁ Κλαζομένιος κ.τ.λ.* Musical education had a similar effect (Plut. Inst. Lac. § 14). 1313 b.

Dionysius the Elder had kept his son the younger Dionysius uneducated because of this (Plut. Dion, c. 9 sq.). Contrast Hipparchus as described in the Hipparchus, 228 C, *ταῦτα δ' ἐγὼ βουλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας κ.τ.λ.* It will be noticed that *παιδεία* is tacitly distinguished from *σχολαί*, which are mentioned separately in 3. Tyrants objected to *παιδεία* because it produced high spirit and mutual confidence, to *σχολαί* because they tended to make the citizens well acquainted with each other.

ἀλλὰ πάντα φυλάττειν κ.τ.λ. *Φυλάττειν*, 'to keep an eye upon,' as in c. 8. 1308 a 31 sqq. Among the things referred to would be close friendship between individuals (see Plato, Symp. 182 B–C and Athen. Deipn. 602 a—d).

3. καὶ μήτε σχολὰς κ.τ.λ. The word *σχολή* appears to be here used of a gathering (cp. *ἄλλους συλλόγους σχολαστικούς*) for the intellectual employment of leisure, probably under a head, and especially a gathering for the study of philosophy or rhetoric (Plut. De Exil. c. 14: Dec. Orat. Vitae, 6, Aeschines, 840 E). The earliest use of the word in this sense appears to be that in Alexis, Ὀλυμπ. Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 455), *ταῦτ' οὐ σχολὴ Πλάτωνος;* The word *διατριβή* was used in the law of Sophocles the Sunian which in B.C. 316 enacted *μὴ ἐξεῖναι μηδενὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν διατριβὴν κατασκευάσασθαι* (Pollux, 9. 42). The *ἄλλοι σύλλογοι σχολαστικοί* would include gatherings in gymnasia and palaestrae (Plato, Laws 935 B), to both of which tyrants were occasionally hostile (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 9 : Athen. Deipn. 602 d), and in leschae, as to which see Liddell and Scott s.v. We read in Plut. Arat. c. 3 that Abantidas, tyrant of Sicyon in the days of Aratus, attended some gatherings in the agora for philosophical discussion, with the result that the opportunity was seized to assassinate him. *Σύλλογοι σχολαστικοί* stand in tacit contrast to *σύλλογοι πολιτικοί* (Rhet. ad Alex. 38. 1445 a 39 sq.: Plato, Gorg. 452 E), and probably also to other gatherings for business purposes. With gatherings of a purely business character tyrants would be the less disposed to interfere as they liked their subjects to be busy and unable to plot. Some tyrants appear to have sought to limit festivals (see next note). Charles II tried to close the coffee-houses in 1675 (Boase, Oxford, p. 163), but no doubt only with the object of checking inconvenient discussion, not with the object which Aristotle ascribes here to the tyrant. When tyrants did not forbid *σύλλογοι*, they often sent spies to them to report what was said (13 sqq.).

4. καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. Under this head the measure of driving people from the central city to which tyrants occasionally resorted may possibly be included (c. 10. 1311 a 13 sq.). So in Cephallenia a tyrant, the son of Promnesus, *ἑορτὰς πλέον δυοῖν οὐκ ἐπέτρεπεν οὐδ' ἐν πόλει διατᾶσθαι πλέον ἡμέρας δέκα τοῦ μηνός* ([Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. § 32: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 222).

6. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας κ.τ.λ., 'and the plan that those staying in the city shall be always visible and shall hang about the palace-gates.' Vict. takes *τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας* to mean 'peregrini externique homines qui urbem visunt': Lamb. translates 'cives qui non absunt peregre,' and so Coray. But perhaps the words refer to all staying in the city, whether citizens or strangers (Welldon, 'the residents in the city'). Greek tyrants seem to have expected all persons staying in the city to 'hang about their palace-gates,' mainly in order that they might be visible and their doings known, but the original author of the corresponding Persian custom, Cyrus, if Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 6–8, 16–20 may be trusted, enforced this only on subjects of his own of high rank, and his object was to have them at hand for any service which he might require of them. It is in a similar form that the custom survives to the present day in Chitral. 'Once during the year every leading man in the country is expected to come to Chitral to pay his respects to the Mehtar, and to remain in attendance on him for a couple of months or so. He has to attend the daily durbars and help the Mehtar with advice about the affairs of the State. . . . In this manner there is a constant ebb and flow from the provinces to the capital; the provincial people get to know what is going on at head-quarters, and the Mehtar becomes acquainted with those he rules' (Capt. Younghusband on Chitral, *Times*, March 26, 1895). There is much to be said for the custom in this form; it evidently does something in a rude way to make up for the absence of a representative Parliament. Xenophon, in fact (Cyrop. ibid.), approved the Persian custom, and not without reason, whatever we may think of his approval (see below on 11) of another Persian custom for which there is less to be said, that of encouraging the king's subjects to act as spies on each other. Philip of Macedon had drawn the sons of the Macedonian nobles to court and made pages of them (Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, p. 133), and there was some wisdom in that measure also. But customs of this kind may easily be carried too far. Louis XIV in France 'turned the governing aristocratic class into courtiers'

(Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 262). The Duke of Wellington said of the grandees of Spain (Lord Stanhope, Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 1), 'They are all at Madrid: none of them according to the ancient system could leave the Court without a special permission from the king,' and again (ibid. p. 56), 'They are so abased as to consider leaving the Court under any circumstances the greatest misfortune ... It has been the constant policy of the government during many reigns to keep them in dependence,' and (p. 188: see also p. 79), 'Long habit has made them neither more nor less than domestics of the Palace; the Royal Household is everything to them.' Aristotle probably has before him Isocr. Paneg. § 151, *τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς διὰ τὰς μοναρχίας ταπεινὰς καὶ περιδεεῖς ἔχοντες, ἐξεταζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καὶ προκαλινδούμενοι καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες, θνητὸν μὲν ἄνδρα προσκυνοῦντες καὶ δαίμονα προσαγορεύοντες, τῶν δὲ θεῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀλιγωροῦντες.* For *διατρίβειν περὶ θύρας* cp. Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 252 b, *ἀκούων μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν Περσῶν τοὺς περὶ τὰς θύρας διατρίβοντας, οἰόμενος δὲ διὰ τῆς θεραπείας ταύτης χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως*: Diod. 14. 26. 7, *Τισσαφέρνης δὲ τοὺς μὲν στρατηγοὺς εἰς τὴν σκηνὴν ἐκάλεσεν, οἱ δὲ λοχαγοὶ πρὸς ταῖς θύραις διέτριβον*: and Diod. 14. 25. 1. See also Dio Chrys. Or. 8. 284 R.

7. **οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἥκιστα λανθάνοιεν τί πράττουσι.** Cp. Plato, Theaet. 174 B, *τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὅ τι πράττει, ἀλλ' ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα.*

9. **καὶ τἄλλα κ.τ.λ.,** 'and the other Persian and barbarian customs of a similar kind.' Among these Aristotle perhaps refers to the *προσκύνησις* or adoration of the Persian king: cp. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361a 36, *τὰ βαρβαρικά, οἷον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐκστάσεις*, and Isocr. Paneg. § 151 (quoted on 6), together with Plut. Alex. c. 54.

11. **καὶ τὸ μὴ λανθάνειν πειρᾶσθαι κ.τ.λ.** Just as the residents in the city are to be visible (6 sqq.), so the sayings and doings of the tyrant's subjects are to be made known to him. Isocrates advises Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, *δεινὸς μὲν φαίνου τῷ μηδέν σε λανθάνειν τῶν γιγνομένων* (Ad Nicocl. § 23). This custom came from Persia (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 10–12, where Xenophon approves it). We read of Midas, king of the Phrygians, in Conon ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186 (p. 130 b 40 Bekker), *Μίδας δὲ πολλοὺς ἔχων ἀναγγέλλοντας αὐτῷ τὰ ὅσα ἐλέγετό τε καὶ ἐπράττετο τοῖς ὑπηκόοις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἀνεπιβουλεύτῳ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔχων καὶ εἰς γῆρας ἐλθών, μακρὰ ὄντα ἔχειν*

ἐλέχθη, and of Caracalla in Xiphilinus' Epitome of Dio Cass. Hist. Rom. 77. 17, *πάντα γὰρ δή οἱ πανταχόθεν καὶ τὰ βραχύτατα ἀνηγγέλλετο· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς ὠτακουστοῦντάς τε καὶ διοπτεύοντας αὐτὰ προσέταξεν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς πλὴν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κολάζεσθαι.*

12. *οἷον περὶ Συρακούσας κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Plut. De Curios. c. 16, *καίτοι τούς γε τυράννους, οἷς ἀνάγκη πάντα γινώσκειν, ἐπαχθεστάτους ποιεῖ τὸ τῶν λεγομένων ὥτων καὶ προσαγωγείων γένος· ὠτακουστὰς μὲν οὖν πρῶτος ἔσχεν ὁ νέος Δαρεῖος ἀπιστῶν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πάντας ὑφορώμενος καὶ δεδοικώς, τοὺς δὲ προσαγωγέας οἱ Διονύσιοι τοῖς Συρακουσίοις κατέμιξαν κ.τ.λ.*, and Plut. Dion, c. 28, both of which passages speak of these spies as men, not women. Hence Sepulveda (p. 181 sq.) would read *οἱ προσαγωγίδαι καλούμενοι*, and Sus. *οἱ ποταγωγίδαι καλούμενοι*, but Grote (Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 83, vol. 11. 69) has already pointed out that women may very possibly have been employed on this service as well as men. I may refer to Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 2. 13 : compare also the account given by Megasthenes (ap. Strab. p. 707) of the Indian caste of spies (*ἔφοροι*), who *συνεργοὺς ἐποιοῦντο τὰς ἑταίρας.*

13. *καὶ τοὺς ὠτακουστὰς κ.τ.λ.* Π^1 Sus. add *οὓς* after *ὠτακουστάς*, but probably wrongly : compare for the structure of the sentence, in which *οἷον* is followed by *καί*, c. 6. 1306 a 1 sqq. (*ὥσπερ* followed by *καί*) and c. 10. 1312 a 1–6 (*ὥσπερ* and *καί*), and also 3. 13. 1284 a 38—b 3 (*οἷον* followed by *δέ*), 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 36—b 1 (*οἷον* and *δέ*), and 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 4 sq. (*οἷον* and *δέ*). Pindar gives many counsels to Hiero in his Second Pythian Ode (73 sqq. Bergk) against encouraging secret delation. The tyrants of Cyprus employed spies called Gergini (Clearch. Sol. Fragm. 25 : Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 311).

14. ***συνουσία καὶ σύλλογος.*** The word *συνουσία* tends to be used rather of friendly gatherings for social intercourse than of gatherings of a more formal and public kind (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 22 and Plato, Rep. 573 A), whereas the word *σύλλογος*, though it is used of convivial gatherings (e. g. in Plato, Laws 671 A) and generally of *σύλλογοι σχολαστικοί* (see note on 3), and of gatherings for worship and sacrifice (Plato, Laches 187 E and Laws 935 B), is used fully as much of public as of private gatherings (Phaedr. 261 A), and frequently of public meetings for debate and of deliberative and judicial assemblies. The presence of spies at convivial parties of friends, where 'in vino veritas' prevailed, would be especially intolerable.

16. καὶ τὸ διαβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις κ.τ.λ. For the construction διαβάλλειν τινὰ τινί see Plato, Phaedo, 67 E, εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν παντα χῇ τῷ σώματι (with Stallbaum's note), and Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 9, ὃ δὴ καὶ Διονυσίῳ Δίωνα καὶ Σάμιον Φιλίππῳ καὶ Κλεομένῃ Πτολεμαίῳ διέβαλε καὶ ἀπώλεσεν.

18. τὸν δῆμον τοῖς γνωρίμοις. We read of Panaetius at Leontini in Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 47, Παναίτιος Λεοντίνων Μεγαρεῦσι πολεμούντων περὶ γῆς ὅρων πολεμαρχῶν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς πένητας καὶ πεζοὺς τοῖς εὐπόροις καὶ ἱππεῦσι συνέκρουσεν κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Hdt. 1. 59, τούτων δὴ ὧν τῶν ἐθνέων τὸ μὲν Ἀττικὸν κατεχόμενόν τε καὶ διεσπασμένον ἐπυνθάνετο ὁ Κροῖσος ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου τοῦ Ἱπποκράτεος, τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τυραννεύοντος Ἀθηναίων.

τοὺς πλουσίους ἑαυτοῖς. It is not easy to set the ἐπιεικεῖς at variance among themselves (1314 a 19 sqq.); hence Aristotle speaks only of the rich.

καὶ τὸ πένητας ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 567 A, οὐκοῦν (sc. πολέμους κινεῖ ὁ τύραννος) καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πένητες γιγνόμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζωνται εἶναι καὶ ἧττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσι; Translate, 'and making the ruled poor is characteristic of the tyrant, in order that not only may no guard be kept on foot (by the citizens), but that they may also be too busy to conspire against their master, being absorbed in their daily needs.' In 18–29 the tyrant is described as keeping his subjects busy by making them too poor to live without working hard, and by engaging them in constant wars. As to μήτε . . . καί compare what is said of οὔτε . . . καί in the critical note on 1261 b 7. Οὔτε . . . καί occurs also in Plut. Tib. Gracch. c. 21 *init.* It appears to be used in a somewhat similar way to οὔτε . . . τε, as to which see notes on 35 and 1272 b 19. Μήτε φυλακὴ τρέφηται has been interpreted in more ways than one. See the notes of Sepulveda, Vict., and Giph. The interpretation given above seems to me the most natural one. That a citizen-force sometimes subsisted side by side with the tyrant's mercenaries we see from Diod. 11. 67. 5, where we read of Thrasybulus of Syracuse, καθόλου δέ, μισῶν καὶ μισούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐξενολόγησεν, ἀντίταγμα κατασκευάζων ταῖς πολιτικαῖς δυνάμεσιν. There would of course be an end of this force when the citizens were deprived of their arms, but the tyrant might be glad to make them too poor to keep it up, and so to save himself the trouble of disarming them. Another interpretation of μήτε φυλακὴ τρέφηται is 'in order that no guard may have to be kept

on foot by the tyrant,' but, as Vict. points out, it would hardly be safe for him to dispense with a guard, however poor his subjects might be. Vict., followed by Giph. Bekk.[2] and others, would read ἤ τε for μήτε, but Thurot remarks (Études sur Aristote, p. 86), 'un tyran n' appauvrit pas ses sujets *pour* entretenir une garde, mais *en* entretenant une garde,' and indeed impoverishing the ruled seems a strange way of securing the maintenance of the tyrant's body-guard, for the poorer they became, the less able they would be to contribute the revenue needed for its support. A design to keep the citizens busily employed is ascribed to the tyrant Aristodemus of Cumae in Plut. De Mul. Virt. c. 26 (referred to by Dümmler, *Rhein. Mus.* 42. 186), *ἔτυχε δὲ κατ' ἐκεῖνο καιροῦ τάφρον ἄγων κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν χώραν ὁ Ἀριστόδημος, οὔτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἔργον οὔτε χρήσιμον, ἄλλως δὲ τρίβειν καὶ ἀποκναίειν πόνοις καὶ ἀσχολίαις τοὺς πολίτας βουλόμενος· ἦν γὰρ προστεταγμένον ἑκάστῳ μέτρων τινῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐκφέρειν τῆς γῆς.* The device of preventing plots by keeping men busy was another of those which the experience of tyrants as military leaders would be likely to suggest to them: see note on 1313 a 41 and cp. Polyaen. Strateg. 3. 9. 35 and Justin, 20. 1. 1. 'While the embankment' protecting Mandalay from the floods of the Irrawaddy 'was being constructed, Mindone Min,' a recent king of Burmah, 'complacently remarked to an European gentleman resident in Mandalay, "When my troops come back to the palace after a hard day's work, they are too tired to think of conspiring against me"' (*Times*, Sept. 21. 1886). Slaves were also kept in order in this way (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20 sq., where see note).

21. **παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου κ.τ.λ.** Τούτου=τοῦ πέμπτας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους κ.τ.λ. The pyramid-building Kings of Egypt had been represented in a similar light by Herodotus (2. 124 sqq.), who dwells on the forced labour which they exacted from their subjects. Aristotle seems rather to have in view the fiscal exactions of the pyramid-builders as well as of the Cypselidae, Peisistratidae, and Polycrates.

22. **τὰ ἀναθήματα τῶν Κυψελιδῶν.** As to the offerings of the Cypselidae at Delphi and Olympia see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 641, and Sus.[2], Note 1720. The chief of them was a colossal golden statue of Zeus in the Heraeum of Olympia, as to which see Plato, Phaedrus, 236 B, and Suidas, Κυψελιδῶν *ἀνάθημα*, where we find the following fragment of Theophrastus (Fragm. 128 Wimmer), which shows in all probability that Theophrastus was acquainted with the

passage before us, *καὶ γὰρ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ περὶ καιρῶν β' λέγει οὕτως. ἕτεροι δ' εἰς ἀνδρωδέστερα καταδαπανῶντες, οἷον στρατείας ἐξάγοντες καὶ πολέμους ἐπαναιρούμενοι, καθάπερ καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ τύραννος· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐ μόνον ᾤετο δεῖν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων καταναλίσκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐφόδιον τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσιν· ἐοίκασι δὲ καὶ αἱ πυραμίδες ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ὁ τῶν Κυψελιδῶν κολοσσὸς καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ παραπλησίαν ἔχειν διάνοιαν.* The passage from Didymus which precedes this fragment in Suidas' article may also be based on Theophrastus, *Δίδυμος δὲ κατασκευάσαι τὸν κολοσσόν φησι Περίανδρον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τῆς τρυφῆς καὶ τοῦ θράσους ἐπισχεῖν τοὺς Κορινθίους.*

23. *καὶ τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου ἡ οἰκοδόμησις ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν.* In place of *Ὀλυμπίου* we should probably read (with Sus.) *Ὀλυμπιείου* (see Liddell and Scott s. v.). The form *τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου*, however, is found in the MSS. even of Plato (Phaedr. 227 B). In those of Diodorus and Strabo it is of frequent occurrence (see Diod. 13. 6. 4, 82. 1 : 16. 83. 2 : 20. 29. 3 : 23. 18. 2 ; and Strabo, pp. 396 and 404). The building of the temple of the Olympian Zeus at Athens, which remained unfinished till the time of Hadrian, is here attributed to the Peisistratidae, but Peisistratus is commonly said to have begun it (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 342), and perhaps he is included under the term Peisistratidae, just as Cypselus is included among the Cypselidae in c. 12. 1315 b 22 sqq. See as to the temple Frazer, Pausanias, 2. 178 sqq. One of the motives of Peisistratus in building it may have been a wish to outshine his old foe Megara, for there was an Olympieum at Megara (Paus. 1. 40. 4). For the absence of a second *ἡ* before *ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν* see note on 1334 b 12.

24. *καὶ τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια.* Schneider appears from his note on this passage (Politica, 2. 350), if I understand it aright, to take *τῶν* as masc. and to supply *τυράννων* with it (cp. *τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν* and *τῶν Κυψελιδῶν* in the preceding lines), and if we interpret the passage thus, we might account for the absence of the article in *ἔργα Πολυκράτεια* as we account for its absence in 3. 14. 1285 b 12, *τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις* (see note). But it is more likely that the interpreters generally are right in supplying *ἔργων* with *τῶν* and taking *τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργων* as a partitive genitive. The meaning of the words will then be 'and among the works at Samos those of Polycrates.' If, however, we take the passage thus, it seems necessary either to read (with Coray) *τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργων τὰ Πολυκράτεια*, or else (with Sauppe and Sus.) to change *τῶν* into *τά* and to

read *τὰ περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια.* Herodotus (3. 60) describes three great works at Samos, but does not say that any of them were built by Polycrates. One of Polycrates' works was probably the palace which Caligula at one time designed to restore (Suet. Calig. c. 21).

25. *καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν* κ.τ.λ. Dionysius the Elder's taxes appear to have been, at all events for a time, at the rate of twenty per cent. not on his subjects' income, but on their property. According to the comic poet Alexis (*Πυλαῖαι*, Fragm. ap. Athen. Deipn. 226 a Meineke) the fishmongers went even further,

λαμβάνοντες βασιλικοὺς
φόρους. Β. *φόρους μόνον; οὐχὶ δεκατεύουσι γὰρ*
τὰς οὐσίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθήμενοι,
ὅλας δ' ἀφαιροῦνται καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν.

The period at which Dionysius' taxes were so heavy probably fell within the first ten years of his tyranny, several of which were years of war with Carthage, when the land and sea forces kept on foot by him were very large (Diod. 2. 5. 6), but it is clear from 1314 b 14 sqq. that in Aristotle's view Dionysius' revenue was not levied simply for the defence of the State. Compare the story told of Cypselus in Oecon. 2. 1346 a 32 sqq.

28. *ἔστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποιὸς ὁ τύραννος* κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 566 E, *πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς ἀεὶ κινεῖ, ἵν' ἐν χρείᾳ ἡγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ᾖ,* and the passage from Rep. 567 A quoted above on 18. We read of Periander in Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 393), *ἐστρατεύετο δὲ συνεχῶς καὶ ἦν πολεμικός.* But both Plato and Aristotle probably have Dionysius the Elder especially in view (cp. Theophr. Fragm. 128, quoted on 22, and Diod. 14. 7. 1, 68. 1, 75. 3). The true king is not *φιλοπόλεμος* (see Bücheler in *Rhein. Mus.* 42. 198). For *ὅπως δή* ('in order that forsooth') cp. *ἵνα δή*, Plato, Rep. 420 E, 610 C, Xen. Hell. 4. 1. 26. It should be noticed that tyrannies ran some special risks in time of war: thus the subjects of Dionysius the Elder rejoiced at his proposal of a war with Carthage, for they looked forward to regaining their arms and hoped that when they had done so, some opportunity would offer of regaining their freedom (Diod. 14. 45. 5).

29. *καὶ ἡ μὲν βασιλεία* κ.τ.λ. Here and in what follows down to 1314 a 12 the tyrant is shown commonly to distrust all who in his view are likely to plot against him, and especially those who are likely to plot successfully, to love flatterers and bad men, to

hate and to regard as subverters of his rule persons whose free bearing leaves him with a sense of diminished greatness, and to choose as his daily companions those on whose complaisance he thinks he can count. Thus he distrusts those whom a good ruler would trust, friends and good men, and his favour is for slaves rather than freemen, women rather than men, aliens rather than citizens. The saying that kingship is saved by friends is one of those which are placed in the mouth of the dying Cyrus by Xenophon (Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, which is imitated by Sallust in De Bell. Iugurth. 10. 4). The distrust of tyrants for their friends is dwelt on first by Aeschylus, Prom. Vinct. 224,

ἔνεστι γάρ πως τοῦτο τῇ τυραννίδι
νόσημα τοῖς φίλοισι μὴ πεποιθέναι,

and after him by Euripides (Fragm. 608 Nauck: 605, ed. 2), Xenophon (Hiero, 3. 7 sqq.: cp. 1. 38), and Isocrates (Hel. § 33, De Pace, § 112). No one distrusted his friends more than Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 15. 7. 3). He distrusted even his own son Dionysius (see note on 1313 b 1). We read of him in Plut. Dion, c. 9, *ἔλεγε δὲ τοὺς φίλους φυλάττεσθαι νοῦν ἔχοντας εἰδὼς καὶ βουλομένους μᾶλλον τυραννεῖν ἢ τυραννεῖσθαι.*

31. *ὡς βουλομένων μὲν πάντων, δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων.* 'Ultro intelligitur *ἐπιτίθεσθαι* (confer 2. 10. 1272 b 16), et futile est quorundam codicum additamentum *αὐτὸν καθελεῖν*' (Vahlen on Poet. 14. 1453 b 17). For the thought cp. c. 10. 1312 a 6 sqq. and Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 a 32, *τοιαῦτα δὲ* (i. e. *φοβερά*) *ἔχθρα τε καὶ ὀργὴ δυναμένων ποιεῖν τι· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται, ὥστε ἐγγύς εἰσι τοῦ ποιεῖν.*

32. *καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq., where much the same thing is said, except that we do not hear of *γυναικοκρατία* there, but only of *ἀναρχία γυναικῶν*, and that the further trait of *ἀναρχία παίδων* is added, the tyrant being also alleged to favour 'living as one likes.' *Περὶ τὰς οἰκίας* is added to distinguish this kind of *γυναικοκρατία* from *γυναικοκρατία* in the administration of the State, as to which see 2. 9. 1269 b 31 sq. As to *δούλων ἄνεσις* in an extreme democracy cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 10 sqq., Plato, Rep. 563 B, and Demosth. Phil. 3. 3. Aristotle's statement is borne out by the account given of the state of things at Rome under Domitian in Plin. Paneg. c. 42 (referred to by Roscher, Politik, p. 594), where Pliny addressing Trajan says, reddita est amicis fides, liberis pietas, obsequium servis: verentur et parent et dominos habent. Non enim iam servi nostri principis amici, sed nos sumus,

nec pater patriae alienis se mancipiis cariorem quam civibus suis credit. Omnes accusatore domestico liberasti unoque salutis publicae signo illud, ut sic dixerim, servile bellum sustulisti. One of the cries vociferously shouted by the senate after the assassination of Commodus was 'servis serviimus' (Ael. Lamprid., Commodus Antoninus, c. 19. 5). The freedman Milichus informed Nero of Piso's conspiracy against him (Tac. Ann. 15. 55). For *καὶ . . . δέ* used as here cp. Categ. 13. 14 b 33.

34. *ἐξαγγέλλωσι* 'seems to be used here in the special sense which comes out most in the *ἐξάγγελος* of tragedy' (Richards). See Liddell and Scott s. vv. *ἐξαγγέλλειν, ἐξάγγελος.*

35. *οὔτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 'for slaves and women not only do not plot against tyrants, but must also feel goodwill both to tyrannies and to democracies, if they prosper under them.' For *οὔτε—τε* see note on 1272 b 19. Aristotle must be thinking of women unconnected with tyrants, for the murder of Alexander of Pherae was planned by his wife (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 35), and according to Xen. Hiero, 3. 8 the same thing had happened to many other tyrants. The stories of Eryxo and Xenocrite are to be read in Plut. De Mul. Virt. cc. 25–26.

38. *καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 11, 15 sq.

39. *διὸ καὶ ὁ κόλαξ κ.τ.λ.*, 'the flatterer also,' as well as slaves and women. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20 sqq.

1. *καὶ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο πονηρόφιλον ἡ τυραννίς.* This charge against tyranny is of early date: cp. Hdt. 3. 80, *χαίρει δὲ (ὁ τύραννος) τοῖσι κακίστοισι τῶν ἀστῶν*, and Eurip. Ion, 566 Bothe (626 Dindorf), 1314 a.

τύραννος ὤν,
ᾧ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἡδονὴ φίλους ἔχειν.

As to Dionysius the Elder see Theopomp. Fragm. 146 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 303). We read in Plin. Paneg. c. 45, where Trajan is addressed, et priores quidem principes, excepto patre tuo, praeterea uno aut altero, et nimis dixi, vitiis potius civium quam virtutibus laetabantur. *Χρηστοφιλία* is an element in *εὐδαιμονία* (Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 18 sqq.). Cp. also Diod. 12. 12. 4, where we read of Charondas, *ὁ νομοθέτης ἀπηγόρευσε τῇ τῶν πονηρῶν φιλίᾳ τε καὶ συνηθείᾳ χρήσασθαι καὶ δίκας ἐποίησε κακομιλίας*, and Eth. Nic. 9. 3. 1165 b 15, *οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον (φιλητὸν τὸ* Stahr, Bywater) *πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. Διὰ τοῦτο*, i.e. because tyrants love flatterers.

2. κολακευόμενοι γὰρ χαίρουσιν. So Isocrates (Epist. 1. 4) says to Dionysius the Elder, *καίτοι τινὲς ἤδη με τῶν σοὶ πλησιασάντων ἐκφοβεῖν ἐπεχείρησαν λέγοντες ὡς σὺ τοὺς μὲν κολακεύοντας τιμᾷς, τῶν δὲ συμβουλευόντων καταφρονεῖς.*

3. φιλοῦσιν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς ἢ οὐ κολακεύουσιν. Ἢ here = 'aut certe.' For the use of *ἤ* in this sense see Bon. Ind. 313 a 26 sqq. Friendship excludes flattery, for the flatterer is defined as *φανόμενος φίλος* (Rhet. 1. 11. 1371 a 23 sq.). Aristotle perhaps corrects himself by adding *ἢ οὐ κολακεύουσιν* because Plato had said in Rep. 568 A, *οἱ δ' ἐπιεικεῖς μισοῦσί τε (τὸν τύραννον) καὶ φεύγουσι.*

4. καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ πονηρά. The tyrant likes bad men not only for the pleasure their flatteries give him, but also because they are useful to him. Leucon, king of Bosporus, once said, *ἀπέκτεινα ἂν σὲ νὴ τοὺς θεούς, εἰ μὴ πονηρῶν ἀνδρῶν ἦ τυραννὶς ἐδέετο* (Athen. Deipn. 257 d). Compare also the quotation in Plut. De Aud. Poet. c. 4 *sub fin.* and De Vitios. Pud. c. 13, *ποτὶ τὸν πονηρὸν οὐκ ἄχρηστον ὅπλον ἁ πονηρία.*

5. ἦλῳ γὰρ ὁ ἦλος, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία. Ἦλῳ ὁ ἦλος, sc. *ἐκκρούεται.* Aristotle's use of the proverb is not the usual one. It was commonly used of the driving out of a thing by a thing of the same kind (cp. *κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι*), not of the execution of evil deeds by appropriate agents. See Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 253, 363 and 2. 116.

καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ χαίρειν σεμνῷ μηδ' ἐλευθέρῳ τυραννικόν. *Μηδενί* is of course masc. Aristotle remembers the lines in the 'Dionysius' of the comic poet Eubulus,

ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς σεμνοῖς μὲν αὐθαδέστερος κ.τ.λ.

(Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 217). He possibly has in view the experience of Plato at the courts of Dionysius I and II (Diod. 15. 7. 1: Plut. Dion, c. 20), or that of the tragic poet Antiphon at the court of the former ([Plut.] Dec. Orat. Vitae, 1, Antiphon, 833 B: Phot. Biblioth. p. 486 a 35 sqq. Bekker), or that of Diodotus at the court of some tyrant in Asia, narrated by Isocrates in Epist. 4. § 7.

8. ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικὸν τῆς τυραννίδος. The flatterer, on the contrary, *διαφυλάττει τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῷ κολακευομένῳ* (Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 10).

10. καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Hiero, 6. 5, *ἔτι δὲ ξένοις μὲν μᾶλλον ἢ πολίταις πιστεύειν, βαρβάροις δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ Ἕλλησιν*, where the tyrant is referred to. **Συνημερευταί** are friends and favourites of the tyrant, *σύσσιτοι* are not necessarily so. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a

8, φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. See also Liddell and Scott s. v. συμβιωτής.

11. ὡς τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἀντιποιουμένους, 'in the view that citizens are hostile, whereas aliens do not act in opposition to him.' Cp. Xen. Hiero, 6. 14 and Isocr. De Pace, § 112. The absolute use of ἀντιποιεῖσθαι is rare. For the omission of ὄντας compare the omission of οὖσι in 19 and of ὄν in c. 10. 1312 a 37 after ἱκανόν.

12. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ. For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.

13. οὐδὲν δ' ἐλλείπει μοχθηρίας, 'but they' (i. e. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα) 'leave out nothing of badness' (so Vict. Lamb. Stahr and others: Welldon, however, following Sus., 'nor is there any villany from which he'—i.e. the tyrant—'shrinks'). Cp. Plato, Rep. 571 D, ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει: Tim. 20 C, ἐλλείψομεν προθυμίας οὐδέν (with Stallbaum's note): Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 178, πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ εἰργασμένον . . . οὐδὲν ἐλλελοιπότα μοχθηρίας. In Plato, Symp. 210 A we have προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω (see Stallbaum's note). The line of conduct which Aristotle recommends to the tyrant has on the contrary nothing demoralizing in it (1315 b 8 sqq.).

16. μικρὰ φρονεῖν. In 29 and 1313 b 8 sq. we have μικρόν, not μικρά. Cp. μεγάλα δὴ φρονεῖ in Aristoph. Acharn. 988, and ὑπέρογκα φρονοῦντες in Phot. Biblioth. 120 a 29 sq. Bekker.

17. δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστεῖν ἀλλήλοις. Cp. 1313 a 40 sqq., b 16 sqq.

18. πρὶν ἢ πιστεύσωσί τινες ἑαυτοῖς. See note on 1336 b 21 and cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 20 sqq., and see Bon. Ind. s. v. πρίν and Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 6.

21. διὰ τὸ πιστοὺς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι. Cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 32 sq., Theogn. 69–72, and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5.

22. καταγορεύειν followed by a gen. is rare. See Liddell and Scott.

23. τρίτον δ' ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων, sc. σκοπός ἐστιν. Bonitz (Ind. 10 b 5) explains τῶν πραγμάτων as=τοῦ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά. Ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων appears to mean 'powerlessness for political action,' not, I think, 'a general incapacity for affairs' (Welldon). A lack of material strength seems to be especially referred to. Cp. for the expression Top. 6. 6. 145 b 1, ὕπνος ἐστὶν ἀδυναμία αἰσθήσεως, and De Gen. An. 4. 6. 774 b 35, διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν.

24. ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις. Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. 3. 5, *τί ὧν τι ἐπιχειροίη τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις;*

ὥστε οὐδὲ τυραννίδα καταλύειν μὴ δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης. Dio Chrysostom seems to have this before him in Or. 1. 64 R, *οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν πόλεις τε ἐξαιρεῖν καὶ τυράννους ἀνθρώπους καταλύειν καὶ τὸν παντοχοῦ προστάττειν χωρὶς δυνάμεως.*

25. εἰς οὓς μὲν οὖν ὅρους—29. φρονῶσιν is bracketed as an interpolation by Schn. Cor. and Bekk.[2], but Vahlen (Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 424), whom Sus. follows, remarks as to this passage 'hierin ich mich nicht entschliessen kann eine Interpolation zu erkennen oder eine aus der Nachlässigkeit des Lehrvortrags entstandene Wiederholung.' The question is not free from doubt, especially as a somewhat similar difficulty arises as to the recapitulation in 3. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq. (see note on 1278 a 34). Ὅρους here = *σκοπούς*, as in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33 (cp. 1342 b 17 sq.).

τὰ βουλήματα τῶν τυράννων. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 39, *νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα* (sc. *τῶν δημοκρατιῶν*) *καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ ὧν ἐφίενται λέγωμεν.*

30. δι' οὗ (not *καθ' ὅν*, as in 1313 a 35), cp. 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 15, *δι' ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν*, Demosth. in Lept. c. 100, and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 11 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 234),

πλὴν ἔν τι τῶν πάντων ἀδύνατον ἦν ἄρα
εὑρεῖν δι' οὗ τρόπου τις οὐ λυπήσεται.

In c. 6. 1305 a 37 sq. we have, still more remarkably, *διὰ δύο τρόπων τοὺς φανερωτάτους.*

31. ὁ δ' ἕτερος κ.τ.λ. For the phrase see note on 1297 b 18.

34. οὕτω τῆς τυραννίδος σωτηρία ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικωτέραν. Ποιεῖν, not τὸ *ποιεῖν*: see notes on 1330 b 10, 1331 b 28, and 1289 a 3. Plato may perhaps have given this advice to Dionysius II through Dion (see note on 1313 a 34).

36. τὴν δύναμιν, 'his power': cp. c. 10. 1313 a 12, *δύναμιν τυραννικήν.*

38. ὥσπερ ὑπόθεσιν, 'as a fundamental postulate' (cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 16 and 8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40).

39. τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν, sc. *ποιεῖν*. For instance, the tyrant is to seem to care for the public weal.

40. πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ δοκεῖν φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν κ.τ.λ. The tyrant will thus seem to resemble a king (c. 10. 1311 a 2 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 a 33 sqq.).

1314 b. **1. μήτε δαπανῶντα (εἰς) δωρεὰς τοιαύτας κ.τ.λ.** Μήτε—τε, 'not only not—but also' (see notes on 1313 b 35 and 1272 b 19). For the

addition of *εἰς* see critical note. For *τοιαύτας ἐφ' αἷς* see note on 1266 b 36. For *τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουσιν*, where a neut. pl. substantive is followed by a plural verb, see Bon. Ind. 490 a 44 sqq.

2. ὅταν ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Γλίσχρως goes with *λαμβάνωσιν* (Bon. Ind. s. v. *γλίσχρος*). Cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 91, *τοῖς δὲ τυράννοις ἔθος καθέστηκε τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων πόνοις καὶ κακοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονὰς παρασκευάζειν*, and *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 16. l. 18 sqq. There may be a reminiscence here of some lines of Archilochus (Fragm. 142 Bergk⁴, ap. Ael. Var. Hist. 4. 14), *πολλάκις τὰ κατ' ὀβολὸν μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων συναχθέντα χρήματα, κατὰ τὸν Ἀρχίλοχον, εἰς πόρνης γυναικὸς ἔντερον καταρρέουσιν.* The conjunction in the passage before us of the three unpopular classes, *ἑταῖραι ξένοι* and *τεχνῖται*, is significant. Hiero I of Syracuse was famed for his bounty (Ael. Var. Hist. 9. 1), and especially for his bounty to aliens (Pindar, Pyth. 3. 71 Bergk, *ξείνοις δὲ θαυμαστὸς πατήρ*). Among the aliens favoured by tyrants would often be found poets and philosophers (Plato, Rep. 568 C: Athen. Deipn. 656 d). The *τεχνῖται* would be of very various types; there would be not only practitioners of the fine arts but also cooks, physicians (Polycrates outbade Athens for the services of Democedes, Hdt. 3. 131), actors, dancers, makers of the remarkable dresses which tyrants loved to wear (Polyb. 6. 7. 7), and the whole tribe of craftsmen required for the outfit of a luxurious court. In addition to these there would be the *τεχνῖται* employed in the equipment of the tyrant's army and fleet; thus we hear of Dionysius the Elder offering *δωρεὰς μεγάλας τοῖς κατασκευάσασιν ὅπλα* (Diod. 14. 41. 4). Dionysius was no doubt munificent also to those who made the dies for his splendid coins, 'the finest of all the Syracusan coins both in gold and in silver' (Head, Hist. Num. p. 154). *Τεχνῖται* are distinguished from aliens in the passage before us, but that many of them would be aliens we see from 3. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq. The rule of tyrants probably did much to add to the numbers of the metoeci in Greek States. The more luxurious they were, the more they would need the services of *τεχνῖται*, and therefore of metoeci and other aliens.

5. ὅπερ ἤδη πεποιήκασί τινες τῶν τυράννων. Gelon (Diod. 11. 26. 5: Polyaen. Strateg. 1. 27. 1), and Micythus of Rhegium (Diod. 11. 66). We read of Caligula in Sueton. Calig. c. 16, rationes imperii ab Augusto proponi solitas sed a Tiberio intermissas publicavit. Compare what Pliny tells us of Trajan in Paneg. c. 20, where he adds, adsuescat imperator cum imperio calculum ponere: sic exeat,

sic redeat, tamquam rationem redditurus; edicat quid absumpserit. Ita fiet ut non absumat quod pudeat dicere. As to the use of the perfect with ἤδη see note on 1303 a 27.

6. οὕτω γὰρ ἄν τις διοικῶν κ.τ.λ. For the use of διοικεῖν here without an expressed object see note on 1313 a 1.

7. οἰκονόμος ἀλλ' οὐ τύραννος, 'a steward of the State and not a tyrant': cp. 38, ὡς ἐπίτροπον ὄντα καὶ μὴ τύραννον, and 1315 b 1. οἰκονόμον καὶ βασιλικόν. A steward had to render an account, whereas a tyrant claimed to be ἀνυπεύθυνος (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 20). Οἰκονομικὴ ἀρχή is for the advantage of the ruled (3. 6. 1278 b 37 sqq.).

οὐ δεῖ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ. Giph. (p. 717) points out the similarity of the advice given by Maecenas to Augustus in Dio Cass. 52. 34. 10.

9. ἀλλὰ τοῖς γ' ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κ.τ.λ. For ἀλλὰ . . γε see note on 1311 b 15. Ἐκτοπίζειν is not often used in this sense. Καὶ συμφέρει, 'is expedient also' as well as right. Τοῦτο, i.e. the course just recommended, that of rendering an account of receipts and expenditure. It is implied that the adoption of this course would preclude the accumulation of a treasure. The first thing a tyrant usually did was to amass a great treasure by confiscation and heavy taxation (Lucian, Cataplus, c. 8: Diod. 14. 95. 5: Isocr. Epist. 7. 1). Aristotle's view was perhaps inherited by him from Dionysius the Elder (see the fragment of Theophrastus quoted above on 1313 b 28).

11. ἐπιτιθεῖντο. See critical note.

12. εἰσὶ δὲ φοβερώτεροι κ.τ.λ. Φοβερώτεροι τῶν πολιτῶν, 'more to be dreaded than the citizens.' For the fear which tyrants felt of those who guarded them and their treasure cp. Xen. Hiero, 1. 12 and 6. 4, 11: Isocr. De Pace, § 112, Hel. § 34: Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 2. 4: Plut. De Mul. Virt. c. 15 *init.* Cp. also Hdt. 3. 61 *init.* Dionysius the Elder often left his brother Leptines in charge of Syracuse, and Dionysius the Younger trusted Philistus in the same way (Dio Chrys. Or. 73: 2. 389 R).

14. ἔπειτα τὰς εἰσφορὰς κ.τ.λ., 'next the tyrant should evidently collect,' etc. For φαίνεσθαι with the participle see Bon. Ind. 808 b 40 sqq. Φαίνεσθαι recurs in 18, 23, 33, 39, 1315 a 21, b 1 (in this last passage with the infin.). The tyrant must not only do the things recommended but be seen to do them (cp. 22 sq.). In collecting revenue only to the extent made necessary by the needs of the State he imitates the king (1315 b 1 sqq.). Peisistratus is

made to represent himself as thus acting in a letter to Solon ascribed to him in Diog. Laert. 1. 53, *ἀπάγει δὲ ἕκαστος Ἀθηναίων τοῦ αὐτοῦ κλήρου δεκάτην, οὐκ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ ὁπόθεν ἔσται ἀναλοῦν εἴς τε θυσίας δημοτελεῖς καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἦν ὁ πόλεμος ἡμᾶς καταλάβῃ.*

16. ὅλως τε κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly,' i. e. not merely in respect of eisphorae and liturgies, but in his whole dealings with the revenue. Cp. 1315 b 2, *μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλ' ἐπίτροπον.* So we read in Diod. 8. 30. 1 of the kings of Cyrene after Battus I, *τοὺς δὲ ὕστερον ἀεὶ τυραννικώτερον δυναστεύοντας ἐξιδιοποιήσασθαι μὲν τὰς δημοσίας προσόδους, ἀλιγωρῆσαι δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείας.* Cp. Suidas s. v. *βασιλεία* (quoted by Kaerst, Studien zur Entwickelung und theoretischen Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum, p. 60), *ὅτι ἡ βασιλεία κτῆμα τῶν κοινῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ δημόσια τῆς βασιλείας κτήματα. διὸ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ μεθ' ὕβρεως εἰσπράξεις ὥσπερ τυραννικὰς ἀκολασίας μισεῖν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ σὺν λόγῳ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ τῶν εἰσφορῶν ἀπαιτήσεις ὥσπερ κηδεμονίαν τιμᾶν.* A treasurer of public funds demands no more than the requirements of the State oblige him to demand and makes his demands in a considerate way.

18. καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ χαλεπὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνόν. Tyrants were often *χαλεποί*: Arcesilaus II of Cyrene was called *ὁ χαλεπός* (Plut. De Mul. Virt. c. 25 *init.*). As to Dionysius the Elder we read in Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 6, *ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ μεῖζον, οὐκ ἔλαττόν γε τὸ κακὸν ἦν Ἀθηναίοις ἡ Λαχάρους, καὶ Συρακουσίοις ἡ Διονυσίου χαλεπότης, ἥπερ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις· ταράττοντες γὰρ ἐταράττοντο, καὶ πείσεσθαι κακῶς προσεδόκων ἐκ τοῦ προαδικεῖν καὶ λυμαίνεσθαι τοὺς προεντυγχάνοντας.* It is implied in Isocr. Epist. 7. 2 that Clearchus, the founder of the tyranny at the Pontic Heracleia, was *δύσκολος καὶ χαλεπός*. As to Alexander of Pherae see Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 35: Pelopidas, we read in Plut. Pelop. c. 26, *ἐπειρᾶτο τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ποιεῖν ἐκ τυράννου πρᾶον ἄρχοντα τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς καὶ νόμιμον.* Compare also [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 32, *ἐν Κεφαλληνίᾳ Προμήσου υἱὸς ἐκράτησε καὶ χαλεπὸς ἦν*, and what Thucydides says of the *χαλεπότης* of the Lacedaemonian Pausanias, when he was suspected of aiming at tyranny (Thuc. 1. 130. 2). *Σεμνότης*, on the other hand, is characteristic of a king (Plut. Demetr. c. 2, *βασιλικὴ σεμνότης*: De aud. poet. c. 8. 26 E, *σεμνότερος καὶ βασιλικώτερος*). Isocrates had already given similar advice to Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis (Ad Nicocl. § 34).

19. ἔτι δὲ τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ. Some tyrants sought to inspire fear in those who came in contact with them, for instance Clearchus of

Heracleia on the Euxine, of whom we read in Memnon (ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 222 b 19 Bekk.), *ἐξαλλάττειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς χειρῶνας ἐπὶ τὸ φοβερόν τε καὶ ἀβρότερον*. Thucydides (6. 55. 3) speaks of *τὸ ξύνηθες τοῖς πολίταις φοβερόν* of Hippias. Kings, on the other hand, are *αἰδοῖοι* (Plato, Rep. 390 E: cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 51 R, *τοὺς δὲ προσιόντας* (sc. *τῷ βασιλεῖ*) *καὶ ὁρῶντας οὐκ ἔκπληξις οὐδὲ φόβος, ἀλλ' αἰδὼς ὕπεισι, πολὺ κρεῖττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον φόβου*). Pindar had praised Xenocrates, brother of Theron tyrant of Agrigentum, because he was *αἰδοῖος ἀστοῖς ὁμιλεῖν* (Isthm. 2. 37): compare a saying of Pittacus (ap. Stob. Floril. 48. 47), *ἔκτος δ' ὁ Πιττακὸς* (*ἔφη εὐδαιμονίαν ἄρχοντος νομίζειν*), *εἰ τοὺς ὑπηκόους ὁ ἄρχων παρασκευάσειε φοβεῖσθαι μὴ αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ*, and one of Cheilon (ibid.), *ὕστατος δ' ὁ Χείλων εἶπε, κάλλιστον εἶναι βασιλέα τὸν μὴ μόνου τοῦ φοβεροῦ εἶναι φροντίζοντα*. Cp. also Plut. Apophth. Lac. Polydor. 4. 231 F. Isocrates had said much the same thing as is here said by Aristotle (De Antid. § 122: Ad Nicocl. § 23: Evag. § 45), and a dictum of Epicurus ran (Usener, Epicurea, Fragm. 537), *οὐκ ἔστιν ἄφοβον εἶναι φοβερὸν φαινόμενον*. For the contrast of *αἰδώς* and *φόβος* cp. Probl. 11. 53. 905 a 5 sqq., Plato, Euthyphro 12 B–C and Laws 886 A (with Stallbaum's note): see also Pol. 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 41, where genuine *αἰδώς* is connected with *ὁ τῶν ἐλευθέρων φόβος*.

21. *ὄντα εὐκαταφρόνητον*, 'if he is contemptible.'

κἂν μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆται. Isocrates had said to Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus (Ad Nicocl. § 11), *ὃν ἐνθυμούμενον χρὴ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ὅπως ὅσαπερ ταῖς τιμαῖς τῶν ἄλλων προέχεις, τοσοῦτον καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς αὐτῶν διοίσεις*.

22. *ἀλλὰ τῆς πολεμικῆς* (sc. *ἀρετῆς*). As to *πολεμικῆς* see critical note. For the connexion of military and tyrannical tendencies see Plato, Soph. 222 C and Laws 831 E sq. Isocrates had already advised Nicocles, *πολεμικὸς μὲν ἴσθι ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς* (Ad Nicocl. § 24), and we read of the good tyrant Timotheus of Heracleia on the Euxine, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς τῶν πράξεων ἀνδρείως ἐφέρετο* (Memnon ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 223 b 19 Bekk.).

23. *ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and further not only should he himself manifestly avoid outraging any of the ruled, whether boy or girl, but also the men connected with him.' For *μὴ φαίνεσθαι ὑβρίζοντα* see note on 1261 a 9 sqq., *οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον*. Dionysius the Elder sharply reproved his son Dionysius for seducing the wife of a freeman (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. Sen. 3. 175 D sq.). We

read of Cato the Censor in Plut. Marc. Cato, c. 10, *οὐ μόνον δ' αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν ἐφύλαττε καθαροὺς παντὸς λήμματος*: cp. (with Giph.) Cic. Epist. ad Quint. Fratrem, 1. 1. 3. 10. Cp. also Tac. Agric. c. 19, a se suisque orsus primum domum suam coercuit, quod plerisque haud minus arduum est quam provinciam regere.

26. *ὡς καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ὕβρεις κ.τ.λ.* Giph. refers to Dio Cass. 60. 8. 4, *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ Κλαυδίου ἔργα ἦν καὶ ὑφ' ἁπάντων ἐπηνεῖτο· ἐπράχθη δὲ καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τότε, οὐχ ὁμοιότροπα, ὑπό τε τῶν ἐξελευθέρων αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς γυναικὸς Οὐαλερίας Μεσσαλίνης.* Contrast the account given in Plin. Paneg. c. 83 sq. of the bearing of Trajan's wife and sister.

28. *περί τε τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς κ.τ.λ.* Pittacus had advised Periander of Corinth *μὴ μεθύσκεσθαι μηδὲ κωμάζειν, ἵν', ἔφη, μὴ γνωσθῇς οἷος ὢν τυγχάνεις, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷος προαιροῖῃ* (Athen. Deipn. 427 e). Aristotle probably remembers the habits and fate of the younger Dionysius, of whom it was recorded in the *Συρακοσίων Πολιτεία* ascribed to his pen, that he was sometimes drunk for ninety days together (Athen. Deipn. 435 e: Plut. Dion, c. 7). According to [Plato,] Epist. 3. 315 B he addressed the Delphic Apollo thus,

χαῖρε καὶ ἡδόμενον βίοτον διάσωζε τυράννου.

Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, is also probably referred to, for we read of his competition in luxury with Strato, king of Tyre, in Theopomp. Fragm. 126 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 299), where Theopompus says of both in words which recall the passage before us, *ἐσπούδαζον δὲ δοκεῖν εὐδαίμονες εἶναι καὶ μακαριστοί.* The phrase *εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος* indicates the height of felicity: it is used of the gods (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 24: Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 9) and of tyrants (Plato, Rep. 344 B sq.). Cp. also Plato, Rep. 354 A, Laws 718 B etc. Warnings against drinking continued for many days together would not be thrown away on Alexander (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 23). 'Diocletian flattered himself that an ostentation of splendour and luxury would subdue the imagination of the multitude' (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 13: vol. ii. p. 166, ed. 1812). For *τοὐναντίον ποιεῖν ἢ νῦν* ('as it is') *τινὲς τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν* cp. (with Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 422 sq.) Anal. Post. 1. 17. 80 b 35, *λῃστέαι γὰρ ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ προτάσεις*: cp. also Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29 sqq.

32. *θαυμάσωσιν.* So Π, except a correction in P^{s} which is of no authority: *θαυμάζωσιν* Bekk.[2] Sus. 'MS. evidence apart, *θαυμάζωσιν* seems much more natural than *θαυμάσωσιν*, for Aristotle would

naturally speak of a lasting state of admiration, but the aorist may be used here of the entrance upon a state, like *ἐθάρσησαν*, i. e. "that they may conceive, be struck with, admiration"' (Richards).

38. *μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις.* Peisistratus *μετρίως ἐχρῆτο ταῖς ἡδοναῖς* (Theopomp. Fragm. 147: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 303), and we read of Jason, tyrant of Pherae, in Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 16, *καὶ μὴν ἐγκρατέστατός γ' ἐστὶν ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδονῶν ὅστις οὐδὲ διὰ ταῦτα ἀσχολίαν ἔχει τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἀεὶ τὸ δεόμενον.*

39. *τοὐναντίον τε ποιητέον* κ.τ.λ. takes up *τοὐναντίον ποιεῖν*, 28.

τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων refers to 1313 b 18–25. See note on 1313 a 39. A tyrant builds and adorns a city in order to make his subjects poor, an *ἐπίτροπος* with a view to their well-being.

38. *ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς* κ.τ.λ. In honouring the gods and men of merit the tyrant imitates the king: cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 49 R, where Dio Chrysostom says of the king, perhaps with the passage before us in his memory, *ἔστι δὴ πρῶτον μὲν θεῶν ἐπιμελὴς καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον προτιμῶν . . . μετὰ δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελεῖται, τιμῶν μὲν καὶ ἀγαπῶν τοὺς ἀγαθούς, κηδόμενος δὲ πάντων.* Some tyrants had been wanting in reverence for the gods, for instance the tyrants of Cyrene after Battus I (Diod. 8. 30. 1), and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 14. 67. 4 and 69. 2: [Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1353 b 20 sqq., 1349 b 33 sqq.: yet Dionysius built some temples, Diod. 15. 13. 5, and sent offerings to Delphi and Olympia, Diod. 16. 57). Cypselus (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 641) and Peisistratus (ibid. 2. 343 sqq.) followed a very different policy. Alexander of Pherae paid special reverence to the Dionysus of Pagasae (Head, Hist. Num. p. 261). Maecenas in Dio Cass. 52. 36. 1 gives Augustus the same advice as Aristotle gives the tyrant here. According to Machiavelli (Prince, c. 18) 'a prince should take the greatest care to look and to speak as if he were the incarnation of pity, good faith, humanity, integrity, and religion.'

39. *ἧττόν τε γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 25, *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐλογίζετο ὡς εἰ πάντες οἱ κοινωνοῦντες θεοσεβεῖς εἶεν, ἧττον ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐθέλειν περί τε ἀλλήλους ἀνόσιόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτόν*, and Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adesp. 494 Nauck, ed. 2,

οὐδεὶς παρανομῶν πρὸς θεοὺς ἐχέγγυος.

1315 a. **1.** *τὸν ἄρχοντα.* We expect *τοὺς ἄρχοντας*, but variations in number of this kind are not rare in Aristotle's writings: see Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1448 b 7.

2. καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἧττον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hom. Il. 17. 98 sq., Aesch. Sept. c. Theb. 596, δεινὸς ὃς θεοὺς σέβει, and Pindar, Fragm. 209,

ἴσον μὲν θεὸν ἄνδρα τε φίλον (θεῷ)
ὑποτρέσσαι.

Cp. also Plut. Timol. c. 16 *sub fin.*, Diod. 14. 69. 2, and Lucian, Dial. Mort. 14. 1, where Alexander says to his father in defence of his claim to be the son of Ammon, οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀνθίστατο οἰόμενοι θεῷ μάχεσθαι, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἐκράτουν αὐτῶν. Dionysius the Elder was probably plotted against all the more because of his acts of sacrilege and impiety.

4. τούς τε ἀγαθοὺς περί τι γιγνομένους κ.τ.λ., i. e. skilled in the arts of peace or war, in oratory or in philosophy (cp. Xen. Cyneg. 1. 14, ἐγένοντο καὶ τέχνας καὶ λόγους καὶ πολέμους ἀγαθοί). The honours referred to would consist in social precedence, a place at the tyrant's table, rich dresses, etc. (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 2 sqq.: 8. 3. 3: 8. 6. 11). We read of the Persian king in Xen. Oecon. 4. 15, φασὶ δέ τινες, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης . . . καὶ ὅταν δῶρα διδῷ βασιλεύς, πρῶτον μὲν εἰσκαλεῖν τοὺς πολέμῳ ἀγαθοὺς γεγονότας . . . δεύτερον δὲ τοὺς κατασκευάζοντας τὰς χώρας ἄριστα καὶ ἐνεργοὺς ποιοῦντας κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Hdt. 3. 154 and 7. 135, and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 4. 5. It was thought kingly to honour men of merit (Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 49 R, quoted above on 1314 b 38): tyrants were often jealous of such men and ungrateful to them; thus we read in Plut. De tranq. an. c. 12, Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος οὐκ ἠγάπα μέγιστος ὢν τῶν τότε τυράννων, ἀλλ' ὅτι Φιλοξένου τοῦ ποιητοῦ μὴ βέλτιον ᾖδε, μηδὲ περιῆν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι Πλάτωνος, ὀργισθεὶς καὶ παροξυνθείς, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὰς λατομίας ἀνέβαλε (ἐνέβαλε?), τὸν δ' ἀπέδοτο πέμψας εἰς Αἴγιναν. Memnon (ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 222 b 21 sq. Bekk.) calls Clearchus, tyrant of Heracleia on the Euxine, πρὸς τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἀχάριστον (cp. Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 221 sqq.), and Pindar (Pyth. 3. 71 Bergk) is careful to speak of Hiero as οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς (cp. Isocr. Evag. § 43, τοὺς χρηστοὺς τιμῶν, and Plato, Laws 694 B). Peisistratus paid great honour to Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 31). Philip of Macedon, on the other hand, is described by Demosthenes (Ol. 2. 18) as jealous of his most efficient officers. Maecenas in Dio Cass. 52. 34. 9 gives Augustus similar advice to that given to tyrants here, and we read of Augustus in Suet. Aug. c. 38, nec parcior in bellica virtute honoranda super triginta ducibus iustos triumphos et aliquanto pluribus triumphalia ornamenta decernenda curavit. Pliny (Paneg. c. 44) perhaps has the passage before us in his memory when he says of Trajan, eadem quippe sub

principe virtutibus praemia quae in libertate, nec bene factis tantum ex conscientia merces.

6. καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμὰς κ.τ.λ., 'honours of the kind just mentioned,' i.e. honours paid to men of merit. This advice, as Giph. points out, is borrowed from Xen. Hiero, 9. 3, ἐγὼ οὖν φημὶ ἀνδρὶ ἄρχοντι τὸ μὲν τὸν ἀνάγκης δεόμενον ἄλλοις προστατεύειν εἶναι καλόν, τὸ δὲ τὰ ἆθλα ἀποδιδόναι δι' αὐτοῦ ποιητέον. Maecenas in Dio Cass. 52. 31. 4 gives similar advice to Augustus, and Machiavelli (Prince, c. 19) recommends princes to leave odious functions ('cose di carico') to others and to reserve acts of grace ('quelle di grazie') for themselves.

7. δι' ἑτέρων, ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων, 'by the agency of others, magistrates and lawcourts.' For the epexegesis of ἑτέρων by ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35, μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκκλησίαν δικαστήρια ἀρχάς, and Athen. Deipn. 21 f, ἀπὸ τοσῶν δὲ πλείους (κινήσεις φέρειν), ἐμβατηρίους καὶ χορευτικάς. Sus. following Oncken brackets ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων, but Welldon rightly abstains from following him in this. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 8 sqq., where the distribution of ungracious functions between magistrates and dicasteries is recommended.

8. κοινὴ δὲ φυλακὴ πάσης μοναρχίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1312 a 8 sqq. and c. 8. 1308 b 10 sqq. Aristotle probably thinks that Astyages and Amadocus would have been wiser if they had not heaped greatness on one person. Philip of Macedon made both Parmenio and Antipater great, and Alexander exalted no one of his generals above the rest.

10. ἐὰν δ' ἄρα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1312 a 17 sqq. It may be safe to make a Burghley great but not an Essex.

For μή τοι . . . γε see critical note on 1308 b 15.

12. κἂν τῆς δυνάμεώς κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 8. 1308 b 15 sq. Aristotle is perhaps thinking of the sudden removal of Dion from power by Dionysius II. Contrast the way in which the emperor Alexander Severus dealt with Epagathus, the principal leader in the mutiny of the praetorian guards which ended in the murder of Ulpian. Epagathus 'was removed from Rome by the honourable employment of prefect of Egypt; from that high rank he was gently degraded to the government of Crete; and when at length his popularity among the guards was effaced by time and absence, Alexander ventured to inflict the tardy but deserved punishment of his crimes' (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 6). The story of

Carmagnola illustrates Aristotle's counsel. Carmagnola had been made great by Filippo Maria Visconti, duke of Milan, but his greatness at length aroused the duke's jealousy. The duke removed him from the government of Genoa with the result that Carmagnola entered the service of Venice (H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 284). Wallenstein, suddenly dismissed by the emperor Ferdinand II, intrigued with Gustavus Adolphus (Gardiner, Thirty Years' War, p. 141). Napoleon's dismissal of Talleyrand from the office of High Chamberlain and the insults by which it was accompanied had ultimately important consequences, though they were long delayed (Chancellor Pasquier's Memoirs, Eng. Trans., vol. i. pp. 380–383).

13. The fem. form **ἀθρόος** is rare.

14. **πάσης ὕβρεως.** Under the head of *ὕβρις* fall, in addition to the two kinds here specified, verbal and other insults and arrogant outrages of all sorts.

15. **παρὰ πάσας**, 'above all others.' Eucken (Praepositionen, p. 61) compares Hist. An. 8. 19. 602a 12, *συμφέρει δὲ τοῖς κορακίνοις ὡς εἰπεῖν παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἰχθῦς τὰ αὐχμώδη μᾶλλον τῶν ὑγρῶν.* Cp. also Plato, Rep. 424 B, *παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι.*

τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα [κολάσεως]. See critical note. For the phrase *ὕβρις εἰς τὰ σώματα* cp. Demosth. c. Mid. c. 179, *πολλὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ μὴ τὸ σῶμα ἕκαστον ὑβρίζεσθαι πεποιήκασιν οἱ νόμοι.*

17. For the distinction between **ὀλιγωρία εἰς τὰ χρήματα** and **ὀλιγωρία εἰς ἀτιμίαν** cp. c. 8. 1308 a 9 sq. The latter phrase evidently includes both the infliction of bodily punishment in a spirit of outrage and *ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ὁμιλία.* The word **ὀλιγωρία** here takes the place of *ὕβρις*, but it is properly a wider term (Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 13 sqq.). For *ὀλιγωρία εἰς τὰ χρήματα* cp. Demosth. Or. 38. in Nausim. c. 21, *τῶν εἰς χρήματα γιγνομένων ἀδικημάτων.* For *οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων* see note on 1281 b 10.

20. **ἢ τὰς μὲν κολάσεις κ.τ.λ.**, 'or manifestly to inflict the punishments which he inflicts in a paternal spirit.' The tyrant Alexander of Pherae is described in Plut. Pelop. c. 29 as inflicting punishment in sport (see J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy—Age of the Despots, p. 138, for an account of the similar atrocities practised by Giovanni Maria Visconti). Aristotle has especially in view the treatment of Smerdis by Penthilus and of Decamnichus by Archelaus (c. 10. 1311 b 28 sqq.). Isocrates had already given tyrants similar advice (Ad Nicocl. § 23, cp. Evag. § 43, *νομίμως δὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτόντας*

κολάζων). It will be observed that Aristotle's counsel refers only to the punishment of φιλότιμοι, though he might well have extended it to punishment in general.

23. ὅλως δέ, 'and broadly,' i.e. in whatever way the apparent slight may have been inflicted, whether in connexion with punishment or ὁμιλία or other matters. Philip of Macedon did endeavour to conciliate Pausanias in the way which Aristotle recommends, but without success (Diod. 16. 93. 9). See note on 1311 b 1.

24. τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθοράν. For the use of ἐπί with the acc. in Aristotle's writings to express the end or aim, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 39 sq., and see Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 58, where De Part. An. 3. 1. 661 a 36, τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἡ τῶν ὀδόντων φύσις κοινὴ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐργασίαν ὑπάρχει, is quoted among other passages. See also Bon. Ind. 268 b 59 sqq.

28. ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν. Decamnichus, Crataeas, Pausanias belong to the former category, Aristogeiton and the two regicides of Aenus to the latter. For the phrase cp. Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 12 and 2. 6. 1383 b 19.

30. Ἡράκλειτος. Heraclit. Fragm. 105 (Bywater). There is a tacit allusion to the saying in Plato, Laws 863 B, ὁ θυμός, δύσφορα καὶ δύσμαχον κτῆμα ἐμπεφυκός, and Rep. 375 B (quoted in note on 1328 a 6). Cp. also Seneca, Epist. 4, quisquis vitam suam contempsit tuae dominus est. For ψυχῆς ὠνεῖσθαι cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 1. 36, κἂν τῆς ψυχῆς πριαίμην ὥστε μήποτε λατρεῦσαι ταύτην, and Eurip. Med. 915 Bothe, 967 Dindorf,

τῶν δ' ἐμῶν παίδων φυγὰς
ψυχῆς ἂν ἀλλαξαίμεθ', οὐ χρυσοῦ μόνον.

33. μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους κ.τ.λ. This is the case in a true kingship (c. 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.). So we read of Darius in Plato, Laws 695 D, φιλίαν πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσι Πέρσαις, χρήμασι καὶ δωρεαῖς τὸν Περσῶν δῆμον προσαγόμενος. Peisistratus succeeded to a large extent in winning the good will of both classes (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 16. l. 36 sqq.). When in c. 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. tyranny is described as making war on the γνώριμοι, Aristotle is no doubt referring to the policy usually adopted by tyrants, though it was not the only policy open to them.

34. καὶ τοὺς ἑτέρους ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων ἀδικεῖσθαι μηδέν. Supply διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν ('as a consequence of his rule'), which is common to both clauses, though it is placed in the first. The same thing is

often noticeable in Thucydides: see Classen's Thucydides, ed. 2, Einleitung, p. lxxxv.

35. ὁπότεροι δ' ἂν ὦσι κρείττους κ.τ.λ. This is in accordance with the principle laid down in c. 9. 1309 b 16 sqq. Euripides had placed in the mouth of one of his characters (Fragm. 171),

δεῖ τοῖσι πολλοῖς τὸν τύραννον ἁνδάνειν.

Dionysius the Elder sought to win the many (Diod. 14. 70. 3), and Machiavelli (Discorsi, 1. 40) advises tyrants always to make the people their friends. Gelon, on the other hand, seems to have favoured the rich (Hdt. 7. 156).

τούτους ἰδίους μάλιστα ποιεῖσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cp. Diod. 18. 8. 2, *ἅμα δὲ βουλόμενος ἔχειν ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει πολλοὺς ἰδίους ταῖς εὐνοίαις πρὸς τοὺς νεωτερισμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἀποστάσεις τῶν Ἑλλήνων.*

36. ἂν ὑπάρξῃ τοῦτο τοῖς πράγμασιν, 'if their good will and support are given to his interests.' For *τοῖς πράγμασιν*, cp. 1. 11. 1259 a 30 sq. and Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 127–8, *τὰ Φιλίππου πράγματα, τὰ Κερσοβλέπτου πράγματα.*

37. οὔτε δούλων ἐλευθέρωσιν . . . οὔτε ὅπλων παραίρεσιν. Tyrants often set slaves free in order to add them to their body-guard (Plato, Rep. 567 E). We hear of this being done by Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8): compare what we read of Dionysius the Elder in Diod. 14. 58. 1 and of Clearchus of Heracleia on the Euxine in Justin, 16. 5. 2. Cp. also Aristot. Fragm. 356. 1538 a 24 sqq. Xenophon (Hiero, 6. 5) had put in the mouth of Hiero a complaint that the tyrant's position left him no choice but to set slaves free. Aristotle here tacitly replies to this remark and contends that the tyrant is not obliged either to do this or to disarm the citizens. Success in conciliating both rich and poor, however, does not seem to have enabled Peisistratus to dispense with the latter measure (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 15. l. 13 sq.: c. 16. l. 36 sqq.), though we do not hear of his freeing slaves. Aristotle may possibly have before him the example set by Cleommis tyrant of Methymna (Isocr. Epist. 7. 8 sq.). In [Demosth.] De Foed. cum Alex. c. 15, *δούλων ἀπελευθερώσεις ἐπὶ νεωτερισμῷ* are grouped with *γῆς ἀναδασμοί* and *χρεῶν ἀποκοπαί* and other similar measures.

38. ἱκανὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For *ἱκανός* followed by *ὥστε* cp. Plato, Laws 875 A, and see Stallbaum on Polit. 295 A. The subject of *κρείττους εἶναι* appears to be 'those attacked.' *Τῇ δυνάμει*, 'his power.'

1315 b. 1. **οἰκονόμων καὶ βασιλικόν.** See note on 1314 b 7.

2. **μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλ' ἐπίτροπον.** See note on 1314 b 16. The *ἐπίτροπος* administers for the benefit not of himself but of another (Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 12 sqq.). Compare Spartian. Hadrianus, c. 8, et in contione et in senatu saepe dixit (Hadrianus) ita se rem publicam gesturum ut sciret populi rem esse, non propriam.

καὶ τὰς μετριότητας τοῦ βίου διώκειν, μὴ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, i.e. moderation in pleasures (1314 b 28 sqq.) and in expenditure on them and on gifts (1314 b 1 sqq.) and buildings (1314 b 36 sqq.) Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 14, *ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπιεικὲς καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φαμέν.* We read of the well-known physician Mnesitheus (see note on 1335 a 41) in a fragment of the *Σύντροφοι* of Alexis (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 481),

Μνησίθεος γάρ φησι δεῖν
φεύγειν ἁπάντων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἀεί,

so that the principle had found its way into medicine.

3. **ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους καθομιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς δημαγωγεῖν.** The difference between *καθομιλεῖν* and *δημαγωγεῖν* is illustrated by *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 16, where we read of Peisistratus, *ἐβούλοντο γὰρ καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν [δημο]τικῶν οἱ πολλοί· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις τοὺς δὲ ταῖς εἰς τὰ ἴδια βοηθείαις προ[σ]ήγετο* (cp. Plato, Laws 695 D. *χρήμασι καὶ δωρεαῖς τὸν Περσῶν δῆμον προσαγόμενος*). Aristotle does not advise the tyrant *καθομιλεῖν τοὺς πολλούς*, 'to win the many by daily companionship'; he must win them by benefactions (c. 12. 1315 b 17 sq.). Dionysius the Elder *φιλανθρώποις λόγοις χρησάμενος καθωμίλει τὰ πλήθη, καὶ τισὶν μὲν δωρεαῖς ἑτοίμα, τισὶν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ συσσίτια παρελάμβανε* (Diod. 14. 70. 3), but companionship of this kind is not what Aristotle recommends to the tyrant.

5. **τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω** κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25 sqq. This was the aim of Hipparchus according to [Plato,] Hipparch. 228 C, *ταῦτα δ' ἐποίει βουλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἵνα ὡς βελτίστων αὐτῶν ἄρχοι, οὐκ οἰόμενος δεῖν οὐδενὶ σοφίας φθονεῖν, ἅτε ὢν καλός τε κἀγαθός.*

7. **ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν** κ.τ.λ. The correspondence should be noted between 5–7, *τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω*, and *μηδὲ μισούμενον καὶ φοβούμενον διατελεῖν* on the one hand, and 7–10, *τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πολυχρονιωτέραν* and *ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν* κ.τ.λ. on the other. For the awkward repetition of *τὴν ἀρχήν* see critical note on 1319 a 33. There is more excuse for it than for the iteration in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 10,

ἐν σὐδεμιᾷ γὰρ πόλει τὸ βέλτιστον εὔνουν ἐστὶ τῷ δήμῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ κάκιστον ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἐστὶ πόλει εὔνουν τῷ δήμῳ.

8. *ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν διακεῖσθαι* κ.τ.λ. Plato had said of the tyrant in Rep. 580 A, *ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονερῷ, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ, καὶ πάσης κακίας παντοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ.* Isocrates, on the other hand, had claimed in Hel. § 34 that Theseus *ἐπέδειξεν ὅτι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἅμα τυραννεῖν καὶ μηδὲν χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι τῶν ἐξ ἴσου πολιτευομένων.* Aristotle agrees rather with Isocrates than with Plato.

9. The phrase (*διακεῖσθαι*) *ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα* is a remarkable one, and I have not noticed any parallel to it.

11. [*Καίτοι—89. παντελῶς*]. I follow Sus. in bracketing this passage. See Sus.[2], Note 1745. As Spengel (Aristot. Studien, 3. 63) has already pointed out, the reference to oligarchy seems quite out of place in a part of the Book which is concerned with monarchies only. Nothing further, indeed, is said on the subject of oligarchy. Again, it is implied in 11, *πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν*, that tyranny is a constitution, whereas (with the one exception of c. 10. 1312 a 39 sq.) monarchies are distinguished from constitutions throughout the Book. Sus.[2] remarks in Note 1756 on the omission of any reference to the tyranny of Dionysius I and his successors at Syracuse, which lasted (with a break under Dion and Callippus) fifty-seven or fifty-eight years, but neither is there any reference to the tyranny of Heracleia on the Euxine, which was founded by Clearchus in B. C. 364 and lasted till B. C. 285 (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 190), so that at the time at which the Politics was written it had already lasted more than thirty years. Nor is anything said about the tyranny of Pherae, which seems to have been founded by Lycophron towards the end of the fifth century B. C. (Diod. 14. 82. 5) and which lasted till B. C. 352 (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 11, 13). It is hardly likely that Aristotle would have omitted to take these tyrannies into account, though we can understand the omission of semi-Oriental tyrannies like those of Cyprus and of tyrannies like those of Cyrene and Panticapaeum, which might be regarded as kingships. As to the short duration of tyrannies cp. Isocr. Epist. 4. § 6 and Ael. Var. Hist. 6. 13. Some Greek oligarchies lasted a long time; that of Corinth, for instance, lasted (with a break of five years in B. C. 392–387) from B. C. 583 till long after the Politics was written (Gilbert, 2. 90). C. 12.

12. *πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον* κ.τ.λ. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2,

1. 661. 4) takes the tyranny of the Orthagoridae to have lasted from about B.C. 665 to an uncertain date in the sixth century, probably several years later than B.C. 576 or 572 (p. 666 sq.). Cp. Strabo, p. 382, *ἐτυραννήθη δὲ (ἡ Σικυὼν) πλεῖστον χρόνον, καὶ ἀεὶ τοὺς τυράννους ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας ἔσχεν.* As Eaton remarks, the Delphic oracle had predicted for this tyranny a duration of a hundred years (Diod. 8. 24). For *πλείστον ἐγένετο χρόνον*, cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 44 *init.*, *καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε πλείω χρόνον οὔτε δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι* (sc. *ἐπιστάτην*).

13. **ἡ τῶν Ὀρθαγόρου παίδων καὶ αὐτοῦ Ὀρθαγόρου.** These words imply, as Busolt points out (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 661. 4), that the tyrants of Sicyon after Orthagoras were his sons, whereas, according to Hdt. 6. 126, Andreas, who is thought to be identical with Orthagoras, was the great-grandfather of Cleisthenes, the tyrant of Sicyon. See note on 1316 a 29. Busolt prefers the account of Herodotus, as he does not think it likely that a tyranny of two generations only can have lasted a hundred years.

14. **τούτου δ' αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.** Those who assailed tyrannies were commonly influenced by feelings of hatred or contempt (c. 10. 1312 b 17 sqq.), and the Orthagoridae could be neither hated nor despised. They courted their subjects, and one of them at any rate, Cleisthenes, was formidable in war; and the fact that they exercised their power for the most part in subordination to the laws would tend to assimilate it to that of a king (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 9 sqq.) and to make it more durable.

17. **ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις ἐδημαγώγουν**, 'they courted their subjects by their acts of attention.' Cp. Isocr. Hel. § 37, *τῇ μὲν ἐξουσίᾳ τυραννῶν, ταῖς δ' εὐεργεσίαις δημαγωγῶν*, and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 16, l. 37, *τοῖς δὲ ταῖς εἰς τὰ ἴδια βοηθείαις προ[σ]ήγετο.*

18. **λέγεται γοῦν Κλεισθένης . . . ὡς ἐστεφάνωσεν.** For the construction cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 1, *ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀθήνησι προεστηκότων ἐλέγοντό τινες ὡς γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ.*

τὸν ἀποκρίναντα τῆς νίκης αὐτόν. The construction in Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 149, *τὸν Λεωκράτους ἀποψηφιζόμενον θάνατον*, or in Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 26, *καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων*, is not quite similar, and I have not happened to meet with an exact parallel to this use of *ἀποκρίνειν*.

19. **ἔνιοι δ' εἰκόνα κ.τ.λ.** If Cleisthenes placed in the agora, or allowed to be placed there, a statue of the judge who refused him the victory, this would be to do him a still greater honour than

crowning him: cp. Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 101, *περιεῖδες αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ χαλκοῦν σταθέντα καὶ τῆς ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως κεκοινωνηκότα τοῖς Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἀπογόνοις*, and Rhet. 1. 9. 1368 a 16 sqq. For *τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καθήμενον* cp. Paus. 2. 20. 1, *ἄγαλμα καθήμενον Διὸς Μειλιχίου*, and 9. 2. 7.

21. **φασὶ δὲ καὶ Πεισίστρατον κ.τ.λ.** *Ὑπομεῖναι* is probably 'to be taken closely with the participle: see Liddell and Scott' (Richards). For the fact cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 16 and Plut. Solon, c. 31, where we learn that the charge was one of homicide and that the accuser was afraid to appear. Compare as to Augustus Suet. Aug. c. 56, and as to Trajan Plin. Paneg. c. 36.

22. **δευτέρα δὲ περὶ Κόρινθον ἡ τῶν Κυψελιδῶν.** The term Cypselidae, as here used, seems to include Cypselus. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 638. 1, 639. 1) places the tyranny of Cypselus in B.C. 657–627, that of Periander in B.C. 627–586, and that of Psammetichus in B.C. 586–3.

26. **τέτταρα.** See critical note.

Ψαμμίτιχος. In Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 60 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 394) the name of the son of Gorgus who succeeded Periander at Corinth is given as Cypselus, not Psammetichus.

27. **καὶ ταύτης,** 'of [the durability of] this tyranny also.'

ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 29 sqq. Cypselus is described as king, and Periander as tyrant, of Corinth in Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 393), and we read in Fragm. 58, *Κύψελος δὲ Κορίνθου πράως ἦρχεν οὔτε δορυφόρους ἔχων οὔτ' ἀποθύμιος ὢν Κορινθίοις.* Cp. [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebus-publ. 5: Diog. Laert. 1. 98. Herodotus' account (5. 92. 5) is different and less favourable to Cypselus. For *κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν* ('omni suo principatu,' Vict.) cp. c. 7. 1307 a 4, *ὁ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον.*

28. **Περίανδρος δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59, *ἐστρατεύετο δὲ συνεχῶς (Περίανδρος) καὶ ἦν πολεμικός.*

31. **ὥστ' ἐν ἔτεσι κ.τ.λ.** According to *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 17 *init.* and c. 19 *sub fin.* Peisistratus ruled not seventeen but nineteen years, and his sons not eighteen but about seventeen, so that the total would be not thirty-five years but thirty-six, which agrees with Hdt. 5. 65. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 17 is in accord with the passage before us in reckoning thirty-three years from the time when Peisistratus first became tyrant to his death, but *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 19 reckons forty-nine years from the first acquisition of the tyranny to the fall of the dynasty, whereas

the passage before us reckons fifty-one (33 + 18). As Kirchner (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 383 sqq.) points out, the two passages in the Ἀθ. Πολ. are not in agreement with each other as to the number of years which elapsed between the time when Peisistratus first became tyrant and his death, for according to Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 19 thirty-two years (forty-nine, *minus* seventeen) elapsed, and according to Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 17 thirty-three. Kirchner thinks that the inconsistency arises from a difference in the mode in which the years are counted in the two passages. In Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 17 (as also in the passage before us) the year which forms the 'terminus ad quem' is reckoned in, while in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 19 it is not.

34. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κ.τ.λ. Supply πλείστον ἐγένετο χρόνον (cp. 1315 b 12). 'This again is not correct, for Anaxilaus of Rhegium (e. g.) himself reigned eighteen years from B. C. 494 to 476 (Diod. 11. 48. 2), and his sons were not expelled till after the fall of Thrasybulus (Diod. 11. 76. 5).' I translate from Sus.², Note 1760. The fall of Thrasybulus happened in B. C. 466.

For ἡ περὶ Ἱέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα (sc. τυραννίς) cp. Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 2, τὴν περὶ Φίλιππον τυραννίδα. Hence there is no need to insert τῶν (with Bojesen and Sus.) before περὶ Ἱέρωνα.

35. ἔτη δ' οὐδ' αὐτὴ κ.τ.λ. See as to this passage Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 779. 3. Diod. 11. 38. 7 makes Gelon reign seven years, but Hiero eleven and eight months, and Thrasybulus his successor is said in Diod. 11. 66. 4 to have reigned one year. Busolt adopts Diodorus' account of the duration of Hiero's reign in preference to that of the passage before us, thinking that it rests on the testimony of Timaeus, who is said to have had the merit of chronological exactness. As Sus.² (Note 1700) points out, in the passage before us Thrasybulus is regarded as the successor of Hiero, whereas in c. 10. 1312 b 10 sqq. it is apparently implied that the son of Gelon was on the throne after Hiero's death.

37. δέκα δ' Ἱέρων, sc. ἐτυράννευσε.

40. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Here after a nominative prefixed to the sentence a change of construction occurs in σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων: see note on 1306 b 9. The sentence would have been more regularly constructed if its closing words had been ὅσα τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, as in 2. 12. 1274 b 27 sq., and not σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων.

1316 a. **1.** ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ—**b 27.** ὁ Σωκράτης. See vol. i. p. 519, note 1, as to this passage. The article is prefixed to Σωκράτους

because the Socrates of the dialogue is referred to (see critical note on 1261 b 19). In 2. 1. 1261 a 6 we have *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος*, but in 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 32 sq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10 sq. *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ* as here. Compare as to the fault here found with the Platonic Socrates Magn. Mor. 1. 1. 1182 a 11, *πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρησε Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ· τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος.* Aristotle goes even further here. He holds that the overthrow of the best constitution should be traced to causes not only special to constitutions in general as distinguished from other things, but special to it. In a similar spirit he undertakes in c. 5. 1304 b 19 sqq. to trace the causes of overthrow special to each existing constitution.

3. *τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὔσης* κ.τ.λ. Cp. 28, *τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην*: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 19, *παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν*: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 24, *τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην.* *Πρώτης* here probably means something more than merely 'first on the list'; it means rather *τῆς κυριωτάτης*, for the word is often used by Aristotle in this sense (Bon. Ind. 653 a 26 sqq.). It is implied that to omit to assign a mode of change special to itself to an entity so supreme as the best constitution, the constitution *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, is a very serious omission.

4. *φησὶ γὰρ* κ.τ.λ., 'for he says that the cause [of its change] is that nothing [that comes into existence] abides, but that everything changes in a period of some kind, and that the source [of change] is contained in those things whose ratio 4 : 3 taken in its lowest terms, wedded to the number 5, furnishes two harmonies, meaning [that this happens] when the number of this diagram becomes cubed, his view being that nature occasionally brings into existence individuals bad and beyond the influence of the education, speaking perhaps truly so far as this particular remark is concerned' etc. See on the subject of the Nuptial Number of Plato Sus.[2], Note 1763; Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 423, note 110; Mr. J. Adam, The Nuptial Number of Plato, its Solution and Significance, and Mr. D. B. Monro's remarks in *Class. Rev.* 6. 152 sqq., 242 sqq., together with those of Mr. Adam, ibid. 6. 240 sqq. The words *ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται* are quoted *verbatim* from the famous passage of Plato, Rep. 546 C, where they are followed by the words *τρὶς αὐξηθείς*: Aristotle omits these two words, substituting for them (by way of explanation,

according to Zeller, *loc. cit.*, and Mr. Monro, *Class. Rev.* 6. 154 b) the words λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός. 'In Plato's language τρίτη αὔξη denotes the "third dimension" or so-called "solid" numbers, and in particular the cube' (Mr. Monro, ibid. 6. 154 a), so that τρὶς αὐξηθείς would seem to mean 'when cubed.' The antecedent of ὧν in the passage before us is τούτων and in the passage of the Republic probably αὐξήσεις. though Zeller prefers to take πάντα as the antecedent. 'The ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν can only be the numbers 3 and 4 themselves, for πυθμένες means (Theon, Math. 125 sq. Bull.) for any arithmetical relation οἱ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις καὶ πρώτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους λόγοις ὄντες (ἀριθμοὶ) . . . ἐπιτρίτων δὲ ὁ τῶν δ πρὸς γ" (Zeller, *loc. cit.*). 'No one doubts that the explanation' of ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν—τρὶς αὐξηθείς 'turns upon the figure known as the Pythagorean triangle, that is to say. the right-angled triangle whose sides are represented by the numbers, 3, 4, 5' (Mr. Monro, *Class. Rev.* 6. 153 b). Ἥπτηται συζυγείς seems a natural phrase to express the circumstance that the two sides which exhibit the ratio 4 : 3 are "yoked together" in the Pythagorean triangle with the number 5, which is the hypotenuse' (Mr. Monro, *Class. Rev.* 6. 154 a). As to ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου see Mr. Adam, Nuptial Number of Plato, pp. 15, 23 sq. Zeller (*loc. cit.*) explains δύο ἁρμονίας as 'two series of numbers progressing in a definite arithmetical ratio.' As to the question what the 'two harmonies' are and how they are generated from the wedding of the ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν with the number 5, reference must be made to the authorities cited above. Not a little light has been thrown on this question by the labours of a succession of learned men, but there is much that remains obscure, and as Plato himself places his dark and oracular deliverance on this subject in the mouth of the Muses and hints that they utter it in a playful mood, it is doubtful whether he meant the enigma to have a solution. Some, however, among whom are Zeller and Susemihl, believe that it was comprehended by Aristotle and others, which implies that it is not incomprehensible. It is not perhaps certain that Aristotle understood it. It is true that he does not complain of the obscurity of the passage, as we should expect him to do, but his words of approval, as Mr. Monro points out (*Class. Rev.* 6. 243 b), relate only to the remark of Plato that nature sometimes brings into being individuals incapable of being made what they ought to be even by the best

education. Some light may possibly be thrown on the reason why Plato introduced this mathematical puzzle into the Republic by a story told of him in Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 7, where he is made to account for an oracle commanding that the altar at Delos should be doubled, a command which the Delians for want of geometrical knowledge were unable to obey, by saying *προσπαίζειν τὸν θεὸν Ἕλλησιν, ὀλιγωροῦσι παιδείας, οἷον ἐφυβρίζοντα τὴν ἀμαθίαν ἡμῶν καὶ κελεύοντα γεωμετρίας ἅπτεσθαι μὴ παρέργως.* Cp. Plato, Laws 819 D sq.

8. ὡς τῆς φύσεώς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 25 sqq., with which Dr. Sandys (*Class. Rev.* 5. 308) compares Pindar, Nem. 6. 9 sqq. Bergk and 11. 40 sqq. Compare also a saying of Plato's quoted by Plutarch in De Cohib. Ira, c. 16, *καὶ γὰρ Ἑλικῶνα τὸν μαθηματικὸν οὕτως ἐπαινεῖν φησὶν (ὁ Πλάτων), ὡς φύσει εὐμετάβολον ζῷον, καὶ τοὺς τεθραμμένους ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶς δεδιέναι, μὴ ἄνθρωποι καὶ σπέρματα ἀνθρώπων ὄντες ἐκφήνωσί που τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀσθένειαν.*

14. καὶ διά γε τοῦ χρόνου κ.τ.λ., 'yes, and is it through the influence of time, to which he ascribes the change of everything, that things also which have not come into being contemporaneously change contemporaneously? For instance, if a thing came into being the day before the revolution of things, does it then change contemporaneously [with things which came into being long before]?' For *καὶ . . . γε*, 'yes, and,' cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 12 and 2. 5. 1263 b 37: Xen. Hiero, 2. 1: Plato, Gorg. 450 D, Epist. 7. 325 C. Mr. Adam (*Class. Rev.* 5. 446) identifies the *τροπή* here mentioned with the *μεγίστη καὶ τελεωτάτη τροπή* of Plato, Polit. 270 B.

18. ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει, sc. *ἡ πολιτεία*: cp. c. 1. 1301 a 22, *ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται* (sc. *αἱ πολιτεῖαι*), and c. 7. 1307 a 28, *εἰς ἔλαττον (τίμημα) μετέβη* (sc. *ἡ πολιτεία*). Ἡ *πολιτεία* or *αἱ πολιτεῖαι* or *τὴν πολιτείαν* should similarly be supplied in 21, 23, 35, 40, b 11, and 20.

πλεονάκις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 7. 1307 a 20–27 and Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 21 sq. What constitutions are 'contrary' to each other may be gathered to some extent from the former passage and from c. 10. 1312 b 4 sqq. It should be noticed that though we often hear of the normal constitutions changing into the deviation-forms (i. e. of kingship changing into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and polity into democracy), we seldom hear of the deviation-forms changing into the normal constitutions, and never of tyranny changing into kingship, though in 33 we hear of tyrannies changing

into aristocracies. Deviation-forms, however, seem freely to have changed into each other. Perhaps what Aristotle says here of constitutional change is less true of modern Europe than it was of ancient Greece, where constitutional change was usually sweeping and sudden.

21. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Λακωνικῆς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 C sqq. 555 B sqq., 562 A sqq.

22. εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ ἐκ δημοκρατίας. For the reversal in the order of the words in *ἐκ δὲ ταύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ ἐκ δημοκρατίας* see note on 1277 a 31, and cp. 1316 b 11, 12, where *εἰς δῆμον ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας* is followed by *ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν*.

24. ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. Cp. c. 5. 1304 b 20—1305 a 7.

καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς μοναρχίαν. Aristotle thought that democracies were less apt to change into tyranny than they once were (c. 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.), though he held that they were still liable to do so (c. 8. 1308 a 20 sqq.), and that this was especially true of the extreme democracy (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sq.).

27. ἀόριστον γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for this is not determinable, since [the only account which it was open to him to give of it is an unsatisfactory one, for] according to him the change from tyranny ought to be into the first and the best constitution, [which is absurd].' The words *ἀόριστον γάρ* have been interpreted in two ways: see Giph. p. 752, who apparently prefers the second of the two interpretations given by him—'propterea quod res sit *infinita* . . . id est, quod non ita una mutatio ut priorum quatuor, sed multiplex et infinita sit tyrannidis, quae alias aliter et *in aliam* rempublicam mutatur . . . Haud scio tamen an non aliter accipi possit illud *ἀόριστον γάρ*, non pro infinito sed pro *inexplicabili*.' Sus., followed by Welldon, who translates, 'no precise determination of the question is possible,' appears to adopt Giphanius' second interpretation, and is probably right in this.

28. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο συνεχὲς καὶ κύκλος. Just before Plato reveals his Nuptial Number in Rep. 546 B sqq., he has spoken of *κύκλοι* in 546 A, *οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζῴοις φορᾶ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἑκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς ξυνάπτωσι*. Thus he might be expected to make his series of constitutional changes move in a circle and repeat itself. There was a proverb *κύκλος τὰ ἀνθρώπινα* (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 492): see Bon. Ind. 570 b 1, where reference is made to Phys. 4. 14. 223 b 24 sqq. and Probl. 17. 3. 916 a 24 sqq.

Polybius *does* thus arrange changes of constitution (6. 9. 10, *αὕτη πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις, αὕτη φύσεως οἰκονομία, καθ' ἣν μεταβάλλει καὶ μεθίσταται καὶ πάλιν εἰς αὐτὰ καταντᾷ τὰ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας*). The view that Nature moves in a circle and returns into herself was held by Heraclitus: see Plut. De EI Delphico, c. 8. 388 C–E, and Bywater on Heraclit. Fragm. 22.

29. ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννὶς κ.τ.λ. Cleisthenes of Sicyon seems from Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 61 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 394) to have won the tyranny from his brothers Myron and Isodemus, grandsons apparently of the Myron whom Herodotus (6. 126) and Pausanias (2. 8. 1) name as the grandfather of Cleisthenes (see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 661. 4). According to this account Isodemus was induced by Cleisthenes to slay the tyrant Myron, who had seduced his wife, and to share the tyranny with Cleisthenes. To purge his homicide, however, he went into exile for a year, and Cleisthenes forbade his return. The succession of one tyranny to another may be traced also in the history of mediaeval Italy. Thus, when the Gonzagas acquired the tyranny of Mantua, which they retained till the eighteenth century, they dispossessed an earlier tyrant. Passerino de' Bonacossi, tyrant of Mantua, had offered an affront to the wife of one of them, and they assassinated him on Aug. 14, 1328, and took his place (Sismondi, Italian Republics, p. 141).

31. ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Χαλκίδι ἡ Ἀντιλέοντος. See note on 1304 a 29.

32. καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις. Elsewhere in the Politics we gather that 'the tyranny of Gelon's house' (*τῶν Γέλωνος*: see, with Richards, Krüger, Gr. Gr. § 47. 5. 2) was succeeded by a polity or aristocracy (see note on 1304 a 27).

33. καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ Χαριλάου ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ . . . ἐν Καρχηδόνι. There were two traditions as to the rule of the Lacedaemonian king Charilaus, one that it was too mild (Plut. Lycurg. c. 5), the other that it was tyrannical ([Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 2. 3 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 210: [Plato,] Epist. 8. 354 B). Aristotle here follows the latter tradition, and may possibly refer to Charilaus among others in c. 10. 1310 b 18 sqq. and 1313 a 1 sqq. Contrast the statement in Xen. Ages. 1. 4, *οἵ τε βασιλεῖς* (i. e. the Lacedaemonian kings) *οὐδεπώποτε μειζόνων ὠρέχθησαν ἢ ἐφ' οἷσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν βασιλείαν παρέλαβον*. When Aristotle implies here that a tyranny once existed at Carthage, it is difficult to reconcile his statement with 2. 11. 1272 b 32 sq. But

more than one statement in this part of c. 12 is inconsistent with statements contained in other parts of the Politics (see vol. I p. 519, note 1, and above on 1316 a 32). As to the existence of a small lacuna before ἐν Καρχηδόνι see critical note on 1316 a 34.

34. καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, sc. ἡ πολιτεία (see above on 1316 a 18). This remark is made in further correction of Plato, who had represented tyranny as preceded by democracy.

35. ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν ἀρχαίων, sc. ὀλιγαρχιῶν. Gelon's tyranny at Syracuse was preceded by a democracy (c. 3. 1302 b 31 sq.), but this was an exception.

36. ἐν Λεοντίνοις κ.τ.λ. For Panaetius cp. c. 10. 1310 b 29 sqq., and see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 56 sqq., for Cleander Freeman, 2. 104 and for Anaxilaus of Rhegium (which is mentioned here as if it were in Sicily) Freeman, 2. 107.

39. ἄτοπον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D sqq., 551 A. Aristotle appears to agree with Plato in 3. 15. 1286 b 14 sqq.

1316 b. 1. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq.

3. ἐν πολλαῖς τε ὀλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ., 'and [so far from its being an accompaniment of oligarchy that the holders of office engage in money-making occupations,] in many oligarchies they are not allowed to do so and there are laws to prevent it, and in Carthage though it is a democratically governed State [and not an oligarchy] the holders of office *do* engage in occupations of this kind and yet no change of constitution has so far taken place.' The statement that Carthage was a democratically governed State is of course inconsistent with 2. 11 and with 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq., where it is said to be aristocratically governed. This, however, affords no ground for rejecting the reading δημοκρατουμένη, for several remarks made in this chapter are inconsistent with statements contained in other parts of the Politics (see note on 1316 a 33). Still the sense of the passage would be improved if we read τιμοκρατουμένη in place of δημοκρατουμένη. I cannot give any reference for the word τιμοκρατουμένη except to Mich. Ephes. in Eth. Nic. K, p. 611. 10 Heylbut (quoted in Sus.[2a] p. xli), but in Plato's view (Rep. 545 B, 550 D) it is the τιμοκρατία that changes into oligarchy when the rulers come to be lovers of gain, not the ἀριστοκρατία, and Schneider's emendation ἀριστοκρατουμένη, which is adopted by Sus. and also by Meltzer (Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 459), seems to be open to objection on this ground, as well as on that of the difficulty of accounting for the

change of *ἀριστοκρατουμένη* into *δημοκρατουμένη*. I must admit, however, that I cannot prove that Aristotle regarded Carthage as a *τιμοκρατία* of the kind described in the Republic, though he may well have done so. As to the existence in oligarchies of laws forbidding holders of offices to trade, see note on 1278 a 25. Laws forbidding the ruling nobility to trade existed in the oligarchy of Venice (Houssaye, Hist. du Gouvernement de Venise, 1. 25).

6. *ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις* κ.τ.λ. This refers to Plato, Rep. 551 D. Aristotle thinks (2. 5. 1264 a 24 sqq.) that Plato's own ideal State described in the Republic is open to this criticism, and indeed many democracies (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 4 sq.).

8. *τί γὰρ αὐτῇ* κ.τ.λ., 'for what happens to this more than to the Laconian,' etc.?

10. *οὐδενὸς δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου* κ.τ.λ. This refers to Plato, Rep. 552 A sqq., 555 B sqq. Aristotle passes on here to another assertion of Plato's, the assertion that oligarchies change into democracies through the impoverishment of the citizens. This assertion also he probably regards as *ἄτοπος*. Sus. transposes *οὐδενός*, 10—*νοῦν*, 14, to after *πολιτείαν*, 21, where however the passage interrupts Aristotle's enumeration of the 'many causes' which bring about the fall of oligarchies. *Καὶ ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν* κ.τ.λ. is added in further correction of Plato, who had made democracy change into tyranny.

14. *πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι' ἃν γίγνονται αἱ μεταβολαί*. This refers to Plato, Rep. 555 D. Aristotle has just said that Plato attributes the change of oligarchy into democracy to a cause to which it is not always attributable, and now he adds that Plato passes over many causes of that change in silence. Thus over and above an error of commission he is guilty of a huge error of omission. For *δι' ἃν* (*αἰτιῶν*) cp. 1. 9. 1258 a 9, *δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο* (*πορίζειν*) *πειρῶνται*, and Plato, Tim. 57 C, *ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἄκρατα καὶ πρῶτα σώματα, διὰ τοιούτων αἰτιῶν γέγονε*. *Αἱ μεταβολαί* appears to mean 'the changes of oligarchy into democracy.'

15. *οὐ λέγει ἀλλὰ μίαν*. For *ἀλλά* thus used see Bon. Ind. 33 b 14 sqq., where Eth. Nic. 10. 5. 1176 a 21, *ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις*, is quoted among other passages.

18. *ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν* κ.τ.λ. As to the consequences of the impoverishment of leading men see c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq., *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 13. l. 12 sqq., and Plut. Aristid. c. 13. Aristotle does not always treat the impoverishment of others than leading men so lightly as

he does here: cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 10 sqq. and 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 36 sqq. etc.

22. καὶν ἀδικῶνται ἢ ὑβρίζωνται. Here *ἀδικία* is distinguished from *ὕβρις* (cp. Plato, Soph. 229 A, Laws 691 C and 906 A, though in c. 10. 1311 a 27 (cp. Rhet. 2. 16. 1391 a 18 sq.) it is implied that *ὕβρις* is a kind of *ἀδικία* (compare the Definitions ascribed to Plato, 415 E). See also note on 1302 b 6.

23. κἂν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι τὴν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν. This refers to Plato, Rep. 555 C, ὅτε, οἶμαι, ἄρχοντες ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸ πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἴργειν νόμῳ τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἂν ἀκόλαστοι γίγνωνται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὑτῶν, ἵνα ἀνούμενοι τὰ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ εἰσδανείζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίγνωνται, and 556 A, καὶ οὔτε γ' ἐκεῖνος ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκαόμενον ἐθέλουσιν ἀποσβεννύναι, εἴργοντες τὰ αὑτοῦ ὅπῃ τις βούλεται τρέπειν, οὔτε κ.τ.λ. It is to the absence in oligarchies of any check on the tendency of improvident rich men to squander their patrimony that Plato traces their fall. I do not agree, therefore, with Schn. Cor. and Sus. that a lacuna exists before διὰ τὸ ἐξεῖναι.

24. οὐ αἰτίαν τὴν ἄγαν ἐλευθερίαν εἶναί φησιν. Οὐ probably does not refer to the whole of the preceding sentence, κἂν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι—ποιεῖν, for Plato nowhere says that the squandering of fortunes by spendthrifts is caused by excessive freedom; this squandering, in fact, goes on in oligarchies, and excessive freedom is a concomitant not of oligarchy, but of democracy. Οὐ refers rather to τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν, which Plato *does* connect with excessive freedom in Rep. 557 B, οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅ τί τις βούλεται; where he is speaking of the democratic State. Aristotle's charge against Plato seems to be that, as he traces squandering to liberty to do what one pleases and traces this again to excessive freedom, he in effect traces squandering to excessive freedom. He sneers at him, I think, for doing so, his own view probably being (cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 22 sqq.) that squandering is not caused by excessive freedom but by *μοχθηρία*.

25. πλειόνων δ' οὐσῶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 8 sqq. Aristotle speaks here as if he had himself done in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book what he finds fault with Plato for not doing and had taken account in it of the many sub-forms of oligarchy and democracy which he distinguishes in the Sixth and Eighth (old Fourth and

Sixth) Books, but this is not so; as has been pointed out in vol. ii. p. xxvii, he has noticed in the Seventh only two forms of oligarchy and democracy, *ἔννομοι δημοκρατίαι καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι* and *κύριοι* (7 (5). 6. 1306 b 20 sq.: compare the mention of the ultimate oligarchy and the extreme democracy in c. 10. 1312 b 34 sqq.).

27. Conring Schneider and Susemihl agree in believing that something is wanting after **Σωκράτης**. Conring says (p. 729 of his edition), 'cum haec disputatio non finiatur sueto Aristoteli more, facile patet quaedam deesse.' Schneider not only misses the 'formula solennis et clausa' with which Aristotle is wont to wind up his discussion of a subject, but holds that he cannot have brought to a close here the illustrations and arguments with which he combats the views expressed in Plato's Republic on the subject of constitutional change. Susemihl (Sus.[2], Note 1786) thinks that Aristotle is not likely to have left unassailed the account given by Plato in the Republic of the change of democracy into tyranny. He also thinks (see Sus.[2a], Appendix, p. 368) that, looking to what is said in 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11 sqq., an inquiry respecting laws is wanting. Be that as it may, the abrupt way in which the chapter ends certainly seems to indicate that it is not complete.

BOOK VIII (VI).

31. Πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραὶ—34. πολιτείαν. These topics are dealt with in 6 (4). 14–16. For *τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας* cp. 6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1 sq., and for *τὸ βουλευτικόν* in the sense of *τὸ βουλευόμενον*, 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 31, 38, where however it is used in a slightly different way. With *περὶ δικαστηρίων* supply *πόσαι καὶ τίνες διαφοραί*. For *ποία* (sc. *διαφορά*) *πρὸς ποίαν συντέτακται πολιτείαν*, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, *διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον*, and Theopomp. Fragm. 110 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 295), *συντέτακται καὶ συνακολουθεῖ τοῖς μὲν πλούτοις καὶ ταῖς δυναστείαις ἄνοια καὶ μετὰ ταύτης ἀκολασία*: also Plato, Rep. 550 C, *τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, λέγωμεν*

ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον

(cp. Sept. c. Theb. 451 and 570). C. 1. 1316 b.

34. ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε κ.τ.λ. In the Seventh (old Fifth) Book.

35. ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας. See note on 1301

a 22, and cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 23–26, 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 20 sq., 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 17 sq., 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 34 sqq., and 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 16 sq.

γίνεται is in the sing., though *φθορὰ καὶ σωτηρία* must be supplied: cp. Xen. Anab. 2. 4. 16, *ἔπεμψέ με Ἀριαῖος καὶ Ἀρτάοζος*, and Plato, Lysis, 207 D, *ἦ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι, σφόδρα φιλεῖ σε ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ*. In these passages, however, 'the verb precedes the still indeterminate noun,' and this is the more usual case (Prof. J. B. Mayor in *Class. Rev.* 10. 111), whereas in the passage before us *γίνεται* follows *περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας*: see also 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 33 sqq.

36. ἐπεὶ δὲ τετύχηκεν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here tells us that he will point out what is the appropriate and the advantageous way of constructing the various sub-kinds of each constitution, and will also investigate any points which remain to be investigated with respect to each. Under the latter head of inquiry may possibly fall such questions as that which is dealt with in c. 4. 1318 b 6—1319 a 6, the question which is the best form of democracy and why it is the best. Here and also in 1317 a 15 Aristotle leads us to expect that he will deal with the sub-kinds of all constitutions, but we shall find that in fact he confines his attention to the sub-kinds of democracy and oligarchy, in conformity with his announcement in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 20 sqq.

38. καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἑκάστην, 'and to determine the mode of organization which is appropriate and advantageous to each.' For *ἀποδοῦναι* in this sense cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 b 7, *ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι*, and see Bon. Ind. 80 a 51 sqq. **Πρὸς ἑκάστην** should apparently be taken with *τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον*, not with *ἀποδοῦναι*: see note on 1317 a 36. For the meaning of *οἰκεῖος* cp. 1317 a 29 sqq., and for the distinction between *οἰκεῖος* and *συμφέρων* c. 4. 1318 b 27, *διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρότερον ῥηθείσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὑπάρχειν εἰωθέν*. There may be ways of organizing each sub-kind of democracy and oligarchy which are appropriate but not advantageous. An 'advantageous' mode is one which makes the constitution durable (c. 5. 1319 b 33—1320 a 4: Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 26).

39. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς κ.τ.λ., 'and further we must investigate the combinations also of all the modes of organizing the above-mentioned departments,' i.e. the deliberative, magisterial, and

judicial (so Heinsius, p. 695, Schneider, and Welldon). Aristotle's instances of these combinations are taken from cases in which a normal constitution is combined with its deviation-form—aristocracy with oligarchy, polity with democracy. We see from this that the classification of constitutions as normal or deviation-forms which we find in 3. 6. 1279 a 17 sqq. is not exhaustive, for there are in fact constitutions which are partly normal, partly deviation-forms. Aristotle does not in all probability mean to imply that the institutions of other constitutions also might not be combined—for instance, those of aristocracy and polity and those of oligarchy and democracy. It is interesting to know that these hybrid constitutions existed in Greece, but our acquaintance with its constitutional history is too imperfect to enable us to point to clear examples of them. Epidamnus at one time had a democratic Boulê, but was in other respects oligarchically governed (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 21 sqq.). The Council of the Areopagus was to a certain extent an aristocratic element in the oligarchy which existed at Athens in early times (*Aθ. Πολ.* c. 2. l. 2 sqq.: c. 3. l. 34 sqq.), but it is questionable whether Aristotle has it in his mind here. It should be noticed that as the deliberative is *κύριον τῆς πολιτείας* (6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1 sq.), the way in which it was organized must have gone far to determine the character of the constitution. The deliberative had the right of legislating, and therefore it might modify the constitution at any moment.

1. **ταῦτα**, 'these modes,' referring to *τρόπων*. 1317 a.

2. For **ἐπαλλάττειν** see note on 1255 a 13.

4. **οἷον ἂν τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας ὀλιγαρχικῶς ἢ συντεταγμένον.** For the way in which the deliberative is organized in oligarchies see 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 34 sqq. The oligarchical mode of election to office is *τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν* (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 1 sq.).

6. **τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστοκρατικῶς.** Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 19 sq. As to the oligarchical mode of organizing dicasteries see 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 12 sq. For *τὰ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια* cp. c. 8. 1322 b 34, but we expect *τό* (which Spengel and Bekk.[2] read) instead of *τά*.

8. **ἀριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας**, i. e. when office is awarded for virtue (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sq.: 2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq.: 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 2 sq.: 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq.).

13. **εἴρηται πρότερον**, in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 13–1297 a 6.

15. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. See note on 1316 b 36.

17. φανερόν, sc. ἔσται, which is omitted as in 2. 5. 1263 b 34, where however ἔσται is easily supplied from the preceding line, which is not the case here. See note on 1306 a 24 for instances of similar omissions. It may be added that ἦν is omitted in 1. 9. 1257 a 23 and ἦσαν in 1. 9. 1257 a 32.

18. ἣν καλοῦσί τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν. Cp. Plato, Rep. 544 C, ἡ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία. Ὀλιγαρχία is not quite the appropriate name, for the few rule in aristocracy also (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 25); oligarchy is the form in which the rich rule, and that fact should find expression in its name. See, however, note on 1331 b 9.

19. ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον, i. e. the inquiry how to construct each kind of democracy.

πάντα τὰ δημοτικά. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 a 1, τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, and Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 27, τὰ τυραννικά.

24. πρότερον, 'in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 15–28: 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq.: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26–31' (Sus.[2]).

γίνεται. See note on 1304 b 5.

25. πλῆθος is here used in the same sense as δῆμος (cp. c. 4. 1319 a 19 sq. and 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq., and see note on 1281 b 15). For the use of the two words in the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, see Kaibel, Stil und Text der Πολ. Ἀθ., p. 52 sq.

26. ὧν τοῦ πρώτου κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26–31. A democracy in which the peasants and handicraftsmen are supreme seems to be regarded by Aristotle as better than one in which the peasants, handicraftsmen, and day-labourers are supreme.

27. τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις, 'the two previously mentioned': cp. Plato, Laws 875 A, τῷ κοινῷ τε καὶ ἰδίῳ τοῖν ἀμφοῖν.

οὐ μόνον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ., 'not only does the democracy differ in respect of its becoming better and worse, but also in respect of its becoming not the same.' We should probably supply ἡ δημοκρατία with διαφέρει.

32. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω. Thus in the first form of democracy (c. 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.) many δημοτικά are wanting: all judge and elect magistrates, but the most important magistracies are not accessible to all, and it is only the less important ones that are filled by lot. Pay is also probably absent, and the assembly is not supreme over everything.

33. χρήσιμον δ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν κ.τ.λ. Αὐτῶν, i. e. τῶν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθούντων. The fact that a knowledge of the institutions which go with each kind of democracy is useful in correcting existing examples of each form, as well as in instituting new ones, is an additional reason for studying them, though the question which Aristotle now has before him is how the various kinds of each constitution should be *instituted* (1317 a 13 sqq.). For the thought cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 3 sqq., and for the language 1. 11. 1259 a 33 sq. For πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάζειν καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις, cp. Polyb. 3. 118. 12, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολιτευμάτων διορθώσεις καὶ κατασκευάς.

35. ζητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., '[for errors are committed for want of this knowledge,] for' etc. Some δημοτικά are fatal to democracies, and some ὀλιγαρχικά to oligarchies (7 (5). 9. 1309 b 20 sq.), others are not.

36. ἅπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα must be taken with πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν: cp. Polyb. 5. 105. 1, οἰκείοις χρησάμενος λόγοις πρὸς τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἤδη προκατεσκευασμένην ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ Δημητρίου παραινέσεων.

37. καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., in 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 18 sqq.

39. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ ὧν ἐφίενται λέγωμεν, 'but now let us speak of the demands of democratic constitutions and their ethical character and the things they aim at.' Aristotle tacitly distinguishes these matters from the institutions through which democracies seek to attain their aims (τὰ δημοτικά). Νυνί must occur but rarely in Aristotle's writings, for it is omitted in the Index Aristotelicus. Τὰ ἀξιώματα = 'quae requiruntur in democratia, cf. ἀξιοῦν, postulare, et ὑπόθεσις τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, 40' (Bon. Ind. 70 a 46: see also Coray's note). So in Plato, Laws 690 A, ἀξιώματα τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι is rendered by Stallbaum 'Ansprüche.' With τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἤθη should probably be supplied τῶν δημοκρατιῶν, not τῶν πολιτειῶν, and αἱ δημοκρατίαι with ἐφίενται. For τὰ ἤθη τῶν δημοκρατιῶν cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 12, and for ὧν ἐφίενται 1366 a 2 sqq.

40. Ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 4. Stahr and Welldon apparently take ὑπόθεσις to be the subject of the sentence, but perhaps it is better (with Sus.) to make it the predicate. In either case it takes up τὰ ἀξιώματα, 39, and means 'the fundamental postulate' (cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 38 sq.). C. 2.

41. τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 562 B sq. and see note on 1291 b 34. The words τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν,

ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντας (sc. *τοὺς πολίτας*) *ἐλευθερίας* have been interpreted in two different ways. Sus. translates thus, 'ist es doch Dies, was man immer im Munde zu führen pflegt, als ob man in dieser Verfassung allein der Freiheit genösse'. he seems, therefore, to take *τοῦτο* to refer to the preceding sentence, *ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία*, but Sepulveda who translates, 'sic enim dici consuevit, in sola populari republica homines libertate frui,' appears to refer *τοῦτο* to *ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἐλευθερίας*, i. e. not to what precedes, but to what follows, and so do Giph. and Stahr, the latter translating, 'und es ist eine ganz gewöhnliche Behauptung, dass nur die Bürger einer solchen Verfassung die Freiheit wirklich genössen.' Perhaps the latter interpretation is to be preferred (for the use of *ὡς* with the participle cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 25 sqq.). *Τούτου γὰρ στοχάζεσθαί φασι πᾶσαν δημοκρατίαν* seems to be added not in proof of the assertion which precedes it, that freedom is enjoyed only in a democracy, for obviously it does not prove the truth of this assertion, but in justification of the mention of freedom—'[freedom, I say,] for' etc. Aristotle probably has Plato, Rep. 562 B sq. before him, where the two things had already been brought into connexion with each other, democracy being described as insatiable in its quest of freedom, and democrats being represented as holding that no one who is by nature a freeman will deign to live under any other constitution.

1317 b. **1.** *τούτου* = *τῆς ἐλευθερίας*. See note on 1330 b 8.

2. *ἐλευθερίας δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Eurip. Suppl. 390 Bothe, 404 Dindorf,

οὐ γὰρ ἄρχεται
ἑνὸς πρὸς ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρα πόλις.
δῆμος δ' ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει
ἐνιαυσίαισιν.

Aristotle is here reproducing the conception of freedom entertained by *οἱ δημοτικοί* (cp. 11), not giving his own, as to which see vol. I. p. 246 and notes on 1259 a 39 and 1310 a 27. It should be noticed that in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq. *ἐλευθερία* is distinguished from *τὸ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι κύριον*. The *δημοτικοί* read much into the conception of freedom which does not strictly belong to it. According to them freedom implied two things—1. an equal share for each citizen (7)—whether in everything, property included, or not, we do not learn—and consequently an interchange of ruling

and being ruled, and also the supremacy of the will of the majority, or in other words of the poor, for the poor are in a majority; and 2. living as one likes. Both these sides are recognized in the conception of freedom by Pericles in his Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2. 37. 3: see the remarks of L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, 2. 233 sq.). These notions of freedom differ in one respect from those current among ourselves. We do not hold that freedom implies an interchange of ruling and being ruled, or in other words that no one is free who has not from time to time a turn of office. This was a view likely to prevail in communities like the Greek City-States, in which a person excluded from office felt himself to be on a level with a resident-alien (3. 5. 1278a 37 sq.). We still, however, often identify freedom with 'government by majority' (Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 158), and with 'permission to do what you like' (ibid. p. 119). Among us, again, as among the Greeks, freedom is often construed as bound up with equality, so that it eventually involves the supremacy of the majority, or in other words the poor, over the rich, a state of things in which equality disappears. It will be observed that here as elsewhere Aristotle regards the demands characteristic of democracies as originating not in conscious self-seeking, but in a mistaken, perhaps a biassed (3. 9. 1280a 14 sqq.), theory of what is just and of what freedom implies. The teaching of the passage before us does not quite agree with that of 3. 8, where it is implied that democracy is a constitution in which the poor are supreme, whether they are in a majority or not, nor with that of 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28–39 and Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq., where *τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον* is treated as a form of *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν δίκαιον*. See note on 1288 a 22. It will be noticed that Aristotle says nothing about *παρρησία*, or the free expression of opinion, in connexion with freedom, and nothing about publicity of government. Nor does he mention the tendency of Greek democracy to extend citizenship to persons of semi-alien or semi-servile or illegitimate birth, of which we read in 3. 5. 1278a 26 sqq. His account of freedom, indeed, can hardly be made to include this tendency.

3. *τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν*, sc. *τοὺς πολίτας* (cp. 7).

4. *τούτου δ' ὄντος* κ.τ.λ. This conclusion appears not to be accepted in c. 3. 1318 a 11–b 1, where it is argued that if all are to have an arithmetically equal share, the rich and the poor must not be thrown together into one undivided aggregate and supremacy

given to a majority of that aggregate, but that supremacy should be given to a majority of the rich and a majority of the poor, or if the two majorities do not agree, to that combination of rich and poor which possesses the larger amount of property.

5. καὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτ' εἶναι [καὶ] τέλος καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον, 'and that what is decided by the majority this is the crown of the matter, and this is that which is just.' Τέλος here is 'operis perfectio et absolutio' (Bon. Ind. 753 a 47, b 6: Sus. Ind. s.v.). For the repetition of τοῦτο cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 11, τοῦτο καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον: 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 11 sq.: Xen. Mem. 2. 2. 13, τούτῳ δίκην τε ἐπιτίθησι καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσα οὐκ ἐᾷ ἄρχειν τοῦτον: Plato, Gorg. 510 C, οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει: [Demosth.] Or. Fun. c. 36. Polyb. 6. 8. 2, οἱ πολλοὶ τούτοις ἐχρῶντο προστάταις καὶ τούτοις ἐπίτρεπον περὶ σφῶν. See also note on 1284 b 28.

10. For the attraction of ὅν into the gender of ὅρον cp. ἥν in 1. 9. 1256 b 40.

11. ἓν δὲ τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις. See note on 1310 a 27, and compare the appeal of Nicias to the Athenians in Thuc. 7. 69, πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας: cp. also 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 28 sq., where it is implied that democracy is an ἀνειμένη καὶ μαλακὴ πολιτεία. Aristotle does not say, as he says of the other sign of freedom, that all the δημοτικοί regarded this as a mark of democracy, and it appears from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq. that 'living as one pleases' was a concomitant only of extreme democracies, notwithstanding that it is treated here as a characteristic of democracy in general. It would seem, indeed, from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34 sqq.) that in oligarchies also the oligarchs were allowed to do what they pleased. That a 'desire of the individual to be let alone, to do as he pleases, indulge his impulses, follow out his projects,' 'has been extremely strong' in the United States is remarked by Mr. Bryce (American Commonwealth, 3. 268). On the other hand Mr. Lecky remarks (Democracy and Liberty, ed. 1, 1. 213) that 'in our own day no fact is more incontestable and conspicuous than the love of democracy for authoritative regulation,' extending in his view apparently to habits of life (ibid. 1. 462).

13. εἴπερ τοῦ δουλεύοντος, sc. ἐστί. See note on 1310 a 27.

14. ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἐλήλυθε κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 562, 563 D, and Laws 698 A, 701 B.

16. καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ κ.τ.λ., 'and in this way [this second criterion of freedom] contributes to the freedom based on equality.' See Bon. Ind. 714 b 57 sqq. Bonitz, however (715 a 2 sq.), places a note of interrogation after his quotation of the passage before us, possibly regarding it as corrupt.

17 sqq. The logical connexion of 1317 b 17–1318 a 3 with what has preceded in 1317 a 40–b 17 is as follows:—democracy means a turn of office for all and a share for all in deliberative and judicial work, and also the supremacy of the many; hence whatever facilitates the access of all to office and to deliberative and judicial work is democratic, and also the aggrandizement of the assembly and the enfeeblement of the magistrates. Now the access of all to office is facilitated by the use of the lot in appointments to most offices, by the absence or smallness of property-qualifications for office, by the prohibition of a repeated tenure of most offices, and by a short tenure of most offices; hence all these things are democratic. So, too, is the provision of pay for office-holders and for members of the assembly and dicasteries, for this measure facilitates the access of all to office and to deliberative and judicial work. The enfeebling of offices of life-long tenure, if any such offices are permitted to exist, is also democratic, and the substitution of the lot for election in appointments to them. This follows from the rule that the tenure of office should be short, and that appointments to offices should be made by lot. The sentence 1317 b 38–41 stands in no logical connexion with 1317 a 40–b 17, and Sus. is probably right in bracketing it.

17. τούτων δ' ὑποκειμένων κ.τ.λ., 'and these things being the starting-point and the principle [of democracy] being such, the following institutions are democratic.' For ὁ τοιοῦτος in the sense of 'the following' and referring not, as it commonly does, to something already mentioned but to something about to be mentioned, cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 6 sqq. and see note on that passage. For τούτων ὑποκειμένων compare (with Bon. Ind. 797 b 46 sqq.) Phys. 4. 4. 211 a 6 sq., De Gen. An. 4. 1. 766 a 16 sqq., and Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 3 sqq., and for τοιαύτης οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 5 sqq. By 'the principle of democracy' Aristotle means freedom in the two senses mentioned by him. He arranges his list of democratic institutions under the three heads of ἀρχαί, τὸ δικαστικόν, and τὸ βουλευόμενον. It is evident from this list that the aim of Greek democracy was twofold—1. to give all the citizens a turn of office,

at any rate so far as regards offices not needing special experience, and also a share either in all kinds of judicial work or in the more important kinds of it, and to enable the poor by pay to act as officials and dicasts: 2. by making the assembly supreme over all matters, or all important matters, and providing pay for its members to secure the supremacy of the poor over the rich. In modern democracies a popular assembly and popular dicasteries no longer find a place, nor does the lot, but the two aims indicated by Aristotle are still traceable in democratic institutions. 'Rotation in office' is demanded by democratic feeling in the United States (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 482), and the supremacy of the will of the poorer class is an universal accompaniment of democracy. It will be noticed that the uniformity of nurture education and dress which is dwelt upon as democratic in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq. is not referred to here, nor are the matters which are so described in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq. and in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 9. No mention is made of the preference of democracy for boards of magistrates in comparison with single magistrates (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 25 sq.) and for a multiplicity of small magistracies (Plato, Polit. 303 A), or of its disapproval of the holding of two paid offices together (Demosth. c. Timocr. cc. 123, 150), or of the ostracism, or of the democratic tendency to publicity in government and in judicial proceedings, or of secret voting. Nor, as has been noticed already (see note on 2), is anything said of the tendency of Greek democracy to admit to citizenship persons of semi-alien or semi-servile or illegitimate birth, of which we read in 3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq. In Hdt. 3. 80 the Persian Otanes says of democracy, *πάλῳ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλεύματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει.* The second of these characteristics of democracy is not included by Aristotle in his enumeration of *τὰ δημοτικά.*

18. **τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς πάντας ἐκ πάντων.** Not many offices will be elective (cp. 20 sq.), but to those that are all the citizens will elect out of all. In the case both of electors and of elected restrictions will be eschewed, whether connected with wealth or birth or age. An 'ordo certus magistratuum' will not be in harmony with the spirit of a democracy, because it places restrictions of age on the choice of the electors. A democracy, however, will be apt to place restrictions on the repeated tenure of the same office, unless it is connected with war. It deserves notice that Greek democracies do not appear to have attempted to make the rich and noble ineligible

for office, whereas at Florence the nobles were made incapable of holding most offices (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 163).

19. τὸ ἄρχειν πάντας μὲν ἑκάστου ἕκαστον δ' ἐν μέρει πάντων. The democratic principle is that all the citizens rule over each individual, and yet that their rule over him is balanced by the fact that he has his turn of ruling over all. If the individual citizen submits to be ruled by all, he does so not as one excluded from rule, but as one who has his turn of ruling. This does not seem to be true of the first form of democracy, for in it only γνώριμοι will hold the greatest offices (c. 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.). It is also obvious that the rule exercised by all over each individual citizen is of a more absolute nature than the rule exercised over all by the individual citizen as a temporary holder of office. We see, however, that the Greek conception of democracy involved not only the rule of all the citizens over the individual citizen, but also a rotation of office among the individual citizens. The individual citizen in a Greek democracy expected, in fact, not only to rule as a part of the collective citizen-body, but also individually as an official. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq.

20. τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης. It is not the mere use of the lot in appointments to magistracies that is characteristic of democracy, but its use in appointments to all magistracies or all but a few. In Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 31 sq. democracy is similarly defined as a constitution ἐν ᾗ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς: cp. Plato, Rep. 557 A. Aristotle omits to add ἐκ πάντων with κληρωτάς, but this is what he means, for the lot would not be democratic if it was not ἐκ πάντων. A limited lot finds a place in oligarchy (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 2). Isocrates (Areop. § 23) had already urged that the lot is not really as democratic as a well-regulated system of election, inasmuch as it allows persons not friendly to democracy to find their way into office. At Athens, however, all persons appointed to office had to undergo a strict δοκιμασία, which would exclude persons of this kind (Lys. Or. 13. c. Agorat. c. 10). For the exception from the rule prescribing the lot of offices demanding experience and skill cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 27 sq. Among these offices would be those of the stratêgi (c. 8. 1322 a 32 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 4 sqq.), of some great financial officers, of envoys, though envoys were not in strictness ἄρχοντες (see note on 1299 a 19), and perhaps in some States of auditors and bouleutae, for these offices are said in c. 8. 1322 a 32–b 17

to require much experience. The following offices are mentioned in 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 43 *init.* as elective at Athens in the time of Aristotle —those of the ταμίας στρατιωτικῶν, of οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικόν, and of ὁ τῶν κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητής, as well as all those connected with war. It is difficult to think that there ever was a democracy in which all offices without exception were filled by lot—one, for instance, in which the generals were appointed by lot.

22. τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος κ.τ.λ. See note on 1294 b 7.

23. τὸ μὴ δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299a 10 and 3. 1. 1275a 24 sq.: also 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 62, ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς μὲν περὶ πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἔ[ξεσ]τι πλεονάκις, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν, πλὴν βουλεύειν δίς (see Sandys' note on this passage). It is easy to see how much this exception must have added to the influence of the magistracies connected with war, and especially to the influence of the stratêgi, for they must have stood to the other magistrates, or most of them, in the relation in which skilled persons stand to novices. Pericles was elected stratêgus at Athens fifteen years in succession (Plut. Pericl. c. 16) and Phocion forty-five times (Plut. Phoc. c. 8). 'The re-election of stratêgi of proved efficiency was the rule at Athens' (Beloch, Attische Politik seit Perikles, p. 267). There seems to have been some laxity at Athens in the application of the rule against a repeated tenure of the same office, for Lysias (Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 29) and Demosthenes (Prooem. 55. p. 1461) complain that it was applied to unimportant offices and neglected in the case of important ones. Restrictions on the repeated tenure of offices were not peculiar to democratic States; aristocracies like the Lacedaemonian went even further than democracies usually did, and imposed restrictions on the repeated tenure of some offices connected with war; thus the Lacedaemonian office of ναύαρχος could not be held twice (Xen. Hell. 2. 1. 7: see however Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 359 and note 3). In the aristocratical Republic of Ragusa the Rector held his office but for one month and was re-eligible only after an interval of two years (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 311). At San Marino, the constitution of which is a sort of ἀριστοκρατία, the two Captain Regents hold office for six months and are not re-eligible for twelve years (E. Armstrong in *Macmillan's Magazine*, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 200). Some democracies are less rigid in this matter than others. Mr. Bryce remarks (American Commonwealth, 2. 405, note), that 'the tendency in Switzerland to re-elect the same men to the legislature and to

public office has doubtless worked as much for good in politics there as the opposite tendency works for evil in the United States.'

ἢ ὀλιγάκις ἢ ὀλίγας. See Vahlen on Poet. 14. 1454 a 1, and note on 1296 a 38.

24. τὸ ὀλιγοχρονίους κ.τ.λ. The aim in this matter, as in prohibitions of a repeated tenure, was that as many might share in office as possible: cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 12 sqq. In the early days of Greek democracy this principle was neglected (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sq.).

25. τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 38 sqq., 1301 a 11 sq.

26. τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων. Cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 3. l. 35, *τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει*, and c. 8. l. 21, *τὰ ἄλλα τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πολιτ[ικ]ῶν*, and Plut. Lycurg. et Num. Comp. c. 4, *τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα τῆς νομοθεσίας.*

28. πολιτείας. Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, *ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει.*

τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων. Some causes of this kind at any rate involved large interests (6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22 sq.).

τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 28 sqq. and see note on 33. Compare also Cic. pro Flacc. c. 7, Graecorum autem totae respublicae sedentis contionis temeritate administrantur, and Plato, Polit. 303 A, *τὴν δ' ἀῦ τοῦ πλήθους (ἀρχὴν) κατὰ πάντα ἀσθενῆ καὶ μηδὲν μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν μέγα δυναμένην ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν ταύτῃ διανενεμῆσθαι κατὰ σμικρὰ εἰς πολλούς.* But I do not remember that Plato, or indeed any one else before Aristotle, calls attention to the characteristic of democracy pointed out in the passage before us. 'All the main features of American government may be deduced from two principles. One is the sovereignty of the people. . . . The second principle, itself a consequence of this first one, is the distrust of the various organs and agents of government' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 1. 407). It is an accepted principle in the United States that 'legislatures, officials, and all other agents of the sovereign people ought to be strictly limited by law, by each other, and by the shortness of the terms of office' (ibid. 3. 267). For *κυρίαν τῶν μεγίστων* cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 7 sq. and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 5. 22.

30. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν δημοτικώτατον βουλή κ.τ.λ. One reason for this may be gathered from 3. 11. 1282 a 29 sqq., where it appears that the property-qualification for membership of the Boulê was

commonly small, while the property-qualifications for the offices of *στρατηγός* and *ταμίας* were larger.

33. εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 4, *ἅπαντα αὐτοὶ κρίνουσιν*, and *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 41, *ἁπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν πεποίηκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον, καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις, ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμός ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν· καὶ γὰρ α[ἱ τ]ῆς βουλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐληλύθασιν.* Deliberative and administrative decisions are referred to, as well as judicial ones: see vol. i. p. 230, note 1, and cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 26 sq., 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 13 sqq., and 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6 sqq.

34. καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης. This refers to 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38–1300 a 4. For this reference cp. c. 4. 1318 b 7, *ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων λόγοις*, and see vol. ii. p. xxvii. It is possible that *ἡ μέθοδος ἡ πρὸ ταύτης* includes both the Sixth (old Fourth) and the Seventh (old Fifth) Book. The Eighth (old Sixth) Book is supplementary to them.

35. ἔπειτα τὸ μισθοφορεῖν κ.τ.λ. It appears that the burden imposed on the revenue by the payment of the assembly dicasteries and magistracies was often diminished by restricting payment in the case of the assembly to those of its meetings which were termed *κύριαι*, meetings which took place at Athens only once in each prytany (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 43: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 285 sq.), or indeed by going farther and paying not all the magistracies, but only 'those whose members required to have a common table,' for this appears to be the meaning of *τῶν ἀρχῶν ἃς ἀνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων*, not 'the magistracies which required to take their meals with each other.' At Athens after the disaster at Syracuse it was ordained *τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀμίσθους ἄρχειν ἁπάσας ἕως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος ᾖ, πλὴν τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων καὶ τῶν πρυτάνεων οἳ ἂν ὦσιν* (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 29. l. 30). We know that at Athens the prytaneis of the Boulê and their secretaries took their meals together (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 43. l. 10 sq.: Demosth. De Fals. Leg. cc. 190, 249), and that the archons did the same (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 62: c. 3. l. 30 sq.), and also the stratêgi (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 190: Gilbert, Beitr. zur innern Gesch. Athens, p. 30). This custom no doubt did much to alleviate the defects of an administrative system in which boards of magistrates were largely employed. We hear the same thing of the ephors at Sparta (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 52 sq.), and of magistrates elsewhere (Plut. Cimon, c. 1: Aen. Poliorc. 11. 3). Aristotle himself evidently intends the most important boards of

magistrates in his 'best State' to have each its common table (4 (7). 12. 1331 a 25), among them apparently those of the stratêgi and ταμίαι (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.), and he probably means his agronomi to have a common table too (4 (7). 12. 1331 b 14 sqq.). The question, indeed, arises, what boards of magistrates in Greek States had not a common table, and the answer is not easy. Those boards would be least likely to have one whose business was not of a nature to call for promptitude in joint action. A similar custom prevailed in the cities of mediaeval Italy. The priors at Florence not only took their meals together, but 'slept together' (Perrens, La Civilisation Florentine, p. 49). As to the κύριαι ἐκκλησίαι it should be noticed that at Athens attendance at them was paid at a higher rate than attendance at other meetings of the assembly (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 62).

38. [ἔτι ἐπειδὴ . . . 41, βαναυσία]. I follow Sus. in bracketing this sentence, mainly for the reason given in the note on 1317 b 17 sqq. (which see). It may possibly have been written by Aristotle himself in the margin of his MS., but, if it was, he can hardly have intended it to be inserted in the text where it stands. Oligarchy is defined by the attributes to which it allots office (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq.), and these are here said to be birth wealth and culture; therefore democracy allots office to the opposite attributes. More usually oligarchy is said to allot office to wealth (3. 8. 1280 a 1 sq.), and culture is treated rather as a note of aristocracy than of oligarchy (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24 sq.), but its connexion with oligarchy is explained by 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 37 sq. Notwithstanding what is said here as to the liking of democracy for βαναυσία, Aristotle tells us in 3. 4. 1277 b 1 sqq. that in some States handicraftsmen (i. e. βάναυσοι) did not share in office till the extreme form of democracy came into existence. As to the preference of democracy for the lowborn and poor cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 7, 2. 19, and 3. 10, Aristoph. Eq. 180 sq., 185 sqq., 217 sq., and Isocr. De Pace, § 53. No doubt in a certain sense, as L. Schmidt points out (Ethik der alt. Griechen, 1. 161), 'indifference to the advantages of birth was alien to the spirit of Athenian democracy,' but it is one thing to respect high birth and another to accord it political power. 'A gentleman having been recommended to Mr. Buchanan as eminently qualified to fill the post of Minister to Spain, because to all other qualities requisite for the position he added that of understanding and speaking Spanish, the President's sole reply was

"Oh, that is too damned aristocratic," and another candidate for the office was named' (Frances Anne Kemble, Further Records, 1848–1883). As to this story I may say with Aristotle (7 (5). 10. 1312a 3), *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλου γε ἂν γένοιτο τοῦτο ἀληθές.*

41. *ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν* κ.τ.λ. Yet cp. 3. 16. 1287a 4 sqq. It has not, I think, been noticed that Aristotle here refers to the fate of the kingship in many Greek States; this was originally an office held for life, but its powers were curtailed (3. 14. 1285b 13 sqq.), and it often came, as at Athens, to be filled by lot. For the change by which the archonships at Athens, and among them the office of archon basileus, ceased to be elective and came to be filled by lot, see *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 22, l. 20 sqq.

1318a. 3. *τὰ μὲν οὖν . . .* b 5, *φροντίζουσιν* is bracketed by Sus. The passage, or at any rate all of it but its first clause, *τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτ' ἐστί*, looks like a subsequent addition, but it may well have been added by Aristotle; the reminiscence of Plato, Laws 663 E in 1318 b 1 sqq. (see note) points to this, as well as the general character of the passage.

5. *ἡ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δῆμος.* Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30–38. In 7 (5). 9. 1310a 25 sq., however, Aristotle refers to extreme democracies as *αἱ δημοκρατίαι αἱ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκοῦσαι δημοκρατικαί*: cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. As to *δῆμος*, a demos comprising both rich and poor would have the best claim to the name.

6. *ἴσον γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. Probably *δοκεῖ* should be supplied from *δοκοῦσα* in the preceding sentence, for it is clear from 9, *οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχειν νομίζοιεν* κ.τ.λ., that Aristotle is expressing the opinions of others.

C. 8. 11. *τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο*, 'in the next place:' cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 6, *τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.*

12. *τὰ τιμήματα διελεῖν χιλίοις τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων*, 'place the assessed properties in two groups, so that those of a thousand will be equal in value to those of five hundred.' Cp. c. 6. 1320 b 22 sq., where the phrase recurs, with this difference, however, that *τὰ τιμήματα* is there used in the sense not of 'assessed properties,' but of 'property-qualifications.'

13. *ἢ οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἰσότητα*, 'or ought we to institute equality in respect of property-qualification not in this way, but otherwise?' For *τιθέναι* ('statuere') cp. Plato, Laws 801 A, *ἢ μηδὲν ἐπανερωτῶ, τιθῶ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτω;* ΚΛ. *παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τίθει· νικᾷ γὰρ πάσαισι ταῖς ψήφοις οὗτος ὁ νόμος.*

15. ἔπειτα . . . λαβόντα . . . τούτους κυρίους εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 21 sqq. For the construction, or want of construction, cp. Meteor. 1. 3. 341 a 23, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα γίγνεσθαι ἅμα τῷ ἡλίῳ αὐτῷ τὴν θερμότητα εὔλογον, λαμβάνοντας τὸ ὅμοιον ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν γιγνομένων, and Pol. 2. 9. 1269 a 40 sqq., τὰς γειτνιάσας πόλεις . . . μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις, and see the examples from Plato of 'inversion of government' collected by Riddell in his edition of Plato's Apology, p. 223, § 271.

16. τούτους, 'these' and not the 1000 and 500 themselves. The advantage of this arrangement would be that supremacy in the State would rest with one body of men and not two.

18. ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος, sc. τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἶναι cp. 2. 3. 1261 b 22, ἕκαστος γὰρ υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, and 3. 10. 1281 a 34 sq., and Menand. Monost. 737 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 361),

φασὶν κακίστους οἱ πονηροὶ τοὺς κακούς.

For the fact cp. c. 2. 1317 b 5 sqq.

20. οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 22 sqq.: 3. 13. 1283 a 31 sq.: 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 31 sqq.: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq.

κατὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας, and not κατὰ πλῆθος ἀριθμοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 10, κατ' ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην).

21. κρίνεσθαι δεῖν, 'iudicium esse faciendum' (Sepulv.).

22. ὅ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι. It is not clear what Greek word or words exactly should be supplied (possibly βούλωνται), and a similar doubt recurs in 33, but the sense is clear, 'whatever the few decide.'

23. καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 16 sqq.

26. τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ὀλαττόνων. See note on 1290 a 35.

καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, in 3. 10. 1281 a 14–17.

30. μὴ μέντοι πάντως, 'but not in all ways': cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 31, δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναί πως μίαν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως.

32. ἢ τοῖς πλείοσι, sc. ἀμφοτέρων, 'or to the majority of each,' i. e., for example, if six rich out of ten and twelve poor out of twenty agreed.

ἐὰν δὲ τἀναντία δόξῃ, i. e. if the majority of the rich decide in one way and the majority of the poor in the opposite way.

33. ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους καὶ ὧν τὸ τίμημα πλεῖον, 'whatever is decided by the majority, that is by those whose property-qualification is greater.' I take καί here to be explanatory, as often else-

where (see for instance note on 1257 b 7). Welldon translates the passage in much the same way. Spengel would bracket καὶ or read ὃν καί in place of καὶ ὃν, which is the reading of ΓΠ, and Susemihl, who follows him in the latter change, translates, 'das, für welches sich diejenige von beiden Mehrheiten ausgesprochen hat, welche zugleich (mit der übereinstimmenden Minderheit zusammen) die höhere Schatzung aufweisen kann,' but Susemihl's equivalent for οἱ πλείους is hardly that which would most naturally suggest itself to a translator, and it does not seem to me that any change is necessary. Aristotle's language implies that each man's τίμημα was recorded and could be readily ascertained, but would this be the case with the poor? We gather from 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sq. and 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 19 sqq. that οἱ ἄποροι οὐκ ἔχουσι τίμημα. His solution differs from that which the advocates of oligarchy would put forward because it takes account of the property of the poor and adds it together, whereas oligarchs would claim that the will of those who own property in large amounts should prevail, even if the total amount of their property is less than the total amount of the property of the poor. But if, as Aristotle often tells us, democracy implies the supremacy of the will of the numerical majority, is the arrangement which he recommends here suitable to a democracy?

34. ἔδοξε δὲ κ.τ.λ., sc. τἀναντία, 'and a conflicting decision was arrived at by six of the rich and fifteen of the poorer.' For τοῖς ἓξ see note on 1259 a 27, and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 465. 13 (ed. Gerth, § 465. 13. ζ).

38. τοῦτο, i. e. τὸ τούτοις δόξαν. Cp. ταῦτα in 1. 2. 1252 a 33. Ἔστω is apparently to be supplied (cp. 32). See notes on 1306 a 24 and 1317 a 17.

ἐὰν δὲ ἴσοι συμπέσωσι, i. e. τύχωσιν ὄντες (Bon. Ind. s.v. συμπίπτειν).

40. For δίχα γένηται see critical note.

1318 b. **1.** ἀποκληρωτέον, 'sorte decernendum est' (Bon. Ind. s. v.).

ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον ποιητέον. Aristotle would perhaps suggest that if the votes should be equal, those voting No should win (cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 34 sqq.). For other modes of meeting the difficulty referred to in the case of a dicastery cp. Julian, Or. 3. 114 D, Ἀθήνησι μὲν οὖν φασίν, ὅτε τοῖς πατρίοις ἔθεσιν ἐχρῶντο καὶ ἕζων τοῖς οἰκείοις πειθόμενοι νόμοις μεγάλην καὶ πολυάνθρωπον οἰκοῦντες πόλιν, εἴ ποτε τῶν δικαζόντων αἱ ψῆφοι κατ' ἴσον γένοιντο τοῖς φεύγουσι πρὸς τοὺς διώκοντας, τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἐπιτιθεμένην τῷ τὴν δίκην ὀφλήσειν μέλλοντι

ἀπολύειν ἄμφω τῆς αἰτίας, τὸν μὲν ἐπάγοντα τὴν κατηγορίαν τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι συκοφάντην, τὸν δέ, ὡς εἰκός, τοῦ δοκεῖν ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ πονηρεύματι: see also the agreement regulating the relations of Oeantheia and Chaleion (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 31: Meister, Rechtsvertrag zwischen Chaleion und Oianthea, p. 35 sqq.).

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου κ.τ.λ. Here there is an allusion to a common saying which has come down to us among the *Γνῶμαι μονόστιχοι* ascribed to Menander, though the saying, if not the verse, is probably older than Menander (Monost. 178: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 345),

εὑρεῖν τὸ δίκαιον πανταχῶς οὐ ῥᾴδιον.

Aristotle also remembers Plato, Laws 663 E, *καλὸν μὲν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὦ ξένε, καὶ μόνιμον· ἔοικε μὴν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πείθειν*: cp. Eryxias, 405 B, *καταμαθὼν δ' αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ὅτι ἴσον εἴη πεῖσαι, ὅπερ ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον λίθον ἐψῆσαι κ.τ.λ.* For *τοὺς δυναμένους πλεονεκτεῖν* cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 10.

4. ἀεὶ γὰρ ζητοῦσι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 1. 3. 1358 b 36, *ὡς δ' οὐκ ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, (οἱ συμβουλεύοντες) πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.*

6. Δημοκρατιῶν δ' οὐσῶν τεττάρων κ.τ.λ. Five in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq., four in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 22 sqq. In *βελτίστη μὲν κ.τ.λ.* and in c. 6. 1320 b 21 sqq. a question is answered which has been raised in c. 1. 1317 a 13 sq. C. 4.

7. καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις. The reference is to 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 3 sqq. For *ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων λόγοις* cp. c. 2. 1317 b 34 sq.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν αὕτη, 'and this kind of democracy is also the most ancient of all; but I call it first [not for this reason, but] in the sense in which one might range different kinds of demos in groups [as first or second].' The demos which is supreme in the first kind of democracy is first because it is best (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 3 sqq.). That the most moderate form of democracy was also the most ancient is confirmed by the fact that the earliest democracies resembled polities (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 24 sq.).

9. βέλτιστος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός ἐστιν. The agricultural demos is best, 1. because it is *unable* owing to the small amount of property it possesses to attend the assembly frequently, and further because owing to its need of the necessaries of life it devotes itself closely to its work and does not covet the goods of others, and indeed *prefers* a life of business to a life of office-holding

and politics (compare for the antithesis c. 4. 1319 a 30–32), unless office offers a prospect of large gains, so that, if it asks for any share of political power, it asks only for the right of electing the magistrates and reviewing their conduct in office: 2. because its life is not devoid of virtue, like the lives of handicraftsmen, shopkeepers, and day-labourers (this is implied in 1319 a 24 sqq.). The γεωργοί were often hoplites (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 30 sq.), and they would make good soldiers, like the herdsmen and shepherds whose military efficiency Aristotle praises in 1319 a 22 sqq. The members of both these classes probably had less alien or servile blood in their veins than the members of the classes to which Aristotle prefers them, but of this he says nothing. It seems clear from his language in 1319 a 6 sqq., which implies that when the demos sold or lost its land it ceased to be an agricultural demos, that his agricultural demos is a demos of peasant-proprietors (see Liddell and Scott s. v. γεωργός), but he does not, like modern believers in the 'magic of property,' trace its good qualities to this fact. Most of the Greek States which were still vigorous in the third century B. C. were States with a demos of small cultivating landowners or else a pastoral demos (e. g. the Achaeans, Arcadians, Macedonians, and Aetolians), and ancient States in general often began to decline when these classes disappeared and were replaced by slaves or serfs, but Aristotle does not seem to have observed this, or he would not have advised that the tillers of the soil in his 'best State' should be slaves or serfs, as he does in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq. We see that he is not so much enamoured of an agricultural demos as to introduce it into his 'best State,' though he holds that it forms the fittest basis for a democracy. 'We scarcely ever find [in Greek writers] any recognition of the fact that a strong and healthy race of peasants together with an industrious middle class is the best means of maintaining the life of a State' (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 493). 'Jefferson regarded agriculture as so much the best occupation for citizens that he was alarmed by the rumour that the cod-fish of the north-eastern coasts were coming down to the shores of Virginia and Carolina, lest the people of those States should "be tempted to catch them, and commerce, of which we have already too much, should receive an accession"' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2, 359 note). Aristotle nowhere includes in his enumeration of the different kinds of δῆμοι

such a δῆμος as existed in the Lacedaemonian State, one composed not of small cultivating landowners resident in the country, but of small non-cultivating landowners resident in Sparta. Would he prefer a demos of the cultivating type to a demos of this sort?

10. ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ., 'and so it is also possible to institute a democracy [as well as other forms of constitution, such as oligarchy], where the mass of the citizens lives by agriculture or pastoral farming,' for—Aristotle in effect continues—a demos of this kind will claim only a small measure of political power. He probably intends here to correct a common impression that under these circumstances an oligarchy was the only constitution in place: cp. Plut. Themist. c. 19, *οἱ τριάκοντα . . . οἰόμενοι τὴν μὲν κατὰ θάλατταν ἀρχὴν γένεσιν εἶναι δημοκρατίας, ὀλιγαρχίᾳ δ' ἧττον δυσχεραίνειν τοὺς γεωργοῦντας*, and Eurip. Suppl. 406 Bothe (420 Dindorf),

γαπόνος δ' ἀνὴρ πένης,
εἰ καὶ γένοιτο μὴ ἀμαθής, ἔργων ὕπο
οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο πρὸς τὰ κοίν' ἀποβλέπειν.

An oligarchy existed at Epidaurus (Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 1), and no doubt in many other places, when the demos consisted for the most part of cultivators of the soil. However, democracies of the agricultural type may be traced at Athens in the days of Solon and Peisistratus (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq.: Isocr. Areop. § 52), and in far later times at Elis (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 102), at Mantineia (1318 b 23 sqq.), at Aphytis (1319 a 14 sqq.), in the cities of Achaia (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 105), and probably elsewhere in the Peloponnesus.

11. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1319 a 30 sqq., 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 25 sq., and 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq. If they had had a large amount of property or none at all, they would have had more leisure (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 6 sqq., 18 sq.). Compare the picture of the Roman demos in early times which we find in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 58. The ruling class in the first form of oligarchy has 'not a very large amount of property' (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 12 sq.), but that is a different thing.

13. διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τἀναγκαῖα κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq., where we read of *τὸ γεωργικόν*, that *ἔχουσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν*. The cultivators had a small amount of property, but had not the necessaries of life. There is no inconsistency in this, for in 2. 7. 1267 a 9 sqq. *οὐσία βραχεῖα καὶ ἐργασία*

are said to be the means of obtaining necessaries. Men who were busily engaged in attending to their own property were thought to be least likely to covet the goods of others (Plut. Aristid. et Cat. Comp. c. 3, *ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀμελοῦντας οἰκίας καὶ πορίζομένους ἐξ ἀδικίας*, and Philopoemen, c. 4, *πάνυ προσήκειν οἴεσθαι οἰκεῖα κεκτῆσθαι τὸν ἀλλοτρίων ἀφεξόμενον*: Isocr. Areop. § 24).

14. ἀλλ' ἥδιον κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 4 sqq. and Aristoph. Γεωργοί, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 985),

> A. *ἐθέλω γεωργεῖν. εἶτα τίς με κωλύει;*
> B. *ἡμεῖς.* A. *ἐπεὶ δίδωμι χιλίας δραχμάς,*
> *ἐάν με τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀφῆτε.*

As to *πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν* see note on 1293 a 4, and cp. [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 3.

16. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 9 sq., and Herach. Fragm. 111, *αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἐν ἀντία πάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θηρεύοντες, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα.* Plato had said the same thing in Laws 870 A, *τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μάλιστα ἐνταῦθα, οὗ πλεῖστός τε καὶ ἰσχυρότατος ἵμερος ὢν τυγχάνει τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἁπλήστου καὶ ἀπείρου κτήσεως ἔρωτας μυρίους ἐντίκτουσα δύναμις διὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν τὴν κακήν*: cp. 918 D. Compare also Demosthenes' account of the feelings of *οἱ πολλοὶ Μακεδόνων* in Olynth. 2. 16.

17. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1312 *b* 21. Machiavelli gives much the same account of the tendencies of the 'ignobili' in Discorsi, 1. 5.

19. ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ κωλύῃ. How did oligarchies hinder the many in their business? Possibly in part by discouraging the residence of the urban poor, or some of them, in the central city (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13 sqq.).

20. ταχέως γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 95 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 259).

21. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ ἑλέσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν κ.τ.λ. It is not often that we find the aor. infin. used in conjunction with the pres. infin. as here. In 29 we have *αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ εὐθύνειν καὶ δικάζειν πάντας* (cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 16, *τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν*). But in Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 8 sq. we have *μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν*, where *λαβεῖν* seems used of an instantaneous and *σώζειν* of a continued act: cp. Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 29 sq. (*γένοιτο* followed by *σώζοιτο*) and 1289 a 3, *ὃς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, and Demosth. De Cor. c. 254 (*προελέσθαι* followed by *πράττειν*). Cp.

also Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 30. l. 17, *τοὺς δ' ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας διανεῖμαι σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τέτταρα μέρη ὡς ἰσαίτατα καὶ διακληρῶσαι, καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν βουλεύειν.* Perhaps the tenses in the passage before us should be explained in a similar way. As to the fact the following may be quoted. 'A very little voting would be enough for the [Bulgarian] peasant, who grudges a walk to the polling-place as so much time taken from the more serious business of field-labour. In some districts it is difficult to find candidates for the Sobranje, and the village patriarch who lets himself be elected makes a virtue of his self-denial' (*Times*, Oct. 29. 1886).

22. *εἴ τι φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσιν.* Cp. 2. 10. 1272 b 9, *ἔχει τι πολιτείας ἡ τάξις. Φιλοτιμίας* takes up *τῆς τιμῆς*, 17.

23. *ἐπεὶ παρ' ἐνίοις δήμοις* κ.τ.λ. It is not clear why the whole citizen-body of Mantineia met for purposes of deliberation, while the election of the magistrates was made over to sections of it selected in succession for the purpose. And does *αἱρετοί* imply that these sections were elected, or that they were selected by some system of rotation similar to that described in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 15 sqq.? If they were elected, by whom were they elected? By the whole citizen-body? Perhaps it was thought that, while deliberation was best left to gatherings of the whole citizen-body, in elections to offices a small body of electors would make a better choice than a large one. The fact that this arrangement existed in some democracies is a remarkable one, because there were oligarchies in which the magistrates were elected by the entire demos (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 126. 2) takes Aristotle to refer in the passage before us to the democracy which existed at Mantineia in B.C. 421.

27. *ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ' ἦν* is added in explanation of *καὶ τοῦτο.*

διὸ δὴ κ.τ.λ. For *διὸ δή* see note on 1310 b 5. It would seem from the passage before us that Aristotle regarded the Solonian democracy as a democracy of the first kind, for many of the institutions here referred to existed in it: for instance, all the citizens possessed the right of electing the magistrates and reviewing their conduct in office (3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq.) and of acting as dicasts (2. 12. 1274 a 3), while the magistracies were filled by election (2. 12. 1273 b 40 sqq.), and a higher property-qualification may probably have been required for the most important of them (see note on 1274 a 18). A similar distinction between the property-qualifica-

tion required for some offices and for others was made in the first form of oligarchy (c. 6. 1320 b 22 sqq.).

32. ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους, sc. ἄρχειν: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 36 sq. This restriction would probably exclude poor men: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 6 sq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 24 sq.

33. αἵ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. For τε γάρ here see note on 1333 a 2, and for τῶν βελτίστων note on 1292 a 9. Οἱ βέλτιστοι is an ambiguous term, meaning either 'the best men' or 'men of high social position.' In order that the conclusion, ἀνάγκη πολιτευομένους οὓς πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς, may be justified, οἱ βέλτιστοι should here bear the former meaning. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 20) points out the resemblance of the passage before us to Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 12–19.

35. τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρίμοις. The omission of the article before γνωρίμοις shows that the ἐπιεικεῖς are regarded as not far removed from the γνώριμοι. Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 31, τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων (sc. πλῆθος), and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 28. l. 6, τῶν εὐγενῶν καὶ γνωρίμων, and contrast 1319 b 13, τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν μέσων.

36. ἄρξονται γὰρ οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλων χειρόνων. The form ἀρχθήσονται occurs in 1. 13. 1259 b 40. Nothing was more bitter to Greeks than to be ruled by men inferior to themselves: cp. 1319 b 15 sqq., Soph. Philoct. 456 sqq., Plato, Protag. 338 B, Rep. 347 C, and Laws 770 E, Demosth. De Rhod. Lib. c. 15, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3. 10, τίς γὰρ ἑκουσίως ἄρχεται τῶν κρειττόνων ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος;

38. τὸ γὰρ ἐπανακρέμασθαι κ.τ.λ. Ἐπανακρέμασθαι is a very rare word. For the thought cp. Hdt. 7. 104, ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι, ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος.

40. For φυλάττειν in the sense of 'watch and check,' cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 19, and Plato, Laws 867 A, ὁ μὲν τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων, and for τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαῦλον cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 30 sqq. and Plato, Timaeus, 71 D, τὸ φαῦλον ἡμῶν.

1319 a. **2.** ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὠφελιμώτατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here has in his memory Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 16, καλῶς δὲ δημαγωγήσεις, ἐὰν μήθ' ὑβρίζειν τὸν ὄχλον ἐᾷς μήθ' ὑβριζόμενον περιορᾷς, ἀλλὰ σκοπῇς ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι μὲν τὰς τιμὰς ἕξουσιν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι μηδὲν ἀδικήσουσι· ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν. For ὁ ταῖς πολιτείαις cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 18, τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν.

6. πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργὸν τὸν δῆμον κ.τ.λ. Τε in τῶν τε νόμων τινές has nothing to answer to it. Aristotle's attention

appears to be distracted by the task of adducing examples, or he would have gone on to mention administrative measures (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 32) likely to produce a similar effect. Some of the laws referred to by Aristotle may have been due to tyrants who wished to keep the citizens away from the city and to make peasants of them (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13 sqq.). According to Plutarch, however (Themist. c. 19), the ancient *kings* of Athens sought to induce their subjects to occupy themselves with the cultivation of the olive, and not with sea-faring pursuits. It is evident from what Aristotle says that there were two ways at least in which an 'agricultural demos' might cease to exist in a Greek State. It might cease to exist because its members lost their land altogether, or it might cease to exist because they lost the fixed *quantum* of land the possession of which secured them political rights. There were, therefore, two ways of making the demos agricultural; one of them was to prevent the loss of its land, and the other was to avoid fixing too high the amount of land on the possession of which its political rights depended. When the demos lost its land, it appears most commonly to have done so either by mortgaging it and failing to pay the interest due or by selling it, the result being in either case that a few large landowners took the place of a number of small ones. The laws mentioned by Aristotle were intended to prevent this happening. They would be especially in place in colonies and in those States of Greece Proper in which a conquest had at one time taken place, for when the colonists or conquerors lost their lots, they ceased to be in a position to serve as hoplites, and, if many did so, the dominant race might find it difficult to hold its own. It will be noticed that Aristotle takes it for granted throughout that small owners will reside on the land they own and cultivate it. This is not always the case; it often is not the case in Flanders at the present day, as readers of Laveleye's Économie Rurale de la Belgique will remember, but perhaps small owners of land in Greece had more difficulty in finding tenants and could hardly trust a slave, except under their own eye. The laws to which Aristotle refers would not avail to make the whole of the demos agricultural, for, notwithstanding their existence, a large element of handicraftsmen day-labourers and ἀγοραῖοι might find a place within the demos, unless indeed these classes were excluded from citizenship. One incidental result of making the whole demos of a State agricultural should be noticed. This is that a body of

metoeci (or other aliens) and slaves would develope within it who would practise the handicrafts and trades in the absence of which the State could not prosper. It was the ease with which metoeci and slaves could be drawn from surrounding regions that made it possible for the Greeks to leave the practice of handicrafts and trade to a large extent to aliens and slaves (3. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq.), and to reserve themselves for agriculture, war, and politics.

8. πάντες. *Πᾶς* is often placed either at the beginning (as in 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 10) or at the end of a sentence (as in the passage before us and 1319 b 27 sq.: cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 12. l. 1 sq.). For *τινὲς . . . πάντες* cp. 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 38 sq.

ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 17 sq. The law broken by the *γνώριμοι* at Thurii may have been a law of this kind (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 29 sqq.). Evasion of a law to this effect would probably also be easy. Harrington, however, in his Oceana (pp. 87, 100, ed. 1656) provides that no one shall own land of a greater annual value than £2000. For the use of *τό* with the infin. to express the effect of a law cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 4 sqq.

9. ἢ ἀπό τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. No land was so likely to be bought up by rich men as land lying within an easy distance of the central city. The owner of land thus situated would have a better market for his produce, would find it easier to obtain whatever he needed to purchase (see Hom. Il. 23. 834 sq.), and would be better able to combine a life of political activity with attention to his estate. That land lying near the city was usually the most valuable we see from Xen. De Vect. 4. 50. Thus in the newly-founded colony of Thurii the Sybarite portion of the colonists appropriated to themselves all the land lying near the city (Diod. 12. 11. 1). The rising of the Attic Diacrii under Peisistratus against the Pedieis was a rising of the owners of land at a distance from the city against the owners of land near it. *Καὶ τὴν πόλιν* is perhaps added after *τὸ ἄστυ* because *τὸ ἄστυ* was sometimes used to designate a part only of the central city, at Athens the acropolis (see Schn. 2. 373).

10. ἦν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον κ.τ.λ. *Μηδὲ πωλεῖν*, 'not even to sell,' to say nothing of buying or owning. Leucas was probably one of the States referred to (2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq.). We hear of a similar law in the Lacedaemonian State (see note on 1270 a 19). Laws of this kind will hardly have existed in the States with which Hesiod was familiar, for he speaks in Op. et Dies, 341, as if the

buying and selling of lots was a common occurrence (see Prof. Ridgeway in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 6. 338 sq.). Yet it is likely that the sale of the lot was forbidden at Corinth and Thebes when Pheidon and Philolaus legislated there, for otherwise the legislation by which the former sought to maintain the number of the lots intact (2. 6. 1265 b 12 sqq.), and the latter to prevent a diminution of their number through the extinction of families (2. 12. 1274 b 2 sqq.), would have been of little avail. According to Plato, Rep. 552 A sq., 555 C, laws forbidding men to sell their property were not favoured in oligarchies and did not exist in them. As to the provisions respecting the lot in the Laws of Plato see vol. i. p. 441. According to Professor Mahaffy (*Times*, Sept. 10, 1892), the Macedonian and Greek κληροῦχοι in the Fayoum whose position is made known to us in the Petrie Papyri were not allowed to alienate their farms. Measures of this kind are still resorted to in India. 'Acting on the advice of Mr. Lawrence, the Kashmir Government has decided that the title given by the new settlement of Kashmir to the cultivators, heretofore serfs, may not be alienated by sale or mortgage. This means, of course, that the Kashmir cultivator will have to pay a higher interest for borrowed money than he would have to pay if he could pledge a first-class security such as his homestead. Mr. Lawrence was perfectly aware of the fact, but he considered that high interest was a less evil than the expropriation of the cultivators from their land, if they were allowed to alienate it' (*Times*, Oct. 14, 1895).

12. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν Ὀξύλου νόμον εἶναι κ.τ.λ. The mention of Oxylus indicates that this law existed at Elis. This State seems to have studied with especial care the convenience and well-being of the small landowners scattered over its territory (Polyb. 4. 73. 8). Solon, on the other hand, does not appear to have placed any check on the mortgaging of land, though he did much to diminish the occasion for mortgaging it by checking expenditure (Plut. Solon, c. 21). Laws not unlike that ascribed to Oxylus have found advocates in some States in recent years. The National or Slovene party in Carniola, finding that the peasants were being pauperized by excessive partition, the population increasing rapidly, in 1883 favoured the proposal that 'the minimum amount of land required for the support of a family should be made indivisible and should not be capable of being mortgaged beyond a fixed proportion—say a third—of its value'

(*Times*, Dec. 26, 1883). So in the United States individual States have legislated to exempt 'homesteads, or a certain amount of personal property, from the claims of creditors' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3. 275, 276 note). But here a wider object is sought than the preservation of a class of small cultivating landowners.

14. νῦν δὲ δεῖ διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ Ἀφυταίων νόμῳ κ.τ.λ., 'but, as things are, [the evil having already made its way into the State,] it is well to amend matters by the law of the Aphytaeans also [as well as by those previously mentioned].' The laws previously mentioned, as Vict. points out, tend to prevent the evil finding its way into the State; this one tends to mitigate its effects after it has found its way in. The law of Aphytis to which Aristotle refers appears to have been a law fixing the property-qualification which any one enjoying political rights under the constitution was required to possess at a certain portion of a lot of land. Thus at Aphytis those who owned no land at all were excluded from political rights and apparently from citizenship (cp. 16, πάντα γεωργοῦσιν). Compare the law proposed by Phormisius at Athens after the restoration of the democracy (Lysias, Or. 34: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 66, vol. 8. 403 sqq.). Phormisius, however, seems to have been prepared to admit to citizenship any one who owned land, however small might be the quantity held by him. Aphytis, like the other cities in Pallene (Kuhn, Entstehung der Staedte der Alten, p. 296), had evidently escaped when Philip of Macedon destroyed Olynthus and many other Thraceward cities (Demosth. Phil. 3. 26). Pallene had a fertile soil and was especially well-suited for the cultivation of the vine (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 453); this was one reason why the demos of Aphytis was agricultural. It should be noticed that in sketching the measures by which an agricultural demos might be created Aristotle does not suggest anything resembling what Tiberius Gracchus proposed at Rome two centuries later (Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., 3. 90, 95), the establishment by the State of a new class of small landowners. Greek States had not in all probability a sufficient amount of *ager publicus* at their disposal to effect this.

17. τιμῶνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις κ.τ.λ., 'for they value the lots of land not in their entirety, but dividing them up in parts so small that even the poor can exceed in the valuations of their property [the value of one of these parts].' Many have taken the suppressed object of ὑπερβάλλειν to be τοὺς πλουσίους, but not,

I think, rightly: Welldon's version is right, 'can more than attain the necessary standard of assessment.' See as to this law at Aphytis vol. i. p. 375, and cp. Oecon. 2. 1347 a 18 sqq. In States in which the sale of the original lots was forbidden the property-qualification required for citizenship would be the ownership of a lot, but at Aphytis the lots had come to be broken up. Aristotle does not say that the law was enacted at Aphytis with the object of creating an agricultural democracy; its object more probably was to prevent the owner of a portion of a lot escaping such imposts as the eisphora.

19. *μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος* κ.τ.λ. For the use of *πλῆθος* here as an equivalent to *δῆμος* see note on 1317 a 25, and cp. c. 7. 1321 a 5 sq. Whether the *νομεῖς*—a term including herdsmen of all kinds and shepherds—were generally small owners of land like the *γεωργοί*, or owners of the herds and flocks tended by them, is not clear, but they resembled the *γεωργοί* at any rate in this, that they were too busy to attend the assembly often or to take an active part in politics. In summer, indeed, they would be far from the city on mountain-pastures with their cattle and sheep. Many citizens of Achaean and Arcadian cities (E. Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 169) and also of Elis (E. Meyer, Gesch. d. Alterthums, 2. 286) would be herdsmen and shepherds.

21. *πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει τῇ γεωργίᾳ παραπλησίως.* For the adverb cp. Hist. An. 2. 12. 503 b 29, *ὁμοίως δ' ἔνια μόρια καὶ οἱ ὄρνιθες τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἔχουσι ζῴοις.*

22. *καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις* κ.τ.λ. Contrast Xen. Oecon. 5. 8, *καὶ δραμεῖν δὲ καὶ βαλεῖν καὶ πηδῆσαι τίς ἱκανωτέρους τέχνη γεωργίας παρέχεται;* For *τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις* cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 5, *τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*, and Polyb. 6. 12. 4, *τῶν πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις ἀνηκόντων.* Richards adds Xen. Cyneg. 1. 18, *τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀγαθοί*, and 12. 1, *τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδεύει. Γεγυμνασμένοι τὰς ἕξεις*, sc. *τοῦ σώματος*, 'trained and hardened in habit of body' (to bear fatigue and heat and cold): cp. Xen. Oecon. 7. 2, *ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔνδον γε διατρίβεις οὐδὲ τοιαύτη σου ἡ ἕξις τοῦ σώματος καταφαίνεται*, and 21. 7. *Χρήσιμοι τὰ σώματα*, 'serviceable in body': cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 5. 9, *οὐκ ἂν οὖν ῥᾳδίως γέ τις εὕροι Σπαρτιατῶν οὔτε ὑγιεινοτέρους οὔτε τοῖς σώμασι χρησιμωτέρους· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀπό τε τῶν σκελῶν καὶ ἀπὸ χειρῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τραχήλου γυμνάζονται*, and [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 b 3 sqq. A person might be hardened in constitution without having muscular strength and handiness, or swiftness of

foot. Aristotle has before him in this passage Plato's description of the Persians in Laws 695 A, *ἠγνόει τὴν πατρῴαν οὖν παιδευομένους τέχνην, οὖσαν Περσικήν, ποιμένων ὄντων Περσῶν, τραχείας χώρας ἐκγόνους, σκληρὰν καὶ ἱκανὴν ποιμένας ἀπεργάζεσθαι μάλα ἰσχυροὺς καὶ δυναμένους θυραυλεῖν καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖν καί, εἰ στρατεύεσθαι δέοι, στρατεύεσθαι.* In ancient Greece, as in the East, it was necessary for shepherds to 'abide with their flocks by night' in order to protect them from wild beasts. 'The nomad shepherds' of modern Greece 'live out among their flocks on the barren mountains, where the sheep in the summer find precarious subsistence. In wet or dry, by day or by night, these men have no shelter but their coarse frieze cloaks, a blanket stretched on a couple of sticks, or in the winter a rude hut of brushwood and reeds' (Review of Mr. Rennell Rodd's 'Customs and Lore of Modern Greece,' *Times*, July 7, 1892). So we read of Daphnis in Timaeus, Fragm. 4 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. I. 193), *βουκολῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν Αἴτνην χείματός τε καὶ θέρους ἠγραύλει.* The military achievements of the herdsmen and shepherds of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden illustrate the truth of Aristotle's remark.

24. τὰ δ' ἄλλα πλήθη κ.τ.λ., i. e. *βάναυσοι τεχνῖται, ἀγοραῖοι*, and *θῆτες*, as appears from 27 sq. (cp. c. 7. 1321 a 5, *ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μέν ἐστι μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους, γεωργικὸν βαναυσικὸν ἀγοραῖον θητικόν*). In c. 1. 1317 a 24 sqq. only *τὸ γεωργικόν*, *τὸ βάναυσον*, and *τὸ θητικόν* are mentioned. We hear nothing in this Book of the more varied *εἴδη τοῦ δήμου* enumerated in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 17 sqq., except so far as *οἱ νόθοι καὶ οἱ ἐξ ὁποτερουοῦν πολίτου* are regarded as parts of the demos in 1319 b 9 sq., but Aristotle would probably say of all of them except the *γεωργοί* what he says here of the *βάναυσοι*, *ἀγοραῖοι*, and *θῆτες* (compare what he says of the trireme-oarsmen in 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 7 sqq.). In Aristoph. Eccl. 432 *τὸ σκυτοτομικὸν πλῆθος* is contrasted with *οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν*. For *ἐξ ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστᾶσι*, cp. Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 79, *τρία γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκεν, ὁ ἄρχων, ὁ δικαστής, ὁ ἰδιώτης.* As to *οἱ ἀγοραῖοι* see note on 1291 a 4.

26. ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 40 sq., 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8 sqq., 3. 4. 1277 a 35 sqq., 3. 5. 1278 a 20 sq. Cp. also Xen. Oecon. 6. 7 and Plut. Pericl. c. 1.

28. τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. There is a slight shade of contempt in the use of *ἀνθρώπων* here, as in Plato, Gorg. 518 C, *διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους*, and

Phrynichus, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 601), *ἄνθρωπος ὢν ὑδατοπότας.*

ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ κυλίεσθαι κ.τ.λ. The *βάναυσοι τεχνῖται* and the *ἀγοραῖοι* came to the marketplace to sell what they had to sell, and the *θῆτες* to be hired (Matth. 20. 3). The Sausage-seller in the Knights of Aristophanes (636) prays to the *ἀγορά, ἐν ᾗ παῖς ὢν ἐπαιδεύθην ἐγώ.* The *δῆμος* of Byzantium spent its time *περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸν λιμένα* (Theopomp. Fr. 65: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 287). Diodorus, contrasting Egyptian ways with Greek to the advantage of the former, says of Greek handicraftsmen, *πλεῖστοι δ' ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις πόλεσιν εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας συντρέχοντες τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν λυμαίνονται, τὸ δὲ λυσιτελὲς περιποιοῦνται παρὰ τῶν μισθοδοτούντων* (1. 74. 7). The assembly in many cities probably met in the marketplace (Polyb. 28. 7. 3: 29. 24. 5 Hultsch). At Delphi meetings of the assembly were called *ἀγοραί* (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 313: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 37). For some purposes the assembly at Athens met in the agora (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 288). We ask, were not the *γεωργοί* also, like farmers among ourselves, frequently to be seen in the marketplace? Did they not take their own produce to the marketplace and sell it there? Probably they often did (cp. Plut. Arat. c. 8, *ἡ δὲ ὥρα κατήπειγεν ἤδη φθεγγομένων ἀλεκτρυόνων καὶ ὅσον οὔπω τῶν ἐξ ἀγροῦ τι φέρειν εἰωθότων πρὸς ἀγορὰν ἐπερχομένων*), but Büchsenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 456 sq.) thinks that it was more usual for them to sell their produce to retail-dealers, who sold it again at a profit. As to the form *κυλίεσθαι*, which seems to be that commonly used by Aristotle, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 2. 453.

31. οὔτ' ἀπαντῶσιν οὔθ' ὁμοίως δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης, 'neither attend this gathering nor have a similar need of it.' For the suppression of *εἰς τὴν σύνοδον ταύτην* after *ἀπαντῶσιν* see note on 1339 a 19. For *ἀπαντᾶν* cp. (with Bon. Ind. s. v.) 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 24 sq. The term *σύνοδος* is applied to gatherings of different kinds, in 2. 9. 1271 a 28 to the Lacedaemonian syssitia, in Pollux, 8. 131 to the dicasteries, and in Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 42 (cp. 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 10) to markets; it is often applied by Polybius to meetings of an assembly (e. g. in 4. 14. 1 to those of the Achaean assembly).

32. ὅπου δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ., 'and where it also happens [in

addition to the demos being agricultural or pastoral] that' etc. Ὅπου δέ takes up 1318 b 10 sq. and 1319 a 19 sqq. This must commonly have been the case in Achaia, where the cities were mostly on or near the seacoast, while much of their pasture-land, and in some cases of their tillage-land and vineyards, lay far from the coast on the mountain-slopes of the interior (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 408–9, 484). In many colonies, again, the city was on an islet or headland, and most of the territory a good way off, if not on the other side of an arm of the sea. As to the repetition of τὴν χώραν see critical note on 1319 a 33.

36. ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποικίας, 'to make its settlements' (Welldon) or perhaps 'its out-settlements.' Cp. Hist. An. 8. 13. 599 a 4. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἐκτοπισμοὺς τούτων ποιοῦνται τὸν τρόπον.

ὥστε δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'and so, [as democracies are better when the assembly meets rarely,] it is well, even if there is a city-populace in the State, [so that sufficient numbers to form an assembly can easily be got together,] not to hold meetings of the assembly in democracies without the presence of the body of citizens scattered over the territory, [for this will make its meetings rarer].' At Athens the citizens resident in the country were summoned to important special meetings of the assembly (Pollux, 8. 116), but probably the assembly often met there without any citizens from the country being present. For τὸ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλῆθος cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 30.

40. ἑπομένως. Bonitz (Ind. s. v. ἕπεσθαι) compares Metaph. Δ. 23. 1023 a 23, καὶ τὸ ἓν τινι δὲ εἶναι ὁμοιοτρόπως λέγεται καὶ ἑπομένως τῷ ἔχειν.

1319 b. 1. τὸ χεῖρον δεῖ πλῆθος χωρίζειν. Cp. c. 6. 1320 b 28 sq. The γεωργοί are best, then the νομεῖς, then the βάναυσοι τεχνῖται (see note on 1317 a 26), then the ἀγοραῖοι and θῆτες, then οἱ πάνθοι καὶ οἱ ἐξ ὁποτερουοῦν πόλιτου (1319 b 9 sq.). Compare the order in which the different kinds of demos are enumerated in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. At the bottom of the list would stand οἱ ἐκ δούλου ἢ δούλης (3. 5. 1278 a 33).

τὴν δὲ τελευταίαν κ.τ.λ. To what kind of States the ultimate democracy is alone appropriate, will be clear from 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq. As this constitution could not exist in its fullness unless pay was provided for the members of the assembly and dicasteries and for the magistrates, its maintenance imposed a heavy burden on the rich in States which did not possess special sources of revenue

such as an emporium or dependent allies. Aristotle adds that an ultimate democracy would not be durable in the absence of laws and customs favourable to its continuance—preventing, for instance, the spoliation of the rich by lawsuits or eisphorae or heavy liturgies or confiscation (c. 5). See note on 40.

4. ἃ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. *Συμβαίνειν* with the infin. is sometimes used by Plato not impersonally, but personally (Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 477 c), and, as Richards points out, it may be so used here and in 17 sq.

5. εἴρηται πρότερον, in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book.

6. πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι κ.τ.λ., 'and with a view to institute this democracy the leaders of the popular party are accustomed to make the demos also [as well as the democracy] strong by adding as many as possible to the citizen-body' etc. We are told in 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq. that democracies tend to arise when the πλῆθος becomes numerous and strong. For οἱ προεστῶτες, which is explained by οἱ δημαγωγοί in 11, cp. Plato, Rep. 565 A. Aristotle is concerned with τὸ καθιστάναι (or τὸ κατασκευάζειν, 12) down to the end of c. 4, but in c. 5 he passes to measures intended to *preserve* this kind of democracy. Contrast with his counsels the view expressed in Lys. Or. 20. pro Polystr. c. 13, πῶς δ' ἂν γένοιτο δημοτικώτερος ἢ ὅστις ὑμῶν ψηφισαμένων πεντακισχιλίοις παραδοῦναι τὰ πράγματα καταλογεὺς ἂν ἐννακισχιλίους κατέλεξεν . . .; καίτοι οὐχ οἱ ἂν πλείστους πολίτας ποιῶσιν, οὗτοι καταλύουσι τὸν δῆμον, ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν ἐκ πλειόνων ἐλάττους.

9. τοὺς νόθους καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ὁποτερουοῦν πολίτου. See note on 1278 a 26. This may have been done by the founders of the democracy at Cyrene (see 17 sqq.). Cleisthenes, though he was not the founder of an ultimate democracy, went still further, and brought absolute aliens into the tribes (3. 2. 1275 b 35 sqq.).

10. ἅπαν γὰρ οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον, 'for all this element is congenial to the kind of democracy of which we have been speaking rather than to any other' (cp. 20, χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν τοιαύτην). For μᾶλλον see note on 1270 b 33.

12. δεῖ μέντοι προσλαμβάνειν κ.τ.λ., 'it is well, however, to add members to the citizen-body only until the mass of the citizens exceeds in number the notables and the moderately well-to-do.' Cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 23 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq. The advice which Aristotle gives here is hardly in harmony with what he says in the latter of these two passages, for there he tells us that when the poor without the addition of the moderately well-to-

do to their side are more numerous than the rich, democracies do not last long. For *μέχρι ἂν ὑπερτείνῃ* cp. De Gen. An. I. 21. 729 b 31, *μέχρι ἂν συστήσῃ*, sc. *τὸ κύημα* (Bon. Ind. s. v. *μέχρι*).

14. *ὑπερβάλλοντες γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. Supply *οἱ πολλοί*, contained in *τὸ πλῆθος* (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 17 sq.). For the thought, cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 31, *ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως.*

17. *ὅπερ*, 'which,' i. e. the discontent of the notables with the democracy.

περὶ Κυρήνην. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 231. 1) takes the reference to be to the *στάσις* which Diodorus (14. 34) describes under the date of B. C. 401. Five hundred of the rich were put to death and many of the rest fled from the city, till after a battle in which the losses on both sides were large an arrangement was come to, and the rich were allowed to return. Compare the experience of Syracuse (Diod. 11. 86. 3).

19. *ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάσματα* κ.τ.λ. For *τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷς* κ.τ.λ. see note on 1337 b 6. The measures referred to are measures for re-grouping the citizens in tribes phratries and worships, with a view to mingling them together and putting an end to pre-existing groupings not favourable to democracy. It is unfortunate that Aristotle does not tell us whether all the measures he mentions were adopted both by Cleisthenes and by the founders of the democracy at Cyrene, or, if not, which of them were adopted by Cleisthenes and which by the Cyreneans. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 230) thinks it likely that new and more numerous tribes and phratries were instituted at Cyrene when democracy was introduced there on the death of Arcesilaus IV somewhat after B. C. 462. We know that Cleisthenes introduced new and more numerous tribes at Athens (Hdt. 5. 69) and took pains to mingle the old and new citizens together (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 21) and to break up the pre-existing political intimacies, but the statement (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 21. l. 23), *τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰς φρατρίας καὶ τὰς ἱερωσύνας εἴασεν ἔχειν ἑκάστους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*, seems to me to imply that he did not introduce new and more numerous phratries, and is perhaps hardly consistent with his having made the change referred to in the worships of the State. Dr. Sandys (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* p. 83), it is true, seeks to reconcile the statement in the *Ἀθ. Πολ.* with that before us by taking the former to refer only 'to those who were already citizens connected with existing *γένη* and *φρατρίαι*.' 'Cleisthenes,' he adds, 'allowed all these to continue as of old in their respective *γένη* and *φρατρίαι* with their

religious institutions intact,' but 'provided new *φρατρίαι*' for his *νεοπολῖται*. The object of Cleisthenes, however, was to mingle the *νεοπολῖται* with the old citizens ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 21), and would he have been content to place the former in phratries of their own distinct from the others? Perhaps, if we seek to reconcile the two statements, the safest way of doing so is to suppose that Aristotle refers only to Cyrene in his mention of phratries in 1319 b 24. But even if the 'Αθ. Πολ. is from Aristotle's pen, which is doubtful, there is no reason why all its statements should agree with those of the Politics, for statements which are not in complete harmony with each other are to be found in the Politics itself. It is easy to understand why new tribes and phratries should be introduced on the foundation of a democracy, but why should they be more numerous than the pre-existing ones? Probably because small tribes and phratries do not break up the citizen-body so much as large and powerful ones. An university composed of four large colleges would be less of an unity than one composed of a dozen small ones. Plutarch tells us in Num. c. 17 that Numa softened the contrast between the Roman and Sabine elements in the citizen-body by breaking it up into smaller groups based on trade, *διανοηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ φύσει δύσμικτα καὶ σκληρὰ καταθραύοντες καὶ διαιροῦντες ἀναμιγνύουσιν, ὑπὸ μικρότητος ἀλλήλοις συμβαίνοντα μᾶλλον*. The substitution of Departments for Provinces in France at the Revolution may be compared. The increase in the number of the *ἑκατοστύες* at the Pontic Heracleia mentioned by Aeneas in Poliorc. 11. 10 seems to have had a different object, and to have been intended to baffle the treasonable schemes of the rich, not to make the democracy more extreme. So again, when Marshal Boucicault, the French Governor of Genoa from 1401 to 1409, 'broke up the old unions under constables and divided the citizens into fresh combinations for military purposes' (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 233), and further steps of the same nature were taken in 1528 (ibid. p. 401 sq.), the object was to restore peace to the faction-ridden city, not to strengthen a democracy. The same thing may be said of Spenser's suggestion in his 'View of the State of Ireland' (H. Morley, Ireland under Elizabeth and James I, p. 193 sqq.), that a division into tithings and hundreds should take the place of the division into septs. Still schemes of this kind help us to understand the measures referred to in the text.

21. **βουλόμενος αὐξῆσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν.** Herodotus, on the

contrary, speaks of Cleisthenes as ὁ τὰς φυλὰς καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν Ἀθηναίοισι καταστήσας (6. 131). Aristotle here represents the object of Cleisthenes in his re-grouping of the citizens of Athens to have been the intensification of the democracy by the destruction of pre-existing unions which were the strongholds of an anti-democratic spirit, but in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21 the aim ascribed to him in his re-grouping is rather that of facilitating and paving the way for the introduction of new citizens. The two aims, however, do not lie far apart. Cleisthenes may, indeed, have had other aims also. The tribe was closely connected with the military organization of the State, and he may well have desired that the former military grouping of the citizens should be altered, for it evidently favoured the influence of the nobles. We may also conjecture looking to the way in which he constituted his new tribes, making each of them to consist of three trittyes, one in the seacoast region, another in the interior, and a third in the city and its neighbourhood (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21), that one of his aims was to put an end to feuds between different districts of Attica and to make the tribes willing and fit to work together in the Boulê and elsewhere by making them as uniform and as free from local feeling as possible.

24. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὀλίγα καὶ κοινά. Private worships were those in which it was not open to all the citizens to take part. So the Gephyraei at Athens had a private worship of their own (Hdt. 5. 61). As to the private worship of the phratry of the Clytidae at Chios see Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 360 (commented on by Prof. Percy Gardner in his Manual of Greek Antiquities, ed. 1, p. 197 sq.), where it appears that the images of the gods of the phratry were at one time kept in the private houses of certain influential members, not in a temple common to all, and that the sacrifices on festal days were long offered in these private houses, a circumstance which must have secured to their owners an ascendency in the phratry. It is to private worships of *gentes* and phratries and sacrificial unions that Aristotle refers here. He intends, it would seem, to ascribe to Cleisthenes a measure of the kind which he describes, for Cleisthenes certainly sought to mingle the citizens together (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21), but what the private worships were which he converted into a few public ones, it is not easy to say. Gilbert (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 150) seems to take the reference to be to the worship of Ζεὺς φράτριος, Ἀθηνᾶ φρατρία, and Ἀπόλλων πατρῷος, but the point is doubtful.

Plato in the Laws (909 D sq.: see vol. i. p. 179) is little tolerant of exclusive private worships. The object ascribed to Cleisthenes by Aristotle (the intensification of the democracy) was probably not the only object he had in view in making private worships public. He sought also to put an end to the ignorance of each other and distrust of each other which the tyranny had probably produced in the minds of the citizens (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 4 sqq.). Common sacrifices drew men together and made them friendly to each other (Plato, Laws 738 D sq.). Herodotus (1. 59) speaks of τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἔθνος as κατεχόμενόν τε καὶ διεσπασμένον ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου, and Cleisthenes did his best to heal its divisions. Compare with his measures the introduction of the worship of the Emperor in the Roman Empire, as a worship in which all could join, whatever their national or local worship, and consequently a means of union.

25. καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον κ.τ.λ. For ἀναμιχθῶσι cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21. ll. 4, 11. In αἱ συνήθειαι αἱ πρότερον the reference appears to be to intimacies based on the tribe, the phratry, and the private sacrificial union, perhaps also the ναυκραρία (cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21. l. 19 sqq.). The new tribes of Cleisthenes were so constructed (see above on 21) as to mingle together residents in widely severed regions of Attica. Citizens living in districts at a distance from each other and formerly hostile were drawn together by being made members of the same tribe. Another means by which Cleisthenes sought to effect the same object was the classification of the citizens by demes, for this enabled him to make all citizens resident in the deme members of the State, whether they were the sons of Athenian fathers and mothers or not (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21), and to break down family exclusiveness. Plutarch (Pericl. c. 3) justly says of Cleisthenes, νόμους ἔθετο καὶ πολιτείαν ἄριστα κεκραμένην πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ σωτηρίαν κατέστησεν. Ὅπως ἄν is rarely used in the genuine writings of Aristotle (see Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, pp. 22 sq., 40 sq., and Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 55). It occurs with the optative in c. 5. 1320 a 35.

27. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατασκευάσματα κ.τ.λ. See notes on 1313 b 32 and 35, and as to κατασκεύασμα note on 1271 a 33. Compare Demosth. Phil. 3. 3, who says, addressing the Athenians, ὑμεῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὕτω κοινὴν οἴεσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεδώκατε, καὶ πολλοὺς ἄν τις οἰκέτας ἴδοι παρ' ὑμῖν μετὰ πλείονος ἐξουσίας ὅ τι βούλονται λέγοντας ἢ πολίτας ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων. We read in

Polyb. 15. 30. 9 of a riot at Alexandria, *ἐγίνετο βοὴ καὶ κραυγὴ σύμμικτος, ὡς ἂν γυναικῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ παίδων ἀνδράσιν ἀναμεμιγμένων· οὐ γὰρ ἐλάττω ποιεῖ τὰ παιδάρια τῶν ἀνδρῶν περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ταραχὰς ἔν τε τῇ Καρχηδονίων πόλει καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν.*

29. *αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη μέχρι του συμφέρουσα*, 'and this would be [not only congenial to the extreme democracy, but also] up to a certain point advantageous to it.' For the distinction between what is *δημοτικόν* and what is advantageous to democracy cp. 1318 b 27 sqq. For *μέχρι του* cp. 3. 12. 1282 b 18 sq. and 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 41, *μέχρι τινὸς πλήθους*. For the reason why indulgence to slaves is up to a certain point advantageous to an extreme democracy see 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 37 sqq.

30. *πολὺ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθοῦν*, 'for many will be the quarters from which support will come to a constitution of the kind we have described' (i. e. to one which permits living as one likes). *Τοῖς πολλοῖς* takes up *πολύ*.

C. 5. **33.** *Ἔστι δ' ἔργον* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 960 B, *τῶν πάντων ἕ ἑκάστοτε τέλος οὐ τὸ δρᾶσαί τι σχεδὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κτήσασθαι κατοικίσαι τ' ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γεννηθέντι σωτηρίαν ἐξευρόντα τελέως ἀεὶ τόν' ἤδη νομίζειν τὸν ὅσον ἔδει πραχθῆναι πεπρᾶχθαι, πρότερον δ' ἀτελὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅλον.* As to the repetition of *ἔργον* see critical note on 1319 b 35.

34. For the order of the words in *τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν* cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 30, *στόματός τινα πλείω γένη*, and Plato, Critias 112 E, *τινὰ τοιοῦτον . . . τρόπον*.

36. *μεῖναι*, 'to hold one's ground' (i. e. *τὴν πολιτείαν σώζεσθαι*: cp. 35): compare 1319 b 3, *διαμένειν*, and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 3, *ἵνα μένουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀριστοκρατίαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι*. For *οὐ χαλεπὸν* with the aor. infin. *μεῖναι* cp. Thuc. 6. 34. 4, *χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλῆθος μῆκος ἐν τάξει μεῖναι*. Yet in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 28 we have *χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον*. So in 2. 7. 1266 a 40 sq. we have *οὐ χαλεπὸν ἦν ποιεῖν* and in 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 20 *οὐ γὰρ χαλεπόν ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον*.

37. *διὸ δεῖ* κ.τ.λ. This passage, which cannot easily be detached from the context in which it stands (vol. ii. p. xxvii), and therefore can hardly have been added by a later hand than that of Aristotle, clearly indicates that the Seventh (old Fifth) Book should precede the Eighth (old Sixth) Book. Indeed, even if this passage were away, we might assume that the inquiry what institutions are most conducive to the preservation of an ultimate democracy would

follow, not precede, the treatment in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the whole subject of the preservation of constitutions. The experience of Rhodes (7 (5). 5. 1304 b 27 sqq.) and other States is as much present to Aristotle's mind as that of Athens, but still we may gather from the counsels he gives what practical suggestions he would make for the improvement of the Athenian democracy. His recommendations appear very gentle when we compare them with the sweeping and severe change which Antipater made in the constitution in the year of Aristotle's death (Diod. 18. 18). We might have expected some reference to be made here to the fact that ultimate democracies have already been counselled in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. as to the way in which the deliberative should be organized in them. In that passage, however, Aristotle's aim is to enable the deliberative to do its work better, whereas here the object is to point out how an ultimate democracy should be organized and managed so as to be durable.

38. κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 45, *τῇ μὲν δὴ ὅλῃ Περσῶν ἀρχῇ οὕτω τὴν ἀσφάλειαν κατεσκεύαζεν.*

40. τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους κ.τ.λ. It is here implied that the lawgiver is the source not only of written, but also of unwritten law (see vol. i. p. 75, note 1, and cp. Plato, Polit. 295 A, *τὸν νόμον θήσει, καὶ ἐν γράμμασιν ἀποδιδούς, καὶ ἐν ἀγραμμάτοις, πατρίοις δέ, ἔθεσι νομοθετῶν*, and Thuc. 2. 97. 4, where an unwritten law is probably referred to). He may, for instance, create among the *γνώριμοι* a custom of starting the poor in trades or making their own property common in use (1320 b 7 sqq.). A custom like this would not be embodied in writing. Cp. Hesych. Miles. Fragm. 4. c. 32 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 4. 152), *καὶ στρατηγὸς τοῦ παντὸς ἀναδειχθεὶς δήμου πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὸ μεῖζον καὶ ὠφέλιμον μετερρύθμισε, νόμους τε περὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν συμβολαίων τιθέμενος καὶ ἔθη καθιστὰς πολιτικά τε καὶ ἥμερα, δι' ὧν ἀστείους τε καὶ φιλανθρώπους τοὺς πολίτας ἀπέδειξεν.* As to the relation of unwritten to written law see Plato, Laws 793 A sqq. and note on 1287 b 5. The laws and customs which Aristotle would recommend in an ultimate democracy would be laws and customs preventing oppression of the rich and tending permanently to increase the material prosperity of the poor (1320 a 4–b 16), discouraging living as one pleases (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq.), associating rich and poor in the deliberative (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.) and the magistracies (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.), and the like.

1320 a. **2.** καὶ μὴ νομίζειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 20 sqq. and 1310 a 19 sqq.

4. οἱ δὲ νῦν δημαγωγοὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 29, ὁ νῦν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ποιοῦσιν, and (with Sus.², Note 1458) c. 7. 1321 a 40 sqq., and also 2. 12. 1274 a 10, τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. Διὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων is added because confiscation was sometimes decreed by the assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6). See Bernays, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, 1. 173, and as to other accounts in the Politics of the ways in which the rich suffered oppression in democracies note on 1304 b 21. The reference is to Eubulus among others (see Schäfer, Demosthenes 2. 435 on Demosth. De Chers. c. 69, ὅστις μὲν γὰρ . . . παριδὼν ἃ συνοίσει τῇ πόλει κρίνει δημεύει δίδωσι κατηγορεῖ, and c. 71, δυνάμενος ἂν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροι, κατηγορεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δημεύειν καὶ τἄλλ' ἃ ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι ποιεῖν). Compare Plato, Gorg. 466 A–C, and Lys. Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 22, where the Boulê is said, when it is driven by impecuniosity to resort to confiscation, to do so under pressure from demagogues. The penalty of confiscation was inflicted at Athens either separately or, as more often happened, as an accompaniment of sentences of death, life-long exile, the severer form of ἀτιμία, or enslavement, and therefore might be incurred for non-political offences (Meier und Schömann, Der attische Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 959: C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim, 2. 125 sq.: Thonissen, Droit Pénal de la République Athénienne, p. 121 sq.), but the charges on which rich men whose wealth was coveted would be most likely to incur it would be those of treason, sacrilege, a design to upset the democracy, and wrong to the Athenian people. Plato in the Laws, wishing to preserve the lots of land intact, forbids confiscation except in one extreme case (855 A, 856 C sq.: vol. i. p. 441), and Aristotle might well have gone a little further than he does and recommended the abolition of this penalty, which 'has disappeared in our own days from most of the criminal codes of Europe' (Thonissen, p. 128). Still the change which he suggests would have been very beneficial. At Athens, when the penalty of confiscation was inflicted, only a tenth went to Athena (Xen. Hell. 1. 7. 10). It must be remembered, however, that sacred funds could be borrowed under certain restrictions by the State (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 336), so that the State profited by any addition to them, and thus the dicasts would have a motive for inflicting the penalty, even though the confiscated property became

part of a sacred fund. The rule at Athens by which the expense of keeping the lawcourts on foot was defrayed from the fees of the suitors and the fines imposed on the condemned (Gilbert, ibid. p. 339) was a singularly unfortunate one, inasmuch as it gave the dicasts a direct interest in imposing high fines, their own pay being thus secured. Part of these fines seems, however, to have gone to provide pay for the assembly (see note on 17).

6. πρὸς ταῦτα. Cp. c. 7. 1321 a 16, *πρὸς τοῦτο.*

τοὺς κηδομένους τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 28, *τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας φροντίζοντας.*

7. μηδὲν εἶναι δημόσιον τῶν καταδικαζομένων, 'that nothing belonging to those who are (from time to time) condemned should be public property.' **Τῶν καταδικαζομένων** must be masc., like *τῶν κρινομένων* in 11 and *τῶν καταδικασθέντων* in c. 8. 1321 b 42, but *μηδὲν τῶν καταδικαζομένων* is, as Richards points out, curious Greek.

δημόσιον . . . ἱερόν. The marked distinction between public and sacred property should be noticed: cp. 2. 8. 1267 b 34. In modern times the question has been raised whether Church property is the property of the State or not.

10. ζημιώσονται. The future middle of *ζημιόω* is often used in a passive sense, but the future passive also often occurs (see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v.).

11. τὰς γινομένας δημοσίας δίκας. Public actions at Athens were those in which an offence against the State, not merely against an individual, was charged, and this offence might be of two kinds, either directly against an individual and indirectly against the State or directly against the State and indirectly against an individual. Public actions, in fact, might be concerned either with political or with non-political offences. See Meier und Schömann, Der attische Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 195 sqq., and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 404 sq. They might be brought by *ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστι* (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thumser, 1. 549), and not merely by persons specially interested. As Aristotle speaks of their being brought against *γνώριμοι*, he probably refers mainly to public actions relating to political offences.

12. μεγάλοις ἐπιτιμίοις τοὺς εἰκῇ γραφομένους κωλύοντας. At Athens in most public actions, if the prosecutor did not obtain a fifth of the votes given by the dicasts, he became liable to a penalty of 1,000 drachmae and lost the right of bringing similar actions in

future (Meier und Schömann, Der att. Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 951 sq.: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans. p. 413 sq.; C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thumser, 1. 585 sq.) According to Pollux, 8. 41 failure in a charge of ἀσέβεια was punished with death, but see as to this Meier und Schömann, p. 375, note.

15. καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 'to the constitution also,' as well as to οἱ κύριοι under it.

16. μή τοί γε. See critical note on 1308 b 15.

ὡς πολεμίους νομίζειν τοὺς κυρίους. Cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 1, ἣν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν.

17. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ τελευταῖαι δημοκρατίαι κ.τ.λ. The ultimate democracy involved considerable expense to the State, because under it all the citizens expected to share in political functions (c. 4. 1319 b 2), and yet they were both many in number and to a large extent poor men who could not easily attend the assembly without pay; hence when special revenues (as to the meaning of the word πρόσοδοι, which is here tacitly distinguished from εἰσφορά, see note on 1292 b 30) were not forthcoming, the heavy burden of paying the fees of the many members of the assembly fell on the rich, and the necessary funds were often exacted from them by means of eisphorae, confiscation, and the imposition of penalties by the dicasteries (cp. Lys. Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 22: Or. 27. c. Epicr. c. 1), for part of these penalties would seem from what is said here to have gone to provide pay for members of the assembly. On the other hand, when special revenues were forthcoming (and this was the case of Athens, for even when she had few or no dependent allies, she had a great emporium at the Peiraeus and silver-mines at Laurium), the demagogues often squandered their proceeds in distributions of doles of money to the poorer citizens, which were spent as soon as received and left the recipients as much in need of pecuniary help as ever. In both cases Aristotle recommends that the meetings of the assembly should be few (22 sq. and 1320 b 2 sqq.), and he probably desires in both cases that the dicasteries should meet only for a few days, though he dwells on this explicitly only in the case in which special revenues are not forthcoming (23 sq.). It seems likely from his language here that the provision of pay for the assembly was one of the heaviest of the burdens entailed by the ultimate democracy, and this is not surprising, for we learn from Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 62. l. 6 sqq. that each

member of the Athenian assembly in Aristotle's day received nine obols for attendance at a *κυρία ἐκκλησία* and a drachma for attendance at others. At Athens there were forty ordinary meetings of the assembly in the year, four in each prytany, one of the four being a *κυρία ἐκκλησία* (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 43. ll. 13 sq., 17), so that the expense would obviously be considerable.

18. **τοῦτο**, 'this circumstance,' i. e. the circumstance that the citizens are numerous and cannot easily attend the assembly without pay.

19. **πολέμιον**, 'pernicious': cp. Plato, Laws 856 B, *τοῦτον δὴ διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ πάντων πολεμιώτατον ὂλῃ τῇ πόλει.*

20. **γίνεσθαι**, sc. *τὸν μισθόν*, which must be obtained from *ἀμίσθους*, 18. See notes on 1311 a 34 and 1321 a 21.

21. **δικαστηρίων φαύλων.** Cp. Plato, Laws 876 A, *δικαστήρια φαῦλα καὶ ἄφωνα.*

ἃ πολλὰς ἤδη δημοκρατίας ἀνέτρεψεν. *Ἅ*, 'things which,' probably refers not to *δικαστηρίων φαύλων* only, but also to *εἰσφορᾶς καὶ δημεύσεως*. For the tense of *ἀνέτρεψεν* see note on 1303 a 27. Aristotle perhaps has in view the cases of Cos, Rhodes, Megara, the Pontic Heracleia, and Cyme (7 (5). 5. 1304 b 25 sqq.: 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 23 sq.). For the fact cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 36 sqq.

22. **ὅπου μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** *Μὲν οὖν* introduces the apodosis, as in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 18 sqq. (Bon. Ind. 540 b 38 sq.). Aristotle speaks here as if the number of the meetings of the assembly and the dicasteries depended on the will of the authorities of the State. But they would hardly be able to limit the number of the meetings without withdrawing matters from the assembly and dicasteries with which they would otherwise have dealt, and empowering the magistrates to deal with these matters. Would this be possible in an ultimate democracy? And would it be possible in such a democracy to make the assembly and dicasteries meet less often and so to reduce the amount of pay received by their members?

23. **δικαστήρια πολλῶν μὲν ὀλίγαις δ' ἡμέραις**, 'dicasteries with many members, but sitting on only a few days,' costly in the one way but not in the other. Aristotle abstains from making the number of the members few, because that would be unsuitable to an ultimate democracy, and besides would have no chance of acceptance. As to *ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις*, contrast the practice at Athens, where the dicasteries sat on all days except festivals and unlucky days and days on which the assembly met (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 403 sq.).

26. οἱ δ' ἄποροι, 'but the poor [alone receive it].' Here, as often elsewhere, 'only' is suppressed. See note on 1282 a 36.

φέρει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρίνεσθαι τὰς δίκας πολὺ βέλτιον. Judicial work, no less than deliberative (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq.), is thought by Aristotle to be performed better when rich and poor act together than when the poor act by themselves.

29. ὅπου δ' εἰσὶ πρόσοδοι κ.τ.λ. It is not quite clear whether νῦν means 'as it is' and stands in contrast to what ought to be, or 'now' in contrast to 'formerly.' Susemihl and Welldon give it the latter sense. If they are right, there may be an intention tacitly to contrast the conduct of later demagogues with that of Themistocles, who persuaded the citizens of Athens to use the surplus revenues from Laurium for the building of a fleet (Hdt. 7. 144: Plut. Themist. c. 4: Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 22). Later demagogues distributed surplus funds as Theoric money to enable the poorer citizens to take part in festivals, and especially the Dionysia and Panathenaea. Aristotle refers perhaps to Pericles (Plut. Pericl. c. 9) and his successors (Plut. Aristid. c. 24, Περικλέους δ' ἀποθανόντος . . . οἱ δημαγωγοὶ . . . τὸν δῆμον εἰς διανομὰς καὶ θεωρικὰ καὶ κατασκευὰς ἀγαλμάτων καὶ ἱερῶν προαγαγόντες): more certainly to Eubulus (Theopomp. Fr. 96 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 184: Beloch, Att. Politik, p. 178. 2), Diophantus (Beloch, ibid. p. 180. 4), and Demades (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 194). Compare Aristoph. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 42 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1186),

κιρνάντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν κοτυλίζετε τοῖσι πένησιν,

Demosth. Ol. 3. 33 (also Prooem. 53 *sub fin.* p. 1459 sq.), and [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 4. Cp. also Aristot. Fragm. 87. 1491 a 39 sqq. We expect Aristotle to recommend that the proceeds of the special revenues shall be spent not in distributions of money, but in providing pay for attendance at the assembly and dicasteries, and this is what he would probably wish to be done, as soon as the demos has been sufficiently enriched; for the present, however, he recommends in preference that the proceeds of these revenues shall be spent in promoting the permanent enrichment of the poorer citizens, and that, while they are needed for this purpose, the rich shall be enabled to supply pay for the assembly and dicasteries by being relieved of the burden of useless liturgies.

30. λαμβάνουσι δὲ ἅμα, sc. οἱ ἄποροι. The poor receive the money distributed and after a little need a fresh supply, just as the leaky pitchers of the Danaides receive water and in a moment need more.

Cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 154, *Δαναΐδων πίθος· ἐπὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ἐκλειπόντων καὶ μὴ πληρουμένων*, and 2. 161, *εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον· ἐπὶ τῶν μάτην ἀναλισκόντων*. See Frazer's Pausanias, 5. 388 sqq.

34. **τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν.** A similar view underlies the Areopagitic Oration of Isocrates (see e. g. §§ 44 sq., 54 sq.). He seems to ascribe the poverty prevailing at Athens in his day mainly to the laziness of the Athenian poor and to the absence of any authority like the Council of the Areopagus to compel them to work and to encourage the rich to assist them to do so (§§ 32 sq., 55). He does not ask how far it was due to the competition of metoeci and slaves, and to the provision of pay for attendance in the assembly and dicasteries, which must have tended to withdraw the poorer citizens from the paths of industry and trade. Poverty, he says (§ 44), led to ill-doing, and we gather that, in his view, it lay at the root of the unsatisfactory condition of matters political at Athens. Aristotle appears to agree (cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 10 sqq.), though the remedy suggested by him in the passage before us is not the re-establishment of the Council of the Areopagus. He would perhaps add that when the many are very poor, they need to be maintained by the State (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 19); thus they need pay and frequent meetings of the assembly and dicasteries, and in the end become supreme in place of the law (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1–10).

35. **τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος.** Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 52 sq.) remarks that this passage and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 10 sqq. offer exceptions to the general rule which prevails in Aristotle's writings: 'nullo enim loco optativo post particulas finales utitur, sed promiscue et post tempus praesens et post praeteritum coniunctivum adhibet.' See Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 40 sq., who says of the passage before us, 'in the form of the sentence there is an unmistakable approximation to an indirect question, but on the other hand it is equally impossible to contest with success its indubitably final signification.' As to *ὅπως ἄν* see note on 1319 b 25.

ἐπεὶ δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle's advice is—use all the surplus revenue in giving the poorer citizens either simultaneously or by successive sections a start in farming or trade, relieve the rich of all useless liturgies, and make them contribute pay for such meetings of the assembly and dicasteries as are absolutely necessary. The result of this will be that the pauper

demos living by attendance at frequent meetings of the assembly and dicasteries will be replaced by a better-to-do demos occupied in farming and trade, and therefore content with a few meetings of the assembly and dicasteries. It is when the assembly meets frequently that it claims all authority for itself and exalts itself above the magistracies and above the law (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 3 sq.). Aristotle, indeed, wishes the rich to do more, not merely to contribute pay for the assembly and dicasteries, but to do the same with their private income as the State does with its surplus revenue —to use it in giving the poor a start in business. He gets this idea from Isocrates, as we shall see presently. It will be noticed that Aristotle's plan for the enrichment of the demos presupposes the existence of special State-revenues and a surplus from them. It would not be applicable to States not possessing surplus revenues. It is not clear whether he intends the advice which he gives the rich in 1320 b 7 sqq. to apply to States which do not possess surplus revenues, as well as to those which do.

37. συναθροίζοντας and ἀθρόα are emphatic. The surplus revenues are not to be served out in driblets as fast as they come in, but a fund is to be formed and advances made from it, by way of gift, it would seem, not by way of loan.

38. μάλιστα μὲν κ.τ.λ. To give the poor the means of purchasing a piece of land would be to make peasant-proprietors of them, and peasant-proprietors had this merit among others, that they were content with rare meetings of the assembly and dicasteries. If there were not funds enough for that, it might be possible to help the poor to rent a piece of land or to supply them with tools or seed or oxen for ploughing. We might have expected Aristotle to suggest that the State should let some of its public land to poor men, but this he does not do. Probably Greek States had not commonly much at their disposal for this purpose. He seems to have no fear of the success of his paupers in farming; the veterans of Sulla's Asiatic army, whom he provided with land, do not, however, appear to have prospered as farmers (Strachan-Davidson. Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 116). He no doubt remembers the advice of Phocylides (Fragm. 7),

> χρηΐζων πλούτου μελέτην ἔχε πίονος ἀγροῦ·
> ἀγρὸν γάρ τε λέγουσιν Ἀμαλθείης κέρας εἶναι.

For the brevity of ὅσον εἰς γῆδίου κτῆσιν cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 16 sq. and 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 38.

39. εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ γεωργίας. Καί, 'or,' as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8 and elsewhere. This advice is based on Isocrates' account of the ways of the rich at Athens in the days of Solon and Cleisthenes (Areop. § 32, *οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες . . . ἐπήμυνον ταῖς ἐνδείαις (τῶν πολιτῶν), τοῖς μὲν γεωργίας ἐπὶ μετρίαις μισθώσεσι παραδιδόντες, τοὺς δὲ κατ' ἐμπορίαν ἐκπέμποντες, τοῖς δ' εἰς τὰς ἄλλας ἐργασίας ἀφορμὴν παρέχοντες*). Compare Areop. §§ 35, 55, and Isocr. Epist. 7. 3, and the account given of Peisistratus in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 16 and Ael. Var. Hist. 9. 25, where we read how Peisistratus used to send for those who idled away their time in marketplaces, and ask them why they did so, *καὶ ἐπέλεγεν, Εἰ μέν σοι τέθνηκε ζεῦγος, παρ' ἐμοῦ λαβὼν ἄπιθι καὶ ἐργάζου· εἰ δὲ ἀπορεῖς σπερμάτων, παρ' ἐμοῦ σοι γενέσθω· δεδιὼς μὴ ἡ σχολὴ τούτων ἐπιβουλὴν τέκῃ.* *Ἐμπορία* is used here in a broader sense than in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 5, where it is distinguished from *καπηλεία*. Was the advice given here known to Tiberius Gracchus when he introduced his law respecting Attalus' bequest to the Roman people (Plut. Tib. Gracch. c. 14, *εὐθὺς ὁ Τιβέριος δημαγωγῶν εἰσήνεγκε νόμον, ὅπως τὰ βασιλικὰ χρήματα κομισθέντα τοῖς τὴν χώραν διαλαγχάνουσι τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπάρχοι πρὸς κατασκευὴν καὶ γεωργίας ἀφορμήν*)?

2. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ κ.τ.λ., 'and in the meantime,' i. e. while the sur- 1320 b.
plus revenue of the State, which might otherwise be employed in supplying pay for the assembly and dicasteries, has to be employed in lifting the poor out of pauperism. *Τὰς ἀναγκαίας συνόδους* probably includes meetings both of the assembly and of the dicasteries.

4. τῶν μεταλλικῶν λειτουργιῶν. See note on 1309 a 18. Aristotle evidently thinks that the rich would not be able to pay these liturgies in addition to providing pay for the assembly and dicasteries. They were, however, probably often expected to do so.

τοιοῦτον δέ τινα τρόπον κ.τ.λ., i. e. by enriching the demos (2. 11. 1273 b 18 sqq.). *Φίλον*, i. e. to the constitution and the ruling class (cp. 1320 a 14 sqq.). The fact that the demos at Carthage was thus disposed was probably one reason why no one succeeded in establishing a tyranny there (2. 11. 1272 b 30–33: cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 21 sqq.). Compare with the passage before us the humorous suggestion of the Athenian Epicrates, *ψήφισμα γράφειν φάσκοντος ἀντὶ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων χειροτονεῖσθαι κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐννέα πρέσβεις πρὸς βασιλέα τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ πενήτων, ὅπως λαμβάνοντες εὐπορῶσιν* (Plut. Pelop. c. 30). The senate at Rome had many opportunities of enriching members of the demos and used them (Polyb. 6. 17. 1–5).

6. τινας . . . τοῦ δήμου. Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 16, *τοὺς τοῦ δήμου*, and *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 25. l. 16, *τοὺς ἀφαιρεθέντας* (or *αἱρεθέντας*) *τῆς βουλῆς*. 'Homer (Il. 2. 198) has *δήμου ἄνδρα*' (Richards).

7. χαριέντων δ' ἐστὶ καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων γνωρίμων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle's meaning is, 'but if the notables are men of sense and good feeling they will do more than simply relieve the poor in the aggregate by supplying pay for the assembly and dicasteries, they will in addition each take charge of a section of the poor and start it in some business.' This will be a sensible course for them to take, for the better able the poor are to support themselves, the less demand there will be for the pay of the State and the lighter will be the burden on the rich. Aristotle's counsel is no doubt suggested by the traditions as to the ways of the rich at Athens which have been noticed above on 1320 a 39. Probably in his own day this form of charitable activity had died out there. We read of the rich at Rhodes in Strabo, p. 653, *σιταρχεῖται δὴ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ εὔποροι τοὺς ἐνδεεῖς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἕθει τινὶ πατρίῳ*. At Rome the patricians were helpful in many ways to their clients. See as to the nobles of mediaeval Venice H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 258, and as to those of Switzerland, Roscher, Politik, p. 157. For *διαλαμβάνοντες* cp. Polyb. 11. 26. 5, *τοῖς μὲν χιλιάρχοις τοῖς πρεσβεύσασι συνέταξε δι' ἀπορρήτων ὁ Πόπλιος ἀπαντᾶν τοῖς ἀποστάταις, ἕκαστον δὲ διελομένους ἕκαστον πέντε τῶν ἀρχηγῶν τῆς στάσεως εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντησιν φιλανθρωπεῖν καὶ καλεῖν ὡς αὑτούς*. If each rich man took charge of a section of the poor, not only would there be no 'overlapping of charity,' but a cordial relation would spring up between the rich man and those whom he befriended. 'The individualizing of the work [of relief], which assigns to each almoner as limited an area as possible,' is a feature of the Elberfeld system of poor-law administration (G. Drage, Report on Germany to the Royal Commission on Labour, p. 87).

9. καλῶς δ' ἔχει μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ Ταραντίνων. It was probably from their Lacedaemonian ancestors (cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 35 sqq.) that the Tarentines inherited the practice of making possessions common in use. They also made part of their magistracies specially accessible to the poor by arranging that they should be filled by lot. It is not said that Tarentum enriched its poor by these two measures, as Carthage did, but at any rate it won their good-will. Carthage had no *κληρωταὶ ἀρχαί* to give (2. 11. 1273 a 17). The rich at Tarentum were all the better able to be generous to the

demos because the Tarentine demos does not seem, like the Athenian, to have been greedy for State-pay (Theopomp. Fragm. 95: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293).

10. κοινὰ . . . ἐπὶ τὴν χρῆσιν, 'common for purposes of use.' Ἐπί is used here 'vi finali' (Bon. Ind. 269 a 5). See note on 1315 a 24. We have κοινὸς τῇ χρήσει in 2. 5. 1263 a 38 sq. and 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 1 sq.

11. ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς πάσας κ.τ.λ., 'and further they made the magistracies as a whole of two kinds, some of them elective and others filled by lot.' Τὰς ἀρχὰς πάσας stands in contrast to τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 15. Ἐποίησαν does not imply that this arrangement did not exist at Tarentum in Aristotle's day. A similar plan is recommended in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 12 sqq. At Athens there were both αἱρεταί and κληρωταὶ ἀρχαί, but those only were αἱρεταί for which the lot would have been unsuitable (c. 2. 1317 b 20 sq.: [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3). Savonarola introduced a system like the Tarentine at Florence, probably being influenced by the teaching of the Politics. 'He suggested that while all the most important offices should be filled by election, lots might be drawn for the minor ones, by which system every citizen could hope to take some part in the government' (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 354). For the interchange of ὅπως and ἵνα see note on 1333 b 40.

14. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δ' αἱρετούς. Sepulveda and Vict. connect καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς with μερίζοντας, the latter translating 'licet autem hoc facere, et eiusdem magistratus partientes'; Lamb. with τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, translating 'licet autem hoc facere etiam in eodem magistratu.' The sentence is mostly translated more or less as Lamb. translates it, but, if we take it thus, the use of the genitive seems strange, though it is true that Aristotle sometimes uses the genitive in the sense of 'in respect of': cp. De Part. An. 4. 11. 691 a 18, ἰσχυρότεραι γὰρ γίνονται τῶν ὀστῶν ('in respect of the bones') ὡς οὖσαι τοιαῦται τὴν φύσιν. I incline myself to suggest a third interpretation. Is not τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς in the gen. after τοὺς μέν and τοὺς δέ? Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 8, οἷον εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δικαστηρίου εἶεν οἱ μὲν ἐκ πάντων οἱ δ' ἐκ τινῶν. If this is so, we should translate, 'but it is possible to do this also by parting off some members of the same magistracy from others [and making] the former appointed by lot and the latter appointed by election.' The plan suggested by

safeguard of the constitutions opposed to democracy].' Cp. 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 2 sqq., and for *κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν* (not *κατ' ἀξίαν*, as usually) 7 (5). 2. 1302 b 14.

3. For *ὑπὸ τῆς εὐταξίας δεῖ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας* cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 8. 10, *οἶδα δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπιμελείας τεύξομαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων*, and Cyrop. 1. 6. 10, *ὑπ' ἄλλων αἰδοῦς τεύξει*: also Plato, Soph. 225 C. Good order is the opposite of *πολυανθρωπία*, for it is inapplicable to a great multitude (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 31 sq.). In Thessaly oligarchy often found a home, yet we read of it in Plato, Crito, 53 D, *ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία* (cp. Athen. Deipn. 527 a).

C. 7. 5. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μέν ἐστι μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους* κ.τ.λ. See note on 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 32, where three kinds of demos only are enumerated. *Τέτταρα μάλιστα*, 'about four': cp. Hist. An. 9. 14. 616 a 33, *τίκτει δὲ περὶ πέντε μάλιστα φὰ* (*ἢ ἕλασσον*). The fact that there are four parts of the *πλῆθος* seems to be mentioned not because it has any bearing on what follows, but to prepare the way for a mention of the similar quadruple division of *τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον*. Founders of oligarchies must not introduce narrow oligarchies anywhere and everywhere, but only where the character of the State-territory makes cavalry the most important force. This remark was needed, for Lysander had set up narrow oligarchies in a number of States, and in particular at Athens. It slightly qualifies the advice given in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 31 sqq. (see note on that passage). Aristotle further counsels founders of oligarchies, if they have to do with a State in which light-armed troops are numerous, to take measures to secure a supply of such troops on the side of the oligarchs. Some oligarchies had been driven by a pressing need of troops to give the many a share in the constitution (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 25 sqq.), and Aristotle perhaps remembers the fatal results of this step when he recommends in 26 sqq. that this should not be done in a wholesale fashion, but in one of three ways which he enumerates. As a further means of contenting the demos, he recommends that the tenure of high office in oligarchies should be connected with the discharge of costly liturgies.

8. *ὅπου μὲν συμβέβηκε* κ.τ.λ. For *ὅπου μὲν—ἐνταῦθα μέν* cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 17 sqq. This was the case at Chalcis and Eretria and at Magnesia on the Maeander and many other cities of Asia Minor (6 (4). 3. 1289 b 39 sq.). In the broad open plains of Asia Minor cavalry was the most important force, as both Agesilaus (Xen.

Hell. 3. 4. 15: Plut. Ages. c. 9) and Alexander (Plut. Alex. c. 16) found. The same was the case in Thessaly (see the account in Diod. 15. 71. 4 sq. of the successful resistance offered by Alexander of Pherae and his cavalry to the invading Boeotian army), and Aristotle perhaps remembers that Philip of Macedon introduced narrow oligarchies (decadarchies) there (Demosth. Phil. 2. 22: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 324). Crete, on the other hand, was not suited for cavalry (Plato, Laws 625 D), nor Attica (Hdt. 9. 13: cp. 5. 63).

11. αἱ δ' ἱπποτροφίαι κ.τ.λ. See note on 1289 b 35. For *μακρὰς οὐσίας* cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 16.

12. ὅπου δ' ὁπλιτικήν, sc. *συμβέβηκε τὴν χώραν εἶναι*. Boeotia was of this character (Plut. Aristid. c. 10, *καλὸν δὲ τὸ Βοιώτιον πεδίον ἀγαθοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ ὁπλίταις ἐναγωνίσασθαι*). That plains were suited to hoplites is clear from Polyb. 4. 14. 6. See note on 1289 b 31.

τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν, cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 35.

13. ἡ δὲ ψιλὴ δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοτικὴ πάμπαν. Hence it is not surprising to find the oligarchies of Chalcis and Eretria, when at war with each other about the Lelantine plain, agreeing *μὴ χρῆσθαι τηλεβόλοις* (Strabo, p. 448). When Aristotle speaks of light-armed and naval forces as supplied by the demos, it must be borne in mind that mercenaries were often employed in both these kinds of force. Light-armed troops were obtainable from Crete, Acarnania, and elsewhere (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 25). The fleet of Dionysius the Elder was partly manned by citizens, partly by aliens (Diod. 14. 43. 4), partly by emancipated slaves (Diod. 14. 58. 1). See also notes on 1327 b 11 and 1291 b 20.

14. νῦν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'as things are, indeed, where there are large numbers of light-armed and trireme-oarsmen, when the citizens have fallen asunder into two hostile bodies, the oligarchs often get the worst of it.' There were probably many light-armed at Argos when the many defeated the few (Thuc. 5. 82. 2: cp. Paus. 2. 20. 2), and many light-armed and trireme-oarsmen at Corcyra when the same thing happened there (Thuc. 3. 74). *Ὅταν διαστῶσι*, cp. 19, *ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν*. Bonitz (Ind. 196 a 23 sqq.) groups the passage before us with Eth. Eud. 7. 5. 1239 b 15, *οὐ φίλοι ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ διίστανται*, and Pol. 1. 6. 1255 a 19 sq. Cp. also Thuc. 1. 18. 6, *εἴ τινές που διασταῖεν*.

16. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. For *πρὸς τοῦτο* cp. c. 5. 1320 a 6.

The combined use of hoplites and light-armed is traceable at a very early date: see Tyrtaeus, 11. 35 sqq. Aristides (Plut. Arist. c. 14) sent Olympiodorus against the Persian cavalry under Masistius, *ἔχοντα τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτῷ τεταγμένους λογάδας τριακοσίους καὶ τοξότας ἀναμεμιγμένους σὺν αὐτοῖς*. As to the combination of light-armed and cavalry, an early instance of this occurs in the defeat of the Athenians at Spartolus by the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans B.C. 429 (Thuc. 2. 79). We first hear of *ἄμιπποι* in connexion with Boeotian troops (Thuc. 5. 57. 2, *Βοιωτοὶ μὲν πεντακισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται καὶ τοσοῦτοι ψιλοὶ καὶ ἱππῆς πεντακόσιοι καὶ ἄμιπποι ἴσοι*). Epaminondas made a great point of the use of them (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 23 sq.; cp. Diod. 15. 71. 6, 85. 4). We find Agesilaus using peltasts intermingled with cavalry against the cavalry of Tissaphernes (Plut. Ages. c. 10, *τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἀναμίξας τὸ πελταστικόν*). Whether Gylippus used his javelin-throwers as *ἄμιπποι* at Syracuse in the fight described in Thuc. 7. 6. 2, is not clear, but at any rate he grouped them with his cavalry, and the same thing may be said of Xanthippus and the Carthaginians in Polyb. 1. 33. 7. Xenophon strongly recommends the use of *ἄμιπποι* (Hipparch. 5. 13, *ἱππαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἀσθενὲς τὸ πεζὸν ἔρημον ἱππικοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἀμίππους πεζοὺς ἔχον*). See Sandys on *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 49, *ἀμίππους*. Light-armed troops, however, were used with cavalry both as *ἄμιπποι* and otherwise; sometimes they were ranged behind cavalry and made to start out suddenly (Xen. Hipparch. 5. 13, 8. 19; C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 51 sq.).

19. *ταύτῃ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσιν* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle may perhaps remember Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 8, *ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κυαξάρης· οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ μὲν* (i. e. *τῷ ἀκροβολίζεσθαι*) *τῶν πλειόνων ἡ νίκη· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν θᾶττον οἱ ὀλίγοι ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν τιτρωσκόμενοι ἀναλωθείησαν ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων*. For *οἱ δῆμοι* cp. 3. 11. 1282 a 28. As to *δέ* see note on 1308 b 37.

20. *ψιλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες* κ.τ.λ., 'for though they are light-armed' etc. That light-armed troops were a match for cavalry, we see from Diod. 15. 85. 4; that they were a match for hoplites, from Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 16 and 7. 1. 19. It was with archers and slingers that the Romans forced the heavy-armed phalanx of Antiochus to give way in the battle of Magnesia (Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 271).

21. *τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων καθιστάναι* κ.τ.λ. *Ἐκ τούτων*, i. e. *ἐκ τῶν δημοτικῶν*, which must be obtained from *οἱ δῆμοι*, 19. See note

on 1320a 20. Aristotle tacitly discountenances the alternative of employing mercenary light-armed troops, no doubt on account of the risks attaching to the practice (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 21 sqq.). The Roman nobles employed Cretan archers against C. Gracchus (Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., vol. iii. p. 127 sq.).

22. δεῖ δὲ διῃρημένης τῆς ἡλικίας κ.τ.λ. Does Aristotle mean by διῃρημένης that the oligarchy is to mark off the older from the young, or that nature has done so? Vict. interprets the word in the former way—'requiri igitur in dominatione paucorum oportere inquit, ut aetas eorum qui participes sunt eius dividatur, distinguanturque senes ab adolescentibus': Sepulveda in the latter—'sed cum duplex sit aetas, sintque alteri seniores, alteri adolescentes,' and Lamb. in much the same way, 'oportet autem, cum aetas non sit simplex sed in aliquot partes divisa, aliique sint aetate grandiores, alii iuvenes.' The latter interpretation seems to me to be preferable. Cp. Pindar, Pyth. 4. 157 Bergk, ἀλλ' ἤδη με γηραιὸν μέρος ἡλικίας ἀμφιπολεῖ. See also 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 5 sq. οἱ πρεσβύτεροι are here contrasted with οἱ νέοι, and the term probably refers to a much less advanced age than in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 15 and 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 29 (see notes on 1329 a 13 and 1335 b 29). For τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς see note on 1262 a 9. Διδάσκεσθαι is probably in the middle voice ('have their sons taught'). In τὰς κούφας καὶ τὰς ψιλὰς ἐργασίας light-armed exercises (cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 27, ὡπλισμένους κουφοτέροις ὅπλοις) are distinguished from exercises without ὅπλα of any kind. Plato had already advised that boys and girls should be taught military exercises (Laws 813 D sq.), but he had not favoured exercises without ὅπλα (Laws 833 A, 834 C). Compare with Aristotle's advice Socrates' suggestion to Pericles in Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 27. In the cities of Boeotia the young men of twenty were enrolled first among the peltasts and did not become hoplites till some years later, when their physical strength had increased (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 58 sq.). The κοῦφαι καὶ ψιλαὶ ἐργασίαι referred to no doubt include exercises in the work of javelin-throwers, peltasts (i. e. javelin-throwers with a sword and light shield: see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 25), archers (though archers are distinguished from ψιλοί in c. 8. 1322 b 1), and slingers. The Cyrus of Xenophon's Cyropaedeia has a great contempt for slinging, which he regards as fit only for slaves (Cyrop. 7. 4. 15). Compare Eustath. on Hom. Il. 13. 600, θεράποντος δὲ ὅπλον αὖτη (i. e. ἡ σφενδόνη), οὐ μὴν ἥρωος, οὐδὲ γὰρ

ἐχρῆν (quoted by Sturz, Lex. Xen. s. v. σφενδονᾶν). The suggestion that the sons of the oligarchs should be taught to serve as light-armed soldiers, a kind of service usually abandoned to men of the demos or to mercenaries, was a bold one and would offend many prejudices.

25. ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ παίδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων, 'and when they have been taken out of the ranks of the boys, they should themselves be skilled practitioners of the duties of soldiers of this sort.' It would seem, however, from Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 27 that men would only be fit for service as light-armed soldiers μέχρι τῆς ἐλαφρᾶς ἡλικίας. For ἐκκεκριμένους ἐκ παίδων, compare διέφερον τῶν νεωτέρων παίδων in Phot. συνέφηβος (quoted in note on 1337 a 1) and see Bon. Ind. s. v. ἐκκρίνειν. For ἀθλητὰς τῶν ἔργων, cp. Polyb. 1. 6. 6, ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀληθινοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων, 2. 20. 5 and 15. 9. 4, and Diod. 12. 75. 7.

26. τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος κ.τ.λ. By a share in the πολίτευμα is meant a share in the magistracies and especially the supreme magistracy (3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq.). Thus what is here termed a μετάδοσις τοῦ πολιτεύματος in reference to Thebes is referred to as the bestowal of a share of office in 3. 5. 1278 a 25 sq. This counsel is probably given because in some oligarchies the many had been brought within the constitution in a more wholesale way (see note on 5). For the phrase μετάδοσις τοῦ πολιτεύματος cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 15, τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος.

27. καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 6. 1320 b 25 sqq.

28. ἢ, καθάπερ Θηβαίοις κ.τ.λ. For the dative Θηβαίοις see critical note on 1292 a 22, and cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 1, καθ' ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει πᾶσι. For the fact cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 25 sq. It was not enough in the Theban oligarchy of which Aristotle speaks that a man should have acquired a certain property-qualification; he was also required to have abstained for ten years from βάναυσα ἔργα, or, which comes to much the same thing, from the sale of the products of a handicraft in the market (1278 a 25 sq.). As βάναυσα ἔργα are unfavourable to virtue (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq.: 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.), this rule showed some regard to virtue, and to some extent fell in with Aristotle's own recommendation that those who belonged to the better kind of demos should be admitted to the privileged class in preference to others (c. 6. 1320 b 28 sq.). It will be noticed that the practice of agriculture did not exclude men from the πολίτευμα at Thebes, but only the practice of a handicraft.

29. ἤ, καθάπερ ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ κ.τ.λ. The exact nature of the process to which Aristotle refers is obscure. Vict. understands it thus—'Massilienses narrat solitos diligenter existimare de vita ac moribus eorum qui participes reipublicae forent, et eorum etiam qui expertes, atque ita delectum habere ut deteriores inde eiicerent et meliores extra ipsam positos in eum ordinem reciperent.' Giph. (p. 845) takes much the same view of the passage. Following Vict., I think that what Aristotle means is this—the Massaliots framed a list of those who deserved to be members of the *πολίτευμα*, taking into account not only those who were already members but also those who were not, so that the admission of members of the demos to the *πολίτευμα* was an incident of the framing of this list. This method gave more weight to virtue than that followed in the Theban oligarchy, for while at Thebes no security was taken that those admitted to the *πολίτευμα* were virtuous and all that was done was to exclude from it those whose occupation was unfavourable to virtue, at Massalia those only were admitted to the *πολίτευμα* who deserved to be so on the ground of virtue. It is not certain that the method here described was practised at Massalia in Aristotle's own day, for the law to which he refers at Thebes had apparently been repealed (3. 5. 1278 a 25 sq.). Κρίσιν ποιῆσαι occurs in Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 333 *init.* For the acc. *κρίσιν ποιουμένους* see note on 1320 b 26. For *τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι* cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 24, 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 34, and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 6 sq. In the Venetian oligarchy membership of the Patriciate with a seat in the Great Council was given in 1381 to thirty commoners as a reward of merit (Brown, Venice, p. 237), but in later times this privilege commonly passed by sale (Houssaye, Hist. du Gouvernement de Venise, i. 97, 98).

31. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς κυριωτάταις κ.τ.λ. 'The most supreme magistracies also' as well as the rich, who were always subject to these burdens. For *ἃς δεῖ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν* cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 31 sq. For *προσκεῖσθαι* see Bon. Ind. 646 b 44 sqq., where the word as used here is explained by 'iniungi' and *προστεθεῖσθαι*. It was the custom at Rome for the aediles to contribute largely from their private fortunes to the celebration of games (Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 289). In the cities of Italy under the Roman Empire office was confined to those who possessed a fixed amount of property, and office-holders were required by usage, and in part also by law, to spend money on

public buildings and games and in other ways (Friedländ Petronii Cena Trimalchionis, pp. 29, 31, 37). At Venice t Doges sometimes 'ruined themselves in the service of the St (Yriarte, Patricien de Venise, p. 350). In the oligarchy of Be in the middle ages the members of the Small Council 'ma belonged to the most respected families and often had to ma important sacrifices for the commonwealth' (Geiser, Gesch. d bern. Verfassung von 1191–1471, p. 39). In England during t last century and the earlier part of this the upper class paid dea for their position in election expenses. The objection to Aristotl recommendation of course is that it practically confines offic the very rich. Office-holders might also be tempted to recoup the expenditure by illicit practices (cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 1 sqq.).

33. ἵν' ἐκὼν ὁ δῆμος κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plut. De se ipso citra invidi laudando, c. 14, ὡς γὰρ οἰκίαν καὶ χωρίον, οὕτω καὶ δόξαν οἱ πολλοὶ κ ἀρετὴν τοῖς προῖκα καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οὐ τοῖς πριαμένοις πόνων πολλ καὶ κινδύνων, φθονοῦσιν.

34. μισθὸν πολύν. Πολύν is made emphatic by being placed a μισθόν (see note on 1275 a 32).

35. ἁρμόττει δὲ κ.τ.λ. The expenditure which Aristotle r commends is of a kind to come home to the palates and the senses of the many. It also belongs to the class of τίμια δαπανήματα (Eth Nic. 4. 5. 1122 b 19 sqq.). Though the outlay on sacrifices an banquets might soon be forgotten, the outlay on buildings woul not. In Plut. Aristid. c. 24 we read of κατασκευὰς ἀγαλμάτων κ ἱερῶν. Κατασκευάζειν includes the equipping of a temple with ἀνα ματα (Hdt. 2. 44), or the rebuilding of walls and other publi edifices.

39. συμβήσεται δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isaeus, Or. 5. c. 41, καὶ τούτ μαρτύρια ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀναθήματα ἐκεῖνοι ἐκ τῶν περιόντων, μνημεῖα τ αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς, ἀνέθεσαν.

καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, 'to the notables also,' i. e. the notables will profit as well as the State.

40. οἱ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας. Cp. Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 76, τ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, and see Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 126, l. 2.

41. τὰ λήμματα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Athenagoras makes the same complaint at Syracuse (Thuc. 6. 39. 2) and Thrasybulus at Athens (Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 40).

42. διόπερ εὖ ἔχει κ.τ.λ. Because they are ruled by men who

are as eager for gain as the many who rule in democracies (c. 4. 1318 b 16 sq.).

1. πῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In c. 1. 1317 a 14 sqq. an inquiry has been promised as to the best way of constructing not only democracies and oligarchies, but also other constitutions, but this latter part of the promise is here left unfulfilled. 1321 b.

4. Ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις κ.τ.λ. The question how to institute a democracy or an oligarchy leads on to a consideration of the questions arising as to magistracies, for magistracies must exist in every State. Besides, as we are told in 1323 a 3 sqq., some magistracies are suitable to democracies and others to oligarchies. For ἀκόλουθον cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 4. 1122 a 18 sq. The chapter before us takes up the investigation contained in 6 (4). 15 (see vol. i. p. 516 sqq.): cp. also 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 1, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἃς δεῖ καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν). Aristotle's enumeration of magistracies and their functions begins with the most necessary ones (1322 a 29 sq.) and gradually rises to ἡ μάλιστα κυρία πάντων ἀρχή (1322 b 12 sq.), then to magistracies, or rather charges (ἐπιμέλειαι, 1322 b 18 sq.), connected with the worship of the gods, and lastly to magistracies peculiar to leisured and prosperous States which study good order. He groups the magistracies otherwise in 1322 b 29 sqq. (see note). He bases his classification of magistracies on the practice of Greek States; he follows this in separating military from civil functions, for this was the general rule at any rate in democratic States; he follows it also in instituting magistracies for the audit of the accounts of outgoing office-holders, and in reserving the initiative for the Boulê and its equivalents (1322 b 12 sqq.). In these three points Roman practice differed from Greek, at any rate originally (see Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, 1. 238). We note that the functions of archons escape enumeration except so far as they were sacrificial (1322 b 26 sqq.). Not a few magistracies are omitted from the list which we expect to find included in it. It includes no magistracy explicitly commissioned to make the valuations of property referred to in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq., or to guard the public health, notwithstanding what is said in 4 (7). 11. 1330 a 38 sqq., or to check spendthrift habits, though the need of such a magistracy is pointed out in 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 20 sqq. To which, again, of the magistracies on the list will the operations C. 8.

for the relief of the poor described in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq. by entrusted? Which will manage the coinage or the farming of the taxes? We hear of no magistrates whose duty it is to keep a list of the citizens, or to take charge of and exhibit copies of laws, decrees, lists of public property, and the like. Some magistracies which played a great part in oligarchies and aristocracies escape without mention, such as the gerusiae and judicial magistrates of the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian States and the Lacedaemonian ephorate. It should also be noticed that Aristotle makes all his magistracies boards, whereas at Athens in his day some important magistracies were held by single individuals ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 43. l. 2 sq.).

τὸ διῃρῆσθαι καλῶς τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. Διαιρεῖν seems here to be used in the sense of διορίζειν, as in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 12 and elsewhere: compare the use of διαίρεσις in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 3, ἐχομένη δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρεσις.

5. καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον comes in here rather awkwardly, for it has not been said before that this inquiry is ἀκόλουθον τοῖς εἰρημένοις, but the reference is no doubt to 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 1 sqq. and 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 3 sqq.

6. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Compare 3. 12. 1283 a 20 sqq. Magistracies are divided into ἀναγκαῖαι and κυριώτεραι in c. 6. 1320 b 24 sq. For magistracies πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον cp. 1322 b 37 sqq. For the conjunction of εὐταξία and κόσμος Bonitz (Ind. s. v. κόσμος) compares that of τάξις and κόσμος in De Caelo, 3. 2. 301 a 10 and Metaph. A. 3. 984 b 16 sq.

10. ὥσπερ τυγχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον, in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 34 sqq.

11. συνάγειν, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 13, ποίας ἁρμόττει συνάγειν ἀρχὰς εἰς μίαν ἀρχήν.

12. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'first then there is the charge of things necessary which is concerned with the marketplace,' etc. For ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων cp. 30, αὗται μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς. Aristotle begins with magistracies which make κοινωνία, and especially κοινωνία τῶν ἀναγκαίων, possible (14 sqq.; 1322 a 5 sqq.). He follows the general custom of ancient Greece in marking off the agoranomi from the astynomi, though it probably sometimes happened that these two magistracies were united. Thus it appears from Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 337, that after the Lamian War the functions of the astynomi at the Peiraeus were transferred for

a while to the agoranomi. In small cities the agoranomi cannot have had a great deal to do, but at Athens and the Peiraeus their hands must have been full. Commodities of all kinds were sold in the agora—slaves, cattle and sheep, provisions, raw and manufactured products—and it was necessary that an authority should exist to marshal the different classes of sellers and their booths in the agora (Plato, Laws 849 E), to control the motley mob of buyers and sellers, and to see that the weights and measures used were honest and the goods sold unadulterated and sound, and generally that buyers and sellers were true to their contracts and conducted themselves in a peaceable and orderly way, and that no refuse or the like was left to accumulate. These duties were discharged in Greek States by the agoranomi (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 331), who had authority to hear and dispose of cases judicially (1322 a 12 sqq.) and to inflict fines and other punishments. Sometimes, as at Astypalaea (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 338), one of their functions was that of seeing that the corn and other commodities sold in the agora were sold at a cheap rate. At Athens the offices of *ἀγορανόμος* and *ἀστυνόμος* seem to have been of little account (Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 112 : Ol. 3. c. 29). Some of the functions usually discharged by the agoranomi were there entrusted to other magistracies—e. g. to metronomi (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 51. l. 5 sqq.) and sitophylakes (Lys. Or. 22. c. 16)—and in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 51 the only function ascribed to them is that of seeing that articles sold were pure and sound. At Rome the aediles answer in many respects to the Greek agoranomi and astynomi.

18. **ἐφ' ᾗ.** Is *ἐπιμέλεια* (Sepulv. Vict. Lamb.) or *ἀγοράν* (Welldon) the antecedent to *ᾗ*? For *ἐπί* cp. 1322 a 37 sq.

14. **τὰ συμβόλαια.** The contracts made in the agora are no doubt referred to (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 11, *τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν συμβολαίων*). Not all contracts were made in the agora.

τὴν εὐκοσμίαν. Cp. Theophr. Fragm. 98, *Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς περὶ νόμων φησὶ δυοῖν τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖν τοὺς ἀγορανόμους, τῆς τε ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ εὐκοσμίας καὶ τοῦ ἀψευδεῖν μὴ μόνον τοὺς πιπράσκοντας ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ὠνουμένους.*

σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. This takes up and justifies the mention of *τὰ συμβόλαια. Πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι*, 'for all States.' Supply *τοὺς πολίτας* or *τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας* or something similar with *ὠνεῖσθαι* and *πωλεῖν*. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 371 B, *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλοις μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ἐργάζωνται ; ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα*

καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι πόλιν ἱδρύσαμεν. Δῆλον δή, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὠνούμενοι. Here, as in 1. 9. 1257 a 14 sqq., Aristotle implies that buying and selling are necessary only so far as the object is the supply of the needs of buyer and seller, and not profit. For ἀναγκαία χρεία cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq.

16. ὑπογυιότατον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, 'the readiest means' of securing self-completeness (Liddell and Scott).

17. δι' ἣν δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν συνελθεῖν. Δοκοῦσιν, 'are thought,' for this is not entirely the case (3. 6. 1278 b 20 sqq.; 3. 9. 1280 a 35 sq.). Εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν συνελθεῖν, cp. Plato, Laws 680 E, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά γε εἰς τὸ κοινόν, μείζους ποιοῦντες πόλεις, πλεῖσται συνέρχονται, and for μίαν πολιτείαν, 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 32 sq.

18. ἑτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια κ.τ.λ. Ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς, because the agoranomi cared for εὐκοσμία in the ἀγορά and the astynomi for the ἄστυ (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 16 sq.), and the ἀγορά and the ἄστυ are closely connected with each other (cp. c. 4. 1319 a 29, τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ, and Plato, Laws 881 C). The functions of the astynomi are defined in a very similar way by Plato in Laws 758 E sq., 763 C sqq., and 779 B sqq. Other duties are assigned to astynomi in Laws 849 E and 913 D of which Aristotle says nothing. In States where the astynomi were charged with the preservation and repair of the city-walls, the care of the city-fountains, and the guard of the harbour, functions nearly connected with the defence of the city, these officers were of high importance. Their importance was less in the more populous States, where these duties were withdrawn from them and made over to special magistrates. This step had been taken at Athens, and probably their functions had come to be much contracted in consequence; at any rate Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 50 dwells mainly on their control of small matters like the fees of αὐλητρίδες and the doings of κοπροκόμοι. See Sandys' notes. We read in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 46 of the Boulê at Athens, ἐξετάζει δὲ καὶ τὰ οἰκοδομήματα τὰ δημόσια πάντα, so that at Athens the task of seeing that the public buildings were in a good state of repair seems to have been entrusted to the Boulê. We are not told whose province it was to keep them in repair to the satisfaction of the Boulê. The 'supervision' by the astynomi 'of public and private property in the city with a view to good order' related probably exclusively to the *matériel*; they prevented encroachments on the street, the opening of window-shutters outwards, the discharge of water-pipes at a high level into the street, and the like. Whether they had control of sacred

property also within the city in relation to these matters does not appear (cp. 1322 b 18 sqq.) According to Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 180, the streets of Greek cities were unpaved, at any rate till the days of Roman predominance, so that their maintenance and repair (nothing is said of cleansing) would not cast a heavy burden on the astynomi. But the expression *τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις* rather suggests that they were paved. Like the agoranomi, the astynomi could hear and dispose of cases judicially (1322 a 12 sqq.) and could inflict fines and other punishments.

21. *σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις.* Cp. 1322 b 20 sqq. For the absence of the article see note on 1285 b 12.

καὶ τῶν ὁρίων κ.τ.λ. Should *σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις* be supplied, or *ἐπιμέλεια*? Probably the latter. If the boundaries of contiguous properties were not distinctly marked, disputes might arise, and still more if they were moved by either party.

22. *ἔχωσιν*, sc. *τὰ ὅρια*, for in Aristotle's writings a substantive in the neut. plur. is often followed by a verb in the plural (Bon. Ind. 490 a 44 sqq.).

For *ὅσα ἄλλα τῆς ἐπιμελείας* cp. Plato, Soph. 232 C, *τί δ' ὅσα φανερὰ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;*

23. *καλοῦσι δ' ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν.* At Heracleia in Lucania these magistrates were called *πολιανόμοι* (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 332). At Thebes magistrates with similar functions were called *τελέαρχοι* (Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 15 *init.*: Valer. Max. 3. 7. Ext. 5).

24. *ἔχει δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'but [though one name is given to it,] it includes more parts than one.'

26. *οἷον τειχοποιοὺς καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ λιμένων φύλακας.* We hear of *τειχοποιοί* at Athens (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 14) and at Cyzicus (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 333), of a *κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητής* at Athens (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 43, where see Sandys' note), and of *λιμενοφύλακες* at Carystus (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 343). We read in Aen. Poliorc. c. 29. 12 of *τοὺς λιμενοφύλακάς τε καὶ ἀποστολέας.* That the charge of the city-fountains at Athens was an important one we see from the fact that the office was elective (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 43). The water-supply of the city was of high importance, especially in the event of fires (Tac. Ann. 15. 43) or of a siege. Frontinus (De Aquae Ductibus Urbis Romae, 1. 1) says of the 'aquarum officium' at Rome that it was 'tum ad usum tum ad salubritatem atque etiam

ad securitatem urbis pertinens,' and that it had always been administered by the leading citizens of the Roman State.

27. ἄλλη δ' ἀναγκαία κ.τ.λ. As to the ἀγρονόμοι or ὑλωροί c. 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 15, where it appears that these officers were charged with the guard of the country districts, and see note on 1331 b 13. Περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἄστεος is added to show that everything outside the city, whether deserving the name of χώρα or not, fell under their jurisdiction. The agronomi would keep forts and other public buildings, and also roads, in repair throughout the territory of the State, and would have judicial authority so far as might be necessary for the discharge of their official duties. The ὑλωροί would probably be especially in use where there were valuable forests of ship-timber belonging to the State. The Chalcidic peninsula was rich in ship-timber (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 130 sq.), and ὑλωροί may have existed there, and possibly at Stageira, Aristotle's own city. The Lacedaemonian περίοικοι perhaps answer to the agronomi (see as to them Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 26). Aristotle says nothing about demarchs, which is remarkable, as the existence of these magistrates in the Athenian State must have been well known to him.

28. περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν is followed by περί with the acc. See notes on 1300 a 8 and 1322 b 30.

31. ἄλλη δ' ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. Already in 19 τὰ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ δημόσια have been mentioned, and the transition is natural to a magistracy which receives the public revenues and takes charge of them till they are distributed to each department of administration. This magistracy appears to be referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sq. as ἡ κυρία τῶν προσόδων. In Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 9 we read of προσόδων ἀποδεκτῆρες καὶ δαπανημάτων δοτῆρες. Under the term αἱ πρόσοδοι τῶν κοινῶν Aristotle probably means to include revenues from all public sources—taxes, fees, fines, and the like, as well as public property strictly so called—for in the recapitulation in 1322 b 32 τὰς προσόδους represents τὰς προσόδους τῶν κοινῶν here. The collection of taxes is not provided for, because, the taxes being farmed, that duty fell on the farmers of them. Aristotle implies that the apodectae not only received the revenue, but also had the custody of it, but at Athens the apodectae appear not to have had a special exchequer of their own, their duty being to divide the sums they received among the magistracies on the same day on which they

received them ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 48. l. 7 sq.: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 237 sq.). Παρ' ὧν φυλαττόντων does not necessarily imply that the distribution of the revenues was made by the officials referred to. Παρά is not quite the same thing as ὑπό. For ὧν referring to ἀρχή cp. οὗς in 1. 2. 1252 b 14.

34. ἑτέρα δ' ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. For πρὸς ἣν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 344. 25, ἀπογράψωνται π[ρὸς] τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου, and Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 15, λόγον καὶ εὐθύνας ἐγγράφειν πρὸς τὸν γραμματέα καὶ τοὺς λογιστάς. For the absence of τάς before ἐκ in τὰς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων see note on 1334 b 12. These κρίσεις stand in contrast to the κρίσεις of the assembly (c. 2. 1317 b 33 sq.) and to the κρίσεις of arbitrators (2. 8. 1268 b 6 sqq.). Aristotle here passes on to other incidents of social life which call for the creation of magistracies to deal with them. Private contracts will be made and lawsuits will arise out of them (2. 5. 1263 b 20 sq.); hence there must be a magistracy to keep a register of contracts and of the decisions of dicasteries, and to preside over the first steps in lawsuits. It will be noticed that Aristotle regards as essential the keeping by a magistracy of a register of private contracts. No such registers are kept in modern States, but the way in which Aristotle refers to them would seem to imply that they were not uncommon in ancient Greece. It is not likely that all private contracts were registered. But a register of gifts in dower was kept in Myconos (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 433: Dareste Haussoullier and Reinach, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, série 1, p. 48 sqq.), and a register of sales of land and houses and of gifts in dower in Tenos (Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, p. 64 sqq.). A register of debts was kept in Chios ([Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1347 b 35 sqq.). At Iasus 'emtiones venditiones tum demum ratae fuisse videntur, cum a mnemonibus in tabulas relatae erant' (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 77, p. 137 note), and a similar rule seems to have existed at Pergamum (Cic. pro Flacc. c. 30. 74). As to the utility of registers of these various kinds see Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, pp. 61, 118 sqq. In many Greek States there was no register of contracts, but the law required that an intended sale should be announced many days in advance by proclamation through a herald, or, as at Athens, in writing before a magistrate, in order that persons aware of any impediment to the sale might have an opportunity of objecting, a similar purpose to that served among ourselves by the publication of banns before a marriage. Buyers were thus protected against

bad faith on the part of vendors. Theophrastus, however, great prefers a register of contracts and of property to these expedien He says (Fragm. 97), *οὐ χρὴ δ' ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι αἱ προγραφαὶ καὶ αἱ προσ-ξεις καὶ ὅλως ὅσα πρὸς τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐστὶ πάντῃ τὰ πλεῖστα δ' ἄλλ-ψιν ἑτέρου νόμου τίθεται· παρ' οἷς γὰρ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν κτημάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τ-συμβολαίων, ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐστὶ μαθεῖν εἰ ἐλεύθερα καὶ ἀνέπαφα καὶ τὰ ἀπ-πωλεῖ δικαίως· εὐθὺς γὰρ καὶ μετεγγράφει ἡ ἀρχὴ τὸν ἐωνημένον.* In State where registers of contracts existed their use must have been com-pulsory on the parties, and they must have been open to public inspection. They would serve not only to record the exact nature of a contract and to prevent either of the parties receding from his bargain, but also to facilitate the detection and punishment of fraud. It would be convenient that the magistracy which kept the register of contracts should also be that which had to do with the first step in lawsuits, for the entry of the contract would commonly form the basis of the lawsuit, and also that its head-quarters should be situated near the agora (4 (7). 12. 1331 b 6 sqq.). A register of the decisions of dicasteries was not kept in all Greek States. Gortyna at any rate appears to have had no such register at the time when the well-known Code was drawn up. 'Le jugement comme tout le reste de la procédure, est purement oral. Aussi l'existence dé la chose jugée, en cas de contestation ultérieure, ne peut-elle être établie que par le serment du juge et du mnémon' (Dareste, Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, p. 435: cp. Col. 9. 31 sqq.). The magistracy here described by Aristotle appears to have been closely connected with the dicasteries (cp. 1322 b 34), and that is probably the reason why it did not apparently register anything but private contracts and the decisions of dicasteries. It does not seem, for in-stance, to have registered decrees of the assembly or the valuations of property of which we read in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. As to *ἱερομνήμονες μνήμονες* and *ἐπιστάται* see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 334, and as to the functions of the *μνάμων* at Gortyna, Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 54. In Diog. Laert. 6. 45 we read of *οἱ ἱερομνήμονες τῶν ταμιῶν*, we are not told of what city; these officials probably kept a list of the valuables in charge of the tamiae. *Συμβολοφύλακες* are mentioned in the Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus, col. 10. 2, etc. At Athens, as we have seen, no register of contracts was kept; contracts were often deposited with money-changers or priests (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim, 2. p. 108 sq.), a very different thing. Indictments were entered at the

Metroum before the Archon (Athen. Deipn. 407 c, ἦκεν (Ἀλκιβιάδης) *εἰς τὸ μητρῷον, ὅπου τῶν δικῶν ἦσαν αἱ γραφαί, καὶ βρέξας τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος διήλειψε τὴν δίκην τοῦ Ἡγήμονος*: Diog. Laert. 2. 40: Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 86: Boeckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 405 note). Were the decisions of the dicasteries also registered at the Metroum? The 'Greffe' in the Channel Islands is thus described by Lord de Saumarez (*Times*, Oct. 11, 1894). 'There is a land-registry office—locally called the Greffe—in which are entered all purchases, sales, and mortgages. The entries are open to public inspection on payment of a small fee. Thus all trouble and expense as regards title-deeds are obviated. A glance at the register shows the whole history of a property—the prices paid on successive transfers, the mortgages, if any, upon it, and its exact legal *status*. Arrangements concerning a property which are not thus registered at the Greffe have no legal value.' The 'Greffe,' however, it will be seen, has only to do with dealings with land, not with *τὰ ἴδια συμβόλαια* generally.

36. *τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν*. Cp. 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 7 sq. The expression includes indictments in private actions as well as public (Meier und Schömann, Der att. Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 233, note).

37. *τὰς εἰσαγωγάς*, sc. *τῶν δικῶν* (Bon. Ind. 224 a 26).

καὶ ταύτην, 'this magistracy also,' as well as that of the astynomi (24 sqq.). Little, if anything, would be gained, one would think, by breaking up this magistracy. It would be convenient that the registers of contracts and of the decisions of dicasteries should be kept in the office of one and the same magistracy, and that this magistracy should also have to do with the first steps in lawsuits.

38. *ἔστι δὲ μία κυρία τούτων πάντων*, 'but there is one magistracy supreme over all these things, and its holders are called' etc. Cp. 1322 a 38 sq. As to *τούτων πάντων* see critical note on 1282 a 40.

40. *μετὰ δὲ ταύτην κ.τ.λ.* There is a singular resemblance in point of language between the passage before us and Metaph. B. 4. 999 a 24, *ἔστι δ' ἐχομένη τε τούτων ἀπορία καὶ πασῶν χαλεπωτάτη καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτη θεωρῆσαι, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν*. The word *χαλεπωτάτη* is translated in the passage before us by Lamb. 'difficillimus' and by Jowett and Welldon 'most difficult,' but by Sepulv., Vict., and Heinsius 'molestissimus' (so Stahr, 'überaus beschwerlich'), and by Ramus 'molestissimus et difficillimus.' In Susemihl's rendering, 'welche es am Schwersten von allen hat,'

I am not sure whether 'schwer' means 'onerous' or 'difficult,' and the same doubt arises in a less degree as to Schlosser's, 'einer der schwersten Dienste.' I incline myself to translate the word 'most difficult' or 'most trying' (cp. 1322 a 2). In the very similar passage quoted above from the Metaphysics χαλεπωτάτη evidently means 'most difficult.' We now come to a magistracy standing next to that which has just been described (for it has to do with the execution of sentences of dicasteries, as that has to do with the sentences themselves, and the sentences come first and their execution next), but which is the most necessary and the most trying of all. This magistracy executed, as the last-named registered, the sentences of dicasteries. It had also to put the law in execution against persons publicly placarded as debtors to the State, and to assume the custody of prisoners. Aristotle does not mention the title of this magistracy, as he mentions those of others—perhaps because he is in effect proposing its abolition—but at Athens the functions assigned to it were discharged partly by the practores and polêtae, partly by the eleven. Compare the functions of the 'tres viri capitales' at Rome (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 558 sqq.). Τῶν καταδικασθέντων is masc., like τῶν καταδικαζομένων in c. 5. 1320 a 8. Τῶν προτιθεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς, 'those whose names are posted up in connexion with the entries [in the lists of the practores].' It was the duty of the practores at Athens 'to enforce payment of the fines imposed by magistrates or dicasteries and to hand them over to the proper authorities, for which reason the names of those who were condemned in these penalties were reported to them and entered in their lists pending payment' (Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1. 432: see also Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 240). These names were exposed on boards in the Acropolis ([Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 4). It would seem that the Gortyna Code left it to the winning side to levy the fines imposed by the judge: 'c'est à la partie gagnante à pratiquer sur les biens du débiteur, quand et comme elle voudra, des saisies jusqu' à concurrence des dommages-intérêts qui lui sont alloués' (Dareste, Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, p. 448). At Athens the execution of the sentences of dicasteries in private suits was left, except in certain cases, to the plaintiff himself: see Meier und Schömann, Der att. Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 962 sqq., and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 414.

1322 a. 4. οὔθ' ὑπομείναντες ἐθέλουσι πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. The

holders of this office probably often infringed the law by undue lenity: cp. Plato, Rep. 558 A. Socrates might have escaped from prison if he had been willing to allow his friends to bribe the gaolers (Plato, Crito, 44 sqq.).

5. ἀναγκαία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Crito, 50 B, *ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύωσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίγνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται;*

8. διὸ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., 'hence it is better that this magistracy' (i. e. that which exacts the penalty) 'should not be one, but should consist of some persons from one dicastery and others from another, and that as to the posting-up of the names of persons registered as public debtors, an effort should be made to distribute the task in the same way, and further that [the whole burden should not be allowed to fall on the dicasteries, but that] the magistrates also should exact some penalties, and especially the incoming magistrates those due to the outgoing ones, and in the case of those due to magistrates actually in office, that, when one magistracy has tried the case and condemned, a different magistracy should exact the penalty.' With *τὰς τῶν ἕνων, τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων, τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων*, and *τὰς παρὰ τούτων* we should probably supply *πράξεις*. With a view especially to the efficient exaction of penalties Aristotle seeks to distribute the odium connected with their exaction as much as possible. If the task is assigned to dicasteries, it should not be assigned to the members of one dicastery, but to some from one and some from another, and a part of the burden should be borne by magistracies, but in their case care should be taken that the magistracy which tries and condemns should not be that which exacts the penalty. At Athens the whole of the burden fell on two magistracies, the practores and the polêtae (as to whom see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 239-240, and Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 335), and the result probably was that the sentences of dicasteries were not fully carried into effect, and that there was laxity in connexion with the posting-up of the names of public debtors. In some States the authority which tried and condemned also exacted the penalty, and this arrangement is disapproved by Aristotle. Plato had, it would seem, adopted it in Laws 958 B. The Council of the Areopagus (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 8. l. 19 sqq.), and the Boulê of 500 (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 45) at Athens had power at one time both to try cases and to exact the

penalty; the ephors had the same power in the Lacedaemonian State (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4). The podestà at Florence in the thirteenth century executed his own judicial decisions (Perrens, La Civilisation Florentine, p. 26), but then he did not belong to Florence and left it as soon as he laid down his office. We are ourselves familiar with the distinction between the judge and jury, the sheriff, and the authorities of prisons. In the phratry of the Labyadae at Delphi the penalty for infractions of its statutes was assessed by one authority and levied by another (Baunack, Die delphischen Inschriften, No. 2561. D 18, in Collitz, Sammlung der gr. Dialekt-Inschriften, *αἱ δέ τι τούτων παρβάλλοιτο τῶν γεγραμμένων θωεόντων τοί τε δαμιοργοὶ καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι πάντες Λαβυάδαι, πρασσόντων δὲ τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα*). At Corinth in the days of the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae, if we may trust Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 58 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 392), fines imposed by dicasteries were levied by the polemarch.

12. **τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων.** Bonitz (Ind. s. v. *ἐνιστάναι*) places a query after *ἐνεστώτων* here, but compare the use of the word in an inscription of Iasus (*Revue des Études Grecques*, 6. 155), *τὸ δὲ ψήφισμα ἀναγράψα[ι] τοὺς νεωποίας τοὺς ἐνεστῶτας ἐν τῆ[ι πα]ραστάσει*, and in an inscription of Chios (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 126), *τοὺς ἐξεταστὰς το[ὺ]ς ἐνεστηκότ[α]ς*.

15. **ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ.**, 'for the less odium there is in the business for those who exact the penalty.'

16. **τὸ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** *Μέν* here, as often elsewhere, = 'while.' Lamb. adds *ποιεῖ* after *πᾶσι*, and Sus. *ποιεῖ αὐτούς* before *πολεμίους*. I am not *certain* that any word or words have fallen out of the text, for Aristotle may intend us to carry on *ἔχει*, which is of course unsuitable (see notes on 1257 a 21, 1287 b 26, and 1297 a 40: see also note on 1294 b 27), or at any rate to obtain the notion of *ποιεῖ* from it, but perhaps it is more likely that *ποιεῖ* or some similar word has dropped out. In Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6. vol. iii. p. 629 Kühn, *ἀγαθοῖσι δὲ ἰητροῖσιν αἱ ὁμοιότητες πλάνας καὶ ἀπορίας*, the omission of *παρέχουσι* is explained by the fact that the sixth Book of the De Morbis Vulgaribus consists of rough notes written in a very concise and elliptical style.

17. **τοὺς καταδικάσαντας καὶ πραττομένους.** Observe the difference of tense. The condemnation precedes, the exaction of the penalty follows.

19. **πολλαχοῦ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We hear of a *φυλάκτης* at Cyme (Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 2). For *διαιρεῖν* followed by *πρός* cp. Plato, Polit. 265 A.

20. οἷον Ἀθήνησιν (ἡ) τῶν ἕνδεκα καλουμένων, sc. διῄρηται πρὸς τὴν πραττομένην. Susemihl brackets these words and may well be right in doing so (see critical note). They are very possibly a gloss which has crept from the margin into the text, and in addition to that a further difficulty arises in connexion with them (see Sus.², Note 1469). The eleven at Athens were not only charged with the custody of prisoners, but also with the execution of capital sentences, and indeed appear to have been sometimes employed to get in State-debts (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 257). Thus they combined to a certain extent the functions of ἡ φυλάττουσα ἀρχή with those of ἡ πραττομένη, and can hardly be with strict accuracy adduced as an instance of the severance of the two sets of functions. No doubt in most cases at Athens the money-fines were levied by the practores, and it is possible (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thumser, 1. 569. 4) that all that is intended in the passage before us is to point out that the practores were a distinct magistracy from the eleven. Still the instance adduced of a severance between the authority charged with the custody of prisoners and the authority charged with the exaction of penalties is not quite satisfactory.

21. καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, 'to part off this magistracy also,' as well as ἡ πραττομένη.

τὸ σόφισμα is translated by Welldon, perhaps rightly, 'the same artifice as before.'

22. συμβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Men of worth appear to have shunned the office which was charged with the custody of prisoners even more than that which had to do with the levying of penalties. That men of worth were inclined to avoid office of all kinds at Athens we see from Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1460 sq.: cp. Plato, Rep. 549 C and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 27. l. 23 sq. To give bad men the charge of the gaols was not safe, both for other reasons and because aspirants to tyranny (e. g. Aristodemus at Cumae, Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 7) had occasionally set prisoners free and enlisted them in their cause. Vict. compares Cic. in Q. Caecil. Divin. c. 16. 51, custodem, inquit, Tullio me apponite. Quid? mihi quam multis custodibus opus erit, si te semel ad meas capsas admisero?

26. πρὸς αὐτοῖς, 'to attend to prisoners.'

27. ἀλλὰ τῶν τε νέων κ.τ.λ., 'but successive sections of the young, where an organization of youthful police or guards exists,

and of the magistrates should take charge of the matter.' It is implied that *φρουροί* were young as well as *ἔφηβοι*, and this was probably usually the case in ancient Greece: cp. Chionides, Ἡρακλῆς Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 5), where a father says to his son,

πολλοὺς ἐγᾦδα κοὐ κατὰ σὲ νεανίας
φρουροῦντας ἀτειχῶς κἀν σάμαι κοιμωμένους.

The Lacedaemonian *κρυπτεία* was composed of young men (Arist. Fragm. 495. 1558 b 19 sqq.). Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 12.

29. **ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle sometimes places a thing first, as here, because it is most necessary (e. g. in 4 (7). 11. 1330 a 38), sometimes, as in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 8 sqq., because it is best. See note on 1330 a 38.

31. **ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι τεταγμένας,** 'but ordered in a more imposing guise.' For *σχήματι* cp. Plato, Laws 685 C, *ἦν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκείνης σχῆμα τὸ σωζόμενον οὐ σμικρόν*, and Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 210, *εἰ ἄρα αἴσθοιντο ὅτι νῦν ἡ πόλις εἰς ὑπηρέτου σχῆμα καὶ τάξιν προελήλυθε*. Compare also Plut. An seni sit gerenda respublica, c. 20, *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχαῖς τὸν τηλικοῦτον ἄρα φέρεσθαι, κἂν ὅσαι γε μέγεθός τι κέκτηνται καὶ ἀξίωμα*. As to the greatness of the position held by the stratêgi at Athens see Alexis, Ἀσπγλαυκιμάσ. Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 391), and Gilbert, Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens, p. 2 sq., where Lys. Or. 26. c. Evand. c. 20 is referred to among other passages.

32. **καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται πολλῆς,** 'for they require [for their due administration] much experience and trustworthiness.' Vict. 'egere autem affirmat hos (magistratus) usu et fide multa, nec posse recte sustineri haec munera, nisi ab hominibus peritis et probis.' I follow Vict. and the earlier interpreters, and also Welldon, in translating *πίστεως* 'trustworthiness,' but Stahr and Sus. translate it 'Vertrauen' ('trust,' 'confidence'), and Bonitz also apparently (see Ind. s. v.).

33. **τοιαῦται δ' εἶεν ἂν κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10 sqq., where the high dignity of *ἡ κυρία τῆς φυλακῆς ἀρχή* (i. e. *στρατηγία*) is dwelt upon. The stratêgi are charged with the *φυλακὴ τῆς πόλεως* in Plato, Laws 760 A also. In Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 240. 29, the magistrates at Miletus entitled *οἱ ἠιρημένοι ἐπὶ τῇ φυλακῇι* are probably stratêgi. That the charge of the gates—a very important and anxious charge (Aen. Poliorc. cc. 18–20)—fell to the stratêgus or polemarch we see from Polyb. 4. 18, where

we read of Cynaetha in Arcadia, *πολέμαρχοι τῶν κατεληλυθότων τινὲς ἐγεγόνεισαν· ταύτην δὲ συμβαίνει τὴν ἀρχὴν κλείειν τὰς πύλας καὶ τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον κυριεύειν τῶν κλειδῶν, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν τὴν δίαιταν ἐπὶ τῶν πυλώνων*, and from Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25, 29. The *φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας* was an important part of the duties of the stratêgi at Athens (see Sandys on *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 61), but of this Aristotle says nothing. He distinguishes the 'watch and ward of the city' from 'matters connected with war', because the city needs to be guarded against domestic as well as external foes.

34. *δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* *Ὁμοίως* goes with *καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ*. This remark is added to correct a mistaken view which might be entertained by some that offices of this kind need not exist except in time of war (Vict.). In time of war the stratêgi and polemarchs would have other duties to discharge in addition.

36. For *ἐξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πολιτῶν*, 'inspection of the citizens and drawing them up in order of battle', cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2. 4. 1, *ἐξέτασιν δέ ποτε πάντων τοῦ Κύρου ποιουμένου ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ σύνταξιν κ.τ.λ.*

37. *ἔνθα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle does not describe in detail the way in which the various functions of the stratêgi and polemarchs were distributed, when distributed they were, but the charge of the walls and gates of the city may well have been occasionally severed from the duties of inspecting and marshalling the army and of commanding it on expeditions beyond the frontier.

39. *καλοῦσι δὲ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολεμάρχους τοὺς τοιούτους.* 'Of these two titles *πολέμαρχος* was the older, it would seem, and the less frequent, *στρατηγός* the commoner' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 329). The two offices existed together in Athens Eretria and Paros (Gilbert, 2. 329. 2), and also probably at Leucas (Oberhummer, Akarnanien, p. 272 sqq.). For other duties discharged by stratêgi and polemarchs besides those mentioned in the passage before us by Aristotle, see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 330. 1. As to the functions of the stratêgi at Athens, see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 233 sqq.

1. *ἔτι δὲ κἂν ὦσιν κ.τ.λ.* It would seem from Aristotle's language 1322 b.
here that cavalry, light-armed troops, and archers were not kept on foot in every Greek State. Light-armed troops (javelin-throwers, slingers, and the like) are here distinguished from archers, as in Plato, Laws 756 A.

2. *ἐπὶ τούτων ἑκάστων*, 'in charge of each of these': compare

such phrases as *ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ὅπλων στρατηγός*, and see Kühner, Ausführ. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 438. I. 3. h (ed. Gerth, § 438. I. 3. f). For *τῶν ἑκάστων* cp. Plato, Laws 682 D, *τὰ τῶν πολιορκούντων ἑκάστων*, and 943 B, *ἑκάστων τούτων*. Coray remarks, '*εἰς τὸ ἑκάστῳ ἔτρεφον. Συνείδερος τὴν λέξιν (μηδὲν δέον, οἶμαι)*'. No mention is here made of persons employed in supervising engineering work or in the command of a siege-train. There would not be many such persons in Greek citizen-armies.

8. ναυαρχίαι. Athenian admirals were called *στρατηγοί*, not *ναύαρχοι*, but the Lacedaemonian *ναυαρχία* is well known (2. 9. 1271 b 37 sqq.), and *ναύαρχοι* existed in Achaia (Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr.* Gr. No. 178), at Rhodes (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 179), Abydos (Gilbert, 2. 159), and elsewhere.

ταξιαρχίαι. This term appears to be used here of command over light-armed troops or archers: cp. Xen. Anab. 4. 1. 21 and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 81. 1. The taxiarchs of this kind of force appear to have *had λοχαγοί* under them (1322 b 4).

5. τὸ δὲ πᾶν κ.τ.λ., i. e. *τὸ δὲ πᾶν τούτων εἶδός ἐστιν ἕν τι εἶδος, οἷον ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν*. For the epexegetic genitive *ἐπιμελείας* see note on 1289 b 35 and Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 124 (Digest of Platonic Idioms, § 24).

7. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνιαι τῶν ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr.* Gr. No. 248. 170, *πλεῖστα χειρίσας τῶν κοινῶν*, and Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 27, *τὰ δημόσια χρήματα διεχείριζε*. Apodectae, tamiae, poletae, practores, and stratêgi would be among the magistracies referred to, Aristotle evidently holds that an audit was especially necessary in the case of magistracies which had the control of large amounts of public money or public property, and at Rome the only magistrates subject to an audit were those who had to do with the disbursement of public money from the treasury of the State (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 1. 88 sq.), but at Athens all magistracies were subject to audit, and not only magistracies, but also posts like those of priests and ambassadors (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thumser, 1. p. 651). Aristotle often speaks of the right of audit as resting with the deliberative authority (3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6), and not with any magistracy, but here he takes it for granted that a magistracy will be necessary to exercise it. In *τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν* the distinction between *λόγος* and *εὔθυνα* appears, as to which see

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, 2. 231 sqq., and Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 945 B. 'The εὔθυνα has primarily nothing to do with the money, but concerns itself rather with the exercise of the powers of the magistracy', remarks Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (ibid. 2. 234), who quotes Lys. Or. 24. 26, οὔτε χρήματα διαχειρίσας τῆς πόλεως δίδωμι λόγον αὐτῶν, οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἄρξας οὐδεμίαν εὐθύνας ὑπέχω νῦν αὐτῆς. Notwithstanding αὐτὴν μηδὲν διαχειρίζουσαν ἕτερον, it does not seem that in Greek States the magistracy which exacted an account was always, or perhaps commonly, confined to this function; it was often charged not only with the direction of the finances, but also with particular financial operations (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 336).

10. καλοῦσι δὲ τούτους κ.τ.λ. For the distribution of these titles in Greece see Gilbert, ibid. At Athens both logistae and euthyni existed, but it appears from Ἀθ. Πολ. cc. 48 and 54 that the main part of the work of reviewing the conduct of magistrates at the expiration of their term of office must have fallen on the logistae, for the powers of the euthyni were called into action only when some citizen was dissatisfied with the result of the trial of an outgoing magistrate before a dicastery presided over by the logistae; thus they were merely supplementary officials designed to correct any errors in the process before the logistae. See Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 226 sqq. Synegori also existed at Athens, as to whom see Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 54, and Gilbert, ibid.

12. παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ., 'and besides all these magistracies there is that which is in the highest degree supreme over all State-affairs; [I speak of it thus,] for the same magistracy often has in its hands the final completion and the introduction of a measure, [and so is itself supreme,] or at any rate presides over the many where the demos is supreme, for there must be an authority to convene the supreme element in the constitution'. When a magistracy has in its hands both the inception and the completion of measures, its powers are great: cp. Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 16 *sub fin.*, Σκυθινῷ λέγοντι περὶ τῆς λύρας, ἣν ἁρμόζεται Ζηνὸς εὐειδὴς Ἀπόλλων, πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος συλλαβών, and Polyb. 6. 1. 9 sq. Hultsch. It was the prerogative of kings τὸ τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι (Plato, Laws 761 E, πλὴν τῶν τὸ τέλος ἐπιτιθέντων, οἷον βασιλέων: Eustath. on Hom. Il. 1. 25, ἦν γὰρ τοῦ δήμου παντὸς εἰπεῖν, βασιλέως δὲ τὴν ὑστάτην κατ' Εὐριπίδην ἀφεῖναι ὅπα καὶ κυρῶσαι τὸ δοκοῦν);

cp. Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως 3. 469 a 4, ἡ δὲ καρδία κυριωτάτη καὶ τέλος ἐπιτίθησιν. Compare the powers of the consuls at Rome (Polyb. 6. 12. 4, καὶ μὴν ὅσα δεῖ διὰ τοῦ δήμου συντελεῖσθαι τῶν τε τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις ἀνηκόντων, τούτοις καθήκει φροντίζειν καὶ συνάγειν τὴν ἐκκλησίας, τούτοις εἰσφέρειν τὰ δόγματα, τούτοις βραβεύειν τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς πλείοσιν). For προκάθηται τοῦ πλήθους cp. Plato, Laws 758 D, ἐκ ξυλλόγων τε ἀεὶ δεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ προκαθήμενον τῆς πόλεως εἴρων καὶ διαλύσεων τῶν τε κατὰ νόμους τῶν τε ἐξαίφνης προσπεπτουσῶν τῇ πόλει. At Athens the Boulê possessed large powers in matters of finance and administration, but of this Aristotle says nothing here.

16. ὅπου δὲ πλῆθός ἐστι, 'where the many rule': cp. τὸ πλήθους, 14. Sus.[2] (Ind. s. v.) explains πλῆθος as = δημοκρατία here and in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 16, but in the absence of parallel passages this seems doubtful.

17. αἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. For the distinction here drawn between πολιτικαὶ ἀρχαί and priesthoods cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18 sq. and 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 4 sq. Aristotle seems here, however, to imply that priesthoods are ἀρχαί, though not πολιτικαὶ ἀρχαί. We note that he distinguishes the offices of archon, king, and prytanis as well as priesthoods, from πολιτικαὶ ἀρχαί.

18. ἄλλο δ' εἶδος ἐπιμελείας κ.τ.λ. It would seem that in small States, and probably also in the smaller temples of large States, the priests not only discharged their special function of offering sacrifices and superintending the temple-worship, but also kept the sacred buildings and other sacred objects in repair and managed the sacred property. Plato in the Laws (759 E) creates special ταμίαι τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων καὶ τεμενῶν καὶ ταφῶν καὶ μισθώσεων, and arranges that they shall be elected in a particularly careful way, while he treats the appointment of priests differently, allowing a considerable place to the lot. In the case of a priest he makes ceremonial purity the main requirement, whereas in that of a treasurer of sacred property much would be desirable over and above this (cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 6 sqq.). It sometimes happened indeed, in ancient Greece that the priest was a youth or a very old man, and where this was so, there would be an additional reason for making careful provision for the wise administration of the temple-property. Aristotle says nothing about ἐξηγηταί, though Plato in Laws 759 C sqq. provides for the appointment of sacred officials thus entitled, nor about μάντεις, though Thyrreium and Ambracia kept a μάντις (Oberhummer, Akarnanien, p. 230).

19. τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερά. Vict. 'rerum quae pertinent ad aedes sacras': Sepulv. 'earum rerum quae ad sacra pertinent': Lamb. 'quae ad res sacras pertinent': Welldon, 'the ordinances of religion'. Sus. translates simply 'die Heiligthümer'. I incline to follow Vict.

21. τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, 'of all other things which are set apart for the service of the gods', is dependent on ἐπιμεληταί, like τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερά. Sacred property, both animate (slaves, herds, and flocks) and inanimate, not falling under the head of τὰ περὶ τὰ ἱερά, and sacred revenues are probably especially referred to. For ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 17 sqq. and 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34, ὅσαι (ἀρχαὶ) τάττονται πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας.

24. ἱεροποιούς. At the temple of Apollo in Delos (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 367. 1 sqq.: Gardner and Jevons, Manual of Greek Antiquities, ed. 1, p. 189 sqq.), and also in Myconus (Dittenberger, No. 373. 17 sqq.), the ἱεροποιοί had the control of the sacred property. The same was the case with the ἱεροποιοί of the temple at Eleusis (Dittenberger, No. 13. 9 sqq.). It is to ἱεροποιοί attached to temples, not to State-officers like those whose functions are described in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 54, that Aristotle here refers. See Dittenberger, No. 334, note 13, as to the different kinds of ἱεροποιοί at Athens.

25. ναοφύλακας. We read of ναοφύλακες in Eurip. Iph. Taur. 1175 Bothe (1284 Dindorf), and ἱεροφύλακες existed in Rhodes and Segesta (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 11. 7).

ταμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων. These existed at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 30: see Sandys' note) and at the temple of Apollo Didymaeus at Branchidae (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 170. 1). We find ταμίαι τῶν ἱερῶν at Chersonesus Taurica (Dittenberger, No. 252. 53), and ἱεροταμίαι at Stiris (Dittenberger, No. 294. 20 sqq.) and Ialysus (No. 357).

26. ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 10, τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαί. Aristotle's language appears to imply that some public sacrifices were celebrated by priests, while others were 'celebrated from the common hearth' by archons, kings, and prytaneis. According to Plato, Polit. 290 E the sacrifices offered by ὁ λαχὼν βασιλεύς at Athens were τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μάλιστα πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσιῶν. The 'common hearth' of a State was in the prytaneum (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 347. 6, ἐν τῶι πρυτανείωι ἐπὶ τῆς

κοινῆς ἑστίας τοῦ δήμου: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 65). For the connexion of kings and prytaneis with the 'common hearth' cp. Aesch. Suppl. 370 sqq. and Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 431, 45–49, and as to ἄρχοντες Plut. Sympos. 6. 8. 1, θυσία τίς ἐστι πάτρια, ἣν ὁ μὲν ἄρχων ἐπὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἑστίας δρᾷ, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστος ἐν οἴκῳ and Dittenberger, No. 240. 26 and No. 389. 31 sqq. In Plut. Gen. Socr. c. 30 the ἄρχων is a sacred functionary. See also Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 323–6.

27. After ἀλλά supply ὅσαι. Cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 36 sq. and Isocr. Nicocl. § 43, κάλλιστον οὖν ὑπέλαβον, εἴ τις δύναιτο ταύτας τὰς ἀρεταῖς προέχειν τῶν ἄλλων, ὧν οὐδὲν μέρος τοῖς πονηροῖς μέτεστιν, ἀλλὰ γνησιώτατα καὶ βεβαιότατα καὶ μεγίστων ἐπαίνων ἄξιαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι.

29. αἱ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In the enumeration of magistracies contained in 1321 b 12—1322 b 29 Aristotle begins with the minor ones and ends with the most important, but in this recapitulation he arranges magistracies in a different way. He groups them thus—those connected with the gods, war, and finance; those whose functions are local; and those which are connected with the dicasteries and the deliberative. Matters connected with the gods are grouped with matters connected with war, just as they are in 3. 14. 1285 a 5 sqq. and 1285 b 9 sq.

30. περὶ τούτων is followed in 31 sqq. by περί with the acc.: see notes on 1300 a 8 and 1321 b 28.

31. τὰ δαιμόνια is probably a somewhat more comprehensive term than τὰ θεῖα: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 5. 1122 b 19, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνιον.

37. For the suppression of περί before τῶν κοινῶν cp. 4 (7). 10 1330 a 22, and see note on 1292 a 32 and Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 168. In 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 41 we have τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν κοινῶν.

ἴδιαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to the magistracies here mentioned see Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 337 sq. As to the νομοφύλακες cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 14, ἐδίδασκον δὲ αὐτὴν ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολίταις, ἢν νόμους καλοὺς γράψωνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ νομοφύλακας προσαιροῦνται, οἵτινες ἐπισκοποῦντες τὸν μὲν ποιοῦντα τὰ νόμιμα ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἢν δέ τις παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῇ, ζημιοῦσι. The way in which the νομοφύλακες are here mentioned suggests that their function was to compel adult male citizens to observe εὐκοσμία, as the γυναικονόμοι and παιδονόμοι compelled women and boys to do so. Cp. 1323 a

6 sqq. We find γυναικονόμοι not only in wealthy communities like those of Samos and Syracuse, but also, which we hardly expect after what Aristotle says here, at Gambreium, not probably a very wealthy one (Gilbert, ibid.: Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 470). The same thing may be said of παιδονόμοι and γυμνασίαρχοι, but these magistracies may well have become more common after Aristotle's time. As to the γυμνασιαρχία see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Blümner, 4. 337 sq. The Athenian citizen who defrayed the expenses of a torch-race is often said γυμνασιαρχεῖν (Lys. Or. 21. c. 3: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 360 sq.), but in the passage before us the reference is not to a χορηγός, but to a magistrate, the magistrate who kept order in the gymnasia: cp. [Plato,] Axiochus, 367 A, γυμνασιαρχία καὶ ῥάβδοι, and Eryxias, 399 A, and Plut. Amat. c. 10, ἄρχουσι γὰρ (οἱ γυμνασίαρχοι) ἰσχυρῶς τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν σφόδρα τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν πραττομένοις. We see from Valer. Max. 9. 10. Ext. 2 that the office existed at Pherae in the time of Jason.

1. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ. It would seem that a special magistracy 1323 a.
for the management of the matters here referred to would commonly be found only in prosperous and leisured States which cared for εὐκοσμία. For ἀγῶνας Διονυσιακούς cp. Rhet. 3. 15. 1416 a 32. At Athens the athlothetae managed the musical and gymnastic competitions, and also the horse-races, at the Panathenaea ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 60), while the eponymous archon managed the competitions of the greater Dionysia ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 56. l. 27 sq.) and the archon basileus those of the Lenaea ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 57. l. 4 sqq.).

3. θεωρίας. See note on 1342 a 21, ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας. There were θεωρίαι which were not ἀγῶνες, for instance non-competitive dramatic or musical performances.

τούτων δ' ἔνιαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 30–1300 a 8, where much the same thing has already been said, though no notice is here taken of the fact. We can understand why gynaeconomi should object to the employment of women as ἀκόλουθοι (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 4 sqq.), but the passage before us implies that paedonomi also would object to the employment of children for the same purpose. Was it one of the functions of the paedonomi to keep boys and girls out of the public streets?

5. τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις κ.τ.λ. We are often told that a Greek democracy was virtually an aristocracy, inasmuch as most, if not all, of the citizens would be the owners of one or more slaves, but

the passage before us shows the baselessness of this view, for it implies that *ἄποροι* will have no slaves, and there can be little doubt that in almost all democracies a majority of the citizens were *ἄποροι*. The same thing is implied of *οἱ πένητες* in 1. 1. 1252 b 12. The fact is no more than one would expect. The maintenance of a slave, to say nothing of the purchase of one, would be too heavy a burden for a poor man's purse. I find a statement quoted from Mr. Booth's Life and Labour of the People in London, that out of the 4,200,000 inhabitants of London no fewer than 3,700,000 have no servants at all (*Times*, June 6, 1895). As to the use of slaves as *ἀκόλουθοι* ('pedisequi') see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 187 sqq. When a Greek citizen went to the market, he needed some one to carry home the provisions or other articles he purchased (Theophr. Charact. c. 22). Hence an *ἀκόλουθος* was the most necessary kind of slave (Aristoph. Eccl. 593,

μηδ' ἀνδραπόδοις τὸν μὲν χρῆσθαι πολλοῖς, τὸν δ' οὐδ' ἀκολούθῳ:

Lys. Or. 32. c. 16: Büchsenschütz, ibid.). That poor relatives were sometimes employed as *ἀκόλουθοι* we see from Isaeus, Or. 5. c. 11, and Dio Chrys. Or. 15. p. 451 R, *οὕτω μέν, ἔφη, καὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀποφαίνεις δούλους τῶν πατέρων, καὶ γὰρ ἀκολουθοῦσι πολλοῖς τῶν πεπτωκότων καὶ εἰς γυμνάσιον βαδίζουσι καὶ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον*, passages quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Blümner, 4. p. 86, note 1. See Liddell and Scott s. v. *αὐτολήκυθος*.

6. *τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ.* *Καθ' ἃς* probably means 'in accordance with whose directions': cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 44, *ποιοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιρεσίας στρατηγῶν καὶ ἱππάρχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, καθ' ὅ τι ἂν τῷ δήμῳ δοκῇ· ποιοῦσι δ' οὐ μετὰ τὴν ἕκτην πρυτανεύοντες ἐφ' ὧν ἂν εὐσημία γένηται. δεῖ δὲ προβούλευμα γενέσθαι καὶ περὶ τούτων.* If a *προβούλευμα* of the Boulê was a necessary preliminary to these elections at Athens, similar elections may well have been to a still greater extent under the control of the pre-considering authority elsewhere. As to nomophylakes see notes on 1298 b 27 and 1322 b 37. For the reversal in the order of the words in 8 sq. see note on 1277 a 31.

9. *μὲν οὖν* implies that this Book is not complete (vol. ii. p. xxvi). For *ὡς ἐν τύπῳ* cp. (with Bon. Ind. s.v. *τύπος*) Eth. Nic. 5. 1. 1129 a 11 and Hist. An. 1. 6. 491 a 7 sqq. For *περὶ πασῶν* see note on 1301 a 19.

APPENDIX A.

(See explanatory note on 1307 b 26.)

THE counsels given in the eighth and ninth chapters of the Seventh (old Fifth) Book are as a rule deduced from the investigations in the preceding part of the Book as to the causes of the overthrow of constitutions. This will be evident from the following table:—

1307 b 30–40. Based on the experience of Thurii (1307 b 6–19) and Ambracia (1303 a 23–25).

1307 b 40–1308 a 3. This does not seem to be based on anything said previously in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book. Aristotle probably has in his mind what has been said in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7–13. 1297 b 1, where the subject is fully dealt with, though advice respecting it is given in that passage not only to aristocracies, but also to democracies.

1308 a 3–24. Based on 1302 b 6–14, 1305 b 2–22, 36–39, 1306 a 12–19, 31–b 5, 1306 b 31–36.

1308 a 24–30. Possibly based on the warning against neglectfulness in 1303 a 16–25.

1308 a 31–35. Based on 1303 b 19–1304 a 17 and on 1305 b 22–39.

1308 a 35–b 10. Based on 1306 b 6–16.

1308 b 10–19. Based on 1302 b 15–21 and 1307 a 2–5.

1308 b 20–24. Based on 1305 b 39–1306 a 9.

1308 b 24–31. Based on 1302 b 33–1303 a 13, 1304 a 17–38, 1306 b 36–1307 a 2.

1308 b 31–1309 a 14. Based on 1302 b 5–10.

1309 a 14–20. Based on 1304 b 20–1305 a 7.

1309 a 20–32. Based on 1305 a 38–b 1.

1309 a 33–b 14. Based on the experience of Oreus (1303 a 16–20) and also on 1302 b 5–10.

1309 b 14–18. Based on the warning against incurring contempt given in 1302 b 25–33 and on the fact of the

frequent overthrow of narrow oligarchies (1305 b 2–12, 36–39, 1306 a 12–19) and the frequent peril of narrow aristocracies (1306 b 22–1307 a 5).

1309 b 18–1310 a 2. Based perhaps on 1305 a 28–34 and on the reference to the errors of Charicles and Phrynichus in 1305 b 24–27, but probably suggested by Plato, Laws 701 E.

1310 a 2–12. Based on 1304 b 20–1305 a 7 and on 1305 a 38 sqq.

1310 a 12–36. Based perhaps on 1302 b 25–33 and on the experience of Thurii (1307 a 32 sq.), but probably rather suggested by Plato, Rep. 552 E (cp. 554 B, ἀναιδεστέρους) and Laws 793.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOL. IV.

P. 101, line 1, *add* καὶ *before* κατ'.

P. 109, line 19, *add* Sus. *after* Bekk.

P. 110, five lines from foot of page, *after* Π^2 *add* except Ald.

P. 120, twenty lines from foot of page, *after* Γ *add* Sus.

P. 138, line 6, *after* 684 B sq. *add* and Rep. 426 B sq.

P. 140, line 3, *for* Ἧν *read* Ἦν.

P. 140, ten lines from foot of page, *after* ἐπηνώρθωσε *add* 4. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμανθάνειν τοῦ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 11. 307 R, χαλεποῦ δέ, ὡς ἔφην, ὄντος τοῦ διδάσκειν, τῷ παντὶ χαλεπώτερον τὸ μεταδιδάσκειν.

P. 164, fifteen lines from foot of page, *dele* As to εἰ δή see note on 1331 a 10, and.

P. 189, note on 1293 a 3, and p. 222, note on 1296 b 18. Τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν in 1296 b 18 sq. probably means 'superiority in number', not, as I have taken it in my note to mean, 'the numerical superiority of the many'. The meaning of διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους in 1293 a 4 is, however, more doubtful. It may mean either (1) 'by reason of the excess (or magnitude) of the numbers', presumably of the citizens (cp. Sepulv. 'propter maximam multitudinem', and Lamb. 'propter ingentem multitudinem'); it is thus that I understand Bonitz (Ind. 793 a 35) to take it; or (2) 'in consequence of the predominant influence of the masses' (Sus., Welldon); or (3) 'on account of the numerical superiority of the many' (Vict.). The first rendering has the merit of giving τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους much the same sense in 1293 a 4 and 1296 b 18 sq., but it is not clear how an excess in the number of the citizens leads to τὸ πάντας μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας. If we have to choose between the two other renderings, I incline to prefer the third, which is that adopted in my note on 1293 a 3, for it seems likely from 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq. and 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 24 sqq. that the numerical superiority of the many is referred to, not their superiority in influence.

P. 190, line 1, note of interrogation *in place of* comma *after* διέλθωμεν.

P. 199, line 5, *after* laws *add* He will not allow that εὐνομία exists where the laws are good, but are not obeyed.

P. 200, seven lines from foot of page, *dele* of.

P. 215, line 10, and p. 270, line 17, *after* 1253 b 3 *add* and iii. Additions and Corrections, p. 595 (on iii. 131).

P. 223, line 3, *after* 1286 a 36) *add* As to τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν see above on p. 189.

P. 223, line 10, *for* τοῦτο τὸ μέρος *read* τοὺς ἀγεννεῖς ἢ τοὺς ἀπόρους.

P. 223, line 11, *after* 25. *add* Τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος probably means here, as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 9 and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 29, 'the body' (or 'class') 'of the poor', not 'the number of the poor' ('die Zahl der Armen'), as Sus. takes it to do: cp. 1296 b 31, τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων (πλῆθος), and 34, τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους.

P. 227, lines 9–15. This reference to the late South African Republic should be in the past tense.

P. 245, five lines from foot of page, *after* spirit *add* **Αἱρετοί τε ὦσι**, sc. οἱ **κύριοι τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι** (cp. 1298 b 3).

P. 256, line 11, *after* lot *add* For the inference compare explanatory note on 1254 a 28.

P. 256, line 15, *for* **χοηγοὶ** *read* **χορηγοί**.

P. 285, line 11, *after* **κ.τ.λ.** *add* This is added to show how it is that men of high birth are led to claim more than an equal share. They base their claim not on their own virtue or wealth, like those previously mentioned, but on the virtue and wealth of their ancestors.

P. 302, line 2, *after* 470 R *add* Prof. Bywater suggests that in the above quotation from De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 27 sqq. the bracketed words **τοῦ ζῴου** are 'a dittographia of **τοῦ προσώπου**', the **προσ** being represented by 'the well-known compendium which is so easily mistaken for **ζ** or **ξ**, as Bast tells us (Comm. Pal. p. 727)'.

P. 310, twenty lines from foot of page, *after* **εἶναι** *add* and Eth. Nic. 7. 1 1145 a 25 sq., Demosth. Prooem. 42. p. 1450, and Polyb. 6. 47. 8.

P. 312, nine lines from foot of page, *for* claim *read* claimed.

P. 323, five lines from foot of page, *after* uncertain *add* See as to recent excavations on this site *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 21 (1901). 347.

P. 344, nineteen lines from foot of page, *after* 32. *add* For **ὃς κύριον εἶναι** see explanatory note on 1. 8. 1256 b 11.

P. 459, sixteen lines from foot of page, *after* 18 *add* and Hdt. 3. 134.

P. 540, line 3, *for* 7 (5). 2 *read* 7 (5). 3.

P. 546, line 9, *for* last *read* eighteenth *and for* this *read* the nineteenth.

INDEXES :—P. 578 a, l. 13, *for* 129 *read* 219; last line but four, *add* the comic poet *before* iii : P. 583 b, l. 27, *for* 342 *read* 442 : P. 587 a, l. 22, *for* ii *read* iii : P. 590 b, l. 12, *for* 423 *read* father of Miltiades, iv. 423 : P. 591 b, l. 40, *add* iii. *before* 268 : P. 598 a, l. 39, *add* iv. *before* 495 : P. 599 b, l. 18, *dele* 364; l. 38, *for* 501 sq. *read* 502 sq. : P. 601 b, l. 39, *for* 468 *read* 268 : P. 602 b, l. 43, *add* another *before* iii : P. 605 b, l. 28, *for* 328 *read* 338 : P. 607 b, l. 3, *for* 171 *read* 172 : P. 610 a, l. 38, *for* iii *read* ii : P. 610 b, l. 14, *for* 200 *read* 201 ; l. 20, *for* 490 *read* 491 ; last line but three, *transfer* 551 *to* Heracleia in Italy : P. 611 b, l. 23 sq. *for* 260, 286 *read* 261, 287 : P. 614 a, l. 3, *for* 508 *read* 502 : P. 616 b, l. 36, *for* 177 *read* 178 : P. 617 b, l. 28, *dele* i. 312 sq. : P. 622 a, last line but seven, *add* iv. *before* 562 : P. 622 b, l. 13, *for* iii *read* ii : P. 627 a, l. 11, *for* 53 note *read* p. liii note, 66 ; l. 25, *for* 370 *read* 371 : P. 630 a, l. 37, *for* 138 *read* 108 : P. 631 b, l. 27, *for* i *read* ii : P. 636 a, l. 7, *add* of Leontini *before* iv ; l. 9, *add* iv. *before* 532 : P. 655 a, l. 19, *for* xxxiii *read* xxiii : P. 656 b, last line but five, *dele* 370 : P. 676 b, l. 15, *for* ii *read* iii : P. 678 b, l. 31, *for* ii *read* iii : P. 679 b, l. 29, *for* 455 *read* 456 : P. 682 b, last line but eight, *for* 201 *read* 202 : P. 686 a, l. 24, *add* iv. *before* 568 : P. 687 b, l. 5, *for* 359 *read* 399 : P. 692 a, last line but seven, *dele* 356 : P. 693 a, last line but seven, *for* 118 *read* 119 : P. 693 b, l. 5, *add* iii. *before* 312 ; l. 19, *dele* 345 : P. 694 b, l. 42, *for* 200 *read* 201.

The following errata should be added to the list of errata in the Indexes contained in vol. iv, p. 572:—

P. 585 a, last line but seven, *for* iii. 357 note, 524 *read* i. 357 note; iii. 524.

P. 585 b, last line but thirteen, *for* 535 *read* Attalus iii of Pergamon, iv. 535.

P. 596 b, l. 17, *transfer* iii. 301 *to* Cyrus, the younger.

P. 623 a, l. 5, *add* iv. *before* 477.

P. 635 b, l. 17, *add* iii. *before* 385.

P. 638 a, last line but twelve, *for* 388 *read* 389.

P. 641 b, l. 36, *for* 339 *read* 340.

P. 648 b, l. 35, *for* 260 *read* 261.

P. 657 a, ll. 28, 34, *for* 200 *read* 201.

P. 657 b, l. 33, *for* 159 *read* 140.

P. 696 a, l. 29, *for* 201 *read* 202.

P. 697 a, l. 24, *for* ii *read* iv.

P. 699 a, last line but thirteen, *for* 361 *read* 561.

P. 700 a, last line but nine, *for* 208 *read* 308.

P. 700 b, last line but thirteen, *or* αὐτόν *read* αὐτόν.

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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS.

Vat. Pal. = the Palimpsest Fragments of the Third and Sixth (Fourth) Books in the Vatican Library (see vol. i. p. vii sq., and vol. ii. p. xlii sq.).

M^a = B 105, ordinis superioris, of the Ambrosian Library at Milan.

P^1 = 2023 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.
corr.^{1} P^1 = corrections in P^1 in ink of the same colour as the MS.
p^1 = corrections in P^1 in a paler ink.

Γ = the Greek text rendered by the Vetus Interpres, William of Moerbeke.

P^2 = the I^b of Bekker, MS. Coislin 161 in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.
corr.^{1} P^2 = corrections in P^2 in ink of the same colour as the MS.
corr.^{2} P^2 = corrections in P^2 in darker ink than the MS.
corr.^{3} P^2 = corrections in P^2 in paler ink than the MS.

P^3 = 2026 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.
corr.^{1} P^3 = corrections in P^3 in ink of the same colour as the MS.

P^4 = 2025 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

P^5 = 1858 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

P^6 = 1857 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

Q = Marcianus Venetus 200.

M^b = Marcianus Venetus 213.

Q^b = Laurentianus 81, 5.

R^b = Laurentianus 81, 6.

S^b = Laurentianus 81, 21.

T^b = Urbinas 46.

U^b = Marcianus Venetus Append. 4, 3.

V^b = Vaticano-Palatinus 160.

L^s = Lipsiensis bibliothecae Paulinae 1335.

C^4 = Florentinus Castiglionensis iv (Acquisti nuovi) in the Laurentian Library at Florence.

O^1 = 112, Corpus Christi College, Oxford (see vol. ii. pp. xli, 58 sqq.).
corr.^{1} O^1 (see vol. ii. p. 59).

Harl. = Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 6874 (see vol. iii. Appendix A).

C^c = a MS. known to Camerarius, but now lost.

Ald. = the Aldine edition (see vol. ii. p. xlv).

Vet. Int. = the Latin Translation of the Politics by the Vetus Interpres, William of Moerbeke.

Ar. = Leonardus Aretinus' Latin Translation of the Politics.

Π = the consent of the Aldine edition and all extant complete MSS., so far as they were examined for Susemihl's editions (see vol. ii. p. xlix).

Π^1 = the consent of $\Gamma M^s P^1$.

Π^2 = the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the second family ($P^{2.3.4.6} Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b L^s C^y$), so far as they were examined for Susemihl's editions.

Π^3 = the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the less good variety of the second family ($P^{4-6} Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b L^s$), subject to the same limitation.

a = 19, *sciences et arts*, *latin*, of the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal at Paris, a MS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation of the Politics collated for Sus. (vol. ii. p. xli sq.; see also Sus.[1], p. xxxiv sq.).

b c g h k l m = other MSS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation consulted by Sus. (see as to them Sus.[1], p. xxxv sqq.).

o = 112, Balliol College, Oxford, a MS. of the same Latin Translation (see vol. ii. p. 61 sq.).

y = Bodl. Canon. Class. Lat. 174 (see vol. ii. p. 62).

z = 891, Phillipps Library, Cheltenham (see vol. ii. pp. xli sq. 60 sq.).

n (see Sus.[1], p. xxxviii).

s (see Sus.[1], p. xli).

Alb. = the commentary of Albertus Magnus (see Sus.[1], p. xli).

Bas.[3] = the third Basle edition of Aristotle published in 1550 (vol. ii. p. xlvi).

Bekk.[1] = the Berlin Academy edition of Aristotle in quarto form edited by Bekker and published in 1831.

Bekk.[2] = the edition of the Politics in octavo edited by Bekker, the second edition of which appeared in 1855.

Sus.[1] = the edition of the Politics published by Susemihl in 1872.

Sus.[2] = the edition of the Politics in two volumes published by Susemihl in 1879.

Sus.[3] = the edition of the Politics belonging to the Bibliotheca Teubneriana published by Susemihl in 1882.

Sus.[3a] = the revision of the last-named edition published by Susemihl in 1894.

Sus.[4] = the edition of the Politics in English by Susemihl and R. D. Hicks, of which the first volume was published in 1894.

pr. prefixed to the name of a MS. refers to its original state, and distinguishes an original reading from a correction.

corr. prefixed to the name of a MS. denotes a correction.

rec. prefixed to the name of a MS. denotes a recent hand.

marg. = in the margin.

marg. rec. = a recent hand in the margin.

Half brackets (⌈⌋) have been used by me in printing the Greek text in passages needing, in my opinion, to be placed elsewhere (see vol. iv. pp. 38, 59).